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The Middle
East Turmoil and Israel's Security
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The Middle East is in great turmoil. The statist order that underpinned
the region for a century has collapsed. Several states have lost their
monopoly over the use of force and are no longer able to provide law and
order. This is especially true of Iraq, Lebanon, Libya, and Syria. Even
Egypt, the only historic Arab state, has had difficulties effectively enforcing
its sovereignty over its territory.
Many of the militias challenging these state entities have a radical
Islamist ideology, reflecting the rise in appeal of political Islam in the
Arab world. In contrast to the leaders of these states, who are inefficient
and corrupt, the Islamists actually deliver services to the people and have
a reputation for being brutal but honest. However, the likes of Al Qaida in
Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or the so called Islamic State (IS) are hardly the
proper agents for modernizing their environments and their popularity dooms
the Arab world to continuous ignorance and poverty.
For this and other reasons, Israel will need to remain vigilant in the
years ahead.
Outside Looking
In
The statist order that underpinned
the region for a century has collapsed.
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The decline of the Arab world has been paralleled by the rise of
non-Arab Muslim powers – Turkey and Iran. Both countries fare better on
development indices and display nowadays an ambitious foreign policy fueled
by imperial and Islamist impulses. Under Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his 'zero
problems' approach to foreign policy, Turkey has gradually distanced itself
from the West. In 2003, for example, Ankara rejected the United States' request
to open a "northern front" against Iraqi forces. More recently,
Turkey has opposed sanctions levied by the United Nations and the West
against Russia and Iran.
For its part, Iran has successfully advanced its nuclear program despite
the displeasure of the international community. Comparatively, recent
developments in the Middle East and beyond have also allowed Tehran to
establish a 'Shiite Crescent' stretching from Tehran to the eastern
Mediterranean. This has provided Iran with countless opportunities to
project power into the Middle East and Balkans, much to the chagrin of
Saudi Arabia and others. Indeed, the successes of Iranian Shiite proxies in
Baghdad, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa underscore the Tehran quest for
hegemony in the Middle East.
Arab decline has been paralleled by
the rise of non-Arab Muslim powers – Turkey and Iran.
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By contrast, US influence around the Middle East appears to be in
decline, primarily as a result of the Obama administration's foreign policy
outlook. Correcting Washington's overextension in the Islamic world is
indeed necessary, but insensitivity to the concerns of its allies such as
Egypt, Israel and Saudi Arabia is destructive to the regional balance of
power.
In this respect, Washington's efforts to strike a deal with Iran that
basically legitimizes its nuclear breakout status and awards Tehran the
role of the regional policeman will be viewed by Cairo, Riyadh and
Jerusalem as a colossal strategic mistake. The inevitable result will be
further nuclear proliferation as none of these countries are likely to want
to stay behind in uranium enrichment capabilities. Moreover, the regional
instability could lead to more bloodshed. Relying on a radical and
revisionist regime in Tehran to provide stability is the height of strategic
folly.
The View from
Jerusalem
The implications of the Middle East's ongoing turmoil for Israel's
security are mixed. Like Iran and Turkey, a democratic and politically
stable Israel is also a rising non-Arab power and a player in the regional
balance of power. The power differential between Israel's national might
and its neighbors has further increased, given that it has managed to
prosper economically and develop a high-tech powerful military.
Pro-Western Sunni Arab states see
Israel as an ally against a rising Iran.
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In addition, the strong armies of Iraq and Syria have disappeared,
decreasing the chances for a large-scale conventional encounter with
Israel. Moreover, the pro-Western Sunni states such as Egypt, Jordan and
Saudi Arabia see Israel as an ally against a rising Iran, as well as
against radical Islamist movements. This also comes at a time when the
United States is viewed in many quarters as a less dependable ally.
