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What's worse
than an Iranian bomb? An Iranian almost-bomb
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For all of their sharp disagreements over the particulars of foreign
policy, everyone in Washington seems to agree on one thing — that the
overarching objective of American policy toward Iran should be, as
President Barack Obama frequently intones,
to "prevent Iran from building a nuclear weapon."
They've got it wrong. The primary objective of American policy must be a
sweeping degradation of Iran's nuclear industrial infrastructure,
preferably by diplomatic means, even if the resolute pursuit of this goal
provokes Iran into rashly attempting the construction of a bomb — indeed,
especially if it does so.
Bear in mind that Iran hasn't been rushing to build a bomb. Rather, it
has been working steadily to increase its breakout capacity — the
ability to successfully produce a nuclear weapon on short notice, if it
made a mad dash to do so. According to the latest report
of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has accumulated
7,154 kg of under-5% low-enriched uranium (LEU) and 196 kg of near-20%
medium enriched uranium (MEU), altogether enough to build six or seven
bombs if enriched further to weapons grade (i.e., about 90%). With over
18,000 centrifuges installed at the Natanz and Fordow facilities, Iran's breakout
time is currently four to six weeks — which is to say, that is how long it
would take to produce a sufficient quantity of weapons grade uranium (WGU)
for its first bomb, according to an October 24 report
by the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), plus
whatever extra time is needed to construct a serviceable explosive device.
Iran's paramount goal is to inch as close as possible to the finish line
without triggering a military response, then reach a permanent settlement
with the P5+1 (the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, plus
Germany) that preserves as much of its breakout capacity as possible in
exchange for an end to sanctions that have hobbled its economy.
Achieving an internationally-legitimized nuclear threshold status has
immense strategic advantages for the Islamic Republic, above and beyond the
ability to rapidly weaponize at a few months' notice: Fear of provoking
Tehran to cross this final threshold likely will discourage the
international community from slapping on future sanctions for sponsoring
terrorism, bloody proxy interventions in the region (including Syria),
human rights violations, and Iran's various other rogue-state activities.
And Iranian threshold status is just as bad as a bomb in instigating a
regional nuclear arms race.
Phase one of this strategy had largely run its course by the time Iran
began secretly negotiating with Obama administration officials in 2013, and
Iran's enrichment efforts had slowed
considerably. Moving substantially closer to the nuclear goal line (e.g.,
by accumulating sufficient MEU to build a bomb without having to enrich LEU
all the way up to weapons grade) would have resulted in even more damaging
sanctions and risked provoking a war. The Iranians now are ready to stop
pushing the envelope because they already are in the position they want.
The Joint Plan of Action (JPA) — the name of the November, 2013 accord
that would temporarily freeze Iran's nuclear program — effectively rewards
Iran for doing something that was already in its interests. Slightly
reducing enriched uranium stockpiles and accepting modestly expanded
inspections to verify its "voluntary measures" (as Iranian
obligations are described in the text)
enable Tehran to park its nuclear progress, eliminate the perceived threat
of an imminent breakout, and thereby immunize itself from the threat
of Israeli attack while negotiation of a final status agreement drags on,
all while enjoying limited sanctions relief and an upfront P5+1 promise to
allow a "mutually defined enrichment program."
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry's frequent admonitions
that, absent the JPA, Iran would "rush towards a nuclear weapon"
are absurd. Iran won't seriously consider a breakout unless or until its
leaders are prepared to absorb Israeli, and possibly American, air strikes
and live with a far more debilitating sanctions regime — or until one or both
of these threats fade away. Thankfully, we're not there yet.
But if a firm and unyielding international commitment to reduce Iran's
breakout capacity happens to increase the possibility of a breakout attempt
in the short-term, so be it. We should all be so lucky if Iranian Supreme
Leader Ali Khamenei is foolhardy enough to launch a breakout prematurely
and unite the world against his regime. Even if he manages to squeeze a
weapon's worth of fissile material out of what's left of Iran's smoldering
enrichment facilities, I like the international community's chances of
ensuring that it is destroyed or relinquished once the ayatollahs have
shown their true colors.
But five years from now, if the JPA forms the basis of a permanent
accord, all bets are off. The nightmare scenario isn't that the Iranians
rush to weaponize; it is that they are allowed to perch on or near the
precipice of doing so until a day when the sanctions are lifted and Western
desire for Iranian co-operation in Syria, Lebanon, and the Palestinian
territories is at a premium.
So enough talk about preventing Iran from building a bomb, a phrase that
too easily conjures to mind hypothetical scenarios in which Tehran accepts
an enrichment freeze and omniscient inspections regime, while keeping most
of its present nuclear infrastructure intact. Averting the construction of
a nuke, at the expense of doing little to roll back the threat of a nuclear
Iran, virtually guarantees that the mullahs will eventually cross the
finish line in force.
Gary Gambill is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum.
Related
Topics: Iran |
Gary C. Gambill This
text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral
whole with complete and accurate information provided about its author,
date, place of publication, and original URL.
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