Please take a moment to
visit and log in at the subscriber
area, and submit your city & country location. We will use this
information in future to invite you to any events that we organize in
your area.
The
Two-State Delusion
by Mordechai Nisan
Middle East Quarterly
Winter 2014
  Be the first of
your friends to like this.
Two decades after the signing of the declaration of principles (DOP)
by Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) on the White
House lawn, there is something unreasonable in the world's continued
adherence to the Oslo paradigm, tattered and battered as it is by years
of a bloody fiasco. The Palestinian Arab leadership has consistently and
adamantly rejected the two-state solution since its first articulation in
1937 by the British Peel commission[1]
and has, as consistently, advocated the destruction of the Jewish state.
Still, it undertook a successful public relations campaign in the 1980s
promoting the notion of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and the Gaza
Strip—"the occupied territories."
|
Twenty years of
Oslo, filled with optimism and enthusiasm and adorned with Nobel
prizes, like the ones held here by Arafat, Peres and Rabin (l-r) have
delivered no peace for either side of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
Firmly entrenched in its place, however, is a textbook example of
cognitive dissonance written on a grand political scale, as the failed
Oslo paradigm is revived again and again.
|
Over the years and especially in the wake of the DOP, the Palestinian
demand for statehood has gained rapid political momentum and
international acceptance. A succession of Israeli prime ministers—from
Shimon Peres, to Ehud Barak, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Olmert, and Binyamin
Netanyahu—embraced the idea, as did U.S. presidents Bill Clinton, George
W. Bush, and Barack Obama. The paradigm for a final peace includes among
its primary components Israeli territorial withdrawal and Palestinian
sovereignty, political separation with reconciliation, compromise, and
coexistence.
Yet twenty years on, the two parties find themselves further apart
despite years of diplomatic wrangling. It is thus past time to examine
and invalidate the paradigm that has taken hold in the hope that a new
and less sanguinary one will take root.
A History of
Failure
The concept of a Palestinian state appears just and reasonable. It
evolves from the notion of a right to national self-determination for the
stateless Palestinian people and their demand to end an Israeli presence
in the territories captured in 1967. The terminology of decolonization
regarding Jews who have settled in those territories fits this narrative
of thwarted native Palestinian rights; ending the "illegality"
of Israeli rule over the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem is
a global political stipulation for conflict-resolution. From the November
1988 resolution in Algiers that called for Palestinian independence to
the extensive diplomatic campaign of September 2011 to promote
Palestinian statehood at the United Nations, the PLO dramatically altered
the political parameters of the conflict and its resolution. In sketching
the two-state solution of Israel and Palestine as representing
complementary rather than contradictory elements in the puzzle of
peace-making, values of equality and freedom radiated from both sides.
The Palestinian state idea had been proposed repeatedly in the
post-1967 era,[2]
and its feasibility, viability, and desirability were analyzed and
advocated again and again. The idea was central to the Arab-originated
Fahd plan of 1981 and the Fez plan of 1982 and was reintroduced two
decades later in 2002 by the Saudis as the Beirut peace plan. On the
Jewish side, the nongovernmental Council for Peace and Security founded
in 1988 was book-ended by the so-called Geneva initiative of 2003—headed
by two failed politicians, Yossi Beilin and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak—with
centrist Labor and leftist political parties contributing their own details
along the way, all promoting a Palestinian state alongside Israel. The
two-state solution emerged within PLO circles in 1988 when Bassam Abu
Sharif, a political advisor to Arafat, presented a position paper on the
theme.[3]
However, when the Oslo accords between Israel and the PLO were signed
in September 1993, there was no explicit mention that the peace process
would culminate in a Palestinian state. Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin, who
had in 1974 rejected the notion of a "third state" between
Israel and Jordan,[4]
had reiterated this position in an autobiographical work in 1979,
contending that a Palestinian "mini-state" in the West Bank and
Gaza Strip would serve as a stage toward the "secular, democratic
state of Palestine" that would rise "on the ruins of the state
of Israel."[5]
Four years before concluding the historic agreement with Arafat at the
White House, Rabin asserted that a Palestinian state would be a time-bomb
for chaos and warfare,[6]
and even with the establishment of the Palestinian Authority (PA) in
1994, it remained Rabin's belief that the final version of the
Palestinian entity must be less than a sovereign state.[7]
With that said, Palestinian sovereignty was, nevertheless, anticipated
as the end-product of the Oslo process. Israel had acknowledged
Palestinian peoplehood and rights in the 1978 Camp David-negotiated
framework agreement for Middle East peace. It then recognized the
Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993, agreed to the founding of the
PA and its police force in 1994, and implemented territorial withdrawals
from towns and rural areas in Judea-Samaria and Gaza in 1994-97. The International
Donors' Committee provided billions of dollars in aid to the PA, which
established institutions for what could be termed a state in formation.
