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Can
Saudi Arabia Feed Its People?
Gulf
Economies
by Yossi Mann
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2015 (view PDF)
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Saudi
Arabia managed to avoid dependence on the import of agricultural
products such as wheat from the 1980s on. The increase in its wheat
exports was spectacular, shooting from a mere 2.4 tons in 1978 to a
million tons in 2000, sent mostly to its Persian Gulf neighbors and
Asian countries such as Bangladesh.
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In 2007, almost thirty years after setting out on an ambitious
agricultural project, Saudi Arabia announced it would be phasing out
government handouts to the agricutural sector, which would end in their
entirety in 2016. Outsiders criticized the project from its beginnings,
emphasizing the burden it would place on the economy and the damage it
would inflict on the country's water assets. Critics were particularly
scathing of the decision to subsidize the project and its detrimental
effects on the Saudi economy as a whole.
Nonetheless, Riyadh moved forward with what it saw as its quest to
provide both food security for its burgeoning population as well as
additonal employment opportunities. An examination of the wheat industry
that flourished in the kingdom between 1980 and 2007, its achievements
and failures, as well as the influence of the agricultural sector on the
local economy and on water resources may prove a cautionary tale,
reconfirming the truths behind the law of unintended consequences.
Subsidizing
Food Security
Before analyzing the reasoning behind the decision to try to increase
the agricultural output of the desert kingdom, it is necessary to get a
full picture of what came before that decision and the actual, concrete
steps taken to bring it to pass.
Despite a great deal of skepticism, Saudi Arabia managed to avoid
dependence on the import of agricultural products such as wheat from the
1980s on. Indeed, Saudi increases in agricultural production were
unprecedented, rising from 148,000 tons of wheat in 1981 to 4.1 million
tons by 1993. The increase in its wheat exports was even more
spectacular, shooting from a mere 2.4 tons in 1978 to a million tons in
2000, mostly to its Persian Gulf neighbors and to other Asian countries
such as Bangladesh.
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The
Saudi wheat industry has been concentrated in areas including the Qasim
area of the Najd plateau; the outskirts of Riyadh, Qatif, Taif, and
Ha'il, and in the southern province of Asir.
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One way in which this was accomplished was by significantly expanding
available arable areas. The kingdom had an estimated 67,000 hectare of
agricultural land in 1980, which grew to 907,000 hectare by 1993.
Similarly, in 1980, the average production per farm was 2.2 tons of wheat
per hectare; this grew to 5.19 tons by 2005. Some companies in the
country's northern territories even managed to significantly increase
production to 8-10 tons per hectare, an amount more or less on a par with
production in Eastern and Central Europe.[1]
Over the years, the Saudi wheat industry became concentrated in
several areas including the Qasim area of the Najd plateau, the outskirts
of Riyadh, the outskirts of Qatif in the eastern province, Taif and its
environs in the Northern Province, around the northwestern city of Ha'il
and in the southern province of Asir.
Due to better climactic conditions, the Saudi royal family invested
greater effort in the northern parts of the country where agricultural
companies controlled vast areas that expanded to over 268-380 hectares.
In most other parts of the kingdom, the usual amount of land allotted to
wheat was more in the 5-10 hectare range.
The explosion in wheat production could not have taken place, however,
without government support. In the 1980s, Riyadh granted the agricultural
sector incentives such as subsidies on grain, fertilizer, and irrigation
water, and a 45 percent discount on purchasing agricultural machinery.
Despite the huge price difference between locally produced wheat ($1,000
per ton) and what was available on world markets ($100 per ton), the
Saudi government continued to purchase domestic agricultural produce and
to sell it on the local market at artificially lowered prices.
The thriving agricultural sector
brought about a significant rise in employment.
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This thriving agricultural sector brought about a significant rise in
employment. In the mid-1970s, 274,000 people worked in agriculture; those
numbers rose to 681,000 by 1992. The boom increased profits for the
farming sector though mainly for large landowners.
