Eye on Iran: Iran's Ties to Terror Shadow Nuclear Talks

Join UANI           Top Stories VOA: "As the U.S. and the West continue negotiations with Iran over its controversial nuclear program, the specter of Iran's ties to terrorism - and specifically al-Qaida - lingers in the background, analysts and U.S. officials say... For the past several years, the only U.S. government agency to consistently make the case linking Iran to al-Qaida has been the Treasury Department, which in February designated an Iran-based terrorist, Jafar al-Uzbeki, as a key al-Qaida facilitator.  The designation accused him of funneling a 'significant amount' of money from Iran into Afghanistan and Pakistan to help fund al-Qaida activities. The designation also linked al-Uzbeki to Yasin al-Suri, previously identified as the head of al-Qaida's Iran network and one of a handful of operatives identified since 2011 for getting al-Qaida fighters into Syria.  And according to a senior Treasury official, al-Uzbeki has been 'operating with the knowledge of the Iranian authorities.' 'This really deserves attention,' said U.S. Representative Adam Schiff, a member of the House Intelligence Committee. 'We see a relationship between Iran and al-Qaida that at times is difficult to figure out, because on the one hand they would be natural adversaries, but in that part of the world, terrorism makes strange bedfellows.'" http://t.uani.com/OUlQE0 Al-Monitor: "One of the five Iranian border guards kidnapped by a Sunni militant group on the Iran-Pakistan border has been killed. Jaish al-Adl, a Baluch militant group, announced the execution of Jamshid Danaeifar March 22. After conflicting statements by Iranian officials, the news was confirmed March 24 by Iranian security officials from Sistan-Baluchistan province. Danaeifar, the 27-yeard-old sole officer among the border guards kidnapped in February in Sistan-Baluchistan, had a 10-day-old son... Frustrated by the news of the killing and the statements by Pakistan's spokesperson, some Iranians began sharing pictures of Danaeifar on their Facebook pages juxtaposed next to Gilad Shalit, an Israeli border guard kidnapped by Hamas in 2006 and released in 2011. They compared the steps Israel took to secure the release of its soldier to what Iran has done." http://t.uani.com/1iA2e2b AP: "A senior official says Iran is planning to build a new oil terminal beyond the strategic Strait of Hormuz. Akbar Torkan, a senior trade official, is quoted by the semiofficial ISNA news agency as saying Tuesday that the new terminal will be at Bandar Jask port on the Oman Sea. Iran's sole major crude export terminal is at Khark Island in the Persian Gulf. Torkan didn't elaborate, but bypassing Hormuz would be seen as protecting exports from instability in the Gulf." http://t.uani.com/1g0GN5L        Domestic Politics WashPost: "Residents taking a staycation in the vast Iranian capital during the Nowruz holiday that began with the onset of spring on March 20 are experiencing a rare break from a particularly harsh urban environment. Most businesses are closed, as are schools. Tehran's infamous traffic has disappeared temporarily and along with it the layer of air pollution that usually hovers over this bowl-like metropolis. The city's chronic pollution, caused mostly by auto emissions and low-quality gasoline, is some of the worst in the world. According to World Health Organization data, Tehran's air is more toxic than that of Mexico City or Bangkok and is the cause of more than 4,000 deaths per year in the capital." http://t.uani.com/1l3Vf2g Reuters: "'Have a shot of tequila first, cheer up!' Shahriyar tells guests gathered at his luxury apartment in Tehran. His girlfriend, Shima, said they party every weekend. 'Shahriyar has one rule: bring your booze! We drink until morning,' she told Reuters on a FaceTime call, as lights flashed to rap music in the background. Despite the ban on alcohol and frequent police raids, drinking in Iran is widespread, especially among the wealthy. Because the Shiite-dominated Muslim state has no discotheques or nightclubs, it all takes place at home, behind closed doors. Some of the alcohol is smuggled in, but many resourceful Iranians make their own... 'By drinking we forget about our problems,' he said. 'Otherwise we will go crazy with all the limitations on young people in Iran.'" http://t.uani.com/1dvfRkf Foreign Affairs UANI Advisory Board Member Olli Heinonen in ISIS: "Work remains to be done to confirm that Iran has placed all centrifuge rotors and rotor cylinders under IAEA monitoring. The results on the inspectors' visits to uranium mines are still being assessed. Dilution and conversion of 20 % enriched UF6 proceed according to the path laid out in the Joint Plan of Action, but conversion of existing 5 % enriched UF6 to uranium oxide is delayed. These are the key findings from the second status report issued by the IAEA on 20 March 2014 following the January 2014 agreement on 'voluntary measures' taken by Iran to implement the JPA. Iran agreed in the JPA to dilute half of its 20 % enriched UF6 stocks to uranium oxide with enrichments below 5 %, and to convert the other half to 20 % enriched uranium oxides during a six month period. On 20 January 2014 the inventory of 20 % enriched UF6 was 206.9 kg. Since then Iran has made good progress by diluting 74.6 kg of 20 % enriched UF6 to enrichments below 5 %. However, Iran has not been able to complete the commissioning of the Enriched UO2 Production Plant (EUPP), which is required to turn 5 % UF6 to oxides. According to the information provided by Iran the commissioning of EUPP using natural uranium is scheduled to start on 9 April 2014. Since such commissioning tests normally take several weeks, there is a looming possibility that Iran may fail to oxidize its several tons of 5 % UF6 to meet the 20 July 2014 deadline established under the