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Tunisia's
Fragile Post-Revolutionary Order
North
African Turmoil
by Daniel Zisenwine
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2016 (view PDF)
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A
British tourist mourns at the site of one of Tunisia's worst acts of
terrorism, the murder of thirty-eight people at the seaside resort of
Sousse. Jihadism is on the upswing in Tunisia and threatens to
undermine the fragile political order that emerged in the aftermath of
the 2011 revolution.
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On June 26, 2015, a lone gunman attacked a beachfront hotel in the
Tunisian city of Sousse, exclusively targeting foreign tourists. By the
time he was shot to death by the security forces, the 23-year-old
Seifeddine Rezgui had murdered thirty-eight people, many of them British
tourists vacationing in the seaside resort.[1] The Islamic State of Iraq and
Syria (ISIS) quickly claimed responsibility for the atrocity.
One of the worst in Tunisian history, the attack occurred just over
three months after the killing of twenty-two people (including seventeen
foreign nationals) at the Bardo National Museum in the capital city of
Tunis.[2] While
both attacks were clearly aimed at Tunisia's tourist industry, a vital
source of foreign revenue that had been struggling to regain its footing
since the 2010-11 revolution, they also threatened to undermine Tunisia's
tenuous democratic system established in the years following the
revolution.[3]
Further endangering this system is the large number of young Tunisians
(estimated at several thousand) who have rushed to Syria and Iraq to join
the ranks of ISIS. There is much about which to be concerned, given the
untested capacity of
the country's new political structures to confront such widespread
jihadist activity (in addition to the host of other challenges faced). While
many Western governments aptly view Tunisia as a bright light in an
otherwise bleak regional landscape, it would be misleading to consider
post-revolutionary Tunisia a foolproof success story. In order to truly
succeed, the government will need to address many lingering economic and
political issues as well as inspire the younger generation and reduce the
appeal of violent jihadists
The 2011
Revolution and Its Aftermath
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A
Tunisian stamp honoring Muhammad Bouazizi, a 26-year- old fruit and
vegetable vendor, who set himself on fire in an act of protest in
December 2010. Deteriorating socioeconomic conditions along with
resentment against a corrupt regime unleashed a torrent of anger
against the government, and Bouazizi's protest ignited a revolution
that swept away a decades-old dictatorship.
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The uprising was triggered in December 2010 by the self-immolation of
Muhammad Bouazizi, a 26-year-old fruit and vegetable vendor from the
minor town of Sidi Bou Zid, who set himself on fire in front of the local
government offices in a desperate act of protest. While he was not the
first Tunisian to embrace such a desperate act,[4] his image reverberated across
diverse segments of Tunisian society. Mounting frustration over
deteriorating socioeconomic conditions, along with rising resentment
against a corrupt regime that seemed out of touch with the lives of
ordinary Tunisians unleashed a torrent of anger against the government.
Bouazizi was inaccurately presented on social media as an unemployed
university graduate, forced to sell produce to support his family. This
cyber image resonated with scores of young Tunisians, who, frustrated by
their stalled economic progress, identified with this fictional image.
Other segments of society sided with the frustrated, educated younger
generation. These included the population of peripheral towns like Sidi
Bou Zid, which took to the streets after Bouazizi's deed. Spontaneous
protests spread across the country, reaching the capital in early
January. Initial demands for social justice and improved economic
opportunities gave way to unprecedented calls for President Ben Ali to
step down. On January 13, 2011, the president delivered a televised
address to the nation, in which he claimed that he "understood"
the protesters, vowed to address their grievances and pledged not to seek
reelection. These statements did little to calm the demonstrators, who
returned to the streets of central Tunis the next day. By early evening
of January 14, Tunisia's media announced that Ben Ali and his family had
fled the country for Saudi Arabia where they received asylum.[5]
Tunisia has a tradition of
political moderation and compromise and a homogeneous, well-educated
society.