To increase profits further and to administer their holdings better,
the important Saudi trading families and the Saudi princes joined forces
with international companies. In the 1980s, for example, Prince Muqrin
bin Abdul Aziz, governor of the town of Ha'il, became a partner in the
Ha'il Agricultural Development Company, which soon became the biggest
agricultural company in the kingdom. Since most of the large agricultural
companies were established by the Saudi elites, critics have claimed that
the subsidies were essentially granted for the benefit of the same
elites.[2] A
further consequence of the policy was an increase in wheat smuggling from
Yemen and Oman in order to sell it on the Saudi market at a huge profit.[3]
By the 1980s, Saudi government stability had become dependent on those
who demanded subsidy guarantees in exchange for domestic stability. The
subsidies took an enormous toll on the country's economy, though, eating
up an estimated 20 percent of Saudi oil profits between 1980 and 2000.
Nor were agricultural subsidies always consistently granted. When food
and oil prices dropped, the Saudi government cut down on financial
support in order to avoid excess production. Subsidies were at a peak in
the beginning of the 1980s when the agricultural industry was just
starting out, and government income was particularly high following a
decade of oil-induced prosperity. However, low oil prices from 1995-96
made it hard to grant subsidies at the same level as in the preceding
years. This, in turn, resulted in a decrease in agricultural production
in those years. The royal house looked to avoid too drastic a subsidy cut
even when the country was undergoing an economic crisis figuring that
once the agricultural sector had been granted assistance, it would find
it difficult to function without it. Indeed, the sector's dependence on
subsidies was one of the factors behind violent clashes that broke out in
the city of Buraida in January 1995 when those who earned their
livelihood from agriculture protested against the possibility of
cutbacks. Such guarantees provided a quid pro quo for domestic stability.[4]
The Most
Precious Resource
But, the ambitious wheat project also had a negative impact on the
country's fragile water supply. The Saudi summer is very hot and arid
with temperatures often reaching as high as 120° Fahrenheit (49°
Celsius). Average rainfall is 5 inches (130 mm) a year although there has
been some occasional flooding in agricultural areas during the
"rainy" season. The sporadic rain, soaring temperatures, and
high evaporation rates in the eastern areas of the country make it very
difficult to establish a viable agricultural economy. For example, an
average of 13,173 cubic meters of water is required to irrigate a hectare
of wheat in Saudi Arabia as compared to the world average rate of 1,622
cubic meters.[5]
The Saudi water sector only began to be developed in the 1930s. Until
then, most of the kingdom's water came from wells that could be found
near the main towns. In 1956, sewage water infiltrated many wells,
forcing the government to accelerate the ground water pumping rate. In
the 1970s, the use of non-renewable water resources was raised even
further. A population explosion—from 6.2 million in 1970 to 16.2 million
by 1990—led to a sharp increase in demand. Rapid urbanization also took
its toll: While 2.7 million out of a population of 7.6 million Saudis
lived in cities in 1974, the country's population had risen to 18 million
by 1992 with only 3.8 million remaining in villages and peripheral areas.
By the mid-1990s, the agricultural industry was responsible for 92
percent of total water consumption with 48 percent of that going to
wheat. The sharp rise in water consumption for agriculture first began to
take effect in the 1980s. In 1980, for example, the Saudis were consuming
2 billion cubic meters of water, but a mere three years later,
consumption had already reached 7.2 billion cubic meters. This high
consumption rate was also due to demographic changes in the kingdom, such
as in Mecca, Riyadh, and Abha, and not exclusively as a result of
increased agricultural needs.[6]
By 1993, the government began to realize what a heavy toll the
agricultural sector had taken on its water resources. According to the
Saudi Ministry of Agriculture, 140 billion cubic meters of water had been
pumped from non-renewable water sources between 1980 and 1994, by which
time there was significant depletion of drinking water resources in
various parts of the kingdom as in the Tebrak area, which is about 95
kilometers from Riyadh and was one of Saudi Arabia's biggest sources of
water. In other areas, such as the eastern province, water reservoirs
dried up or became unavailable because of bad management, lack of sewage,
and excess use of fertilizers, which contain high levels of toxic
chemicals. All of these factors caused contamination of the water supply
and resulted in a decrease of between 8-15 meters of ground water between
1980 and 1993.[7]
There were 26,000 wells in Saudi Arabia in 1982 and 52,500 by 1990.