Binyamin Netanyahu, leader of the opposition Likud Party in 1993, said he
would abrogate the Oslo accords, but as prime minister in 1996, he failed
to do so.[8] The
Hebron protocol of January 1997 and the Wye River memorandum of October
1998 demonstrated that Netanyahu operated within the Oslo paradigm for
peace by relinquishing Israeli control over land, which was linked to
explicit Palestinian obligations such as combating terrorist
organizations and preventing incitement. Soon afterward, the Israeli
government cancelled additional withdrawals because the PLO did not
fulfill its commitments but not because Jerusalem dispensed with the Oslo
idea.
Faith in Oslo did not dissolve even when failure struck over and over
again. In July 2000 at the Camp David summit, Ehud Barak offered Arafat
Palestinian statehood with control over approximately 92 percent of the
West Bank and the Gaza Strip and a political capital in the vicinity of
Jerusalem. But Arafat spurned the offer, and a reign of terror and
suicide-bombing ensued.
Despite the basic breakdown of diplomacy and although U.S. Middle East
envoy Dennis Ross admitted that Oslo had failed, he remained
convinced—having written eight hundred pages of close text detailing the
intricacies, efforts, obstacles, formulae, and setbacks regarding
"the missing peace"—that "there is room for creative
diplomacy."[9]
Should failure not have brought about a reevaluation and some change in
policy orientation?
In January 2002, President Bush called for an "end to occupation
and [for] a peaceful democratic Palestinian state" as the
prescription for peace, a formula endorsed a year later by the
international "Quartet" (the United States, Russia, the
European Union, and the United Nations). Another year later, Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon also hitched onto the Palestinian state bandwagon
as did his successors in Jerusalem—Olmert and Netanyahu—a few years
hence. Yet negotiations, such as those between Olmert and PA president
Mahmoud Abbas in the latter part of 2007, dragged on without results. The
plethora of issues—from settlements and prisoners, to Palestinian
institutions in East Jerusalem, to the Fatah/Hamas split—preoccupied and
confounded the Israeli-Palestinian discussions without any satisfactory
conclusion.[10]
On May 19, 2011, President Barack Obama affixed his name to the
distinguished roster of supporters of a Palestinian state by advocating
that "the borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the
1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps."[11] Netanyahu reacted sharply that
the Palestinian state could not come at the "expense of Israeli
existence," affirming that the 1967 borders were
"indefensible."[12]
This set the political stage for a dispute between Washington and
Jerusalem and assured that Israeli-Palestinian negotiations were not
likely to renew soon. The Oslo paradigm was frozen: There were to be no
negotiations, no Palestinian recognition of a Jewish state, and no peace
in the offing. The three "nos" on Israel formulated at the 1967
Khartoum Arab summit—no negotiations, no recognition, and no peace—had
been transformed and reformulated with their political core unchanged.[13]
Twenty years of the Oslo process filled with optimism and enthusiasm,
adorned with Nobel prizes, grand summitry, and historic declarations that
peace was "just around the corner" have delivered no peace.
Firmly entrenched in its place, however, is a textbook example of
cognitive dissonance written on a grand political scale. A final status
agreement should have been consummated by 1999, five years following the
"Gaza-Jericho First" stage in 1994, but neither Rabin's
assassination in 1995 nor the murder of 1,084 Israelis from September
2000 to October 2010 (along with 250 from 1993 until July 2000)[14] could quash efforts at
advancing the process. True believers continue to argue that once a
Palestinian state in the territories is established, the Oslo paradigm
will be validated. For those afflicted with "Osloitis," when
the evidence counters their utopian paradigm, the bearer of bad news is
defamed rather than commended for contributing to an alternative
conceptual construct.
