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Should
Washington Withhold Aid to Egypt?
Responding
to Cairo's New Leadership
by Yehuda Blanga
Middle East Quarterly
Fall 2014 (view PDF)
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Despite having signed a peace treaty with Israel, Egypt's
armed forces continue to receive thousands of tanks and hundreds of
planes from Washington. "There's no conceivable scenario in which
they'd need all those tanks short of an alien invasion," declares
Shana Marshall of George Washington University.
|
Two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the attendant
weakening of the radical Arab camp, and three-and-a-half decades after
the conclusion of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty and the removal of
the foremost threat to Egyptian security, Cairo's continued acquisition
of thousands of tanks and hundreds of fighting aircraft seems to make no
sense. Yet Washington's withholding of $1.3 billion in annual military
aid following the Egyptian army's July 2013 ouster of President Mohamed
Morsi sparked an angry retort, with the military regime threatening to
turn to its former Russian patron.
Why does Cairo continue to adhere to this anachronistic military and
strategic raison d'être? Has the U.S. administration overplayed its hand
by assuming that the threat of military aid suspension could be leveraged
to obtain political influence? And what are the implications of this
episode for Egypt and the Middle East as a whole?
View from the
Nile
Despite its 1979 peace agreement with Israel, Egypt has yet to
internalize the idea that it is at peace with its neighbor to the east.
What prevails between the two countries is a "cold
peace" as the Mubarak regime made no attempt during its 30-year
reign to further the normalization of bilateral relations or to modify
public opinion and perceptions of Israeli citizens in particular and of
Jews in general.[1]
Thus, "establishment Egypt" and, all the more so, the public at
large still view Israel as a potential adversary with whom strategic
parity is imperative. Former defense minister Muhammad Tantawi alluded to
this in his remarks to the People's Assembly in February 1996:
Peace does not mean relaxation. The endless development of military
systems and the arms race prove that the survival is for the strongest. …
Military strength has grown to be a prerequisite of peace.[2]
Egyptian
officers, including President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, attend courses at
U.S. institutions such as the Army War College in Carlisle,
Pennsylvania.
|
Accordingly, the Egyptian armed forces have conducted large-scale
exercises that simulate a frontal attack on the country—usually from the
east. In the three largest such exercises—held in September 1996, April
1998, and February 2009—Egyptian troops simulated parrying an Israeli
invasion by transitioning from defensive to offensive operations,
crossing the Suez Canal, and regaining full control of the Sinai
Peninsula.
As a result, the Egyptian defense establishment has pursued a policy
of strategic parity with Israel, manifested in a prolonged and
comprehensive modernization program that began in the early 1980s and
continued for more than twenty years. By the end of the process, the
Egyptian armed forces had been transformed into a modern Western military
organization and had cast off the Soviet influence that dated back to the
mid-1950s.[3] As of
2014, Egypt has the tenth-largest military in the world with
approximately 460,000 soldiers in the standing army.[4]
A prominent symbol of Egypt's abandonment of the Soviets is the fact
that Egyptian officers (including President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi) attend
courses at U.S. institutions such as the Army War College in Carlisle,
Pennsylvania, the Army Command and General Staff College at Fort
Leavenworth, Kansas, and the National Defense University in Washington,
D.C. In contrast to the past, when the course of study for Egyptian
officers included Marxism and the nature of the work of the communist
party, they now study democracy and the primacy of civilian authorities
over the military. According to Robert Scales, a retired Army major
general who served as commandant of the Army War College, "This new
generation of Egyptian officers has been exposed to the American military
and is impressed not just in the way we fight our wars but also about the
relationship between the military and society."[5] However, the July 2013 coup
raises serious doubts about how deeply these democratic ideals have been
assimilated.
In addition, Egyptian armed forces collaborate in joint exercises with
various Western and Middle Eastern militaries: In 2009, the Egyptian
military carried out maneuvers with the French, Italian, British, Dutch,
and German armed forces while joint Egyptian-Turkish and U.S.-Egyptian
exercises were held in 2012.[6]
The pinnacle of this military collaboration is Operation Bright Star, a
joint U.S.-Egyptian exercise that has been held roughly every two years since
1980. However, the exercise planned for 2011 was cancelled due to the
events surrounding the ouster of President Husni Mubarak that year, and
then in 2013, President Obama canceled the exercise because of the
Egyptian military's toppling of Morsi. Both cancellations have had
important repercussions on U.S.-Egyptian relations.