During this time, there was a marked increase in the use of non-renewable
resources from aquifers such as those at Wajid, Saq, Tabuk, Minjur,
Biyadh, Wasia, and Umm ar-Radhuma. Some measures were taken to reduce
water consumption including the imposition of new water rates in 1994 in
order to avoid wastage and excess consumption. Then in 2000, the
government decreed that all private home owners and public establishments
must install wastewater treatment apparatus.
These measures notwithstanding, Saudi Arabia continued to rank third
in world water consumption at 248.7 liters per capita per day in 1993.[8] As a result, in 2005, the
government began using desalinated water rather than water from
non-renewable sources. Before then, 11,679 million cubic tons of water
had been taken from non-renewable sources per year while only 8,000
million cubic tons of water came from renewable sources. As a result,
neighboring countries such as Qatar, Jordan, and Iraq had begun to object
to Riyadh's extensive use of shared ground water, which was depleting
their own supplies.[9]
Sixty sewage collection disposal plants in the towns of Jeddah,
Medina, and Khubar were established to supply 70 percent of the country's
water between the early 1990s and the beginning of the twenty-first
century. Riyadh also intends to establish forty wastewater treatment
plants and to streamline water transportation pipelines. But there is a
significant downside to these measures. Desalination plants are energy
guzzlers, and depending on them takes a financial toll on governmental
revenues accrued from oil and gas exports.[10]
The Roots of
a Decision
As far back as 1993, Saudi government officials reported that water
resources in the kingdom were dwindling, and yet Riyadh continued to opt
for more investment in agriculture. What then were the considerations
that motivated the House of Saud to continue subsidizing this project,
despite deep financial and environmental losses?[11]
Large agricultural enterprises in
Saudi Arabia were established and run by outsiders.
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Some have contended that the policy was a misguided course of action
derived from a sensible desire to reduce the country's number of foreign
workers.[12]
Unofficially, estimates are that seven million foreign individuals work in
80 percent of the private sector, making it difficult for native Saudis
to find jobs.[13]
Dependence on foreign workers has a direct impact on the economy: It is
estimated to cause losses of billions of dollars every year because much
of the derived income goes into the hands of foreigners who then transfer
their wages to families outside the kingdom.
However, if recruiting native Saudis to the agricultural sector was a
goal of these government subventions, the plan backfired. By the 1980s,
most of the field workers were foreigners, and most farms were run by
people of Egyptian, Omani, and East Asian origin. In addition, due to the
gap between Saudi workers' abilities and industry requirements, more
specialized work such as the operation of irrigation systems and advanced
equipment were under the control of Westerners. Saudi citizens working in
agriculture were mainly limited to positions in marketing and
distribution.[14]
Similar to the Saudi oil industry (which had been controlled by Western
companies until 1980), large agricultural enterprises were established
and run by outsiders. For example, Saad-co, a company that was
operational in the 1990s, employed 450 workers, of whom 100 were Saudi,
60 American and European, and the rest from Asian countries.[15]
Others have pointed to a desire to diversify sources of revenue for
the kingdom as key to the decision to invest so much in the agricultural
sector. But an analysis of the contribution of the agricultural sector to
the Saudi economy shows it to have consisted of 4.5 percent of the gross
national product in 1975, 1.8 percent in 1986, almost 6 percent in 1998,
and 4.2 percent in 2002.[16]
Instead, the roots of the Saudi decision must be
found elsewhere. Surprisingly, it may be a result of the 1973 global oil
crisis, ironically enough triggered by the Saudis' own behavior. The
sharp rise in oil prices from that period produced an increase in the
cost of agricultural goods from abroad, which in turn, persuaded the
government to try to lessen dependence on foreign food sources. The
government also feared the creation of an external food cartel that could
arise in reaction to the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting
Countries (OPEC) oil cartel. Alongside that, the closure of the Suez
Canal between 1967 and 1975 raised transportation expenses and provoked
fear that food supplies could be further disrupted. Moreover, a number of
natural disasters that were detrimental to world wheat production
occurred between 1970 and 1976—such as the deadly 1970 Bhola cyclone in
east Pakistan as well as severe drought in Australia in 1972—and the
Saudi government wanted to ensure that the country would not lack in food
sources. With a rise in bread consumption due to the oil-induced economic
boom and a 50 percent increase in Hajj pilgrims from 1980 to 1989, the
Saudis needed more wheat as well as diversification of their food
sources.[17]
Settling
the Nomads
But perhaps the most significant factor behind the royal family's
decision to subsidize and expand the agricultural sector lay in domestic,
political considerations.