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News of Ben Ali's departure shocked the public. Few anticipated such
an outcome, and many feared for the country's internal stability. At
first, some of Ben Ali's cronies believed that political turmoil in the
country had ended with the president's flight, that their own positions
were secure, and that Tunisia would maintain its existing political
structure. That assumption was quickly proved false by angry protesters
who resumed their demonstrations, demanding that the Ben Ali regime be
completely dismantled. From the demonstrators' perspective, the Tunisian
revolution was far from over. As the protests intensified, the Tunisian
military refused to intervene or suppress the demonstrations. The
remaining officials of the Ben Ali regime ultimately relented; by early
March, the ruling Rassemblement Constitutionnel Démocratique party was
dismantled. A veteran Tunisian political figure, Beji Caid Essebsi, was
appointed interim prime minister, and the country embarked on a
transition process aimed at transforming the political system and
establishing democracy.[6]
A
Renaissance?
Tunisia's potential for restructuring its political system was
considered high, owing in large part to features specific to the country.
These include a tradition of political moderation and compromise and a
homogeneous, well-educated society. The fact that the military largely
removed itself from political life also suggested that, unlike other
countries, the armed forces would not intervene. But the obstacles the
country faced throughout the ensuing years were substantial and could
potentially have disrupted these efforts at any phase. Tunisia also came
under stress as a result of the revolution in nearby Libya, which sent
thousands of refugees into its territory. On the domestic front, there
was no guarantee that Tunisian society would be able to construct a
bottom-up democratic system and navigate a process that would avoid a
"winner takes all" mentality between rival political forces.[7]
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A
supporter waves the flag of the Islamist Ennahda party ahead of the
2011 elections. Ennahda, outlawed under the Ben Ali dictatorship, made
a strong initial showing in Tunisia's first democratic elections.
However, by 2013, with deepening economic issues, the party gave up
control of the government, and new elections were scheduled.
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Difficult relations between Tunisia's Islamists and the secular forces
that opposed them presented a major challenge to efforts to construct a
new political system. The Ben Ali regime had taken an uncompromising
position toward Islamist movements, particularly the most organized of
them, the Ennahda (Renaissance) faction, whose activities were banned
while thousands of its supporters and leaders had been imprisoned and
tortured. Some of its leaders had gone into exile abroad, including the
movement's leading figure, Rachid al-Ghannouchi.[8] There was no way of knowing how
the Islamist movement would fare under the changed political
circumstances of a post-revolutionary state.
Shortly after Ben Ali's flight, Ghannouchi indicated that he intended
to return to Tunisia and reenter the political fray. He reiterated his
more recent support for democracy and moderation, which contradicted his
earlier, radical utterances. Given Ennahda's effective absence from
public life for nearly twenty years, this was a political gamble on
Ghannouchi's part. In hindsight, he demonstrated a shrewd grasp of the
changed Tunisian political reality, and the enthusiastic welcome he
received upon his return suggested his calculated risk had panned out.[9] Within weeks, Ennahda emerged
as a leading post-revolutionary political force while other opposition
groups active in the Ben Ali era languished. Ennahda's opponents were
unable to offer a compelling ideological alternative to the Islamist
movement and lacked the organizational structure to compete with it.
Ennahda also established a widespread network of branches and offices,
utilized informal public spaces across the country via mosques, and
seemed poised to become a leading force in the emerging political
landscape.
The main focus of Tunisian politics in the latter months of 2011 was
the effort to organize elections for a National Constituent Assembly.
This assembly was to be entrusted with the task of framing a new
constitution and establishing a democratic political order. The concept
of free and transparent multiparty elections was unfamiliar to most
Tunisians while the technical challenges of arranging such a vote were
formidable.
Despite this, the October 2011 vote was conducted in an orderly
fashion and was not marred by overwhelming irregularities. The outcome
was, in many ways, a blessing in disguise for constructing a new
political system for Tunisia. No single party won a clear majority in the
Constituent
Assembly, which forced the leading parties to forge a coalition
government. The reality of operating in a coalition further induced the
need for political compromise.
