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The Iraqi
Shiite Challenge to Tehran's Mullahs
by Nathaniel Rabkin
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2014
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Nearly two million Shiite pilgrims passed from Iran to Iraq between
March 2009 and February 2010 through the Mehran land border crossing.[1] Thousands more entered Iraq
through other land border crossings or by air travel. These pilgrims came
from countries the world over to visit the tombs of the Shiite imams in
Najaf, Karbala, and Baghdad. By way of comparison, 1.6 million Muslims
traveled to Saudi Arabia for the 2009 hajj (an additional 700,000
Muslims from within Saudi Arabia also participated)[2] while some 700,000 religious
pilgrims visited Christian and Jewish holy sites in Israel in the same
year.[3]
Clearly, the pilgrimage to Iraq is a major religious phenomenon.
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The tomb of Imam
Ali in Najaf, Iraq, is one of the holiest shrines for Shiite pilgrims.
Millions of Iranians flock to it and other sites across the border
annually, and control over what the pilgrims see and hear has become a
major issue for the ruling theocrats in Tehran.
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Iranians are the largest group of foreign pilgrims to Iraq, and the
Iranian government has shown great interest in promoting the trip. American
journalists and policy analysts frequently describe the pilgrimage as a
tool of political and economic influence, but Iran's policy seems to be
dictated more by domestic concerns than by regional ambitions. Pilgrimage
to Iraq is an important religious rite for Iranian Shiites, and the
government prizes the prestige attending its sponsorship.
The post-2003 revival of the pilgrimage has also contributed to the
growing clout of Iraqi-based Shiite religious leaders, first and foremost
Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, whose political independence and growing
popularity among Iranian Shiites present a serious challenge to the
legitimacy of Iran's state-sponsored religious establishment. The Iranian
authorities are aware of this threat, but their efforts to counter it have
so far been hampered by political and religious sensitivities. In the years
to come, the political impact of the pilgrimage to Iraq may do much to
shape the future of both countries as well as that of the Shiite world.
Islamic Iran
and Revival of the Pilgrimage
Journeying to the tombs of imams in Iraq's shrine cities is a
time-honored Shiite practice that has recently emerged from a long hiatus.
For most of the twentieth century, a variety of political circumstances
kept the holy sites of Iraq out of reach for most Shiites.
Iranian governments have had a long history of involvement with Iraq's Shiite
shrines. Successive Shiite dynasties in Iran donated extensively to them,
helping to build the architectural structures themselves as well as related
infrastructure.[4]
Then as now, promoting the pilgrimage was a way for Iranian rulers to
portray themselves as upholders of Shiite Islam—the country's official
religion since the sixteenth century.
The pilgrimage was disrupted for most of the twentieth century by
feuding regimes in Tehran and Baghdad, which gives its recent revival
special significance. Following World War I, Reza Shah Pahlavi rose to
power in Iran and sought to modernize the country by promoting secular
nationalism. He also endeavored to uproot customs seen as backward or
superstitious, which to his mind included the pilgrimage to ancient tombs
in neighboring Iraq. Reza Shah's government instituted a series of measures
that drastically cut the number of pilgrims and kept it low for decades.[5] After his son Mohammed Reza
Pahlavi was overthrown and replaced by the Islamic Republic in 1979, a new
obstacle to the pilgrimage arose in the form of Iraqi dictator Saddam
Hussein, who invaded Iran, ending bilateral religious ties and instituting
harsh measures against Iraqi Shiites, including tight pilgrimage
restrictions.
Saddam's toppling in 2003 paved the way for a restoration of the
pilgrimage tradition to Iraq. The return of Iranian pilgrims was a
long-awaited event, rich with political and religious symbolism. For the
Iranian government, which made the liberation of Karbala a propaganda motif
during the Iran-Iraq war, the revived pilgrimage represented the triumph of
Shiite Islam over secular, Westernizing rulers. Organizing and promoting
the travel of Iranian pilgrims to Iraq is a way for Tehran to celebrate
what it portrays as an Islamic victory. At the same time, promoting the
pilgrimage also continues a centuries old tradition of Iranian state
patronage of Iraq's Shiite shrines.