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By
1976, there was a wave of government- sponsored development in suburbs
surrounding cities where Bedouin began to cultivate their lands,
including near Jeddah, Riyadh, Dammam, Ta'if, Abha, and Jizan. Bedouins
who have settled in the Ta'if region now make their living as herders
and farmers.
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Before the establishment of the modern Saudi kingdom, 70 percent of
society in the Arabian Peninsula was of a Bedouin tribal, nomadic nature.
In that setting, tribal leaders controlled the lives of their clansmen in
ways that were essentially inimical to a centralizing government. To some
degree, even after the establishment of the kingdom, these leaders
maintained their status for a time through political marriages, control
over pasture lands, and acquiring administrative or army posts for their
people. But to truly consolidate power, the central government decided it
needed to settle these Bedouin nomads in the big cities and in permanent
villages, thereby breaking their traditional tribal bonds.
It must be borne in mind that the House of Saud was not the long-time
ruler of the peninsula and its members were in fact something of
upstarts. Generous subsidies granted to farmers by the government would
be suitable compensation for foregoing a previous nomadic life and
drawing the beneficiaries of the Saudi largesse closer to the ruling
house. A growing agricultural industry appealed to many Bedouin nomads because
it meant that they would have access to pasturelands as well as a regular
income and would be released from their rigid tribal structure. Indeed,
while 25 percent of Saudi citizens were nomads in the 1970s, by 1989,
fifteen years after the agricultural project began, only 3.8 percent of
the population remained nomadic.[18]
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Large
areas of the Saudi desert have been turned into huge wheat fields
although the country receives only about four inches of rain a year,
one of the lowest rates in the world. The Saudi Grain Silos and Flour
Mills Organization, established in 1972, is the government agency in
charge of managing the kingdom's wheat program. In 2010, GSFMO expanded
Saudi wheat storage capacity and is currently in the process of
enlarging its wheat stocks in order to increase the country's strategic
reserve.
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Beginning in 1970, the Saudi government established a five-year plan
to settle the Bedouin. The government not only granted subsidies to the
agricultural sector, it also established authorities whose responsibility
was to promote urban settlement. Between 1971 and 1974, for example, the
government became increasingly involved in housing matters via the Real
Estate Development Fund, which granted convenient loans to young people
and to the financially disadvantaged who wanted to purchase homes. In
1975, the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs was established to
assist in the settlement of rural areas. By 1976, there was a wave of
government-sponsored development in suburbs surrounding cities where the
Bedouin cultivated their lands, including near Jeddah, Riyadh, Dammam,
Ta'if, Abha, and Jizan, in which many nomadic families settled.[19]
A fundamental reason behind the determination to grant generous
subsidies was the fear that the masses of Bedouins who had left their
nomadic lifestyle would not have a steady income, and thus the subsidies
aimed at avoiding social unrest amid the newly settled people. The royal
family feared that it would lose its legitimacy if it could not provide a
social and economic solution to accompany settlement.
Planning for
the Future
Riyadh has not, however, entirely abandoned the agricultural sector
abroad. In January 2009, King Abdullah announced the establishment of an
"Initiative for Saudi Agricultural Investment" aimed both at
cutting Saudi agricultural production and investing in countries that had
agricultural potential but little financial means. The government
announced an aid package worth $800 million for companies that invested
in agriculture outside Saudi Arabia, pledging further support for the
purchase of tractors and chemicals, the establishment of irrigation
systems, and more in these countries. Thus, the government gave $95
million worth of aid to the Hail Agricultural Development Company
(HADCO), a Saudi firm which operates in Sudan. The Saudis have also
increased wheat imports from Europe, North America, Russia, and Ukraine,
and, in 2010, began to expand the port of Jeddah where most of these
imported agricultural goods arrive.[20]
Not everyone in Saudi Arabia was happy with King Abdullah's program.