Voters appreciated that the
Islamist Ennahda movement had not been "tainted" by
involvement with the former regime.
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Ennahda fared very well among the electorate, garnering the greatest
number of seats although not obtaining an outright majority. Voters
appreciated the fact that the Islamist movement had not been
"tainted" by involvement with the former regime and were
willing to endorse it. Many voters also found the movement's stance on
traditional values and its stated commitment to democracy appealing.
Ennahda would have undoubtedly preferred to govern without partners
but was forced to cooperate with others in an alliance of strange
bedfellows. Its secular opponents endorsed other new parties, such as the
left-leaning Congrés pour la république (CPR) led by veteran human rights
activist Moncef Marzouki, and the center-left Ettaktatol (Democratic
Forum for Labor and Liberties) party. The coalition government that
emerged after the vote placed CPR leader Marzouki in the presidential
palace while Ennahda was entrusted with leading the government, and
Ettakatol was chosen to fill the assembly speaker's position.[10]
Disenchantment
and Discontent
As the new government started its work, it immediately faced high—and
unrealistic—expectations for quick improvements in the country's material
situation. The economy, which had been faltering prior to 2011, was hard
hit by the revolution. Most Tunisians expected the new government to
provide immediate solutions to their economic plight, particularly in the
area of unemployment and rising costs of living. But as much as the new
government sought to revitalize the economy, its resources were limited.
Even more experienced politicians would have found it difficult to obtain
results in such a short period. As time went on, and with little
improvement in the country's economy, the public's view of the government
soured. Political tensions quickly emerged, clouding the transition
process further.
Public disappointment over the economic situation was compounded by
increased tensions between Ennahda and the secularists. Although the
Islamist party had failed to gain an outright majority in the 2011
elections, its strong showing emboldened its leaders. Ennahda sought to
leave its mark on the emerging constitution and political system and
considered itself to be in a good position to do so. Although its leaders
continued to profess a support for democracy, they also sought to inject
religious and traditional values into the debate on Tunisia's political
future. Their opponents accused them of insincerity and inconsistency
regarding democracy and for indirectly endorsing (or turning a blind eye
to) extremist jihadist elements that appeared to be gaining traction.[11]
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Nidaa
Tounes supporters celebrate a victory. The Nidaa Tounes party
galvanized anti-Ennahda voters, who resented the Islamists and had
tired of the revolutionary fervor that had engulfed the country. Nidaa
Tounes managed to gain 85 out of 217 seats in parliamentary elections
and more than 55 percent of the vote in a run-off presidential
election.
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It was no surprise then that this toxic brew of rising economic
discontent and political ferment progressed to violence. The
assassination of two secular, left-wing politicians in 2013 shocked the
Tunisian public and signified that the transition process was faltering.[12] Political assassinations had
been largely absent from the country's political history, and their
emergence in post-revolutionary Tunisia stoked fears that things were
spiraling out of control.
Ennahda's opponents increased their criticism of the Islamist-led
government, arguing that the movement was turning Tunisia into a
theocratic state. The secular-oriented public developed a stronger
infrastructure with the establishment of the Nidaa Tounes (Tunisia Calls)
party, led by Beji Caid Essebsi, the interim prime minister prior to the
2011 vote. The party soon vaulted to the forefront of anti-Islamist
politics as Essebsi successfully tapped into the sentiments of a
significant portion of the Tunisian public, which resented Ennahda and
had tired of the revolutionary fervor that had engulfed the country. The
veteran politician exhorted the public to restore Tunisia's republican
ideals and recreate the spirit that he claimed underscored the country's
early years of independence. Essebsi also strongly criticized Ennahda's
Islamist convictions, which he argued undermined the very ideals he was
seeking to revitalize. By 2013, the party had emerged as the rallying
point for Ennahda's opponents.
