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Top Stories
WSJ:
"The first round of talks on implementing last month's
confidence-building nuclear deal between Iran and six major powers will
take place at experts level in Vienna next week, a spokesman for European
Union foreign policy chief Catherine Ashton said Tuesday. The spokesman,
Michael Mann, said the dates of the talks hadn't yet been confirmed, but
AFP cited Iran's Foreign Ministry spokeswoman as saying the talks will
take place Dec. 9-10. There are a series of issues that need to be
dealt with in the discussions, including when the deal can come into
force and how the easing of U.S. and European sanctions will be
organized." http://t.uani.com/1gBgUMF
Reuters:
"It was a flourishing packing business in Iran's historic city of
Isfahan, but the last two years of harsh economic sanctions brought the
family enterprise to its knees. Owner Gholam Dolatmardian struggled to
raise the funds to keep going but finally succumbed to the inevitable,
laying off his 100-strong workforce and closing the doors of the once
prosperous factory. The prospects for a revival of his business and those
of thousands of others may depend on an interim nuclear accord reached
between Iran and world powers last week. The deal has allowed those
Iranians seeking greater foreign contact and the economic opportunities
it brings to see a glimmer of hope for the first time in years. But
Iranians' enthusiasm about the accord has been tempered by its complexity
and expected gradual implementation, which puts off relief from
restrictions on banking, trade and international travel that ordinary
Iranians seek most." http://t.uani.com/18jpgTW
Times of Israel:
"The secret back channel of negotiations between Iran and the United
States, which led to this month's interim deal in Geneva on Iran's rogue
nuclear program, has also seen a series of prisoner releases by both
sides, which have played a central role in bridging the distance between
the two nations, the Times of Israel has been told. In the most dramatic
of those releases, the US in April released a top Iranian scientist,
Mojtaba Atarodi, who had been arrested in 2011 for attempting to acquire
equipment that could be used for Iran's military-nuclear programs.
American and Iranian officials have been meeting secretly in Oman on and
off for years, according to a respected Israeli intelligence analyst,
Ronen Solomon... Detailing what he termed the 'unwritten prisoner
exchange deals' agreed over the years in Oman by the US and Iran, Solomon
told The Times of Israel that 'It's clear what the Iranians got' with the
release of top scientist Atarodi in April. 'What's unclear is what the US
got.' The history of these deals, though, he said, would suggest that in
the coming months Iran will release at least one of three US citizens who
are currently believed to be in Iranian custody. One of these three is
former FBI agent Robert Levinson." http://t.uani.com/Iqd4ua
Sanctions
Bloomberg:
"NITC, the Tehran-based company that is the biggest owner of
supertankers, said it's hopeful that last month's agreement between Iran
and world powers will eventually lead to an easing of sanctions on its
fleet... 'We hope that the recent developments reached on political
levels will ease restrictions on our fleet and will smooth business
grounds for those who are willing to work with us,' NITC Chairman Ali
Safaei said in an e-mail today... NITC has a fleet of 37 very large crude
carriers, which can typically hold about 2 million barrels of oil,
according to Clarkson Plc, the biggest shipbroker." http://t.uani.com/18jqgYa
Terrorism
Free Beacon:
"A U.S. district court has awarded millions in Iranian government
funds to five American families who were victims of an Iranian-backed
suicide bombing, despite objections from Tehran and the U.S. Department
of Justice. The Nov. 27 ruling, which allows the American victims of a
1997 terrorist attack in Jerusalem to recover more than $9 million from a
U.S.-based defense contractor that worked with Iran, was hailed as a
precedent-setting case by the victims' legal counsel... Iran has been
accused of providing material support and resources to Hamas, which
carried out the 1997 double suicide bombing on the Ben Yehuda pedestrian
mall in Jerusalem. Five people, including three young girls, were killed
in the attack, and many others were injured." http://t.uani.com/IE28ZK
Foreign Affairs
AP:
"Iran's foreign ministry on Tuesday asked Afghanistan not to sign a
security deal with the U.S. that could keep thousands of American and
allied forces in its neighboring country for another decade. The request
comes ahead of an expected visit to Iran next week by Afghan President
Hamid Karzai, who has endorsed the deal but introduced new conditions
before approving it and deferred its signature to his successor in next
April's elections. Iranian ministry spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham said the
'Islamic Republic of Iran does not consider the signing and approval of
the pact useful for the long term expedience and interests of
Afghanistan.' She added that 'we think approval and implementation of the
deal will have negative effects on the trend of regional issues.'" http://t.uani.com/1hvtOPn
WSJ:
"The U.K.'s new nonresident envoy to Iran will travel to Tehran
Tuesday for talks with his counterpart, the first visit by a British
diplomat to the country since late 2011, when the British embassy in the
Iranian capital was overrun by protesters, the British government said
Monday. Foreign Secretary William Hague announced the visit via his
regular Twitter account, adding, 'We'll improve U.K.-Iran ties on a
step-by-step, reciprocal basis.' ... The British government had signaled
its intention to mend diplomatic ties with Tehran with the appointment of
Ajay Sharma as the U.K.'s nonresident chargé d'affaires to Iran earlier
in November. The move, which was matched by the appointment of a
counterpart in Iran, aims to enable the two countries to hold regular
discussions on a range of issues, including conditions under which their
respective embassies could be reopened." http://t.uani.com/1eLjWNd
Opinion
& Analysis
Henry Kissinger & George Schultz in WSJ:
"As former secretaries of state, we have confronted the existential
issue of nuclear weapons and negotiated with adversaries in attempts to
reduce nuclear perils. We sympathize with the current administration's
quest to resolve the Iranian nuclear standoff through diplomacy. We write
this article to outline the options as we see them emerging from the interim
agreement for a policy based on the principle of 'trust and verify.' ...
For 35 years and continuing today, Iran has been advocating an
anti-Western concept of world order, waging proxy wars against America
and its allies in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and beyond, and arming and
training sectarian extremists throughout the Muslim world. During that
time, Iran has defied unambiguous U.N. and IAEA demands and proceeded
with a major nuclear effort, incompatible with any exclusively civilian
purpose, and in violation of its obligations under the Non-Proliferation
Treaty in effect since 1970. If the ruling group in Iran is genuinely
prepared to enter into cooperative relations with the United States and
the rest of the world, the U.S. should welcome and encourage that shift.
But progress should be judged by a change of program, not of tone. The
heart of the problem is Iran's construction of a massive nuclear
infrastructure and stockpile of enriched uranium far out of proportion to
any plausible civilian energy-production rationale. Iran amassed the
majority of this capacity-including 19,000 centrifuges, more than seven
tons of 3.5%- to 5%-enriched uranium, a smaller stock (about 196
kilograms) of 20%-enriched uranium, and a partly built heavy-water
reactor that will be capable of producing plutonium-in direct violation
of IAEA and Security Council resolutions... The record of this
decade-plus negotiating effort combines steadily advancing Iranian
nuclear capabilities with gradually receding international demands... The
interim agreement reached on Nov. 24, though described by all sides as
temporary, thus represents a crucial test of whether the seemingly
inexorable progress to an Iranian military nuclear capability can be
reversed... Until now, the U.N. resolutions and IAEA directives have
demanded an immediate halt to all activities related to uranium
enrichment and plutonium production, and unconditional compliance with an
IAEA inspections regime as a matter of right. Under the interim
agreement, Iranian conduct that was previously condemned as illegal and
illegitimate has effectively been recognized as a baseline, including an
acceptance of Iran's continued enrichment of uranium (to 5%) during the
agreement period. And that baseline program is of strategic significance.