Some believed that discontinuing agricultural subsidies would, in the
long run, be detrimental to those on society's margins.[21] There were also those who
claimed that the cessation of subsidies could expose the kingdom to
extreme fluctuations in the world food market[22] and create a balance of power
that could cause conflict with agriculture-producing countries—mainly
Germany, the United States, and France—which are dependent on OPEC oil
exports. On that score, Riyadh joined the World Trade Organization (WTO)
in 2005 and as such was obliged to stop subsidizing agriculture and
import goods that are cheaper to produce elsewhere.[23] But WTO guidelines allow a
country experiencing a food crisis to restrict its agricultural product
exports, which could negatively affect the Saudi grain supply should such
a crisis arise.
Still others asserted that discontinuing support for agricultural
projects could cause a loss of public faith in future government attempts
to diversify the Saudi economy.[24]
Indeed, the king's pronouncement soon had repercussions: Following the
announcement that the subsidies would end, 42 percent of the existing
9,231 Saudi agricultural companies closed down. Many agree that King
Abdullah's decision has emphasized that the government attaches more
importance to preserving water than to taking care of an agricultural
sector that is likely to shrink significantly by 2016.[25]
Following
the announcement that subsidies would end, 42 percent of existing Saudi
agricultural companies closed.
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Once the fundamental problem of
water depletion was fully grasped and the decision made to stop
subsidizing domestic wheat production, the Saudi government took concrete
measures to both ensure its growing population's food security and
develop other avenues to help farmers and land workers.[26] For example, the Saudi Grain Silos and
Flour Mills Organization (GSFMO), established in 1972, is the government
agency in charge of managing the kingdom's wheat program. In 2010, GSFMO
expanded Saudi wheat storage capacity and is currently in the process of
enlarging its wheat stocks in order to increase the country's strategic
reserve and move it closer to its annual wheat consumption by the end of
2015. It has also announced that there would be an increase in reserves
from six to twelve months of consumption by 2016.[27]
Over the past few years, several
new wheat silo projects have been initiated. By December 2015, these
storage facilities are slated to yield additional wheat storage capacity
of about 3.7 million tons (MT) on top of current GSFMO silos that have a
combined storage capacity of 2.8 MT.[28] GSFMO also signed contracts to build five
additional storage projects in Mecca, Jazan, Hasa, and Qasim with a
combined storage capacity of 790,000 MT, which were to be operational by
the end of 2014.[29] Storage silos may not be cheap to build
and manage, but they are still much less expensive than growing cereal in
such a harsh climate. Annual storage costs for wheat in Saudi Arabia are
about $70 million, a minute figure in comparison to the cost of
production subsidies, estimated at around $5 billion a year in 1984-2001.[30]
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Saudi Arabia
has built additional grain silos to store a 12-month reserve to counter
the threat of supply disruptions. With the decision to stop domestic
grain production in 2016, most of the new silos will be built closer to
ports in order to receive imports.
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Critics, however, point to the fact that most of Saudi Arabia's current
silos were originally designed to receive domestic crops and are thus
located inland; of the 2.5 MT of current silo capacity, 90 percent is
located in those regions. Silo location has a direct link to cost
efficiency as high transportation costs will need to be offset somehow
and perhaps shifted to the consumer.[31] With the decision to stop
domestic grain production in 2016, most of the new silos will be built
closer to ports in order to receive imports.[32] But even with plans to expand
silos near Jeddah and Jazan, close to 80 percent of silo capacity will
still remain for the time being in the interior of the kingdom. Others
maintain that a 12-month reserve is more than is necessary even with the
threat of supply disruptions.[33]
There is also the difficult task of rotating such a large number of grain
stockpiles to and from different locations as an inability to do so could
result in stock spoilage.[34]
While looking to ensure food security for the kingdom, the government
has also sought to maintain a stable social fabric that has the potential
of fraying in the absence of water subsidies and a dramatic shift in
domestic food production goals. It has promoted new water technologies
such as drip irrigation systems and enhanced water use efficiency. Saudi
agronomists are encouraging farmers to include more sustainable
agriculture methods and crops. Different types of xerophytes—plants that
are adapted to desert climates—have been introduced with the hope of
future commercial potential from their fruits. These crops can offer new
ways for farmers in arid areas to earn a living.[35]
To many Saudis, rural areas
epitomize a past golden age, and preserving them is seen as a form of
protecting a national heritage.