Oslo's
Unaddressed Fallacies
At the heart of the failed Oslo paradigm are a core group of fallacies
that have been promoted as truths: that the land can sustain two opposing
population groups; that the Arab goal of destroying Israel can be
appeased through "painful concessions" (rather than defeated by
an Israeli victory); and that this is not a conflict based on something
as elemental and incendiary as religion. Not one can withstand close
scrutiny.
Geopolitical conflict is frequently a function of a dearth of
resources and cannot be resolved by a mere wish for human harmony. In
this case, both land and water are scarce, and the less than 40-mile
width of the land from the Mediterranean coast to the Jordan River is
insufficient to accommodate two rival states with expanding populations
and vibrant national ambitions. While there are a few small states living
cheek by jowl like the Netherlands and Luxembourg that are not at each
others throats, they do not face the other factors that have contributed
to the Israeli-Palestinian impasse.
There is, moreover, a great likelihood that a Palestinian state
ensconced in the West Bank and Gaza Strip would evoke a powerful zeal for
further land concessions, not only from the Arabs of Ramallah or Nablus,
but also among many Israeli Arabs in the Galilee, for example, of whom
opinion surveys indicate their belief that Jews are foreigners in the
Middle East.[15]
Such a state could easily foment an insurgency within Israel, bringing
along further disruptions and destruction in its wake. Indeed, the
Palestinian belief that Tiberias, Haifa, and Tel Aviv-Jaffa are lost
cities of Arab Palestine fuels a deep-seated rejectionism, which is
manifested in the leadership's adamant refusal to recognize Israel's very
right to exist as a Jewish state.[16]
Finally, the war against Israel is little more than a modern
application of Qur'anic hostility toward Jews, expressing the ethos of
jihad and the religious definition of Palestine as a sacred waqf
(Islamic religious endowment). Buoyed with this faith and ideology, Iran
and Hezbollah, al-Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas, Islamic Jihad,
and other Muslim elements dedicate themselves to destroying Israel once
and for all. In this, they are only more obvious than the so-called
moderate Fatah leadership, which makes use of religious imagery and
imperatives whenever it suits its purpose. A two-state solution is, in
essence, a betrayal of Islam although a Palestinian state could become
the springboard for the ongoing campaign to undermine, overrun, and
eradicate the Jewish state—fi Sabil Allah (in the path of God).
All this is so because, as article 15 of the Hamas covenant declares,
"the Palestinian problem is a religious problem."[17]
The irrefutable conclusion is that the Oslo process brought no
discernible change in the Palestinian attitude toward Israel. It remains
a state that has to be eliminated. In May 2013, Mahmoud Abbas repeated
the PLO's position that the Palestinians would refuse, as they indeed
have, to recognize Israel's legitimacy as a Jewish state.[18] Jibril Rajoub, Fatah Central
Committee member, declared soon thereafter that the Palestinians were the
enemies of Israel, adding that if the Palestinians had nuclear weapons
they would use them.[19]
No less acerbic was a remark by Jamal Zahalka, Arab member of Israel's
Knesset, who on July 31, 2013, railed against his fellow-citizens and
parliamentarians: "We [the Arabs] were here before you [the Jews],
and we'll be here after you're gone."[20]
|
Palestinian
Authority President Mahmoud Abbas (l) and Prime Minister Binyamin
Netanyahu meet at a conference in Washington, D.C., on September 2,
2010. In May 2013, Abbas repeated the PLO's position that the
Palestinians would refuse, as they indeed have, to recognize Israel's
legitimacy as a Jewish state.
|
In addition, the Oslo paradigm founders on the twin rocks of
Palestinian factionalism and extremism as Palestinian society is
hopelessly fissured by traditional identities and loyalties with extended
family and tribal ties enduring despite a narrative of nationalism. The
rural-urban split, the settled-refugee dichotomy, and the
Muslim-Christian differentiation all confound integral social cohesion.