For Iran's stockpile of low-enriched uranium is coupled with an
infrastructure sufficient to enrich it within a few months to
weapons-grade, as well as a plausible route to producing weapons-grade
plutonium in the installation now being built at Arak. Not surprisingly,
the Iranian negotiator, upon his return to Tehran, described the
agreement as giving Iran its long-claimed right to enrich and, in effect,
eliminating the American threat of using force as a last resort. In these
circumstances, the major American negotiating leverage-the threatened
reimposition and strengthening of sanctions-risks losing its edge. For
individuals, companies and countries (including some allied countries),
the loss of business with Iran has been economically significant. Most
will be less vigilant about enforcing or abiding by sanctions that are
the subject of negotiations and that seem to be 'on the way out.' This
risk will be enhanced if the impression takes hold that the U.S. has
already decided to reorient its Middle East policy toward rapprochement
with Iran. The temptation will be to move first, to avoid being the last
party to restore or build trade, investment and political ties.
Therefore, too, the proposition that a series of interim agreements
balancing nuclear constraints against tranches of sanctions relief is
almost certainly impractical. Another tranche would spell the end of the
sanctions regime. It will need to be part of a final agreement... The
danger of the present dynamic is that it threatens the outcome of Iran as
a threshold nuclear weapons state. If the six-month 'freeze' period
secured in Geneva is to be something other than a tactical pause on
Iran's march toward a military nuclear capability, Iran's technical
ability to construct a nuclear weapon must be meaningfully curtailed in
the next stipulated negotiation through a strategically significant
reduction in the number of centrifuges, restrictions on its installation
of advanced centrifuges, and a foreclosure of its route toward a
plutonium-production capability. Activity must be limited to a plausible
civilian program subject to comprehensive monitoring as required by the
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Any final deal must ensure the world's ability
to detect a move toward a nuclear breakout, lengthen the world's time to
react, and underscore its determination to do so. The preservation of the
global nuclear nonproliferation regime and the avoidance of a Middle East
nuclear-arms race hang in the balance... The next six months of diplomacy
will be decisive in determining whether the Geneva agreement opens the
door to a potential diplomatic breakthrough or to ratifying a major
strategic setback. We should be open to the possibility of pursing an
agenda of long-term cooperation. But not without Iran dismantling or
mothballing a strategically significant portion of its nuclear
infrastructure." http://t.uani.com/ICeaCx
Walter Pincus in
WashPost: "Iran has the capacity to build a nuclear
weapon, but its leadership 'has not yet decided to build or demonstrate
the bomb' and 'therefore our [U.S.] focus should be on convincing them
not to flip the bomb-production switch.' That's advice from Siegfried
Hecker, director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 to 1997.
He offered his insight in an interview on the Geneva P5 plus 1 interim
agreement with Iran that was published Wednesday by Stanford University's
Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC). Hecker added,
'Completely getting rid of the [Iranian] bomb option is not possible
through military action or sanctions with political pressure. The only
chance is through diplomatic means.' His is a little-publicized view, and
one I share: that what brought Iran to the table was not just tough
economic sanctions, but also that the Tehran regime has reached its
desired nuclear capabilities - and now is ready to negotiate... Hecker
also has been involved in the so-called Track II diplomacy with Tehran.
He was among a U.S. group that met with Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad
Javad Zarif and his diplomatic team in September, after the United
Nations General Assembly session. The team included nuclear specialists.