A mere nine months after Saddam's fall, visitors to Najaf in December
2003 noticed a strong presence of foreign pilgrims, most of them Iranian.[6] After an initial period of
chaotic, ad-hoc pilgrimage, Tehran decided to assume a key role in
promoting it and arranging pilgrims' affairs. In April 2005, just three
months after Iraq's first post-Saddam elections, Iranian and Iraqi
diplomats signed an agreement allowing 1,500 Iranian pilgrims to enter Iraq
daily.[7] By
2009, the quota for Iranian pilgrims had reached 5,000 a day[8] and was further increased to
6,000 a day in 2011.[9]
Tehran quickly took measures to organize and control the activities of
Iranian pilgrims inside Iraq. July 2005 saw the formation of the
quasi-governmental All-Iran Central Company of Pilgrimage Service Providers
(Sharekat Markazi-ye Dafater-e Khadamat-e Zeyarati-e Sarasar-e Iran,
SHAMSA) to provide Iranian pilgrims with packaged tours and to negotiate
deals with Iraqi businesses to provide lodging, transportation, and
security. Although SHAMSA is registered as a private corporation, all of
its business dealings in Iraq and Iran are submitted for approval to an
Iranian government body called the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization (Sazeman-e
Hajj va Zeyarat).[10]
This agency also sets the prices SHAMSA charges for its package tours and
oversees the application process for tourists and guides.[11]
Some American observers have suggested that the Iranian government is
using its control over the journey to exert economic and political
influence ("soft power") inside Iraq.[12] Many Iraqis share this opinion[13] although the belief seems to be
based more on deep-seated suspicions than on hard evidence. Locals in
Karbala believed rumors that Iranians were buying up real estate in the
city as part of a planned takeover, allegedly using local front men to
circumvent Iraqi laws that restrict the purchase of real estate by
foreigners.[14]
One Iraqi journalist even described the sale of Iranian-style women's
clothing in Karbala's markets as evidence of growing Iranian hegemony.[15] Whatever influence Tehran is
thought to have obtained through the pilgrimage would seem to be
counter-balanced by the paranoid fears and resentments the Iranian presence
has provoked among Iraqis.
Gaining influence in Iraq, however, does not seem to be a high priority
for the architects of Iran's pilgrimage policy. An examination of SHAMSA's
record suggests the quasi-governmental tour company is dedicated to
ensuring a comfortable stay for Iranian pilgrims even when this requires
taking measures that displease Iraqi hosts. SHAMSA has provoked resentment
among Iraqi businessmen through its monopolistic practices, which include
forcing Iraqi hotel owners to offer special low rates to its tour groups.[16] In 2009, SHAMSA opened a number
of central kitchens in Karbala where meals are cooked by Iranian staff and
delivered twice daily to the pilgrims' hotels, depriving Iraqi restaurants
of Iranian pilgrims' business. When asked about these kitchens by an Iraqi
journalist, a SHAMSA representative explained that Iranians needed
specially prepared meals because Iraqi restaurants "are not careful
when it comes to standards of hygiene."[17]
The pilgrimage brings millions of Iranians to Iraq every year, but the Iranian
government makes little effort to use its citizens as goodwill ambassadors
or agents of influence. SHAMSA's security department advises pilgrims to
avoid discussing politics with Iraqis and warns them not to accept any
gifts of food, drink, or perfume offered to them by locals. These
instructions explicitly include nudhour, pilgrim offerings, which
are a long-standing custom in the folk religion of southern Iraq.[18] Bread, sweets, tea, and even
cigarettes are proffered as part of the nudhour vow intended to
secure specific divine blessings, such as finding a spouse or recovering
from an illness. (The term is also used to describe other types of
vow-offerings, including cash donations made for the upkeep of the
shrines.)[19] Refusing
gifts from strangers may be a sensible precaution for Iranian pilgrims but
may easily offend well-meaning Iraqi donors. Despite this, SHAMSA's
security procedures prevail, which would seem to reflect Tehran's
indifference to using the pilgrimage to win friends and influence in Iraq.