By contrast, low intensity challenges might intensify. The domestic problems
plaguing weakened Arab states make them increasingly susceptible to radical
Islam and more prone to terrorist violence. As their leaders lose their
grip over state territory and borders become more porous, armed groups and
terrorists gain greater freedom of action. Moreover, as weakened states
lose control over their security apparatus, national arsenals of
conventional (and non-conventional) arms become increasingly vulnerable,
which may result in the emergence of increasingly well-armed, politically
dissatisfied groups that seek to harm Israel. For example, following the
fall of Gaddafi, Libyan SA-7 anti-air missiles and anti-tank RPGs have
reached Hamas in Gaza. The IS even fights with American weapons captured
from the Iraqi army.
As Arab leaders lose their grip on
power, armed groups and terrorists gain greater freedom of action.
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Similarly, in the event of the Assad regime collapsing, Syria's advanced
arsenal of conventional weapons could easily end up in the hands of
Hizballah or other radical elements. This, in turn, raises the prospect of
an emboldened Hizballah and Hamas – both of whom are Iranian proxies
located along Israel's borders – renewing their campaigns of violence. In
recent years, the fallout from the Arab Spring has helped to detract
attention away from the Palestinian issue. In addition, the Palestinian
Authority's (PA) ability to harm Israel in order to reignite international
interest is also very limited. As a result, a weak PA has come under
increasing pressure from the popular Hamas. A Palestinian strategic
miscalculation, leading to the eruption of another round of violence, is a
possibility that Israel cannot ignore. Nevertheless, so far Israel has been
successful in containing the threats from sub-state groups and in limiting
their potential damage.
The emergence of an uncertain and unstable strategic environment is
conducive to strategic surprises. Israeli intelligence is challenged by a
plethora of new actors and leaders whose modus operandi is far from clear.
Israel has a large and sophisticated intelligence apparatus. Yet it is not
immune to surprises. Therefore, it would be wise to prepare for worst-case
scenarios, rather than succumb to rosy assessments.
Looking West
(in more ways than one)
The turmoil in the Arab world is also changing the strategic landscape
in the Eastern Mediterranean basin, where elements of radical Islam are
gaining control. Tunisia, Libya, Sinai in Egypt, Gaza, Lebanon, Syria and
Turkey all play host to groups with Islamist tendencies, thereby
threatening the currently unrestricted access to this area by Israel and
the West.
For Jerusalem, the key factor in the
developing regional balance of power is Iran's nuclearization.
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Approximately 90 percent of Israel's foreign trade is carried out via
the Mediterranean, making freedom of navigation in this area critical for
Israel's economic well-being. Moreover, its chances of becoming energy
independent and a significant exporter of gas is linked to Israel's ability
to secure free passage for its maritime trade and to defend its newly
discovered hydrocarbon fields, Leviathan and Tamar. These developments
require greater Israeli efforts in the naval arena. Indeed, Israel is
engaged in building a robust security system for the gas fields and has
procurement plans for additional vessels.
As with other parts of the Middle East, the assessment in Jerusalem is
that the key factor in the developing regional balance of power is Iran's
nuclearization. This would be a "game changer" that only Israel
has the capability to prevent. Netanyahu's recent electoral victory left in
power the only leader that might have the political courage to order a
military strike to obstruct the Iranian progress towards acquiring nuclear
weapons. Indeed, his victory was quietly welcomed in the capitals of the
moderate Arab states that are terrified of Iran and have little time for
Obama. Saudi Arabia and Egypt are good examples.
Accordingly, Israel is watching with growing bewilderment the endeavor
of the Obama administration to implement a "grand bargain" with
Iran. This puts Jerusalem on an inevitable collision course with its most
important ally. Israel continues to benefit from a large reservoir of
sympathy among the populace of the United States, and most notably within the
Republican controlled Congress.
Yet, while Obama is not popular, as president he can extract heavy costs
in the military, diplomatic and strategic arenas. The remaining 22 months
until he leaves office must be weathered with minimum damage to the American-Israeli
strategic partnership, particularly if Israel chooses to make good on its
threat not to allow Iran to become a nuclear power. With this in mind, the
American-Iranian nexus is the most dangerous challenge for Israel's
national security in the near future.
Efraim Inbar is director of the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a professor of political studies
at Bar-Ilan University, and a Shillman-Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East
Forum.
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