Electro-Magnetic Pulse (EMP): Electronic Doomsday for the U.S.?
by PETER HUESSY January 19, 2016
This threat to the United States from an electromagnetic pulse (EMP) attack due to the high-altitude detonation of a nuclear weapon over the United States is so potentially catastrophic that both the 2004 and 2008 reports of the Congressional EMP Commission said so openly -- probably hoping that the public warning would spur the Department of Defense and the country to action. (1)
Even an EMP attack from a single 10-kiloton nuclear weapon of the type now in the North Korean arsenal could cause as we noted earlier cascading failures that could blackout the U.S. Eastern Grid for months or even years, and dramatically harm the civilian economy. It could be delivered by a short-range missile fired off a freighter some hundreds of kilometers off our shores, and detonated at an altitude above 30-70 kilometers.(2)
The result would be no communications, no transportation, no fuel, no food, and no water for a decade or more. That would be true for at least the entire eastern half of the United States where most of the population lives, and be what the National Geographic has described as an "Electronic Armageddon". (3)
But despite these previous warnings and North Korea's latest bomb test, its fourth known nuclear test since 2006, a nuclear threat from North Korea is being widely dismissed as of little concern by "experts" because the apparent yield of the bomb was in the neighborhood of 10 kilotons or less.
These "experts" associate H-Bombs, or thermonuclear weapons, which is what North Korea claimed to have detonated, with very high yields. (4)
In fact, these experts may be way off base. The North Korean bomb capability may be that of a super-EMP weapon which could launch an electronic Armageddon against the United States, bringing our economic and military power to an end for decades.
Let me explain. Neutron bombs or Enhanced Radiation Weapons such as Super-EMP weapons are essentially very low-yield H-Bombs, that typically have yields of 1-10 kilotons, just like the North Korean device. Indeed, all four North Korean nuclear tests look like a Super-EMP weapon because of their very low yield. (5)
A Super-EMP weapon is designed to produce special effects (like gamma rays, in the case of Super-EMP). A Super-EMP warhead could have a seemingly insignificant explosive yield but would be far more deadly and dangerous to the United States than the most powerful "blockbuster" H-Bomb ever built. (6)
For example, Russia's Tsar H-Bomb, (known as Tsar Bomba) the most powerful H-Bomb ever detonated, during its test in October 1961 produced a yield of 60 megatons, and would have been capable of flattening everything in the state of Rhode Island. (7)
But a Super-EMP weapon detonated 300 kilometers above the center of the U.S. could destroy the entire nation's industrial and military capacity, and kill a large percent of the American people by taking down the US electrical grid, the elements of which once destroyed would take decades to rebuild. (8)
But even if we were to protect our electrical infrastructure from such a threat-which legislation now in Congress-- authored primarily by Representative Trent Franks (R-Arizona)--would do if enacted into law-the parallel vulnerability of U.S. military forces to an EMP attack is equally serious.
We know the Department of Defense has testified to Congress that 99% of the electricity for continental United States military bases comes from the civilian grid.
Thus, as dependent as they are on the civilian electrical grid for their power, our military bases
would be without electrical power for decades as well.
This is due to the fact that the thousands of electrical transformers destroyed by an EMP attack are not primarily built in America and even if they were, they require at least a 5 year lead time for production. (9)
Overseas power projection from U.S. military bases would thus be virtually impossible without an operational grid. Moreover, after such an EMP attack, the national focus would be on saving millions of Americans from mass starvation and preserving societal existence, not on going "over there" to fight a war or defend US interests.
And if the EMP attack is executed anonymously, say by a missile launched off a freighter at sea close-in to the United States, we would probably not even know against whom to retaliate. Thus classical deterrence would not operate further eroding a deterrent against such an attack.
For example, in 1999, at a high level meeting in Vienna of a Congressional delegation with senior members of the Russian government seeking to secure Russia's cooperation on US policy in the Balkans, Vladimir Lukin, the chairman of the Duma's Foreign Affairs Committee, angry with American policy in the Balkans, issued the following threat: ''If we really wanted to hurt you with no fear of retaliation, we would launch a Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile (SLBM), [and] we would detonate a nuclear weapon high above your country and shut down your power grid.'' (10)
Congressman Curt Weldon, (R-PA), the American delegation chair, and who understood Russian and turned to his Maryland colleague, (Roscoe Bartlett, D-MD) and asked, ''Roscoe, did you hear what he said?''
The chairman of the State Duma Geopolitics Commission, Alexander Shabanov, smiled and said, ''And if that one doesn't work, we have plenty of spares". (11)
Thus a nuclear weapon designed specifically for EMP attack, what Russian experts call a "Super-EMP" warhead, would constitute a worst-case threat.
For example, a single Super-EMP warhead detonated 300 kilometers high over the center of the U.S.-as opposed to the East Coast-- would generate such a powerful EMP field over all 48 contiguous United States that, not only would a protracted nationwide blackout result, but even the best protected U.S. military forces and C3I on all military bases-if not sufficiently protected-- could also be at risk.