On the other hand, the pilgrimage is an important tool in the arena of
domestic political propaganda. By promoting the pilgrimage to Iraq, the
Iranian government expresses its ideological commitment to fostering Shiite
religious practice among Iran's citizens. Publicly demonstrating this
commitment bolsters its oft-questioned domestic legitimacy. Equally
important, Tehran's role in sponsoring the pilgrimage gives it some measure
of control over how Iranian Shiites experience Iraq's shrines: All SHAMSA
tour groups are accompanied by government-selected spiritual guides, who
are vetted for political awareness and loyalty to the Islamic regime.
Mostafa Khaksar Qahroudi, head of the Iranian Hajj and Pilgrimage
Organization, which oversees SHAMSA, explained the regime's interest in the
pilgrimage with surprising candor during a 2008 meeting with SHAMSA's board
of directors: "Given the Islamic character of the Islamic Republican
system, the people have certain expectations … the services provided to the
pilgrim must be better than those given to a regular traveler or
tourist."[20]
Qahrudi went on to describe government sponsorship of the pilgrimage as
necessary for Iran's political stability:
The philosophy behind the Islamic Republican regime is faith-based, and
the regime cannot appear apathetic [to the pilgrimage] … The only way to
preserve the regime is to keep the people on a spiritual path. How else
could we keep the people going along with the regime?[21]
This high regard assigned to the pilgrimage's domestic political impact
by Iranian officials may explain their apparent neglect of its potential as
an avenue for influence over neighboring Iraq.
This can also be seen in the manner in which the Iranian state oversees
the trip at the highest levels of the government. On paper, the Hajj and
Pilgrimage Organization is a branch of Iran's Ministry of Culture and
Islamic Guidance;[22]
in practice, Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene'i maintains a
permanent liaison to the agency and exercises veto power over all its
decisions.[23] The
supreme leader's liaison office also selects and trains Shiite clerics who
accompany every SHAMSA tour group as spiritual guides. Among other
conditions, candidates for the guide position must pass a test of their
"political knowledge" and must demonstrate their obedience to the
principle of "absolute clerical political rule."[24]
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The influence of
Najaf-based Shiite cleric Ayatollah Ali Sistani over Iranian Shiites is a
most troubling problem for the mullahs in Tehran. Sistani's political
independence and growing popularity among Iranian Shiites is viewed as a
serious challenge to the legitimacy of Iran's state-sponsored religious
establishment.
|
In April 2009, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad ordered a number of
administrative changes in the Hajj and Pilgrimage Organization but reversed
course after receiving a public rebuke from Khamene'i, who called the
president's move "inappropriate."[25] The public disagreement between
Iran's two most powerful public figures indicates that deep political
sensitivities surround the pilgrimage to Iraq.
Iraqi Shiism's
"Quietist" Influence
Despite the attention given to these matters by the office of the
supreme leader, the government's efforts to co-opt the pilgrimage face
serious competition from a rival force: an independent, Iraqi-based Shiite
religious leadership that refuses to recognize the religious authority of
Tehran's rulers but which is increasingly popular inside Iran. Rather than
strengthening Iranian influence over Iraqi affairs, the pilgrimage seems to
be enhancing the popularity of Iraq-based religious leaders inside Iran.
This popularity will likely be a source of concern for the Iranian
government in the years to come.
The most influential of these leaders is Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani.
Though born in Iran, the 83-year-old Sistani has spent most of his life in
Iraq, studying and teaching in the shrine city of Najaf. Sistani enjoys an
undisputed position as the most respected Shiite religious leader in Iraq,
his popularity due in large part to his reputation for independence and
integrity. His steadfast support for elections played a critical role in
Iraq's post-Saddam democratic transition, but at the same time, he has been
careful to avoid association with any political faction. Unlike many
Iranian religious leaders, Sistani receives no government stipend.