Iran, Hecker said, has done 'most of the work necessary to build nuclear
weapons,' meaning researching the arming devices and delivery vehicles. He
believes this in part because Tehran 'has not satisfactorily explained
nor given access to work and sites suspected of past nuclear
weapons-related activities.' Hecker is talking about Parchin, a military
complex 18 miles southeast of Tehran where, according to a 2011
International Atomic Energy Agency report, there were high-explosive and
hydrodynamic tests that could have been related to nuclear weapons. IAEA
inspectors haven't had access to Parchin over the past two years. Hecker
said he believes that 'Iran's extensive missile development and testing
program also points to Tehran pursuing the option of missile-deliverable
nuclear weapons.' The only thing needed up to now has been the capacity
to build enough weapons-grade uranium, which, Hecker said, 'I believe
they now have.' So what's his suggestion to freeze the program? 'We need
to make it clear to the Iranian regime [leaders] that they are better off
without pursuing the bomb. This will take time,' he said. And what's
going to bring those leaders around? Hecker says that 'if Iran wants
nuclear energy and relations with the West, I believe we need nuclear
integration, no isolation, such as those peaceful programs in South Korea
and Japan.' That means living with a nuclear-capable Iran whose enrichment
program is limited to a grade of 5 percent for generating power or
research and sharply reducing to below 5,000 its number of centrifuges,
which do the enrichment. All this must be open to continuous IAEA
inspection. In short, trust but verify. Whether this can be accomplished
in the upcoming negotiations remains to be seen." http://t.uani.com/1hvvhVY
Emily Landau in
INSS: "Now that negotiations with Iran have produced
an interim deal, the North Korean model comes into sharper relief.
Negotiations with North Korea over the past two decades produced a number
of agreements that were ultimately not upheld by North Korea. The most
notable was the deal struck in September 2005 whereby North Korea
committed to abandon its nuclear program and pursue nuclear disarmament
in return for economic and energy assistance. But the deal never
materialized - North Korea tested its first nuclear device the following
year, and since then has continued on a path of nuclear defiance despite
additional attempts to restart negotiations. The North Korean model thus
demonstrates that when trying to stop a determined proliferator,
regardless of whether the approach is negotiations or military force, the
challenge is the same: to get the determined proliferator to back away
from military aspirations and return to its NPT commitments. As such, it
is always a game of compellence... The experience of dealing with North
Korea underscores the importance of the economic leverage that the P5+1
finally gained over Iran in 2012, following the set of strong and
effective economic and financial sanctions that the US and EU put in
place. The military option is also still realistic enough to be on the
table seriously. If this leverage is squandered in return for anything
less than very significant nuclear concessions by Iran, the Iranian case
will very likely begin looking more and more like North Korea, with the
international community increasingly powerless to stop it. Two additional
models highlight another important lesson for those trying to negotiate a
deal with Iran: Libya (2003) and Syria (2013). The lesson of these two
cases is that when pressure succeeds in forcing a state to actually make
the decision to reverse course - Libya regarding all WMD, and Syria
regarding its chemical weapons - it does not take years to finalize a
deal. Indeed, the details can be worked out very quickly, and the process
can begin almost immediately. In the Syrian case, for example, no one
contends that the rollback is not final because the knowhow to make
chemical weapons is still in the minds of Syrian scientists, an argument
that has lately been thrown into the Iranian debate. When a state makes a
genuine decision to roll back its program, these arguments are irrelevant
- they are only raised when that decision has not been taken. Until Iran
makes the strategic decision to reverse course in the nuclear realm,
there is little chance that a true and lasting deal will be achieved.
Continued pressure is the only key - keeping an eye firmly on the
leverage is, therefore, the only hope the P5+1 have to compel Iran to
finally make that choice." http://t.uani.com/IqeR2g
Emanuele Ottolengh
& Saeed Ghasseminejad in the National Post: "If
any proof was needed that the nuclear compromise hammered out in Geneva
last month between Iran and the six world powers is a mistake, look no
further than the psychological impact it had on Iran's sanctions'
battered economy. Evidence of such boost is already available: Within
hours, Iran's currency, the Rial, appreciated by 5% and shares of petrochemical
companies soared on Tehran's Stock Exchange, a sure sign that the
agreement provides an economic lifeline to the Iranian regime in exchange
for no meaningful or irreversible concessions. Rather than claiming that
the international community is offering modest and reversible sanctions'
relief to Iran, Western negotiators should be more candid and admit that
theirs is a self-defeating proposition. The main beneficiaries will not
be the ordinary Iranians for which Western policymakers constantly express
concern when they fret about their own sanctions' impact. The benefits
will instead flow to Iran's military-industrial complex, the Iranian
Revolutionary Guards' Corps (IRGC) and the Supreme Leader - those most
invested in the nuclear program and least inclined to renounce their
nuclear quest for economic incentives. By relaxing sanctions against the
petrochemical and automotive industries, the United States and Europe are
giving them a cash bonanza. By committing themselves to no
nuclear-related sanctions in the six-month interim period established by
the agreement, Western governments will also enable Iran to exponentially
expand the impact of sanctions' relief. In practice, the deal authorizes
business with the sanctioned IRGC through the backdoor. Take the
petrochemical sector - a key export area for Iran but also a sensitive
industry due to the dual-use nature of the technology it requires.
