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Reuters:
"Iran is refusing to significantly cut the number of centrifuges it
intends to keep to produce nuclear fuel, making it hard to imagine a
compromise at this week's talks with six powers, Western and Iranian
officials said on Wednesday. The remarks from diplomats close to the
talks, who spoke on condition of anonymity, came after the initial rounds
of meetings in the Austrian capital between Iran and the United States,
Britain, France, China, Russia plus Germany... Perhaps the biggest hurdle
to overcome, six-power diplomats said, is Iran's stance regarding its
uranium-enrichment centrifuges, which one negotiator described as a 'huge
problem'... 'The Iranians have not yet shown a willingness to reduce
their centrifuges to an acceptable number, making it difficult to
envision a compromise at this point that we could all live with,' the
negotiator told Reuters. Another Western official close to the talks
confirmed the remarks as accurate. A senior Iranian official appeared to
confirm the assessment. 'Our Supreme Leader (Ayatollah Ali Khamenei) has
set a red line for the negotiators and that cannot change and should be
respected,' he told Reuters. 'Uranium enrichment should be continued and
none of the nuclear sites will be closed. What the West offers Iran on
the number of centrifuges is like a joke and unacceptable,' he
continued." http://t.uani.com/1pfHOgO
AP:
"Any thaw in relations between Iran and the United States under the
pressure of Iraq's turmoil is unlikely to hasten progress in difficult
negotiations seeking limits on Tehran's nuclear program. Recent
high-level U.S.-Iran talks that were meant to pave the way to a final
nuclear deal only highlighted the two nations' huge differences, say two
diplomats, further diminishing expectations that a July 20 target date
for agreement will be met... [Iran] wants to keep the almost 20,000
enriching centrifuges it now operates or has on standby. And it wants to
ultimately expand the number to 150,000 - or replace them with advanced
models that have that same output. The U.S. demands that Iran run no more
than a few hundred centrifuges, dismantle all on standby and agree to
tight limits on how much enriched uranium it can stockpile. 'Unless the
Iranians make a huge concession, it's very unlikely that there will be an
agreement by the end of July,' says Gary Samore, who left the U.S.
negotiating team last year to work with Harvard's Belfer Center think
tank." http://t.uani.com/1qsbzPa
Reuters:
"A U.S. security institute estimates that Iran could amass material
for a nuclear bomb in three months or less while Iranian experts cite a
time frame six times longer - a dispute going to the heart of talks
between Tehran and global powers. Differences over how fast Iran could
'break out' a nuclear weapon complicate the quest for a deal by late July
under which Iran would scale back its atomic energy programme in exchange
for a lifting of crippling sanctions... 'It is impossible for Iran to
break out in months through the uranium route. The required time span is
in years,' the report published on www.nuclearenergy.ir
said, stressing that this was a 'hypothetical' scenario... The Institute
for Science and International Security (ISIS), a U.S.-based think-tank
which closely monitors Iran's atomic activities, said on Wednesday that
the Iranian website 'expresses common government stances' on nuclear
issues. 'This study contains mistakes and uses unwarranted assumptions to
arrive at its conclusions,' ISIS said of the Iranian report. 'Using its
data and correcting for mistakes, we arrive at a breakout estimate of 2-3
months in terms of the time to produce 25 kg of WGU (weapons-grade
uranium).' That is the amount traditionally seen as sufficient for one
bomb." http://t.uani.com/1vRcs45
Nuclear Program & Negotiations
The Hill:
"The top Republican and Democrat on the House Foreign Affairs
Committee are upping the pressure on the White House to work with
Congress before agreeing to any final deal with Iran regarding its
nuclear program. Chairman Ed Royce (R-Calif.) and Rep. Eliot Engel
(D-N.Y.) are collecting signatures on a letter to President Obama
pointing out that any permanent agreement to lift sanctions on Iran must
be approved by Congress. 'As these hugely consequential national security
decisions are made, greater cooperation between Congress and the
Executive Branch is essential, given that any permanent sanctions relief
demands congressional approval,' the two write in the letter released
Tuesday." http://t.uani.com/1lUgiGH
Sanctions
Relief
Reuters:
"U.S. Treasury Secretary Jack Lew said Iran's economy remained in a
state of distress due to sanctions over its nuclear programme and that
the United States would not rush into making a bad deal to prevent Iran
from obtaining a nuclear weapon. Lew said that the temporary and
reversible sanctions relief have been limited. 'Iran is losing a
significant amount in oil sales alone from the sanctions that remain in
place, more than the value of the temporary relief,' Lew said in a speech
in Jerusalem to the U.S.-Israel Joint Economic Development Group on
Wednesday. 'As we approach the last month of the agreed upon period for
negotiations, Iran's economy remains in a state of distress that brought
the government to the negotiating table in the first place,' he said...