Sistani's popularity extends into Iran where it has deepened in recent
years, partly due to the pilgrimage. The Iranian-American scholar Mehdi
Khalaji cites estimates that "nearly 80 percent of Shiite
worshippers" in Iran "follow Ayatollah Ali Sistani" as their
spiritual leader.[26]
This is echoed by Johns Hopkins' Vali Nasr who attributes Sistani's rising
popularity to two factors: the influence of pilgrims returning from Iraq,
and widespread cynicism toward Tehran's corrupt religious establishment.[27] Since the 1979 Islamic
revolution, the Iranian mullahs have transformed themselves from humble
scholars into an elite that controls the country's political and economic
life.[28] Sistani's
popularity reflects a genuine hunger in Iran for an independent religious
leadership untainted by connections and corruption.
While Sistani holds no formal political office, his authority over
Iraq's Shiite shrines is recognized by the Baghdad government and is
formalized by law 19 (the awkwardly named "Administration of the Holy
Shrines and the Noble Shiite Pilgrimage Sites Law"). Passed by the
Iraqi parliament in 2005, it directs the minister of Islamic endowments to
appoint directors for each of Iraq's shrines from among "qualified
individuals of integrity who possess a good reputation and who have been
approved by the supreme religious authority (marja)—being the
religious scholar from among the scholars of Najaf whose authority is
accepted by the majority of Shiites in Iraq."[29]
The custodians appointed by Ayatollah Sistani maintain tight control
over the pilgrimage observances in Iraq's shrine cities. For example,
before the January 2012 Arbaeen pilgrimage commemorating the martyrdom of
Muhammad's grandson Hussein bin Ali, the management of the Imam Hussein
shrine in Karbala issued a very detailed set of instructions covering
matters of safety, hygiene, and security, as well as ritual guidelines.[30] The governor of Karbala province
also affirmed the exclusive authority of Sistani's followers to regulate
and administer pilgrims' activities in and around the holy place.[31]
Sistani's disciples are thus provided with a platform to deliver their
religious message, which eschews the fiery political rhetoric favored by
Tehran's religious establishment. These views are disseminated through
traditional Friday sermons at the shrines and, since the fall of Saddam Hussein,
through modern media outlets as well. Every month, the Imam Ali shrine at
Najaf issues a glossy Arabic magazine called al-Wilaya.[32] The Kazimiyah shrine in Baghdad
publishes no fewer than three magazines[33] while the Imam Hussein shrine in
Karbala has its own satellite TV channel, which began broadcasting in 2009.[34]
The religious discourse promoted by Sistani's acolytes is devotional,
not political. Their publications extol traditional religious values of
piety, learning, and self-improvement while eschewing the politicized
rhetoric of Iran's state-sponsored religious institutions. One searches
these publications in vain for references to America as "the global arrogance"
or to political opponents as "spreaders of corruption on earth."
There is no talk of Western or "Zionist" conspiracies against
Islam. The sermons given at the shrines during Friday prayers reflect this
same pietistic outlook. When the preachers discuss politics, they do so in
very general terms, calling for national unity and speaking about the Iraqi
people's desire for development. They refrain from endorsing specific
political parties, from issuing fiery condemnations of the United States,
or from discussing the politics of neighboring Iran.
At the same time, while the Shiite scholars of Najaf do not share the
Iranian government's radical ideology, neither Sistani nor any other Iraqi
ayatollah calls for a revolution in Iran. Even at the height of Iran's 2009
election crisis, Sistani and the other Iraq-based ayatollahs kept silent,
refusing to endorse either the protesters or the government, carefully
avoid meddling in neighboring politics.
The position of Iraq's Shiite religious establishment reflects the
traditional "quietist" school of Shiite thought, in which
religious leaders can offer advice on political matters but do not take
sides in the struggle for power. Adopting this approach, Sistani's
followers in Iran can accept Khamene'i as a medieval-style king or sultan,
deserving of obedience inasmuch as he maintains order and defends the
country from external threats but devoid of religious authority.[35] While Sistani's followers are
not active supporters of the Iranian opposition, the existence of a popular
and revered religious leadership outside of state control presents a
serious challenge to Tehran's theocratic government.