View from the
Potomac
Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (left) standing next to the man he
overthrew, Muslim Brotherhood leader and Egyptian president Mohamed
Morsi. The popularly supported coup poses a contorted foreign policy
conundrum for Washington, which has been trying to figure out whether
or not to continue military support to Cairo, and if so, what kind.
|
Since 1979, Egypt—along with Saudi Arabia—has been one of two
cornerstones of U.S. policy in the Arab world. It has served as a
mediator in Israeli-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian peace talks; it has
worked to moderate and counter trends toward radicalization in the Arab
world; and it provides military support for U.S. forces stationed in the
region. Egypt's geostrategic importance lies in the fact that it is a
bridge between East and West, located as it is at the intersection of the
Middle East, North Africa, and Asia, and most importantly through its
control of the Suez Canal. In order to move quickly between the
Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, the U.S. fleet transits the Suez
Canal with permission from the Egyptian authorities. Any delay or
restrictions would require the United States government to station naval
forces near the Cape of Good Hope in South Africa and round it in order
to reach the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean. As a result, Washington
would appear to have a vital interest in maintaining good ties with
Cairo, despite the regime changes there since 2011.
The other main component of the continued military assistance to Egypt
has to do with benefits to the U.S. military industry. Every year since
1986, Congress has approved US$1.3 billion in military assistance to
Egypt, the second-largest aid package after that given to Israel.[7] But the Egyptian military does
not receive this sum in cash: As in the Israeli case, a sizable portion
of that largesse is paid out to American military contractors who
assemble tanks and warplanes and send them on to Egypt.[8]
Since 1986, Washington has transferred 221 F-16 fighter jets with a
total value of $8 billion to Egypt as part of its military aid package
despite the fact that U.S. military advisors have been saying for years
that Cairo had more than enough planes and tanks and does not need any
more.[9]
Likewise, over a thousand Abrams tanks have been transferred to Egypt
since 1992 at a total cost of $3.9 billion though close to 200 of them
are in mothballs and have never been used.[10] Such an arrangement can have
economic benefits within Egypt as well: The Abu Zaabal tank repair
factory (aka Factory 200) in Helwan is the site of a joint production of
Abrams tanks that employs thousands of local workers.[11]
As a result, American defense contractors make millions of dollars
annually and employ tens of thousands of workers as a direct result of
U.S. military aid to Egypt and other countries in the Middle East.[12] In the words of Bruce Barron,
president of Barron Industries of Oxford, Michigan, a manufacturer of
Abrams M1A1 parts that the United States sends to Egypt: "The aid
that we give to Egypt is coming back to the U.S. and keeping 30 of my
people working."[13]
In turn, the owners of small businesses like Barron Industries work in
concert with large corporations such as General Dynamics to operate a
lobby of local politicians, business-people, and unions who alert members
of Congress to the domestic ramifications that cuts in military
production or freezing projects might entail.[14]
U.S. Aid:
Protest and Reconciliation
American defense contractors make millions annually and
employ tens of thousands of workers as a direct result of military aid
to Egypt and other countries in the Middle East. These Abrams tanks are
assembled at a General Dynamics plant in Lima, Ohio.