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Educational and extension programs are a significant part of the Saudi
equation. Stressing the importance of these initiatives will raise
awareness of the importance of water conservation among growers.
Providing farmers with crucial research information[36] will help with the challenges
the internal agricultural industry is facing such as low soil fertility
and the need for environmental protection.[37] Thus, King Saud University in
Riyadh established an agricultural extension center in May 1990. This is
the only academic program of its kind in the entire gulf region and
offers a degree in agricultural extension and rural development.[38]
In terms of the social dimensions and the challenges faced there,
recent estimates indicate that only about 15 percent of the Saudi
population still lives in rural areas. Riyadh feels it is of great
importance to keep a balanced ratio of rural to urban population. If such
a balance can be reestablished, it will alleviate pressures on the big
cities and ease the delivery of essential services to the entire
population.[39]
To many Saudis, rural areas epitomize something of a past golden age,
and preserving them and their inhabitants is seen as a form of protecting
a national heritage. The exodus of farmers to the cities is perceived as
a loss, and agricultural education and farm extension programs may stem
that loss. Rural industries such as herbal medicine, bee keeping, and
sheep and goat rearing can continue with the assistance of modern
technology. These initiatives may help make living in rural areas more
inviting and economically feasible so that more people return to their
ancestral farming communities.[40]
In doing so, the Sauds will have made sure not only that the food supply
is ensured but that society is secure and balanced as well. These decisions,
combined with the Arab upheavals that have cascaded throughout the region
since late 2010, gave Riyadh cause to consider its food security, more
specifically, the challenge of securing wheat, the main source of
sustenance for its people. The recent uprisings highlighted the problems
for the Saudis that can arise concerning protection of this main food
source if the correct measures were not taken and expedited solutions
were not devised.[41]
Conclusions
The Saudi attempt to develop its own, internal agricultural industry
to ensure food security was considered by many destined to fail from the
outset. Indeed, subsidizing the agricultural industry had a devastating
effect on the country's water supply as well as a negative impact on the
economy as a whole.
Yet, despite the failure to guarantee food security from domestic
sources, the project did have positive effects by providing employment
for the hundreds of thousands of Bedouins who had abandoned their
traditional, itinerant lifestyle because of the country's rapid
urbanization. In the long term, the Saudi government was forced to look
for other solutions for the food security challenge, notably purchasing
lands abroad and creating food stockpiles that could reduce the challenge
in any future food crisis.
Yossi Mann, a lecturer in the
department of Middle Eastern Studies at Bar-Ilan University, studies
issues related to oil and gas industries in the Middle East. He thanks
Arnon M. Bersson for his assistance.
[1] Annual
Report, Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Riyadh, 2010, p. 389; Safer
al-Kahtani, "Optimum Wheat Production in Saudi Arabia," Journal
of King Saud University, Agricultural Sciences, 1994 (1), pp. 2-3;
Vahid Nowshirvani, "The Yellow Brick Road: Self-Sufficiency or
Self-Enrichment in Saudi Agriculture?" Middle East Report,
Mar./Apr. 1987, pp. 1-2; "Saudi Arabia Grain and Feed Annual
2009," Gain Report, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture (USDA) Foreign
Agricultural Service, Washington, D.C., 2009, p. 7.
[2]
"Saudi Arabia: Grain and Feed Annual," Gain Report, Jan.