The Looming
Confrontation
The ideology underlying Iran's Islamic Republic holds that religion and
politics are inseparable. Iran's rulers insist that opposing the regime is
the same as opposing Islam. To drive this point home, the Iranian
government puts its domestic enemies on trial not for treason but for the
crime of "waging war against God" (moharebeh).[36] To make these claims convincing,
the Islamic Republic needs more than the passive acquiescence of religious
leaders; it needs their active endorsement of the regime's claims. This,
however, is something that neither Sistani nor any of Iraq's Shiite
religious leaders have been willing to give.
In the aftermath of the 2009 post-election crackdown, a number of
religious leaders inside Iran began voicing their displeasure with
Khamene'i's policies. The regime responded by attacking these clerics'
houses and offices, censoring their Internet sites, and in the case of the
prominent cleric Ayatollah Yusof Sanei, having a pro-regime religious body
deny his religious credentials.[37]
But the unintended consequences of this crackdown may only add to Iraq's
prestige as a more independent and more legitimate center of Shiite Islam.
The refusal of Iraqi clerics to endorse political repression in Iran may
also serve to embolden religious opponents of Tehran's current regime.
In the coming years, Iran's ruling elite will likely take measures
designed to either co-opt or subvert the Shiite religious leadership based
in Iraq's shrine cities. A hint of what these measures might look like was
provided recently when Ayatollah Mahmoud Hashemi-Shahroudi, the former head
of Iran's judiciary and a close ally of Khamene'i, opened an office in
Najaf. It was rumored that Shahroudi, who was born in Iraq in 1949 to
parents of Iranian descent, would soon return to Iraq to serve as a
counterweight to Sistani.[38]
These rumors received negative coverage in Iraqi news media,[39] and Shahrudi's office denied he
was planning to move back to Iraq. Meanwhile, Iran's semi-official Fars
News Agency blamed the Shahrudi controversy on "Zionist-Wahhabi media
in Iraq and the region," which it said were "trying to create
divisions between Iraqi and Iranian Shiites."[40]
|
Iraq's premier
Nuri al-Maliki (l) meets with Mahmud Shahrudi in Iran, April 2012.
Shahroudi, the former head of Iran's judiciary and Khamene'i's close
ally, opened an office in Najaf, Iraq, in 2011. It was rumored that
Shahroudi was there to serve as a counterweight to Ali Sistani's
influence.
|
The Shahrudi affair has apparently affected political relations between
the two countries. During a visit to Iran in April 2013, Iraqi prime
minister Nuri al-Maliki was photographed meeting with Shahrudi. During the
same visit, Maliki also met with Iran's deputy president Mohammed Reza
Rahimi, who welcomed him by wishing for a "perfect union" between
Iran and Iraq.[41]
The crudeness of this messaging provoked criticism in Iraq, forcing
Maliki's allies to issue clarifications.[42] At the same time, emphasizing
close political ties with Iraq may be a way for Tehran to distract the
Iranian public's attention from the intra-Shiite rivalry, providing another
example of how domestic religious concerns shape Iranian policy.
With its efforts to promote Ayatollah Shahrudi stalled, Iran may instead
focus on co-opting or undermining the Najaf hawzah (religious
academy), Iraq's most important religious institution. The hawzah is
a loosely organized academy, which operates through time-honored but
unwritten guidelines. There are no professional administrators, written
exams, or formal budgets; the academy operates through private donations
and personal relationships between teacher and student. This decentralized
system has insulated it from political influences for centuries, but there
are those who argue that the academy should be reformed and modernized. Any
formalization of the hawzah system could make it more open to
political influence, especially from Iran's Islamic Republic, a fact which
has not gone unnoted by Iraqi observers.[43]
Ayatollah Sistani is presently the most respected figure in the Najaf hawzah,
his position the result of his personal reputation, not any formal process.