Public disappointment with the Islamist-led administration's overall
performance and a lack of progress in framing a new constitution provided
the backdrop to massive protests calling for the government's resignation
in the summer of 2013. These demonstrations were clearly inspired by
similar events in Egypt at that time, in which the Muslim Brotherhood-led
government was overthrown by the military, backed by massive public
protests in Cairo.
The differences exhibited by Egypt and Tunisia during their separate
transitional processes are instructive. Perhaps most glaring was the
complete absence of the military from the turmoil in Tunisia and its
noninterference in the political process. A second distinction was the
relative strength of Tunisian civil society groups in managing this process,
assuring that negotiations between rival sides over Tunisia's future
political system remained on track. The role of Tunisia's powerful trade
union was particularly instrumental in this regard.[13] Another factor was Ennahda's
apparent willingness—motivated more perhaps by cold political
calculations and a realistic appraisal of its own standing than by
inherent flexibility—to compromise at crucial moments.
Thus, the events in Egypt, where widespread protests against the Muslim
Brotherhood government ultimately evolved into a military intervention
reverberated in Tunisia without shaking it to its core. Ennahda's
opponents were clearly emboldened by the events to the east and were
determined to bring down the government. In the end, Ennahda agreed to
resign, provided that a timetable for new elections would be set, along
with one for completing the work on a new constitution. In so doing, it
averted a prolonged political crisis while guaranteeing it would remain a
key political player. Its decision also reflected the quest for stability
and consensual politics, which had historically underpinned Tunisian
politics.
The New
Constitution's Implementation
The crisis of 2013, which threatened to derail post-revolutionary
achievements, had been averted. A technocratic government led by Mehdi
Jomaa, a former industry leader who had served in the Ennahda-led
government, assumed responsibilities in September. As an interim,
caretaker government, the Jomaa administration did, nevertheless, seek to
improve the economic situation by reaching out to foreign investors and
helping to prepare the country for new elections.
Tunisia's success in ratifying a
constitution was attributed to the strength of its civil society and
the ability of rival groups to compromise.
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However, public pressure to reach an agreement over a new constitution
intensified in the autumn of 2013, and talks over these issues, with the
heavy involvement of the powerful trade unions, resumed. The lessons of
summer 2013, in which Tunisia appeared to be on the brink of collapse,
and the sense of urgency, which all parties shared, paved the way to an
agreement. By January 2014, the National Constituent Assembly approved
the draft of a new constitution. Tunisia's success in framing and
ratifying it was attributed to the strength of its civil society, along
with the ability of rival groups to compromise and maintain the country's
tradition of consensual politics.[14]
The new constitution provided the blueprint for a reconfigured
political system. It focused on a number of central issues, including the
status of Islam, which the constitution has now defined as the state
religion while simultaneously stating that the people are the source of
political legitimacy. Critics have argued that the constitution's
language in such matters was left intentionally vague in order to reach a
compromise and facilitate its release for final approval. They assert
that these vague definitions do not bode well for the country's political
future and that the potential for constitutional disputes is high.[15]
The constitution guaranteed civil
liberties including women's rights, something that Tunisia has
historically embraced.
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Such disagreements were to be adjudicated by a constitutional court,
perhaps the most important institution to be created in the new order.
The creation of such a body, entrusted with supervising other branches of
government and upholding the constitution, was unprecedented in the
country's history. Given the court's past lack of independence, the
extent of its ability to monitor, influence, and reject unconstitutional
developments remains an open question.[16] As with similar documents, the
constitution also guaranteed a wide range of civil liberties including a
special emphasis on women's rights, something that Tunisia has
historically embraced.[17]
The new constitution designated the president as the head of state and
granted him wide authority and responsibility in matters of foreign
policy and security. Concomitantly, the prime minister was given
exclusive responsibility over domestic affairs in a way that could
potentially put him on a collision course with the president. In an
effort to bolster the opposition's role, the
constitution stipulated that the parliament's powerful finance committee
would always be led by an opposition party. The political structure
outlined in the constitution, in sum, leaves a number of unsettled
questions that could undermine efforts to establish a secure democratic
polity. Most of these issues are expected to remain at the forefront of
Tunisia's political agenda in the years to come.