Now the technology to protect the electrical grid is relatively straightforward and inexpensive. A one-time expenditure of $2-3 billion would protect the key electric transformers in America. But only with significant and aggressive action now could the grid be protected sufficiently to give the US industrial and economic capability a fighting chance to survive or deter an "Electronic Armageddon". (12)
Protecting military assets through hardening is also well understood but doing so after production and the fielding of equipment is expensive and time consuming. The sooner we start
with sufficient hardening our new equipment the quicker will the job get done.
Both our industrial electrical grid and our military assets require our best efforts to protect themnow. And we are today seriously behind the eight-ball in what is required to protect us.
And it is not as if the threat is somehow only "over the horizon". We also know Russia and China have Super-EMP warheads. Moreover, according to the Congressional EMP Commission, the design of Super-EMP warheads is no secret: "Certain types of relatively low-yield nuclear weapons can be employed to generate potentially catastrophic EMP effects over wide geographic areas, and designs for variants of such weapons may have been illicitly trafficked for a quarter-century." (13)
The EMP Commission warned that non-state actors--terrorists--could also pose an EMP threat:
"What is different now is that some potential sources of EMP threats are difficult to deter-they can be terrorist groups that have no state identity, have only one or a few weapons, and are motivated to attack the U.S. without regard for their own safety." (14)
The EMP Commission warned that the Department of Defense has failed to maintain adequate EMP protection for U.S. military forces since the end of the Cold War: "The end of the Cold War relaxed the discipline for achieving EMP survivability within the Department of Defense, and gave rise to the perception that an erosion of EMP survivability of military forces was an acceptable risk. EMP simulation and test facilities have been mothballed or dismantled, and research concerning EMP phenomena, hardening design, testing, and maintenance has been substantially decreased. However, the emerging threat environment, characterized by a wide spectrum of actors that include near-peers, established nuclear powers, rogue nations, sub-national groups, and terrorist organizations that either now have access to nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles or may have such access over the next 15 years have combined to place the risk of EMP attack and adverse consequences on the US to a level that is not acceptable." (15)
Indeed, the EMP Commission warned that even U.S. strategic forces and C3I may be at risk from an EMP attack: "Current policy is to continue to provide EMP protection to strategic forces and their controls. The Department of Defense must continue to pursue the strategy for strategic systems to ensure that weapons delivery systems of the New Triad [land, sea and air] are EMP survivable, and that there is, at a minimum, a survivable 'thin-line' of command and control capability to detect threats and direct the delivery systems." (16)
U.S. strategic forces today are also potentially relatively more vulnerable than they were during the Cold War: they are far less numerous and located on fewer bases, so an adversary could more easily target peak EMP fields on each base. Compared to Cold War era systems, the more modern and sophisticated C3I systems for command and control of U.S. strategic forces could be vulnerable to EMP, unless they are strengthened to withstand such electro-magnetic pulse attacks. This is also true for the entire industrial infrastructure, the most critical of which is the electrical grid.
The EMP Commission also warned that as U.S. conventional forces become more dependent upon high-technology, they are also becoming more vulnerable to EMP attack: "The situation for general-purpose forces (GPF) is more complex. The success of these forces depends on the application of a superior force at times and places of our choosing. We accomplish this by using a relatively small force with enormous technological advantages due to superior information flow, advanced warfighting capabilities, and well-orchestrated joint combat operations. Our increasing dependence on advanced electronics systems results in the potential for an increased EMP vulnerability of our technologically advanced forces, and if unaddressed makes EMP employment by an adversary an attractive asymmetric option." (17)
The above alarming assessments about the vulnerability of U.S. military forces to EMP attack are what the EMP Commission decided must be stated publicly, in its unclassified Executive Summary. The EMP Commission submitted a separate--classified--report to the Department of Defense analyzing these, and many other vulnerabilities, in far greater detail.
But what progress has DOD made to protect itself and the nation from EMP since the reports were completed?
When the EMP Commission terminated in 2008, it was on the understanding that DOD would move aggressively to protect U.S. military forces from EMP, and report biennially to Congress on progress being made implementing the EMP Commission recommendations. The only unclassified biennial report from DOD indicates that there were still serious deficiencies in protecting U.S. military forces from EMP in 2011. (18)
On April 7, 2015, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) chief Admiral William Gortney announced that NORAD was moving critical assets back into the nuclear bunker inside Cheyenne Mountain and spending $700 million to harden further the mountain against a potential nuclear EMP attack from North Korea. That the nation's most critical C3I node is just now being adequately protected does not bode well for the preparedness of U.S. military forces as a whole for an EMP Doomsday scenario. (19)
Fortunately, Congress re-established the EMP Commission in the recently completed and passed Fiscal Year 2016 National Defense Authorization Act to serve as a watchdog on U.S. preparedness and the fast-evolving EMP threat.