JPA. Since 20 January 2014, Iran has fed additional 31.7 kg 20 % enriched UF6 to convert it to 20 % enriched uranium oxides. This means that Iran has by now successfully diluted or converted half of the stocks it has committed to do. On 20 January 2014, the total historical production of 20 % enriched UF6 was 456 kg. This means that by 20 July 2014, Iran would possess about 350 kg 20 % enriched UF6 as uranium oxides; or an amount sufficient for one nuclear explosive, if further enriched to weapons grade. Uranium oxides can be reconverted to UF6 in a fairly short period of time. Iran has however stated that it does not possess such a process. According to the IAEA's report, such a reconversion process does not exist at the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP). It should also be noted that the IAEA, however, has, at this stage, limited authorities to confirm the non-existence of such processes beyond declared facilities. The report affirms that Iran has not carried out reprocessing related activities at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access. Such activities are proscribed under the UN Security Council Resolutions and the JPA. However, the IAEA has not reported specifically since a number of years on the status of irradiated fuel targets used for unreported plutonium separation activities carried out in 1988-1993, and currently stored at Karaj. Such material would be useful for reprocessing R&D activities. The report also states that Iran has provided daily access to the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow. Daily access is, according to the terms of the JPA, only addressed to surveillance records and not everywhere at these installations, unless the IAEA has negotiated better arrangements or a separate understanding that goes beyond the JPA wording has been agreed to. Under the Plan's provisions, the Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant at Natanz is also not subject to daily visits. The PFEP has been used mainly for testing of centrifuges, but it had until 20 January 2014 a tandem cascade producing 20 % UF6. As required by the JPA, the tandem cascade connection was removed, and since then those two cascades have been producing 5 % UF6." http://t.uani.com/1ePcLFO Dennis Ross in LAT: "President Obama will visit Saudi Arabia this week. Based on what I hear from key Saudis, he is in for a rough reception. Rarely have the Saudis been more skeptical about the United States, and if the president is to affect Saudi behavior, it is important for him to understand why. Fundamentally, the Saudis believe that America's friends and interests are under threat, and the U.S. response has ranged from indifference to accommodation. The Saudis see Iran trying to encircle them with its Quds Force active in Bahrain, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and their own eastern province. The Saudis see an Iranian effort to shift the balance of forces in the region dramatically in Tehran's favor, whether by killing Sunni Muslims in Syria, mobilizing Shiite Muslim militias in Iraq, providing arms to the Houthi rebels in Yemen or fomenting unrest among Saudi Shiites. Unlike the Israelis, who see the Iranian nuclear program as an existential threat, the Saudis perceive Iranian encirclement in existential terms. Like the Israelis, they are convinced Iran is determined to acquire nuclear arms but see it as an instrument in its pursuit of regional hegemony. Fair or not, Saudi leaders believe the U.S. is seeking detente with Iran and is turning a blind eye to Tehran's troublemaking in the region. They see the Iranians using the nuclear program negotiations to buy time, and fear that the U.S. is so anxious to do a deal and avoid conflict with Iran that it refuses to compete with the Iranians in the region or to back U.S. friends as they do so. U.S. hesitancy in Syria, and particularly the perceived unwillingness to act militarily even though the president had established a 'red line' on chemical weapons, has done much to feed this impression... He needs to take the concerns head-on. That does not require him to accept Saudi complaints. However, he needs to show that he has no illusions about the Iranians, spelling out that we know what the Quds Force is doing and the steps the U.S. will to take to counter it. For example, intercepting clandestine Iranian arms shipments would show we mean what we say. Imagine the effect on the Saudis and others if it had been the U.S. and not Israel that intercepted the Klos-C ship this month carrying Iranian weapons destined for the Gaza Strip. Few things would more clearly demonstrate to the Saudis that we will not allow nuclear negotiations with Iran to prevent us from countering Iran's de-stabilizing actions in the region." http://t.uani.com/1h9Aamp Lori Plotkin Boghardt in WINEP: "On March 6, Bahrain's foreign minister told the UN Human Rights Council that the ongoing violence in his country 'is directly supported by elements of the Islamic Republic of Iran.' Although the statement does not accurately explain all political violence in Bahrain, such claims should not necessarily be dismissed as government propaganda, since U.S. intelligence assesses that Iran is in fact providing arms and more to Bahraini and other fighters in the Arabian Peninsula. To curb this assistance, Washington should increase support to important Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners. The various Iran-linked attacks that occurred in GCC countries following the 1979 Islamic Revolution helped shape perceptions about Tehran's willingness and ability to support violence in the Gulf. The most famous attacks include coup attempts in 1981 and 1996 by the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain and Hezbollah Bahrain, respectively; bombings, airplane hijackings, and an assassination attempt against the emir in Kuwait by Hezbollah and its Iraqi associates in the 1980s; and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing by Hezbollah al-Hejaz in Saudi Arabia. In February 2011, large groups of predominantly Shiite protestors began demonstrating for reform in Bahrain, prompting Saudi Arabia to dispatch troops to help quash the uprising a month later. The United Arab Emirates dispatched police units to the island for the same purpose. These developments appear to be primary factors behind Iran's reinvigorated support to some fighters in GCC countries. From the outset, Iran's Foreign Ministry spokesman called Riyadh's intervention 'unacceptable,' and parliamentary speaker Ali Larijani warned that 'the deployment of forces by a number of regional countries...will definitely harm their glassy palaces in the future.'  