Military involvement in this sector is mainly through the Parsian Oil and
Gas Company (POGC), which is controlled by the IRGC through Ghadir
Investment Company (80.18%), the Bahman Group (1.1%) and Kia Mahestan
Company (1.66%), with a total market value of approximately
$3.83-billion. The IRGC also controls Pardis Petrochemical (worth
$2-billion), Kermanshah Petrochemical worth ($527-million) and Shiraz
Petrochemical (worth $922-million). The price tag for IRGC-controlled
assets in the petrochemical industry is $7.3b-illion. Add to that Pars
Oil and Behran Oil, the two companies controlled by the Supreme Leader through
Rey Investment Group, Tadbir Group and the Mostazafan Foundation, which
are worth a total of $625-million. Since Iran's petrochemical sector is
worth almost $25-billion; in practice, one third of the industry -
$8-billion - is controlled by the two Iranian centres of power in charge
of nuclear proliferation. The car industry is no less problematic -
although U.S. sanctions against the automotive sector did not
specifically target it on non-proliferation grounds, Iran has used it to
procure needed items and materials for its nuclear and ballistic missile
programs over the years. Khodro and Saipa, the two main players in the
car industry, are government-controlled; their procurement networks raise
concerns, given that the car industry, much like the petrochemical
industry, relies on sensitive dual-use technology and raw
materials." http://t.uani.com/1hvz2KZ
David Keyes in The
Daily Beast: "Human rights are the biggest victim of
the Iranian nuclear deal announced last week. In the name of nuclear
cooperation, the West has abandoned the issue of human rights inside
Iran. It is no wonder so many democracy activists have a hard time
trusting America. Just as occurred with the Libyan nuclear deal, Iran's
cooperation on its nuclear program means that the free world will loosen
pressure on a brutal regime. While the nuclear issue is important, it
cannot be allowed to trump human rights. Ultimately it is the regime
which is the most dangerous, not the particular weapons they choose to
kill with. Our disappointment is shared by many Iranians hoping for a
better future. Consider the fact that as President Obama announced the
nuclear deal, he did not mention human rights even once. Hundreds of
journalists, bloggers and dissidents remain behind bars. The leader of the
free world missed a golden opportunity to speak up on their behalf.
Sadly, human rights have been almost entirely absent during the Iran
negotiations. How many times were the names of political prisoners such
as Majid Tavakoli or Shiva Ahari raised? How often were improvements in
human rights linked to the nuclear issue? Seemingly not at all. By
contrast, a former American arms negotiator with the Soviets told one of
us that in the 1980s, during every negotiation he had with the USSR, the
names of three dissidents-Andrei Sakharov, Natan Sharansky and Yuri
Orlov-were brought up as proof that the Soviets could not be trusted. The
1974 Jackson-Vanik amendment directly linked most favored nation status
to the Soviet Union to improvements in human rights. The deal with the
Iranian government will give them a free hand to repress activists and
keep political prisoners behind bars. The regime will now say if America
does not want to jeopardize the nuclear deal, then it must remain silent
on human rights. They will claim that repression of dissidents is an
'internal affair.' It is not. Human rights are universal." http://t.uani.com/1bcCaHF
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Eye on Iran is a periodic news summary from United Against
Nuclear Iran (UANI) a program of the American Coalition Against Nuclear
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email Press@UnitedAgainstNuclearIran.com
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