He and other Najaf-based scholars oversee large charitable and educational
projects, paid for by private fundraising but which could be vulnerable to
competition and co-option from Iran. Already, Khamene'i's office
distributes stipends to students at the Najaf hawzah, supplementing
but also competing with stipends offered by Sistani and other Iraqis.[44]
Sistani is currently in his eighties. When he dies, Iran may use its
influence to back a particular candidate to succeed him or to prevent the
emergence of any clear successor. However, such efforts will likely face
determined opposition from Iraqi Shiites and from the many Iranian Shiites
who now look to Iraq for religious guidance.
If the Iranian government fails to co-opt or undermine Iraq's religious
leadership, it may try instead to exert tighter control over the pilgrimage
itself as a means of blocking any destabilizing religious influence from
Iraq. Iranian authorities already ban non-SHAMSA pilgrims from crossing
into Iraq by land, ostensibly for security reasons, although pilgrims who
reject the official group tours can still book flights into Iraq.[45] Iran's minister of culture and
Islamic guidance, Mohammed Hosseini, recently encouraged prospective
pilgrims to join official group tours, which he described as
"materially and spiritually more suitable" to their needs.[46]
Future crackdowns on independent pilgrims or measures to tighten further
political control of SHAMSA tours may provide indications of growing
distress within the Iranian government about the pilgrimage's potentially
subversive political influence. However, Tehran will have to act with
caution. The adoption of repressive measures against Shiite pilgrims could
be another nail in the coffin of the Islamic Republic's domestic
legitimacy.
Conclusions
The reemergence of Iraq as a Shiite religious center requires a
reevaluation of the Iran-Iraq relationship. Tehran may exercise numerous
forms of influence over its smaller, weaker, and poorer neighbor, but when
it comes to religious affairs, the influence seems to be running mostly in
the opposite direction. In the coming years, Iranian authorities may be
forced to devote their attention to counteracting Iraqi religious influence
inside their country. The pilgrimage is a major avenue for this influence,
which makes control of the pilgrimage a vital interest for the government
in Tehran.
The contest between Iran's theocracy and Iraq's Shiite religious
scholars is asymmetrical and highly volatile. Tehran enjoys vast economic
and political resources and has a record of cunning and ruthless responses
to perceived threats. Ayatollah Sistani and the Najaf hawzah have
none of these advantages, but they do have a strong and growing base of
popular support inside Iran. Neither side seems eager for a direct
confrontation, which would have dangerous and unpredictable consequences
for all involved.
It is too early to tell how this contest will end. Perhaps Tehran will
neutralize Iraq's independent religious establishment, buying the Islamic
Republic a renewed lease on life until the next crisis comes along.
Alternatively, the rebirth of Najaf as a world center of Shiism may deprive
Iran's present rulers of their religious pretensions, paving the way for
the end to the regime's Islamist system. But with close to two million Iranian
pilgrims visiting Iraq each year, an amicable divorce between these two
rival interpretations of Shiism seems unlikely.
Until one side or the other prevails, the religious dimension will play
an important role in Iranian-Iraqi relations. Observers of these affairs
should pay close attention to the pilgrimage, which may in fact be the
single most important bilateral tie between the two countries. For
policymakers, the pilgrimage is an important reminder that, even with all
eyes turned on Iran, events in Iraq may continue to play a pivotal role in
the region's future.
Nathaniel Rabkin is the managing editor of Inside Iraqi Politics
and a graduate student in Middle East history at the University of Haifa.
[1] Hajj News
website, Tehran, Mar. 15, 2011.
[2] "The number of pilgrims for the
Years from 1416H. (1995G.) to 1431H. (2010G)," Central
Department of Statistics and Information, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,
Riyadh, accessed Aug. 27. 2013.
[3] Tourism in Israel: 1990-2009, Israel
Central Bureau of Statistics, Jerusalem, 2011, pp. 1-3.
[4] Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd. edition
(Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1960-2005), s.v. 'Atabat.
[5] Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'is of Iraq
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 170-1.
[6] The Washington Post, Dec. 10, 2003.
[7] Asharq al-Awsat (London), Apr.