'We will take the time to do this right, and we will not rush into a bad
deal,' he said. 'No deal is better than a bad deal.'" http://t.uani.com/1lyWLfK
Trend:
"French carmaker Renault sold 3,280 vehicles in Iranian market in
May. The figure shows a 52 percent increase compared to April, Iran's
Tasnim News Agency reported on June 18. The French company sold 2,150
vehicles in Iranian market in April. Renault used to monthly sell over
10,000 vehicles in Iran before the U.S.-engineered sanctions hit Iran's
car industry in 2012." http://t.uani.com/1kNvFM1
Iraq Crisis
NYT:
"As Sunni militants continued their incursion in Iraq, President
Hassan Rouhani of Iran warned Wednesday that Tehran would defend revered
Shiite holy sites in Iraq against the 'killers and terrorists' battling
Iraq's government, news agencies reported. Speaking on Iranian
television, Mr. Rouhani noted that many volunteers had agreed to travel
to Iraq to 'put the terrorists in their place' and to protect religious
sites, Reuters reported. He said that those willing to take up arms
against the militants included Iraq's Sunni, Shiite and Kurdish
communities, Reuters said. 'Regarding the holy Shia shrines in Karbala,
Najaf, Kadhimiya and Samarra, we announce to the killers and terrorists
that the big Iranian nation will not hesitate to protect holy shrines,'
he was quoted as saying to a crowd in Lorestan Province in western Iran.
'These terrorist groups, and those that fund them, both in the region and
in the international arena, are nothing, and hopefully they will be put
in their own place.'" http://t.uani.com/1ikJEhG
Reuters:
"Saudi Arabia gave an apparent warning to arch enemy Iran on
Wednesday by saying outside powers should not intervene in the conflict
in neighbouring Iraq. Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal also said
Iraq was facing a full-scale civil war with grave consequences for the
wider region... The toughening of rhetoric about Iraq by the Gulf's two
top powers suggested that Tehran and Riyadh have put on hold recent plans
to explore a possible curbing of their rivalry across the region's
Sunni-Shi'ite sectarian divide." http://t.uani.com/1ikGGtG
Opinion &
Analysis
Michael Singh in
WSJ: "During the second Iraq war, Iran's Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps was one of the United States' fiercest foes.
The IRGC was responsible not only for organizing, training and equipping
Shiite militants who fought U.S. troops, but also for manufacturing and
importing into Iraq so-called 'explosively formed penetrators,' or EFPs,
one of the chief banes of American forces there. Also courtesy of Tehran:
mortar and rocket attacks on the Green Zone in Baghdad, designed to speed
the American departure. For this reason, in addition to the deep distrust
that has characterized U.S.-Iran relations since 1979, it is more than
passing strange to hear both American and Iranian officials mooting the
possibility of U.S.-Iran cooperation in Iraq today. The U.S. and Iran share
an interest in preventing further advances by the extremist Sunni militia
that calls itself the 'Islamic State in Iraq and al-Sham,' or ISIS.