Such a political tapestry, barely holding together despite decades of
trying, baffles national unity, complicating the viability of any
Palestinian state project becoming sturdy or stable.
These divisions have become further concretized by geopolitical
partition. In 2007, Hamas seized control of Gaza after Israel's
disengagement-withdrawal from the strip two years earlier and the
Islamists' electoral victory over Fatah in 2006. The 40-kilometer
geographic separation between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, alongside
the ideological and political enmity between Fatah-PA and Hamas, is a
powerful obstacle to generating Palestinian unity. The conventional
two-state proposal is a misnomer inasmuch as Gaza already constitutes a
Palestinian "statelet," so that another Palestinian state based
in the West Bank would actualize a three-state solution. The fathers of
the Oslo accords could not imagine in their wildest dream such a bizarre
turn of events.
Lastly, an ethic of extremism has been embedded in the culture of
Palestinian politics for the last one hundred years, beginning with Hajj
Amin Husseini (1897-1974) and continuing through the tenure of Yasser
Arafat (1929-2004), with a slew of other noteworthy firebrands such as
Izz al-Din al-Qassam (1882-1935) and Ahmad Yassin (1937-2004) throwing
fuel on the blaze in between. Five days before the Oslo signing, Arafat
told an Israeli journalist that one day there would be "a united
state in which Israelis and Palestinians will live together"
(without Israel)[21]
while in 1996, after Oslo, he forecast Israel's collapse under the weight
of an Arab return to the West Bank and Jerusalem, linked to psychological
warfare that would convince the Israelis to emigrate.[22] The Arabs of Palestine have
every reason to believe that the country is theirs alone because their
leaders have been telling them that from the very beginnings of their own
self-awareness as a people. For them, extremism is justified although
this mental universe of self-delusion and fanaticism has not led them to
a political victory.
Four
Insurmountable Oslo Issues
Early in 1993, the Oslo negotiators concluded that a full and
immediate resolution of the conflict was an impossible task, preferring
instead to conceive of peace-making as a staged process rather than a
single, decisive event. The major points of contention would be left to a
later phase following the initial and practical launching of the accord.
In the final status negotiations, peace would be achieved when the
outstanding issues could be settled to the satisfaction of the Israelis
and Palestinians alike.[23]
The religious-cum-political issue of the holy city of Jerusalem
represented perhaps the most intractable problem to be resolved. Despite
the Jewish people's millennial connections to Zion, Israel's June 1967
decision to apply its law and administration over the entire united city
as its capital was rejected by the Palestinians and their abettors in the
international community. At Camp David in July 2000, contorted and repeated
efforts were made to formulate an agreement that would accord
Palestinians sovereignty over the Arab-inhabited peripheral areas of
Jerusalem, jurisdiction over the inner neighborhoods, and Palestinian
governance over the Muslim and Christian quarters of the Old City. In
these plans, the Temple Mount, the holiest site in Judaism, would be
handed over to a Palestinian administration that claimed it as the
al-Haram al-Sharif (sacred precinct). Prime Minister Barak's negotiating
position, although it seemed to waver over the summit days, demanded
Israeli sovereignty over West Jerusalem and the post-1967 Jewish
neighborhoods around the city but also over the inner Arab-inhabited
Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Sheikh Jarrah and Wadi Joz. He firmly
rejected Palestinian sovereignty over the Temple Mount while Arafat
apparently called for Palestinian sovereignty over all of Jerusalem.[24] In the end, Arafat spurned the
deal, and the world will never know if further Israeli concessions, like
recognizing absolute Muslim control and Palestinian sovereignty over the
Haram al-Sharif, would have perhaps elicited Arafat's agreement.