|
This then is the backdrop to the controversy surrounding the
suspension of U.S. military aid to Egypt that first arose during the
events of January and February 2011 when security forces acting on behalf
of the Mubarak regime used brutal force against demonstrators. The idea
of suspension was dropped after the fall of Mubarak and in light of the
subsequent coordination and collaboration between the Egyptian high
command and its U.S. counterpart. Washington also felt that since Egypt
was headed toward free and democratic elections, continued aid would
promote this goal and enhance the country's stability.[15]
The question of the continuation of military assistance came up a
second time after the ouster of President Morsi in July 2013 in what was,
for all intents and purposes, a military coup, albeit one with massive
popular backing. American aversion to such nondemocratic changes of
government was reflected in a law that, with a few exceptions, prohibited
economic aid "to the government of any country whose duly elected
head of government is deposed by military coup or decree."[16] Though the Obama
administration initially refrained from describing Morsi's removal in
these terms,[17]
the military's meddling in Egyptian politics was not the only thing that
irked Washington; there was also the fact that the armed forces embarked
on a violent campaign to suppress the Muslim Brotherhood. In late July,
the scheduled delivery of four F-16s to Egypt was frozen. Then on August
15, Obama cancelled the joint U.S.-Egyptian exercises scheduled for
September and, along with senior administration officials, condemned the
violent dispersal of Muslim Brotherhood supporters from outdoor rallies the
previous day.[18]
Sisi:
"You [the United States] turned your back on the Egyptians, and
they won't forget that."
|
Reaction by senior members of the Egyptian military and the interim
regime to the administration's responses was not long in coming. Against
the backdrop of criticism, Egypt's new headman Sisi granted an interview
to The Washington Post in which he attacked the Obama
administration: "You [the United States] left the Egyptians. You
turned your back on the Egyptians, and they won't forget that." He
added that freezing delivery of the fighter planes was "not the way
to deal with a patriotic military" and complained about the lack of
U.S. support for "a free people who rebelled against an unjust political
rule."[19]
His criticism was echoed shortly afterward by Prime Minister Hazem
Beblawi, who added that Egypt had received military aid from Russia for
many years in the past, and he, therefore, saw no reason to worry.[20]
In contrast with these strong, albeit restrained, statements by
official Cairo, anger was expressed in a much more forceful and
unambiguous fashion on the popular level. In July, shortly after the
coup, Husam Hindi, a leader within the Tamarod (Rebellion) movement that
led the campaign to oust Morsi, called for the masses to take to the
streets "and defend the revolution" against the Muslim
Brotherhood, which, he charged, was collaborating with the United States
to undermine the legitimacy of the revolution. The Brotherhood, he
claimed, had a long history of close ties with the Obama administration
as seen by the major role it played "in exerting pressure on Hamas
to reach a ceasefire during the latest Israeli aggression [Operation
Pillar of Defense]." [21]
When Washington threatened to cut off U.S. aid to Egypt, Tamarod
launched a "Ban the Aid" protest campaign,[22] followed shortly afterward by
the "Reviving Sovereignty" campaign. Protesting what its
leaders called the U.S. attempt to meddle in Egypt's internal affairs, it
posted a petition on its official website calling for the suspension of
U.S. aid and disavowal of the peace treaty with Israel:
Mahmud Badr (above), a Tamarod co-founder, minced no words
when he attacked Obama for condemning the June 30 revolution, declaring
in no uncertain terms that Egypt no longer needed U.S. aid: "I
tell you, President Obama, why don't you and your small, meaningless
aid go to hell?"
|
After the unacceptable American intervention in Egyptian affairs, and
how the U.S. supports terrorist groups in Egypt, I demand, as an Egyptian
citizen who signed this petition, to hold a referendum on two matters.
The first to refuse U.S. aid ... in all its forms. The second, to cancel
the peace agreement between Egypt and the Israeli entity and rewording
security agreements in order to ensure the rights of the Egyptian state
in securing its borders.[23]
Mahmud Badr, a Tamarod co-founder, minced no words in attacking Obama
for condemning the June 30 revolution. He urged Washington not to meddle
in Egypt's internal affairs, especially not in the struggle by the
military and by demonstrators against "the Brotherhood's
terrorism," declaring in no uncertain terms that Egypt no longer
needed U.S. aid: "I tell you, President Obama, why don't you and
your small, meaningless aid go to hell?"[24] For Badr and the members of
his protest movement, violent struggle and bloodshed were the necessary
price for saving the nation from the Muslim Brotherhood.[25]
Roughly two months later, on October 9, Washington ratcheted up
pressure on Egypt's interim government announcing a decision "to
maintain our relationship with the Egyptian government while
recalibrating our assistance to Egypt to best advance our
interests." The communiqué stressed that Cairo would continue to
receive aid for health care, education, and the private sector and that
the United States would continue to help Egypt safeguard its borders,
fight terrorism, and maintain security in the Sinai Peninsula along with
providing training to the Egyptian military and spare parts for U.S.
