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Who's
to Blame in Iraq? Part I: The Shi'a Side
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Originally published under the title, "The Impasse in
Iraq (Part 1: The Shi'a Side)."
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The
conventional wisdom that former Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
(right) was less conciliatory than his successor, Haidar Abadi (left),
is flawed.
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It has become a truism that resolution of the current crisis in Iraq,
which has seen major cities — most notably Mosul — fall out of government
control at the hands of the Islamic State (IS), will require some form of
'reconciliation' between the Shia majority that has led Iraq's
governments since the U.S. invasion in 2003 and the Sunni Arabs, who
likely constitute no more than 20-25% of Iraq's population but were seen
as dominant since the formation of the modern Iraqi state.
'Reconciliation' in the predominant understanding is expected to entail
some kind of central government outreach to Sunnis.
However, is that really forthcoming? If not, why not? The new Iraqi
premier Haider Abadi — hailing from the Islamic Da'wah Party of his
predecessor Nouri al-Maliki — is generally seen as a more conciliatory
figure than Maliki, who is in contrast widely condemned for perceived
sectarian policies that led to the deterioration in the security situation.
However, reconciliation must entail more than mere allocation of
government positions to Sunni political figures who have become ever more
detached from their constituencies. It must also include reforms on the
ground that will make Sunni locals more amenable to working with the
security reforms and integrate them into the post-Saddam order.
Maliki allowed for meaningful
reforms to de-Ba'athification to be put to parliament, but the
legislation quickly died, most notably facing opposition from the
Sadrists.
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One place to start would be amendments to de-Ba'athification
legislation that was initiated after the overthrow of Saddam's regime and
came to be seen as 'de-Sunnification'. And in that regard, nothing seems
forthcoming.
The response to the Sunni protests of 2013 is instructive here. While
it is widely claimed that Maliki did not attempt to make any concessions
to protestor demands, such conventional wisdom is untrue. Through working
with then deputy Sunni premier Saleh al-Mutlaq, Maliki allowed for
meaningful reforms to de-Ba'athification to be put to parliament, but the
legislation quickly died, most notably facing opposition from the
Sadrists.
It is indeed telling that when it came to this rather important issue
on reconciliation, Maliki comes across as the moderate, illustrating the
wider Shia political spectrum's reluctance to consider such reforms,
fearful at least of a supposed return to the prior Sunni-dominated order.
More recent attempts at Sunni empowerment in the form of provincial
autonomy have similarly been put down across the spectrum, partly due to
belief that greater autonomy would only create problems akin to the
constant disputes between the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) and
Baghdad.
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Iranian-backed
Shia militias are eclipsing the Iraqi government.
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Today, the notion of de-Ba'athification amendments is not even put to
discussion. Indeed, the rise of IS, with the collapse of conventional
army divisions caused by the group's conquests in the north of the
country, has only compounded the impasse, because it has helped midwife
the birth of dozens of Shia
militias while strengthening in particular the hand of
long-established Iranian proxies (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq, Kata'ib Hezbollah,
Badr), the last of which was awarded the Interior Ministry and has
spearheaded military operations south of Baghdad and in the mixed
province of Diyala. For the militias, the struggle is perceived — not
wholly without justification — as existential in light of IS's genocidal
anti-Shia sentiments.
Yet that only further damages chances at reconciliation, as the
general tendency among Shia militias is to treat all Sunnis in a combat
zone as IS, which has resulted in ethnic
cleansing in areas like Jurf al-Sakhr (south of Baghdad) and the
wider Baghdad belt area.Considering that the militias are unlikely to
simply disband and will seek to exert influence, Abadi's efforts will
likely only be undercut further. This is well illustrated in the recent
hostility shown by Kata'ib
Hezbollah to Abadi's floundering 'National Guard' legislation that
aims to create local Sunni forces to fight IS, saying it will treat the
formations as an 'American-affiliated Sahwa.'
As Iranian
proxies in particular frame the recent upheaval as an American
conspiracy against Iraq, such enmity is sure to create conflict and
hinder a coordinated effort to roll back IS. But is the impasse wholly or
primarily to be blamed on the Shia side? Stay tuned for part two, which
will explore the issues regarding Sunnis and Iraq's impasse.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a
Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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