Nevertheless, accepting Iran's offer of assistance in Iraq would be a
grave mistake. The efficacy of Iranian assistance is dubious at best: The
IRGC has proven adept at stoking insurgencies, but no better than any
other country at ending them, in Syria or in Iran itself. Not only would
a partnership between Washington and Tehran likely fail to improve the
situation-it could make matters far worse in Iraq and throughout the
Middle East. The current crisis in Iraq is not precisely a sectarian
conflict. ISIS hardly enjoys unanimous support among Sunnis, who are
among the group's victims as it imposes repressive rule in the areas it
conquers. But sectarian tensions are an important factor in the country's
problems. Iranian (Shia) involvement would be perceived by Iraqi Sunnis
as explicitly sectarian in nature, and thus do more to inflame those
tensions than calm them. For their part, Iraqi officials largely appear
to recognize this danger and have thus been publicly wary of embracing
Iranian offers. In contrast, ISIS and other radical groups would likely
welcome deeper Iranian involvement. ISIS seeks to stoke anti-Shia
sentiment to garner both local and outside support. Were Iran to become
more directly involved in Iraqi affairs-especially in concert with the
U.S.-ISIS would take it as a propaganda boon and use the development to
attract funding and fighters. This polarizing effect would be magnified
if Iran resorted to organizing and equipping Shiite militants. These
militants might help halt ISIS advances in the short run, but their
reactivation would threaten to return Iraq to the days of open sectarian
war. Because they are an alternative to a professional fighting force,
these militias also pose an institutional threat to efforts to cultivate
a cross-sectarian Iraqi army. Deeper IRGC involvement would increase
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's dependence on Iran. His success
thus far has been in part due to the perception that his rivals in Iraq's
Shiite community-which is far from monolithic-were too close to Tehran.
Turning now to Iran for aid could change that, and not by accident; while
the U.S. seeks an independent, pluralistic Iraq, Iran appears to prefer
that Iraqi political and clerical institutions be beholden to Tehran's
own. Iranian intervention in Iraq, whatever its immediate tactical
utility, would deepen the country's cleavages. And U.S.-Iranian cooperation
in Iraq would stand at stark odds with President Obama's sensible call
for outreach by Mr. al-Maliki to Iraq's Sunnis... What is needed from
Iran, meanwhile, is not more involvement in regional conflicts, but less.
Specifically, Tehran must end its support for the Assad regime in Syria;
its provision of arms, funding and equipment to Sunni and Shia extremist
groups alike (such as Hezbollah and Hamas); and its nuclear brinkmanship.
This would do far more to improve prospects for the Middle East than the
deployment of IRGC irregulars in Iraq." http://t.uani.com/ULQliw
Max Boot &
Michael Doran in WashPost: "It's sometimes true that
very different countries can cooperate against a common enemy, as the
United States and Soviet Union did during World War II. But the
suggestion of a united U.S.-Iran front is more reminiscent of the wishful
thinking among conservatives who argued in the 1930s that Britain and the
United States shared a common interest with Nazi Germany in countering
communism. The idea that the United States, a nation bent on defending
democracy and safeguarding stability, shares a common interest with the
Islamic Republic of Iran, a revolutionary theocracy that is the No. 1
state sponsor of terrorism in the world, is as fanciful as the notion
that Neville Chamberlain and Adolf Hitler could work together for the
good of Europe. While it's true that Iran is run by Shiite
fundamentalists and ISIS is a Sunni organization, the rise of ISIS
provides Tehran with multiple benefits. For one thing, it makes Prime
Minister Nouri al-Maliki and the Shiites of Iraq ever more dependent on
Iranian protection. For another, ISIS's frightening rise makes the United
States more likely to compromise with Iran. We have grown accustomed to
Pakistan playing both arsonist and fireman at the same time - sheltering
Osama bin Laden and supporting jihadist groups while winning aid from
Washington by portraying itself as a partner in the war against
terrorism. Iran is adept at playing a similar game, only instead of aid it
is likely hoping for a further relaxation of Western sanctions and a
sweeter deal on its nuclear program. Indeed, the non-jihadist Syrian
opposition insists that ISIS is a creation of Iran. In typical Middle
East fashion, the Syrians overstate the case, but there is much evidence
that Iran and its Syrian allies have cooperated with ISIS. Don't forget
that ISIS (then known as al-Qaeda in Iraq) was launched by the late Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi, who, U.S. intelligence believes, received aid, shelter
and financial support from Iran after he was chased out of Afghanistan by
U.S. forces in 2001. Zarqawi received even more support from Iran's close
ally, Syria, which allowed its territory to be used to supply al-Qaeda in
Iraq with a steady stream of foreign fighters. As recently as 2012, the