As 2014 drew to a close, Tunisia set out to choose new elected
officials as outlined in the constitution, including a new president and
parliament.[18]
But a sense of excitement or history-in-the-making did not materialize
during the campaign. Most voters expressed limited interest in the
competing parties and were indifferent to the candidates' efforts to fire
them up. This seemed to indicate that many Tunisians were dissatisfied
with the overall situation in the country and blamed the parties and
leaders that had been at the helm since 2011 for the unsatisfactory way
things had gone. Coalition leaders acknowledged their shortcomings while
at the same time asserting that they were being unfairly blamed for the
country's problems, which were complex and exceeded the capacity of any
political party.[19]
Coalition party leaders kept a low profile throughout the elections
season, opting to avoid confrontations with an angry populace.
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Tunisian
president Beji Caid Essebsi (left) and U.S. president Barack Obama shake
hands after a meeting in the White House, May 21, 2015. While Essebsi's
Nidaa Tounes party did well in recent campaigns, the movement's future
is unclear, with little beyond Essebsi's leadership to unite disparate
elements within the movement.
|
The one exception was the strong showing of the Nidaa Tounes party on
the campaign trail. The group galvanized anti-Ennahda voters, who felt
that they had found a voice that expressed their resentment with the
Islamists They were inspired by leader Essebsi's pledge to restore
Tunisia's former glory, viewing him as a responsible, experienced
authority able to shepherd the country out of its transitional stage and
inaugurate a new political order. Despite unanswered questions concerning
the party's long-term viability, many Tunisian voters, particularly in
the more prosperous coastal areas, endorsed it.[20] Nidaa Tounes managed to gain
85 out of 217 seats in the new parliament and more than 55 percent of the
vote in a run-off presidential election.
Ennahda leaders conceded defeat after the 2014 parliamentary
elections. Nevertheless, it would be inaccurate to conclude that the
Islamist party has been fully rejected by voters, having managed to
garner 69 parliament seats; it is expected to maintain its status as a
significant player in Tunisian politics.[21] After some initial hesitation,
Nidaa Tounes' leaders overcame their reservations and invited Ennahda to
join the government. The inclusion of the Islamist movement, even on a
minimal scale, preserved the possibility of continued Islamist-secular
political cooperation.
In the months following Essebsi's election, the new Tunisian
government set out to address immediate social and economic concerns.
Seeking to gain greater international support, Essebsi reached out to
Tunisia's foreign allies in an attempt to transform their verbal endorsements
into more concrete support. The highlight of these efforts was his visit
to the United States in May 2015, during which he met with President
Obama, lawmakers, and policy experts. During the visit, Essebsi also
publicized Tunisia's progress and future challenges in various media
appearances.[22]
One further important development has been the work of the country's
truth and reconciliation commission, entrusted with investigating cases
of torture and abuse carried out by the Ben Ali regime. Dealing with
these cases will presumably help Tunisian society turn the page and move
on from that dark chapter in its history.[23]
While Tunisia's political crisis has subsided, other challenges loom,
notably the large number of young Tunisians rushing to join ISIS's ranks
having embraced an extremist ideology that is very much at odds with the
prevailing norms of Tunisian politics and society.
Other challenges loom for Tunisia,
notably the large number of young Tunisians rushing to join ISIS.
|
The jihadist violence committed at Sousse and the Bardo Museum was a
shock to the national system. President Essebsi rushed to the seaside
resort and promised new security procedures to thwart future attacks.