military equipment in Egypt. But, the State Department added, the
administration had decided to freeze the transfer of major weapons
systems and funds to the military regime until the formation of a
democratic, civilian government elected in free and fair elections.[26]
The Obama
administration seriously miscalculated how its statements and actions
would be perceived by both the Egyptian public and its leadership.
|
In reaction, the spokesman for Egypt's Foreign Ministry, Badr Abd
Atti, released an official communiqué stating that the move raised many
serious questions about the administration's willingness to provide
permanent strategic support for Egypt's security. While Cairo was
interested in maintaining its warm relations with Washington, it would
preserve its full independence when making decisions about its internal
affairs and would not be influenced by external players.[27]
The following week, Foreign Minister Nabil Fahmy made similar
re-marks, decrying the fact that tension between Washington and Cairo had
reached a critical level. Nevertheless, the freezing of aid was something
that the Egyptian people would be capable of handling: "The Egyptian
people will not hesitate to bear the consequences of such a situation in
order to preserve their freedom of choice after two revolutions."[28] Cairo should open its doors to
other powers that had influence in the international arena. Such a move
would give it multiple and diverse channels of action and pave the way
for close ties with Russia and China. Fahmy added that there was a
positive side to the U.S. decision: "It will equally serve Egypt and
the U.S. because both will reconsider and better estimate their
relationship in the future."[29]
The Obama administration seriously miscalculated how its statements
and actions would be perceived by both the Egyptian public and its
leadership. Not only did it fail to appreciate the depth of public
revulsion with the Brotherhood's highhanded attempts to turn Egypt into
an Islamist theocracy, but perhaps more importantly, it did not grasp how
its response was seen as an insult and an attack on national pride.
Egyptians perceived the United States government as acting as if it had
bought their country with its aid then tried to use it to meddle in local
politics.
Official Cairo handled the matter with restraint and responsibility.
The statements released by the leadership reflected a desire to maintain
strategic ties with the United States but also managed to defend national
honor. At the same time, Sisi and his colleagues paved the way for the
entry of additional players—Russia and China —who would be able to
provide weapons and equipment to the Egyptian military.
Ramifications
of U.S. Aid Suspension
Washington
has sent a message both to its Middle Eastern enemies and allies that
its word and "friendship" were highly iffy.
|
There appear to be three main consequences to the
reduction in U.S. military assistance to Egypt though not all are
restricted to Egypt proper. Thanks to its role in Mubarak's ouster,
Washington has sent a message to both its Middle Eastern enemies and
allies that its word and "friendship" were highly iffy. If a
faithful ally like Mubarak—who had maintained close ties to the United
States and served its interests well for thirty years—could find himself
thrown under the bus when in trouble, no one was safe.
Doubts about U.S. reliability were reinforced by the administration's
criticism of the Muslim Brotherhood's subsequent overthrow. The ouster of
the Brotherhood—a religious and political force clearly identified as
opposing Western values—should have actually served U.S. interests, but
instead Washington condemned it as well as the Egyptian military,
considered by most to be more secular and moderate, and thus more aligned
with Washington and its values. Not only did statements about the need to
freeze military aid contribute to the destabilization of the Egyptian
street, they were also viewed as providing encouragement to Islamist groups
and displaying a distinct lack of support for the will of the millions of
demonstrators from the anti-Morsi camp. Washington's reluctance to aid
post-Morsi Cairo was seen as proof of U.S. disloyalty to its allies and,
among some, as evidence of the need to make war against it and the
treachery it represents.[30]
The second consequence is tied to Israeli- Egyptian relations, in
as-much as every discussion in which the issue of U.S. aid comes up
includes the status of Egypt's peace treaty with Israel. While the United
States is not a legal party to the Israel-Egypt peace accord, and the
accord itself does not include any clauses that obligate Washington to
provide either Egypt or Israel with economic or military aid, the U.S.