17, 2005.
[8] Ibid., Oct.
12, 2009.
[9] Islamic Republic of Iran
Broadcasting, Arabic World Service, June
16, 2011.
[10] Sharekat-e Markazi-ye Dafater-e
Khadamat-e Sarasar-e Iran website,
accessed June 25, 2012.
[11] Ibid.
[12] The New York Times, May
30, 2009; Marissa Cochrane-Sullivan, "Iran's Soft Power in Iraq,"
Iran Tracker, American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C., Aug.
4, 2009.
[13] The National (Abu Dhabi), June
1, 2009.
[14] Niqash (Berlin), Nov. 15, 2011;
al-Sumaria TV News (Baghdad), Apr. 19,
2011.
[15] Niqash, June 30, 2011.
[16] Asharq al-Awsat, Oct.
12, 2009; al-Mada (Baghdad), Jan. 23, 2011.
[17] Niqash, Nov. 15, 2011.
[18] Zeyarat
(Tehran),
no.1,
Oct./Nov. 2008 (Abanmah 1387 Anno Persico), p. 22.
[19] Salman Hadi Toameh, Karbala Fiad-Dhakira
(Baghdad: publisher unknown, 1988), pp. 241-52.
[20] Zeyarat,
Oct./Nov. 2008, p. 22.
[21] Ibid.
[22] Ministry of Culture and Islamic
Guidance website,
accessed Sept. 3, 2013.
[23] Fars News Agency (Tehran), Jan. 23, 2012.
[24] Be'ese-ye Magham-e Moazzam-e
Rahbari, Moavenat-e
Omur-e Ruhaniyun, Sept. 3, 2013.
[25] The New York Times, May
4, 2009.
[26] Mehdi Khalaji, The Last Marja
(Washington, D.C.: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2006), p. 7.
[27] Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival (New
York: W.W. Norton, 2007), p. 221.
[28] Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution
of Iran (London: I.B. Tauris, 1997), pp. 150-5.
[29] Law 19,art. 4, Iraq
Local Governance Law Library, 2005.
[30] Ta'alimat Khassah lil-Mawakib Fi
Dhikra Ziyarat al-Arbain al-Khalida, Imam Hussein shrine, Karbala, Jan. 2, 2012.
[31] Imam Hussein shrine website, Jan.
20, 2011.
[32] Imam Ali shrine website, accessed May 16,
2012.
[33] Kazimiya shrine website,
accessed May 16, 2012.
[34] Karbala TV, accessed June
25, 2012.
[35] Mehdi Khalaji, "The
Iranian Clergy's Silence," Current Trends in Islamist Ideology,
July 12, 2010.
[36] The New York Times, Feb.
1, 2010; "Iran: Stop Imminent Execution of Kurdish
Dissident," Human Rights Watch, Washington, D.C., June
29, 2010; Radio Free Europe, Aug.
19, 2010.
[37] The Christian Science Monitor
(Boston), June
1, 2010; on religious opposition in Iran, see, also, Said Amir
Arjomand, "The
Iranian Revolution in the New Era," Current Trends in Islamist
Ideology, Aug. 3, 2010.
[38] Asharq al-Awsat, Nov. 26, 2011.
[39] Al-Sumaria TV news, Nov. 16, 2011;
Niqash, June
28, 2012.
[40] Fars News Agency, Dec. 18, 2011.
[41] Al-Sumaria TV News, Apr.
24, 2012.
[42] Ibid., Apr.
24, 2012; al-Arab (Doha), Apr.
26, 2012.
[43] Khaled Hantoush, "Hawzat
an-Najaf: Nadhra Min ad-Dakhil," Masarat (Baghdad), v. 6, no. 15, pp.
101-16.
[44] Khalaji, The Last Marja, p. 32.
[45] Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA,
Tehran), reprinted on the Tehran branch website of the Haj and Pilgrimage
Organization, May
11, 2013, accessed Oct.19, 2012.
[46] Fars News Agency, Mar. 4, 2013.
Related
Topics: Iran, Iraq
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