Prime Minster Habib Essid announced further counterterrorism measures,
including the closure of mosques suspected of incitement as well as the
deployment of security forces around hotels and other tourist sites. On
July 4, 2015, fearing criticism of the government's
inability to provide sufficient security and avert attacks, President
Essebsi declared a state of emergency for a 30-day period, allowing
security forces to carry out raids against suspected targets and to keep
tabs on the media.[24]
By most accounts, the number of Tunisian foreign fighters is one of
the highest among those joining the conflicts in Syria and Iraq. More
than three thousand Tunisians, most of them men under the age of thirty,
have joined the battle. This flow is an unexpected and problematic
consequence of the 2011 revolution.[25]
Some have attributed the large number of Tunisian volunteers to the
impact of radical activists who took advantage of the post-revolutionary
environment, enabling them to operate freely among dislocated young
Tunisians.[26]
The families of these volunteers have claimed that they were naively
lured to Syria and Iraq with promises of high wages in return for their
services as well as for the glory of fighting for the sake of Islam. Many
of them ended up disappointed with the reality they met in battle but
have effectively been held captive by ISIS and other groups that
confiscated their passports and have not allowed them to leave.[27] Tunisian leaders have cited
the lack of economic progress and the stubbornly high unemployment rates,
combined with the impact of turmoil in neighboring Libya, as the driving
forces behind the Tunisian decampment to ISIS.[28] They have also asserted that
they have managed to prevent thousands of Tunisians from travelling to
ISIS battlegrounds and have argued that once economic and social
conditions improve, ISIS and other jihadi-oriented groups will lose their
appeal.[29]
While ISIS and its jihadist ideology have not yet attracted widespread
appeal among the general Tunisian public, the impact of the returning
"veterans" from Syria and Iraq remains a matter of concern.[30]
However, support for ISIS among young Tunisians appears to reflect a
genuine ideological void in post-revolutionary Tunisia. While economic
improvement could mitigate some of these groups' appeal,
post-revolutionary politics and society will need to offer a more
inspiring vision in order to meet the aspirations of younger Tunisians.
The traditional clamor for stability will have to be complemented by a
more compelling outlook for the country's future. For now, the jihadist
appeal remains a troubling by-product of Tunisia's revolution, suggesting
again that the country's journey is far from over.
Questioning
Tunisian Success
More than four years after its revolution, Tunisia has demonstrated
impressive progress in transitioning to a new state. It has successfully
framed a new constitution, held several elections largely bereft of
irregularities, and has certainly fared better in comparison to other
Arab states experiencing similar post-revolutionary transitions.
Tunisia has certainly fared better
than other Arab states experiencing similar post-revolutionary
transitions.
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The Economist nominated Tunisia as "country of the
year" in 2014, reflecting the Western appreciation of its recent
accomplishments.[31]
But critical voices challenge that view. This criticism does not dismiss
Tunisia's achievements but contends that the success paradigm disregards
a more complex social and political reality. These new voices assert that
many of Tunisia's venerable political and social foundations are a far
cry from Western conceptions of democracy and are at the heart of the
country's recent setbacks. Thus the traditional notions of consensus and
institutional continuity are the real driving forces behind Tunisia's
transition and are not in any way new. But critics warn that the quest
for stability was also commonly invoked during the Ben Ali era and was
ultimately used to justify many of the abuses associated with that
regime. Therefore, securing Tunisia's much-vaunted consensus in the
post-revolutionary era could result in stifling dissent and sanctifying
the status quo.[32]
Indeed, an assessment of Tunisian politics in the first months of 2015
raises doubts about the success of the country's transition and its
overall future. In the first few months of Essebsi's presidency, protests
and strikes broke out in the south, the Tunisian revolution's birthplace.
The government responded by promoting "unity" and "stability"
at the expense of recognizing the protesters' grievances. The composition
of the newly elected parliament, which is dominated by the more
right-wing, conservative parties, has stifled political debate and
alienated broad swaths of the population.[33] Conditions for a healthy,
pluralist, political order have not yet fully matured.