did append two attached memoranda setting forth its obligations to both
sides. As a mediator between the sides and as the party that sought to
ensure a regional balance of power, stability, and Israeli-Egyptian
cooperation, Washington has, with congressional approval, traditionally
given aid to both Egypt and Israel. [31] As a result, an Egyptian claim
that peace with Israel is linked to U.S. military and economic aid is not
entirely unjustified. Indeed, there is a fear in Israel that a cutback or
freeze of U.S. military aid to Egypt will have a negative impact on
security cooperation between Jerusalem and Cairo or, even worse, on the
peace agreement itself. Israel believes that the U.S. aid money is
Egypt's sole reason for adhering to the peace treaty and that, without
it, the Egyptian regime will feel no obligation to maintain it.[32]
Following Mohamed Morsi's overthrow, relations between
Moscow and Cairo have grown closer. On November 13, 2013, for the first
time since Egypt changed its orientation from East to West in the
mid-1970s, a Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov (second from
left), and a defense minister, Sergei Shoygu (right), visited Egypt.
Then-Egyptian minister of defense Abdel Fatah al-Sisi (second from right)
and foreign minister Nabil Fahmy (left) met with their Russian
counterparts.
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The third and final outcome of either the threat or an actual
reduction in U.S. aid is the growing role of other states, above all
Russia, in the affairs of the Middle East. The United States under Obama
is perceived as a weakened power on a slow retrenchment from the region.[33] As nature—and seemingly
geopolitics—abhors a vacuum, U.S. diffidence is encouraging rival powers
to play a greater role in Egypt and one that bodes no good for the long
term. American history can be instructive here.
During the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration tried to exploit U.S.
military, technical, and economic assistance to persuade Gamal Abdel
Nasser's Egypt to join an alliance to defend the region from communism.
When courting Cairo failed, Washington refused to provide the Egyptians
with requested weapons and later withdrew its offer to fund the
construction of the Aswan high dam.[34] The strategy was a failure as
Moscow quickly provided arms to Cairo through Czechoslovakia. Nasser was
initially unwilling to chain himself to any major power, instead
maneuvering adroitly between Washington and Moscow. In a long and patient
process that developed over subsequent years, Soviet ties turned into
dependence—one that increased markedly in the aftermath of the 1967 war.
Two factors were largely responsible for this. For one thing, the Soviets
never set conditions for assistance to an Arab country. For another,
"the absence of any statement that the Middle East was vital to
American interests"[35]
was seen as a green light by Russia to become fully involved.
Although the Cold War ended in the late 1980s, a resurgent Russia
under Vladimir Putin still views the Middle East as critical to its
political and military interests and would love nothing better than to
curtail U.S. hegemony in the region. Since the outbreak of the recent
Middle Eastern upheavals, Moscow has sought to increase its influence in
the region by protecting the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria and
inserting itself repeatedly in the confrontation between the West and
Iran over the latter's nuclear capabilities.[36]
Under a
contract to be funded by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates,
Russia will supply the Egyptian military with a variety of weapons.