Palestinian militancy regarding Jerusalem has continued over the years,
leading to assaults upon Jews in the Old City area and stoning attacks on
the Temple Mount. These attacks have occurred despite an Israeli policy
to limit and sometimes prohibit Jewish prayer on the mount. Self-imposed
Israeli renunciation of Jewish religious rights merges with and perhaps
evokes Palestinian violence.
|
One of the most
intractable issues that the Oslo accord was supposed to resolve
revolved around the status of Jerusalem. Despite a number of good-faith
efforts to share the city proposed by Israeli negotiators, the
Palestinians have spurned all offers. In fact, lines have hardened as
evidenced by the confrontation seen here between Palestinians and
Israeli police over the presence of Jewish visitors to the Temple
Mount, the holiest site in Judaism.
|
An even greater sticking point is the final status of the so-called
Palestinian refugees. The unyielding Palestinian demand that the
"right of return" be acknowledged and implemented is a call for
Palestinian "justice" that carries within it the seed for
Israel's destruction. The "right of return" has become sacred
dogma for Palestinians. Perhaps equally fixed is the Israeli rejection of
the idea as suicidal for the Jewish state. A growing constituency of
Arabs in Israel echoes the "return" theme.[25]
This Palestinian position, sustained by a contrived memory of forced
dispossession and nurtured by political rigidity, has been met with an
equally steadfast Israeli rejection although Barak was willing to concede
a symbolic number of returning refugees in July 2000.[26] The refugee issue proves
clearly that the Palestinian intent is to Arabize Israel and obliterate
the Zionist enterprise. These are not the building blocks for the
two-state solution envisaged by the Oslo negotiators.
Of late, the issue of the "settlements"—Jewish
communities—has become the international community's bête noire.
The Jewish presence in Judea and Samaria, numbering more than 120
localities with more than 330,000 people, may have begun in part as a
perceived security imperative, but early on, it also expressed the
immutable right of the Jewish people to live in and control the Land of
Israel west of the Jordan River. For the Palestinians however, these
communities were concrete evidence of Zionist expansionism and colonial
occupation. The Palestinian position has become monolithic, demanding a
dismantling of all Israeli communities and the expulsion of all their
residents.
Meanwhile, Israeli governments forged a public consensus around those
population blocks to be retained in any future agreement, a position
endorsed by President Bush in 2004.[27] The Palestinian position
hardened further in 2010 when Abbas, encouraged by President Obama,
demanded a complete cessation of all construction activity, not only in
the territories but also in post-1967 Jerusalem neighborhoods such as Har
Homa and Ramat Shlomo, which are on the eastern side of the
city.[28] In
short, the settlement issue brought the sides to political wrangling that
froze the already-stalled Oslo process. A Judenrein West Bank,
recalling what Menachem Begin did in expelling Jews when handing over the
Sinai Peninsula to Egypt in 1982, and what Ariel Sharon similarly did in
the Gaza Strip in 2005, was not the future that many Israelis had in mind
when imagining the contours of peace.
The fourth intractable issue is one of borders. A final political map
delineating the outline of a Palestinian state is tied to the Arab demand
that Israel withdraw to the June 4, 1967 lines. No Israeli government
ever agreed to such a total retreat, which runs counter to U.N.
resolution 242, which established the land for peace formula in the wake
of the 1967 war: Barak wavered between 88-93 percent of the West Barak
while Sharon and Netanyahu considered withdrawal from perhaps 50 percent
of the area.[29]
Military control of the Jordan Valley remains of particular importance
for Israel to prevent both future smuggling of weapons and terrorists
through Jordan into Palestine and to constitute a defensive line for
Israel's eastern front facing the Arab states across the river. Israel
would have to evacuate 100,000 residents in the unlikely event that final
borders would exclude many smaller Jewish localities dispersed throughout
Judea and Samaria beyond the larger population centers such as Ariel, Maaleh
Adumim, and the Etzion block.[30]
This grim scenario alone would be sufficiently critical to hamper an
agreement, considering the national trauma that resulted from the
expulsion of 8,000 Gush Katif residents from Gaza in August 2005. This is
not the kind of public atmosphere that would generate Israeli support,
let alone enthusiasm, for any peace based on the Oslo parameters.
Conclusion
While Israelis consistently poll in support of a Palestinian state,
the reasons for abandoning the idea have multiplied over time.