Despite the popularity of the Nidaa Tounes throughout the
parliamentary and presidential campaigns, its future remains unclear. The
party incorporated diverse political currents that had little in common
with each other except their opposition to Ennahda. During this period,
its internal ranks were in disarray with little beyond Essebsi's
leadership to unite them. Indeed, commentators asserted that too much of
the party's political fortunes were linked to Essebsi's persona while the
group's internal structures were weak.[34]
The recent terror attack in Sousse further compounds the country's
challenges. The announced state of emergency raises concerns over the
resurrection of a security state in the Ben Ali vein, in which the
government towers over all aspects of public life, and dissent is
effectively stifled.
In the political arena, the question is far from settled
over whether the present compromise between the more secular bloc led by
Nidaa Tounes and the Islamist Ennahda will be sufficient for charting
Tunisia's future. Pressing economic problems are at the top of the new
government's agenda, but the Tunisian political system needs to offer a
broader vision of the country's future in order to encourage large
segments of the population. The coming months should indicate whether
Tunisia will manage to address these challenges, or whether its new
political order will collapse. It is hoped that the country's Western
allies will assist it in various ways, but the ultimate decisions will
have to be made by Tunisians themselves. Despite these concerns, there is
still cause to be optimistic that Tunisia's history of moderation and
compromise will continue to guide the country as it opens a new chapter
in its history.
Daniel Zisenwine is a visiting
professor at Georgetown University's security studies program and the
author of The Emergence
of Nationalist Politics in Morocco (I.B.Tauis, 2010).
[1] The
New York Times, June 26, 2015; BBC News, June 27, 2015.
[2] The
New York Times, Mar. 18, 2015.
[3]
Larbi Sadiki, "Tunisia's
Constitution: Success Story?" al-Jazeera TV (Doha), Jan. 27,
2014; Alexis Arieff and Carla E. Humud, "Political Transition in
Tunisia," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., Oct. 22,
2014.
[4]
Another Tunisian street vendor, Abdesslem Trimech, set himself on fire on
Mar. 3, 2010; see Nouri Gana, "Introduction: Collaborative
Revolution," The Making of the Tunisian Revolution: Contents,
Architects, Prospects, ed. Nouri Gana (Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press, 2013), p. 12.
[5] Le
Monde (Paris), Jan. 5, 2011; Jean-Pierre Séréni, "Le
réveil tunisien," Jan. 6, 2011; The New York Times, Jan.
13,14, 2011; Le Monde, Jan. 14, 2011; BBC News, June 17,
2011; Olivier Piot, "De l'indignation à la revolution," Le
Monde Diplomatique (Paris), Feb. 2011.
[6] BBC News, Mar. 3, 2011;
Alexis Arieff, "Political Transition in Tunisia," Congressional
Research Service, Washington, D.C., Apr. 15, 2011.
[7]
Mehdi Mabrouk, "A Revolution for Dignity and Freedom: Preliminary
Observations on the Social and Cultural Background to the Tunisian
Revolution," Journal of North African Studies, no. 4, 2011,
pp. 625-35.
[8]
Michael Collins Dunn, "The Al-Nahda Movement in Tunisia: From
Renaissance to Revolution," Islamism and Secularism in North
Africa, ed. John Ruedy (Washington: Georgetown University Press,
1994), pp. 149-65.
[9]
Mahan Abedin, "Tunisia: Islamist Leader Returns from Exile: An
Interview with Rashid al-Ghannouchi," Le Monde Diplomatique
(English ed.), Jan. 2011.
[10]
Al-Jazeera TV, Nov. 10, 14, 2011; "National
Constituent Assemble Elections in Tunisia, Oct. 23, 2011, Final
Report," The National Democratic Institute, Washington, D.C.;
al-Jazeera TV, Nov. 19, 2011; Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "Historic
Departure or Temporary Marriage? The Left-Islamist Alliance in
Tunisia," Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, no. 3, 2012, pp.