Periodically during the past three years, Bahrain has reported weapons seizures that often included some combination of homemade bombs, guns, and ammunition. In late December 2013, Manama reported a particularly significant seizure -- of a boat ferrying guns, ammunition, and explosives, including dozens of blocks of C4, mines, and hand grenades. Some of the items featured markings that indicated they were made in Iran or Syria. The vessel was stopped while apparently heading from Iraq to Bahrain, and its crew included two Bahrainis. The extent of Iran's connection to the apparent smuggling attempt remains unclear, but Western governments reportedly took the weapons seizure seriously. For example, the incident may have informed the U.S. intelligence community's assessment that Tehran has been providing arms to Bahraini fighters, as indicated in the 'Worldwide Threat Assessment' published by the Office of the Director of National Intelligence on January 29. Since the uprising began, Manama has also accused Tehran of providing militant training for some Bahrainis in Iran and elsewhere, both directly and indirectly via allied groups. In a private report to the United Nations in April 2011, Bahrain charged Hezbollah with training opposition elements at camps in Lebanon and Iran. And on several occasions in 2013, it identified Iraq as another training site. In November, Bahrainis implicated in violent plots were said to have attended Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) training camps in Iran and Iraqi Hezbollah camps in Baghdad and Karbala. More recently, Bahrain alleged that some of the suspects in the March 3 bombing that killed three security officers in al-Daih received training in Iran, as did the two Bahrainis captured in the December boat seizure. There is no substantive public evidence for current Iranian training of Bahrainis, but unclassified interrogation transcripts from Iraqi Shiites trained by Iran in the previous decade provide a granular description of the methods Tehran may use to train Gulf Shiites...  By expanding its support for efforts to curb Iranian aid to Gulf fighters, Washington could serve several purposes at once. Most fundamentally, such assistance would serve the core U.S. interest in Gulf stability and security, especially during a period of growing Iranian influence in the region. For their part, strategic Gulf partners would view it as meaningful action to accompany verbal assurances about U.S. policy toward Iran -- in particular, Riyadh would see it as direct support for the kingdom's efforts to address its own domestic challenges, and as support for its neighbor, Bahrain, whose security situation holds implications for Saudi Arabia. Assistance to Bahrain could in turn give Washington additional leverage to press for reforms there, based on the correct argument that measures against Iranian interference will be effective only if accompanied by respect for human rights and forward-moving dialogue between the government and the opposition's nonviolent majority. On the security front, U.S. and Gulf intelligence agencies have no doubt cooperated on cases involving surveillance of American installations, and Washington could build on this cooperation by addressing other Iranian-linked operations in partner states. New support could take several forms: greater intelligence sharing on individuals in GCC countries who are connected to Iranian militant aid; new training and development assistance for local coast guard, border, and customs personnel to help them limit Iranian infiltration; deeper cybersecurity cooperation; and even additional measures to address Iranian aid to the Houthi rebels along Saudi Arabia's border with Yemen -- something the kingdom views as a threat to its own security. Finally, measures to counter Iranian activity should be complemented with private statements to GCC partners discouraging the blatantly false portrayal of all Shiite activism as evidence of Iranian subversion. Such portrayals may wind up radicalizing more Gulf Shiites, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy of Shiite collusion with Tehran on seditious activity." http://t.uani.com/1gpLzP2 Eye on Iran is a periodic news summary from United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) a program of the American Coalition Against Nuclear Iran, Inc., a tax-exempt organization under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Eye on Iran is not intended as a comprehensive media clips summary but rather a selection of media elements with discreet analysis in a PDA friendly format. For more information please email Press@UnitedAgainstNuclearIran.com United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) is a non-partisan, broad-based coalition that is united in a commitment to prevent Iran from fulfilling its ambition to become a regional super-power possessing nuclear weapons.  UANI is an issue-based coalition in which each coalition member will have its own interests as well as the collective goal of advancing an Iran free of nuclear weapons.