Palestinian nationalism with its malignant and rogue features remains
committed to destroying Zionism. The Fatah media and school curricula
indoctrinate the Palestinian people and youth to disparage Jews as
"evil" and Israel as a "cancer."[31] Palestinian military forces
train for the possibility of future fighting with Israeli military
forces,[32]
and Palestinian diplomacy, like the recent failed attempt to get the U.N.
to grant it unconditional statehood, remains the stuff of wily bazaar
bargaining in a diplomatic war of attrition. It is clear that the
Palestinian public has never really accepted the two-state solution as a
final end to the conflict.[33]
This was given vivid expression in the last interview by the late Faisal
Husseini, the prominent PLO leader, who infamously compared the Oslo
process to a Trojan horse that would bring about Israel's demise.[34] More recently, Abbas Zaki,
Fatah Central Committee member, confessed that "it's not acceptable
to say we want to wipe Israel out … It's not [acceptable] policy to say
so. Don't say these things to the world. Keep it to yourself."[35]
Obstacles also exist in addressing the practical aspects and
nitty-gritty details of a Palestinian state centered in the West Bank.
Israel's security-related conditions regarding demilitarization and
control of airspace and military monitoring stations on West Bank
hilltops meet with unwavering Palestinian opposition on all counts.[36] A state of Palestine, founded
in a moment of desperation and born in bitter acrimony, will lack the
space to absorb millions of refugees should the expatriate Palestinian
community opt for emigration and be fated for economic impoverishment
(discounting the billions of dollars donated to the PA by the
international community since 1994). Based on everything a dispassionate
observer can testify to since the 1994 establishment of the Palestinian
Authority, this Palestinian state, awkwardly sandwiched between Israel
and Jordan, has all the likelihood of becoming a failed state—fragile,
mismanaged, tending to disorder and civil war.[37]
As such, the two-state paradigm trumpeted by Oslo has been invalidated
with the growth of the magnitude of dissonance. There is just no sound
political basis for an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. All basic
final status issues escape resolution. Yet, there has never been an
admission of error, let alone an apology by Peres or Bill Clinton, Bush,
Sharon, Olmert, Obama, or Netanyahu in their advocacy of a two-state
solution. Speaking of the predominant role played by Peres in the Oslo
saga, the contemporary grand master of realpolitik, Henry Kissinger, once
remarked that Peres had "the trait of French academics who tend to
believe that the formulation of an idea is equivalent to its
realization."[38]
The same could be said of all those well-intentioned diplomats and
politicians who have followed in Peres's footsteps. Small wonder that,
notwithstanding the plan's abysmal failure and likely calamitous future,
the intellectual brainwashing exercised by the Oslo paradigm has not yet
loosened its grip over people's minds as evidenced most recently by John
Kerry's heroic, but ultimately doomed, attempt to resuscitate the
"peace process."[39]
Mordechai Nisan is a retired lecturer in Middle East Studies at
the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and at other academic institutions in
Israel. His most recent book is Only Israel West of the River (CreateSpace
Independent Publishing Platform).
[1] The
Peel commission recommended the incorporation of the Arab part of western
Palestine into Transjordan, ruled by Emir Abdullah ibn Hussein, rather
than its constitution as an independent state.
[2] For example, Richard J. Ward, Don
Peretz, and Evan M. Wilson, The Palestine State: A Rational Approach
(Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977); Mark A. Heller, A
Palestinian State: The Implications for Israel (Cambridge.: Harvard
University Press, 1983).
[3] Mark Tessler, A History of the
Israeli-Palestinian Conflict, 2nd ed. (Bloomington and Indianapolis:
Indiana University Press, 2009), pp. 535-8, 711-29.
[4] Yediot Aharonot (Tel Aviv),
July 26, 1974.
[5] Yitzhak Rabin, Pinkas Sherut,
vol. II (Tel Aviv: Ma'ariv, 1979), p. 583.
[6] Ma'ariv (Tel Aviv), Feb.
10, 1989.
[7] David Makovsky, Making Peace
with the PLO: The Rabin Government's Road to the Oslo Accord
(Washington and Boulder: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy
and Westview Press, 1996), p. 123.