2011, p. 3; Gary Vocke, "Wheat Outlook—A Report from the Economic
Research Service," USDA, July 2010, pp. 3-24; "Employments in
Agriculture," World Bank Data, Washington, D.C., 1981-2001.
[3]
Sala A. al-Suhaibani, "Mechanization Provisions of Modern Farms in
Saudi Arabia," Journal of King Saud University, Agricultural
Sciences, 1990 (1), pp. 161-3; "Agricultural Machinery, Tractors per
100 sq. km of Arable Land," World Bank Data, 1996-2001; Nowshirvani,
"The Yellow Brick Road," pp. 5-7.
[4] Omaha
World Herald, Jan. 9, 1995; "Grains World Market and Trade Part
One," USDA Foreign Agricultural Service, Dec. 13, 1996.
[5]
A.A. Leilah and S.A al-Khateeb, "Statistical Analysis of
Wheat Yield under Drought Conditions," Journal of Arid
Environments, May 2005, pp. 483-7; M. M. Mekonnen and A. Y. Hoekstra,
"A Global and High-Resolution Assessment of the Green, Blue and Grey
Water Footprint of Wheat," Hydrology and Earth Systems Sciences,
Apr. 22, 2010, pp. 1259-76; Ali M. Subyani, "Geostatistical Study of
Annual and Seasonal Mean Rainfall Patterns in Southwest Saudi
Arabia," Hydrological Sciences—Journal-des Sciences Hydrologiques,
Oct. 2004, pp. 803-4.
[6]
Fahad M. Alkolibi, "Possible Effects of Global Warming on Agriculture
and Water Resources in Saudi Arabia: Impacts and Responses," Climatic
Change, July 2002, pp. 225–36.
[7]
Mohammed Abdulla al-Saleh, "Declining Groundwater Level of the
Minjur Aquifer, Tebrak Area, Saudi Arabia," The Geographical
Journal, July 1992, pp. 215-9.
[8]
Ibid; Adil A. Bushnak, "Water Supply and Treatment Trends in Saudi
Arabia," Bushnak Water Group, Jeddah, 2001, pp. 12-22.
[9] Saleh,
"Declining Groundwater Level of the Minjur Aquifer"; Bushnak,
"Water Supply and Treatment Trends in Saudi Arabia," pp. 12-22.
[10]
"The Water Sector of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia," World
Bank/Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, 2007, p. 147; "A Water Sector
Assessment Report on the Countries of the Cooperation Council of the Arab
States of the Gulf," World Bank, 2005, pp. 2-34.
[11]
Joseph Mann, "Saudi- Arabia's Economic Needs and the Price of Oil,"
Middle East Review of International Affairs, Dec. 6, 2010, pp.
5-7; Elie Elhadj, "Household Water and Sanitation Services in Saudi
Arabia: An Analysis of Economic, Political and Ecological Issues,"
SOAS Water Research Group, School of Oriental and African Studies and
King's College London, May 2004, p. 20.
[12]
Elie Alhadj, "Saudi Arabia's Agricultural Project: From Dust to
Dust," Middle East Review of International Affairs, June
2008, pp. 34-5; Manal Soliman Fakeeh, "Saudization as a Solution for
Unemployment: The Case of Jeddah Western Region," PhD thesis,
University of Glasgow, May 2009, pp. 10-1.
[13]
"Annual
Meeting of Ministers of Finance and Central Bank Governors, October
5, 2013," Gulf Cooperation Council and International Monetary Fund,
Riyadh, Oct. 5, 2013, p. 4.
[14]
M.G.H. al-Asmari, "Saudi Labor Force: Challenges and
Ambitions," King Abdulaziz University, Jeddah, 2008, p. 24.
[15]
Richard M. Auty, "The Economic Stimulus from Resource-based Industry
in Developing Countries: Saudi Arabia and Bahrain," Economic
Geography, July 1988, pp. 210-22.
[16]
Masudul A. Choudhury and Mohammed A. al-Sahlawi, "Oil and Non-oil
Sectors in the Saudi Arabian Economy," OPEC Review, Sept.
2002, pp. 235-8.
[17] E.