For example, the recent military writings and exercises of potential adversaries would combine EMP with cyber, sabotage, and kinetic attacks against the national electric grid and other critical infrastructures --a decisive new way of warfare described by Russian experts as a "Revolution in Military Affairs." (20)
The U.S. response has recently gotten some important traction. The House, on November 16, 2015, unanimously passed the Critical Infrastructure Protection Act (CIPA). (21)
The CIPA directs the Department of Homeland Security to educate emergency planners and first responders at all levels of government about the EMP threat, and to prepare plans to protect and recover the electric grid and other critical infrastructures from an EMP attack and from natural EMP that can be generated by a rare solar super-storm. The House Energy and Commerce Committee also passed provisions to secure the electric grid from EMP, including by stockpiling spare parts and incorporating the SHIELD Act, which gives new authorities to the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission to protect the grid.
Protecting the national electric grid from EMP is necessary to preserve the existence of American civilization, to sustain U.S. military power projection capabilities, and would also mitigate worst case threats from cyber warfare, sabotage, kinetic attacks, and even severe weather. CIPA and SHIELD are the crowning achievements of Rep. Trent Franks (R-AZ), who for years has been the conscience of the Congress warning about the existential threat from EMP. (22)
While both bills now await action in the Senate, there is an increasing threat. Iran recently successfully tested two nuclear-capable missiles, and a North Korean satellite, the KSM-3, regularly orbits over North America at the optimum trajectory to evade U.S. National Missile Defenses. If the KSM-3 were to carry a nuclear weapon, it would project an EMP field over all of the 48 contiguous United States.
North Korea is Iran's strategic partner and there is a treaty between the two countries that obligates the sharing of scientific and military technology.
As noted earlier, North Korea's military recently carried out what some have described as an attempted missile test from a submerged barge, an indication that an earlier test failure has not derailed its underwater missile program which North Korea continues to pursue, according to U.S. defense officials. (23)
Add to this looming North Korean missile capability and that of a super EMP weapon and the significance of the recent North Korean nuclear test comes into better focus. Like a geostrategic hurricane, a North Korean or Iranian EMP attack is gathering in strength.
In an address to the Atlantic Council last October, Admiral William Gortney, our Northcom Commander, responsible for defending America noted, "I agree with the intel community that we assess that they [the North Koreans] have the ability, they have the weapons, and they have the ability to miniaturize those weapons, and they have the ability to put them on a rocket that can range the [U.S.] homeland." (24)
We may have already seen what such an attack might look like.
For example, during the recent Gaza War, Hamas, the Syrian Electronic Army, and Iran made mass cyber-attacks, coordinated with massive missile strikes, on Israel's grid. Hamas launched over 5000 rockets and missiles against Israel. Prepared, Israel's cyber defenses defeated the cyber-attacks, and the missile defense system Iron Dome shot down all the missiles aimed at the Israeli grid. (25)
There are important lessons here. Missile and cyber defenses work: they are critically important parts of any national security strategy.
And Israel had also made a previous decision to harden its grid against threats by EMP attacks. The combined efforts of this crucial ally of ours gives us a roadmap to follow: robust missile defenses to defend the homeland from EMP armed missiles; cyber defenses to protect critical assets and the infrastructure; and EMP defenses to protect national security and defense assets and the electrical grid from attack.
Both the 2004 and 2008, EMP Commission reports urged America's leaders to protect against such threats as EMP. The House of Representatives has now passed the necessary legislation to protect the grid. The Senate has a champion-Senator Ron Johnson (R-WI), who has pledged to secure Senate passage.
But there are serious pressures working against its passage. Too many "experts" currently dismiss any such threat to the American homeland.
Just recently, for example, a former intelligence specialist in the US government, Paul Pilar, argued in The National Interest that Iranian ballistic missiles were "here to stay" and were simply elements of Iran's defenses - and, despite repeated Iranian calls for "Death to America," were no threat to the United States homeland or its overseas interests. (26)
Such conventional complacency, such as calling ISIS the jay-vee team, is not uncommon in Washington, D.C. The National Intelligence Estimate on Iran in 2007 argued that Iran had stopped all its nuclear weapons work in 2003 (27); the International Atomic Energy Administration has now determined that Iran's nuclear work had continued to at least 2009. (28)
Unfortunately, there is real-world experience-in Israel-- that such threats from missiles and cyber-attacks are constantly serious and looming: the entire job of an adversary is to look for weak spots to attack.
But there are always those who wish to downplay all threats and are reluctant even to invest in an "insurance premium."
The consequences of failing to protect America against such threats, however, will be far more serious than future embarrassment for some head-in-the-sand bureaucrats.
An EMP attack would shut down the country; lead to the loss of millions of lives, and set it back into effective defenselessness.
It is a threat as serious as any estimates of what a mushroom cloud at the height of the Cold War would have entailed. Instead it kills by sending the country back to what former Speaker Newt Gingrich has described as early 18th century America: people would not be able to function in even the simplest of ways. Buildings would be left standing but the ability to live in them would not. People would be unable to move about, eat, drink, shop or communicate.
It therefore requires our full attention, in this era of increased cyber, missile and nuclear sophistication, especially among enemies of the West, to see that an EMP attack never happens to the U.S. (29)
Peter Huessy is President of GeoStrategic Analysis of Potomac, Maryland , a defense and national security consulting firm.
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