|
Following Morsi's overthrow, relations between Moscow and Cairo have
grown closer. In September 2013, the Egyptian foreign minister visited
Moscow; in October, the head of Russian military intelligence visited
Cairo. A month later, an Egyptian delegation visited Moscow to express
gratitude for Russian support for the "June 30 Revolution"
overthrowing the Muslim Brotherhood. On November 13, 2013, for the first
time since Egypt changed its orientation from East to West in the
mid-1970s, a Russian foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, and a defense
minister, Sergei Shoygu, visited Egypt together. Two months later, in
mid-February 2014, Defense Minister Sisi and Foreign Minister Fahmy
visited Moscow where a meeting between Russian president Putin and Sisi
was the centerpiece of the visit.[37]
The conversations between the Egyptian military and political
leadership and their Russian counterparts focused on strengthening
relations between the two countries and collaboration in a variety of
fields including nuclear power. But the capstone of these contacts was
Russian-Egyptian cooperation on military matters and the drafting of a
comprehensive weapons deal that, according to various reports, is worth
between two and three billion dollars. Under this contract, to be funded
by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, Russia will supply the
Egyptian military with MiG-29 planes, MI-35 attack helicopters, air
defense missile complexes, anti-ship complexes, light arms, and
ammunition. [38]
In return for these arms, Egypt has agreed to provide the Russian navy
with port services in Alexandria and to strengthen the two navies'
cooperation in the Mediterranean Sea. Syria already allows Russian navy
ships to use its port of Tartus, but in the event of the fall of the
Assad regime and a loss of use of those facilities, Moscow is looking for
a "Plan B."[39]
Enhancing its ties with Cairo is a significant step for Russia in its
quest to maintain an important strategic goal—a continued presence in the
Mediterranean, a goal that becomes even more pertinent with the recent
annexation of Crimea on the Black Sea. [40]
Conclusion
Economic stagnation, growing terrorism, and spreading violent,
domestic opposition to the interim government tops the list of internal
and external challenges facing Egypt. In contrast to the pre-1979 peace
agreement, when Israel was considered the foremost threat, Cairo needs to
address the menace posed by organizations associated with global
jihad—especially those that operate in the Sinai Peninsula—by means of a
new strategic view that encompasses the appropriate means to combat it.
The age of classic war in the region, involving large scale air-supported
tank maneuvers, is apparently over and there is no longer any need to
keep accumulating massive quantities of heavy weapons. The threats posed
by Islamist terrorist organizations operating in the Sinai require a new
strategy focused on low-intensity counterinsurgency measures.
At the same time, Washington would be advised to look beyond the
specifics of military aid to its long term interests. Military aid has
significance beyond maintaining the power of the Egyptian military: It
demonstrates the depth of U.S. support for an ally and, practically
speaking, constitutes a declaration of loyalty to the close bond between
the two countries. Any cutback or curtailment of aid to Egypt will be
understood by any moderate and secular wings of the Egyptian regime—and
by the Islamist opposition—as a U.S. vote of non-confidence in its
allies, specifically in Egypt but also throughout the Middle East. Such
measures by Washington are creating an opening for outside players—who
are neither necessarily moderate nor pro-Western—to penetrate Egypt and
the rest of the region, thereby damaging U.S. interests.
In the short term and in the wake of a reduction in assistance, Egypt
will not break decisively with the U.S. government as doing so would
achieve precisely the opposite of the goals sought by Sisi and the
members of the National Salvation Front. Egypt would be further
destabilized, losing its main supplier of military equipment, ammunition,
and spare parts, and slide even further down the economic slope it has
been on since February 2011. On the other hand, opening the Egyptian
gates to the Russians, Saudis, and others would win these countries power
and influence that over the long run could distance Egypt from its U.S.
patron. For this reason, if Washington wants to continue to influence
Cairo's political considerations, it should open its military depots to
it, rather than slam the doors shut in its face.
Yehuda Blanga is a lecturer in the department of Middle Eastern
studies at Bar Ilan University and a visiting scholar at The Moshe Dayan
Center, Tel Aviv University.
[1] See, for
example, Fares
bila Jawwad, YouTube, accessed June 6, 2014.
[2] "Egyptian
Defense Minister Addresses People's Assembly Committee," Foreign
Broadcast Information Service, Near East and South Asia (FIBS-NES), Cairo
MENA, Feb. 6, 1996.
[3] Sinn Fine,
"Haiyum Hamitsri Vesikuei Hamilhama Bamizrah Hatichon," Nativ
77, Nov. 2000, pp. 26, 31.
[4] Mark
Thompson, "Strong and Silent," Time Magazine, Feb. 14,
2011; "Military Balance Files: Egypt," The
Institute for National Security Studies, Tel Aviv, accessed June 6, 2014.
[5] Thompson,
"Strong and Silent"; Foreign Policy, July
2, 2013.
[6]
"Military Balance Files: Egypt."
[7] Jeremy M.
Sharp, "Egypt: Background and U. S. Relations," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C., June 27, 2013; Fine, "Haiyum
Hamitsri," p. 32.
[8] Jeremy M.