196-207; Rikke Hostrup Hangbølle and Francesco Cavatorta, "Beyond
Ghannouchi: Islamism and Social Change in Tunisia," Middle East
Report, Spring 2012.
[11]
Nouri Gana, "Postscript: Preserving the Exemplar," in The
Making of the Tunisian Revolution, pp. 291-8.
[12] The
New York Times, Feb. 7, 2013; Marina Ottaway, "Learning Politics
in Tunisia," Viewpoints, Wilson Center, Washington, D.C.,
Apr. 2013; NPR News, July 25, 2013.
[13]
Sarah Chayes, "How
a Leftist Labor Union Helped Force Tunisia's Political Settlement,"
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C., Mar. 27,
2014.
[14]
Sami Zemmi, "The Extraordinary Politics of the Tunisian Revolution:
The Process of Constitution-Making," Mediterranean Politics,
Mar. 2015, pp. 1-17; Duncan Pickard, "Prospects for Implementing
Democracy in Tunisia," Mediterranean Politics, June 2014, pp.
259-64.
[15]
Amna Guellali, "The
Problem with Tunisia's New Constitution," World Policy Blog,
Feb. 3, 2014; Sarah Mersch, "Tunisia's Compromise
Constitution," Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
Washington, D.C., Jan. 21, 2014.
[16]
Duncan Pickard, "Tunisia's
New Constitutional Court," Issue in Focus, Apr. 2015.
[17]
Mounira M. Charrad and Amina Zarrugh, "Equal or Complementary? Women
in the New Tunisian Constitution after the Arab Spring," Journal
of North African Studies, Summer 2014, pp. 230-40.
[18] Duncan
Pickard, "Tunisian Politics after Constitution Making," Muftah,
Apr. 22, 2014.
[19]
Daniel Tavana and Alex Russell, "Previewing Tunisia's
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections," Project on Middle
East Democracy, Washington, D.C., Oct. 2014.
[20]
Anne Wolf, "The Future of Tunisia's Nidaa Tounes Party," Middle
East Institute, Washington, D.C., July 25, 2014.
[21]
Intissar Fakir, "Tunisia's
Election: Ennahda vs. Nidaa Tounes," Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, Oct. 23, 2014; BBC News, Oct. 30, Dec. 23,
2014.
[22] The
New York Times, May 18, 2015; Tamara Coffman Wittes, "Security
Interests Overshadow Tunisia's President Essebsi in Washington,"
Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C., May 19, 2015.
[23] The
New York Times, May 19, 28, 2015.
[24]
Ibid., July 4, 2015.
[25]
Ibid., Oct. 24, 2014.
[26]
Oussama Romdhani, "North
Africa: Beyond Jihadist Radicalization," World Affairs, Jan./Feb.
2015.
[27] The
Washington Post, Oct. 28, 2014.
[28] The
New York Times, Aug. 9, 2015.
[29] Paris
Match, Mar. 22, 2015.
[30] The
New York Times, Sept. 12, Oct. 24, 2014; Romdhani, "North
Africa: Beyond Jihadist Radicalization."
[31] The
Economist, Dec. 20, 2014.
[32]
Nadia Marzouki and Hamzah Meddeb, "Tunisia: Democratic Miracle or
Mirage?" Jadaliyya, Arab Studies Institute, Washington, D.C.,
June 11, 2015; Raphaël Lefévre, "Tunisia: A Fragile Political
Transition," Journal of North African Studies, Summer 2015,
pp. 307-11.
[33]
Alexis Arieff and Carla Humud, "Political Transition in
Tunisia," Congressional Research Service, Washington, D.C., Feb. 10,
2015.
[34]
Tavana and Russell, "Tunisia's
Parliamentary and Presidential Elections"; "Legislative and
Presidential Elections in Tunisia, Final Report," The Carter Center,
Atlanta, May 28, 2015.
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