I. Mousa, I. S. al-Mohizea, and M. A. al-Kanhal, "Chemical
Composition and Nutritive Value of Various Breads in Saudi Arabia,"
Food Science Dept., College of Agriculture, King Saud University, 1990,
pp. 259-64; Adbullah I. al-Goosi, "Factors Affecting the Import of
Wheat in Saudi Arabia," MA thesis, Michigan State University, 1980,
pp. 43-50.
[18]
Imman Ansir, "Optimizing the Performance of Environmental Planners
and Designers in Saudi Society," Environment Design Sciences
Journal, 2003, pp. 4-7.
[19]
Monera Nahedh, "The Sedentarization of a Bedouin Community in
Saudi Arabia," PhD thesis, University of Leeds, 1989, pp. 26-40,
219-30.
[20]
Carin Smaller and Howard Mann, "A Thirst for Distant Lands: Foreign
Investment in Agricultural Land and Water," International Institute
for Sustainable Development, Winnipeg, Manitoba, May 2009, p. 24;
"Saudi Arabia: Grain and Feed Annual," Gain Report, Jan.
2011, pp. 3-4.
[21]
Jane Harrigan, The Political Economy of Arab Food Sovereignty (New
York: Palgrave, 2014), p. 70.
[22]
"Global
Food Insecurity and Implications for Saudi Arabia," Chatham
House, London, Apr. 29, 2013, p. 2.
[23]
"Political and Economic Reform in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia,"
Institute of Diplomatic Studies, Saudi Arabia Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Riyadh, Mar. 2007, pp. 29-31; "Key Economic Sectors
Telecommunications and Media," The Economist Intelligence
Unit Ltd., in Saudi Arabia Country Report, May 2007, pp. 16-8;
"Saudi Arabia Oil and Gas Report," ibid., pp. 18-9; Philip S.
Khoury and Joseph Kostiner, "Transforming Dualities: Tribe and State
Formation in Saudi Arabia," in Joseph Kostiner, Tribes and State
Formation in the Middle East (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1991), pp. 236-43.
[24]
Harrigan, The Political Economy of Arab Food Sovereignty, pp.
68-70.
[25]
Ibid; Chicago Tribune Business News, Aug. 26, 2010.
[26] Thomas
W. Lippman, "Saudi Arabia's Quest for 'Food Security,'" Middle
East Policy, Spring 2010, pp. 90-7.
[27]
"Global
Food Insecurity and Implications for Saudi Arabia," pp. 8-9.
[28]
Hussein Mousa, "Grain and Feed Annual: Saudi Arabia 2014," Gain
Report, 2014, p. 4-5.
[29]
Ibid., p. 6-7.
[30]
Rob Bailey and Robin Willoughby, "Edible Oil: Food Security in the
Gulf," Chatham House, London, Nov. 2013, pp. 10-2.
[31]
"Global
Food Insecurity and Implications for Saudi Arabia," pp. 9-10.
[32]
Danny Hamlick, et al, "Comparing Egypt and Saudi Arabia's Wheat
GVC," Minerva Research Initiative, Duke University, Durham, N.C.,
Apr. 2014, pp. 4-6.
[33]
"Global
Food Insecurity and Implications for Saudi Arabia," pp. 9-10.
[34] Ibid.
[35]
Mirza B. Baig and Khodran H. al-Zaharani, "Agricultural Extension in
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia: Difficult Present and Demanding
Future," Department of Agricultural Extension and Rural Society,
College of Food and Agricultural Sciences, King Saud University, n.d., p.
8.
[36]
Ibid., p. 9.
[37]
Ibid., p. 10-12.
[38]
Ibid.
[39]
"Global
Food Insecurity and Implications for Saudi Arabia," p. 6.
[40]
Baig and Zaharani, "Agricultural Extension in the Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia," pp. 11-2.
[41]
Raed H. Charafeddine, "The Economic and Financial Impacts of the
Arab Awakening," presentation, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University, Cambridge, Oct. 3, 2011, pp.
5-13.
Related
Topics: Saudi Arabia
| Spring 2015 MEQ
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