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We now have most of the nominees for the key Mideast
positions in the Obama White House and the State and Defense departments,
including Puneet Talwar and Dan Shapiro at the National Security Council;
George Mitchell and his deputy Fred Hof, Dennis Ross, Bill Burns and
Jeffrey Feltman at the State Department; Tony Blinken in Vice President
Joseph Biden's office; and Michele Flournoy and Sandy Vershbow at Defense.
It is possible to make the first assessment of where Barack Obama is going
from what we know about these people.
The Left is not happy with most of Obama's core Mideast
team, with the possible exception of Mitchell. None of the people
announced or reliably reported up to now is known to bring a pronounced
"Arabist" perspective, nor to be a consistent critic of Israel, nor to be
an apologist for Iran, Syria, Hizbullah or Hamas. There is no one with a
history of participation in ideological organizations of the Left, as
Sandy Berger had with Peace Now before joining the Clinton White House.
Semantha Power has been appointed to the NSC's multilateral institutions
office, and has a disturbing record of stridently anti-Israel statements,
but the position to which she has been appointed does not normally have a
great impact on Mideast policy. For those of us who feared that an
inexperienced president so enthusiastically embraced by the left wing of
the Democratic Party might fill the roster with its favorites, there is
scant evidence so far that our worst fears are being realized.
Instead, Obama is assembling a team of intelligent centrists
with a realistic, pragmatic approach. Many of them have experience in the
tough environment of the Middle East, where the use of force is sometimes
required. None is starry-eyed and romantic about the Arabs. Many have
extensive experience with Israel and some understanding of its strategic
position.
On the other hand, nowhere on the list so far is there a
true hawk either, an Elliot Abrams or a Doug Feith or a John Bolton or a
Paul Wolfowitz. Fred Hof is tough on Hizbullah ("Hassan Nasrallah... and
his inner circle do what they do first and foremost to defend and project
the existence and power of the Islamic Republic of Iran... If [they] come
to a violent end in the current crisis you will not find me among the
mourners"). Dan Shapiro was one of the authors of the 2003 Syria
Accountability Act. And Jeffrey Feltman was admirably outspoken as
ambassador to Lebanon.
Broadly, it is a team that represents the thinking in the
center of the Democratic Party. In a situation of real duress, like an
imminent Iranian breakthrough to nuclear weapons, it is not clear who
among them will ring the alarm and rally the others to consider measures
beyond the ordinary.
There could also be a tendency toward magical thinking about
the transformative potential of diplomacy. Among those who believe most
fervently that George W. Bush missed key diplomatic opportunities and
failed to work with allies, there may be a tendency toward undue
confidence that the problems in the Middle East will shrink steadily as
Obama's new envoys get to work. The Bush administration held more than 28
direct meetings with the Iranians and got poor results, but the Obama team
remembers it as a failure to engage.
WISHFUL THINKING could be a particular problem on the issue
of Iran, because the time remaining to stop its relentless drive for
nuclear weapons is so short. The new administration believes it can get
more cooperation on Iran from Russia and China, and induce changes in
Iranian policy by putting together a package of bigger carrots and bigger
sticks. What if Iran exploits America's eagerness for diplomacy, and uses
dilatory tactics to "run out the clock" during its final sprint? What if
Obama's diplomatic initiative fails, and Iran calls his bluff about
nuclear weapons being "unacceptable"?
The president said, "I will do everything in my power -
everything" to prevent Iran from getting nuclear weapons, but will he? If
he is faced, in the end, with a stark choice between a nuclear Iran or the
use of force, will the president have the strength of will necessary to
overcome domestic resistance to the tougher options, including objections
at the Joint Chiefs of Staff? Or will he veto, not just the use of
American forces, but also Israel's? If the United States capitulates to a
nuclear Iran, and tries to fall back on deterrent threats to contain it,
will these deterrent threats be credible, the issuer having just accepted
something he said repeatedly would be "unacceptable"?
There are other issues that may cause stress in the
US-Israel relationship. Settlements, always a sore point, take on greater
importance when American diplomats believe a diplomatic breakthrough with
the Palestinians is achievable. There is little support in Israel today
for relinquishing control of the West Bank, given its bitter experience
after removing all soldiers and settlers from Gaza. Israelis no longer
believe that territorial concessions on their part will bring peace with
the Palestinians. Most believe that the real issue blocking "peace" with
Hamas and its allies is Israel's existence, not its settlements. With
Hamas in firm control of Gaza and growing in strength on the West Bank, it
stretches credulity to believe that the Israeli public can be persuaded to
entrust its security to agreements signed with Palestinian leaders who
can't or won't honor commitments.
THE MOOD IN THE US is quite different. The theory among many
here is that George Mitchell achieved peace between Catholics and
Protestants in Northern Ireland, and now can work his magic between the
Israelis and the Palestinians, if only Obama is willing to use a little
"tough love" with both sides. They want more public criticism of Israel by
American officials. Some of the enthusiasts in the "peace camp" are urging
Obama to produce an American plan for the solution, one that by their
definition would diverge from the terms Israel considers vital to its
national interests, lest we are seen as "Israel's lawyer."
If Obama takes all this bad advice, it won't bring peace to
the Middle East, but it will bring tension between Israel and its
most important ally.
The "peace camp" is also urging Obama to take a more
"even-handed" approach in the Middle East. But the effect of
even-handedness is not even. The Arab League has 22 members and a lot of
oil; there are 56 Muslim countries in the Islamic Conference; and much of
the rest of the world automatically supports Arab positions. Israel
depends uniquely on its close relations with one main ally, the United
States. When the US is neutral, there is a huge imbalance, and the scale
automatically tilts the other way.
The new administration may also have a lower tolerance for
the civilian casualties and diplomatic stresses that arise when Israel is
compelled to take military action in its own defense. Even in quiet times,
there is likely to be heartburn about checkpoints and other security
measures necessary in the struggle against terror. Obama could cut back on
US vetoes to prevent anti-Israel resolutions at the UN Security
Council.
It is too soon to know whether the new administration will
make any of these or other mistakes. We had plenty of reasons to be
anxious about George Bush the day he took over, influenced as he was by
big oil, the Saudis and some of his father's bad advisers. The fears many
of us had about Obama during the campaign as to the people he might
appoint to run Mideast policy are not being realized. Maybe the potential
mistakes listed above also won't happen.
Steven J. Rosen was AIPAC's director of executive
branch relations for 23 years. He chronicles the new administration on
Obama
Mideast Monitor, which is hosted at the Middle East Forum website. He is a
defendant in the AIPAC case.
Related Topics: US policy
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