Treasury Department identified Iran as supportive of ISIS, which has
reportedly grown fat in no small part due to deals with the Assad regime
for oil from wells under its control. That's right. According to Western
intelligence sources, Assad, Iran's top client in the region, has a
business partnership with ISIS even though ISIS has been fighting his
regime. (Assad's motives are varied, but among them is thought to be a
desire to boost jihadist fighters so as to discredit the opposition in
Western eyes.) But even if we were to assume that Iran is truly ISIS's
implacable enemy, that doesn't mean it would be a good idea for the
United States to cooperate with Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps - an
organization that has been responsible for attacks against U.S. targets
stretching back more than 30 years. We have seen in Syria how
Iranian-backed forces go about putting down a Sunni-led insurgency. More
than 150,000 people have already been killed in the Syrian civil war and
millions more uprooted from their homes. The Assad regime has become
notorious for dropping 'barrel bombs' on civilians and even using
chemical weapons. Iranian-backed groups used equally brutal methods in
Iraq during the height of the fighting after al-Qaeda's bombing of the
Samarra mosque in 2006. Shiite extremists became notorious for kidnapping
and torturing Sunnis. Those same groups stand on the front lines today of
Shiite resistance to ISIS. The United States would be making a historic
error if it were to assist such an Iranian-orchestrated ethnic-cleansing
campaign with air power or even with diplomatic support. Not only would
this be morally reprehensible, it would be strategically stupid because
it would convince the region's Sunni Muslims that the United States is
siding against them with Iran and its regional allies." http://t.uani.com/1vRnshZ
David Albright
& Andrea Stricker in ISIS: "An Iranian website, www.nuclearenergy.ir recently
posted an apparently quasi-official government study, How long would an
Iranian 'breakout' really take? The study makes the dubious claims that
Iran would need three years in the case of making a nuclear weapon with
highly enriched uranium and 5-7 years to make one out of plutonium
produced in the Arak reactor. Furthermore, this study asserts incorrectly
that Iran would need at least 18 months to break out and produce enough
weapon-grade uranium (WGU, more than 90 percent enriched) for a nuclear
weapon, defined as 25 kilograms of weapon-grade uranium, or one
'significant quantity.' (Breakout is typically defined as only the step
of producing weapon-grade uranium and does not include the other parts of
making the nuclear weapon. The Iranian study uses breakout to include all
the steps of making a nuclear weapon.) Using its data and correcting for
mistakes, we arrive at a breakout estimate of 2-3 months in terms of the
time to produce 25 kilograms of WGU, instead of its estimate of a minimum
of 18 months. Iran has obviously been uncomfortable with the concept of
breakout, particularly as applied to its gas centrifuge program, since it
shows quite directly the risks of its demands in the negotiations with
the P5+1 for building many more IR-1 centrifuges or an equivalent number
of advanced centrifuges. But the simple metric of breakout time has
proven remarkably useful in allowing the evaluation of questions about
centrifuge programs, requiring only a limited number of technical inputs
which are derived mostly from information published by the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). For example, breakout calculations can
answer the question of how long Iran needs to make enough weapon-grade
uranium for a nuclear weapon under a wide variety of current and posited
centrifuge capabilities. Breakout estimates permit a comparison of
different negotiating positions and provide a criterion helpful in
identifying technically unsound compromises. They allow for key follow-on
questions in negotiations, such as: Is there enough time to respond to
stop Iran if it does decide to build nuclear weapons? This timeframe in
turn helps define a corresponding number of centrifuges, albeit a number
that is considerably less than the one Iran wants. Thus, in addition to
other metrics, breakout timelines will remain a critical measure of the
soundness of any agreement. If Iran is left with a large enrichment
capacity, for example, this would enable it to conduct not only a fast
breakout at declared facilities, but it would also create higher risks
and a faster timeline in a scenario under which Iran diverted low enriched
uranium to clandestine facilities for further enrichment. All else being
equal, a larger program would be more difficult to safeguard against
breakout or 'sneak out.' Officials in Iran seem to have shifted tactics
and now want to engage on the substance of breakout timelines; however,
they do so in order to dismiss Western timelines as unrealistic now that
they have been raised as a vital issue in the talks. As is often the case
when a study is motivated by political need, the Iranian study has several
basic methodological flaws that lead to inflated breakout
estimates." http://t.uani.com/1vRpOx7
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