[8] Yossi Beilin, "Oslo Kvar
Betocheinu," Yisrael Hayom (Tel Aviv), July 27, 2011.
[9] Dennis Ross, The Missing Peace:
The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace (New York:
Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004), p. 800.
[10] "The Israeli-Palestinian
Conflict: Annapolis and After," Middle East Briefing, no. 22,
International Crisis Group, Jerusalem/Washington/Brussels, Nov. 20, 2007.
[11] Barack Obama, remarks on the
Middle East and North Africa, State Department, Washington, D.C., May
19, 2011.
[12] Al-Jazeera TV (Doha), May
19, 2011.
[13] "The
Khartoum Resolutions," Sept. 1, 1967, The Jewish Virtual
Library.
[14] Ross, The Missing Peace,
p. 782.
[15] The Jerusalem Post, May
19, 2011.
[16] "My Country Palestine,"
Fatah PA TV, July 13, 2011, in MEMRI Bulletin, Middle East Media
Research Institute, Washington, D.C., July 26, 2011; YNet News
(Tel Aviv), Aug. 28, 2011.
[17] "Hamas Covenant
1988," Yale Law School Avalon Project, accessed Oct. 29, 2013.
[18] Al-Hayat al-Jadida
(Ramallah), May 4, 2013,
quoted by Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem.
[19] Al-Mayadeen TV (Beirut), in Palestinian
Media Watch Bulletin, May 8, 2013.
[20] Israel Hayom, Aug. 1,
2013.
[21] Efraim Karsh, Arafat's War:
The Man and His Battle for Israeli Conquest (New York: Grove Press,
2003), pp. 59-60; idem, "Arafat Lives," Commentary, Jan.
2005.
[22] The Jerusalem Post, Feb.
23, 1996; Yedidya Atlas, "Stockholm Revisited," Israel radio 7,
May 10, 1996.
[23] Makovsky, Making Peace with
the PLO, chap. 2-3.
[24] Shlomo Ben-Ami, Hazit Le'lo
O'ref: Masa el Gvulot Tahalich Hashalom (Tel Aviv: Yediot Aharonot,
2004), pp. 165-95; Ross, The Missing Peace, pp. 686-7.
[25] L. Barkan, "Israeli Arab
Leadership Jockeys for Central Role in Palestinian Leadership,"
Middle East Media Research Institute, Inquiry & Analysis
Series Report, no.721, Aug. 11, 2011.
[26] Ron Pundak, "From Oslo to
Taba: What Went Wrong?" Survival, Autumn 2001, pp. 31-45.
[27] The Washington Post, Apr.
15, 2004.
[28] YNet News, Nov. 10,
2010.
[29] Ha'aretz (Tel Aviv), Nov.
4, 2006; The Times of Israel (Jerusalem), Feb. 19, 2013;
"Peace Negotiations in Name Only," DebkaFile
(Jerusalem), Sept. 23, 2013.
[30] Giora Island, "The Future of
the Two-State Solution," Jerusalem Issue Brief, Jerusalem
Center for Public Affairs, Feb. 8, 17, 2009.
[31] Al-Aqsa TV (Gaza), July 13, 2008;
"Religious
War," Palestinian Media Watch, Jerusalem, July 3, 2013.
[32] Gal Luft, "The Palestinian
Security Forces: Capabilities and Effects on the Arab-Israeli Military
Balance," Ariel Center for Policy Research, Shaarei Tikva, Oct.
2001; CNS News, July 7, 2008.
[33] Benny Morris, "Eliminating
Israel," The National Interest, July 19, 2011.
[34] Al-Arabi (Cairo), June 6,
2001.
[35] The Blaze (New York and
Dallas), Oct.
3, 2011.
[36] Dore Gold, "Banging
Square Pegs into Round Holes," Jerusalem Center for Public
Affairs, Dec. 2008.
[37] Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and
Eugene R. Wittkopf, World Politics: Trend and Transformation, 7th
ed. (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin's, 1999), p. 372.
[38] Henry Kissinger, Years of
Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), p. 376.
[39] The New York Times, July
19, 2013.
|
Posts
No comments:
Post a Comment