Sharp, "Egypt: Background and U. S. Relations," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C., Jan. 10, 2014, p. 23; National Public
Radio, Aug.
3, 2013.
[9] Bloomberg
News Service (New York), Aug.
20, 2013; Planet Money, National Public Radio, Aug. 3, 2013.
[10] Sharp,
"Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations," June 27, 2013, p. 32;
"Military Balance Files: Egypt."
[11] Sharp,
"Egypt: Background and U.S. Relations," June 27, 2013, p. 32.
[12] Reuters,
May 24, 2012; David Schenker, "Inside
the Complex World of U.S. Military Assistance to Egypt," The
Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Washington, D.C., Sept. 4,
2013.
[13] National
Public Radio, Aug.
3, 2013.
[14] Ibid;
Reuters, May 24, 2012.
[15] Robert
Gibbs, press secretary, White House, Washington, D.C., Jan.
28, 2011; The Guardian (London), Jan.
29, 2011.
[16]
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, pub. law 111-117, U.S. Senate and
House of Representatives, 111th Congress, Washington, D.C., Dec. 16,
2009.
[17] NBC
News, Aug. 2, 2013.
[18] Reuters,
Aug. 15, 2013.
[19] Lally
Weymouth, "Rare Interview with Egyptian Gen. Abdel Fatah
al-Sissi," The Washington Post, Aug. 3, 2013.
[20] ABC
News, Aug. 20, 2013; al-Watan (Cairo), Oct. 12, 2013.
[21] Elaph
(London), July 6, 2013.
[22] Ma'an
News Agency (Bethlehem), Aug. 17,
2013.
[23] Al-Ahram
(Cairo), Aug. 18, 2013; al-Balad (Beirut), Aug. 17, 2013.
[24] Reuters,
Aug.
17, 2013.
[25] Ibid.
[26] Press
statement, U.S. Department of State, Washington, D.C., Oct. 9, 2013.
[27] Al-Wafd
(Cairo), Oct. 10, 2013.
[28] Al-Ahram,
Oct.
16, 2013.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Al-Youm
al-Sabe'a (Cairo), Aug. 18,
2013; al-Masri al-Youm (Cairo), Aug. 18, 2013.
[31] Sharp, "Egypt:
Background and U.S. Relations," Jan. 10, 2014, p. 18-9; Special
International Security Assistance Act of 1979, pub. law 96-35, The
Library of Congress, S. 1007, July 29, 1979.
[32]
Schenker, "Inside
the Complex World of U.S. Military Assistance to Egypt"; Globes
(Rishon Le-Zion), July 4,
2013; Haaretz, July 9, 2013; Galei Zahal radio (Haifa), Oct. 10, 2013.
[33] Daniel
W. Drezner, "Does
Obama Have a Grand Strategy?" Foreign Affairs, July-Aug.
2011.
[34]
"Soviet Penetration of the Middle East," May 12, 1970, Israel
State Archives (hereafter ISA), Foreign Ministry (hereafter FM), 4605/2;
William J. Burns, Economic Aid and American Policy toward Egypt,
1955-1981 (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 16;
Ofer Mazar, Betsilo Shel HaSphinx (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Defense,
2002), pp. 15–28.
[35]
"Soviet Penetration of the Middle East," May 6, 1970, ISA, FM
4605/2.
[36]
Alexander Orlov, ed., "Blizhniy Vostok: Vozmozhnye Varianty
Transformatsionnykh Protsessov," Institute of International Studies,
University MFA Russia, Apr. 2012; Zvi Magen, "Ruhot Shel Shinuy
MeRussia," Mabat-Al, 470, Oct. 2013; Nael Shama, "Cairo
and Moscow: Limits of Alliance," Middle East Institute,
Washington, D.C., Dec. 16, 2013.
[37] Egypt
State Information Service, Cairo, Nov. 13, 2013.
[38] Ibid.; al-Ahram,
Nov. 19, 2013; Daily
News Egypt (Cairo), Nov. 20, 2013; RIA Novosti (Moscow), Feb.
14, 2014.
[39] Al-Ahram,
Nov. 19, 2013.
[40] Ibid.
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