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Islamic
State: The Myth of a Baathist 'Hidden Hand'
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Originally published under the title, "Enemy of My Enemy:
Re-evaluating the Islamic State's Relationship with the Ba'athist
JRTN."
The
Washington Post calls
former officials of Saddam Hussein's Baathist regime "the hidden
hand behind the Islamic State."
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Since the full-blown revival of Iraq's Sunni insurgency at the
beginning of 2014, there has been much misunderstanding of the
relationship between the Islamic State and insurgents of Baathist
orientation, principally represented by the Jaish Rijaal al-Tariqa
al-Naqshabandiyya (JRTN).
Much of the discourse on this subject attempts to tie the JRTN to the
Islamic State, arguing that a so-called "alliance of
convenience" between the two groups has been key to the Islamic
State's maintenance of power in areas outside of government control.
Linked to this theme is the portrayal of the Islamic State as somehow
Baathism reincarnated, most commonly noting the former careers that many
leading figures in the group had in the security apparatus of former
Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's government.
The common notion of a
Baathist-Islamic State "alliance of convenience" is mistaken.
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As such, it is worthwhile to trace the relationship between the JRTN
and the Islamic State from the initial emergence of the former until the
present day, primarily focusing on the aftermath of the United States'
military withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011, in order to highlight
that the common notion of the "alliance of convenience" is
mistaken and that there is a clear dividing line between the two groups.
Whatever coordination took place in mid-2014, in particular, soon
dissipated as the Islamic State consolidated power and local territorial
control at the JRTN's expense, so that the JRTN has largely descended
into irrelevance. Consequently, whatever the veracity of claims by Shia
militias that the JRTN leader and former aide to Hussein, Izzat Ibrahim
al-Douri, was killed in mid-April 2015, the JRTN's impact on Iraq's
security situation in the face of the wider Islamic State threat is
minimal.
Ideology and Beginnings
The JRTN was founded at the end of 2006 following Hussein's execution
in December, officially as part of a Douri-led coalition called Al-Qiyadat
al-Ula lil-Jihad wal-Tahrir, or the Supreme Command for Jihad and
Liberation (SCJL). Although the coalition nominally included other
groups, at least in the beginning, in practice the JRTN has become
interchangeable with the SCJL.
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JRTN
leader Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri was reported killed in April.
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The goal of the JRTN can be summed up as aiming to resurrect Iraq's
Baathist state that existed before the US-led invasion in 2003. The Sufi
religious aegis of the Naqshbandi order, deriving from the cultivation of
the sect during the Hussein era, should be viewed as secondary, though it
does help to separate the JRTN from the Salafist-jihadist ideology of the
Islamic State, as will be discussed subsequently.
The primacy of Baathist ideology is illustrated by the JRTN's pan-Arab
logo portraying a unified Arab world, as envisaged by Baathism, as well
as the first point of the JRTN's creed as stated on its official website,
"Our army believes that Iraq is an Arab, Muslim state that cannot be
separated from the Arab Islamic Ummah."
The term "Arab Islamic Ummah" is a key part of Iraqi
Baathist discourse, reflecting not only the classical pan-Arabism but
also the Islamic face that Hussein tried to give his regime following the
1990-91 Gulf War. Also in keeping with official Baathist ideology is a
superficial anti-sectarian stance, reflected
in point 16 of the JRTN creed, which states, "Our army believes
in the outlawing of the establishment of sectarian, racist, and
regionalist blocs and parties and their possession of weapons."
Indeed, the JRTN even claims non-Sunni members, describing itself in a July
2014 statement as an "extension of the prior national Iraqi army,"
with members from all sects and ethnicities, including Arabs, Kurds,
Shia, Sunnis, Turkmen, and even Christians, Mandaeans, and Yezidis.
Linked to this point is a rejection of any notion of dividing Iraq,
which implicitly entails the repudiation of concepts of federalism by
sect that has gained increasing popularity among Iraq's Sunni population,
especially the more 'moderate' sections of the pro-insurgency movement,
such as the Islamic Army in Iraq (IAI). The IAI set up an activist wing
after the US withdrawal - named Al-Hirak al-Shaabi al-Sunni - to
work for the goal of a Sunni federal region. In contrast, therefore, the
JRTN stands out as an inherently rejectionist and revolutionary actor in
Iraq's Sunni insurgency.
The fact that the IAI showed itself to be more amenable to compromise
within the system was also demonstrated by the large number of its
fighters and commanders who ended up joining the Sunni Awakening (Sahwa)
movement from the beginning of 2007 onwards, which proved key in driving
back the Islamic State's predecessor, the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI).
JRTN operations have been
relatively unsophisticated, with no suicide attacks, coordinated VBIED
attacks, or sustained territorial assaults.
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However, there is much less evidence of extensive JRTN participation
in the Sahwa. Consequently, by the time of the US withdrawal, one could
affirm with reasonable confidence that the two main Sunni insurgent
actors in Iraq were the ISI and the JRTN. Partly on the basis of the
consistent shared rejection of the post-2003 Shia-dominated political
order in Iraq, allegations emerged from security officials even in this
period of collaboration between the JRTN and the ISI, with the JRTN
reportedly assisting the ISI in carrying out vehicle-borne improvised explosive
device (VBIED) attacks in various parts of Iraq, including
Kirkuk, Ramadi, and Tikrit. Although unverified, the reports are
somewhat credible as during 2010-11 the ISI was a weakening organisation
under heavy security force pressure and was unable to impose its will
over other groups in the same way the Islamic State is currently able. By
comparison, the type of JRTN operations officially advertised by the
group's own media always tended to be much less sophisticated than those
of the ISI, with no suicide attacks, coordinated VBIED attacks, or
sustained territorial assaults.
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Images
released by JRTN in 2014
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Rather, JRTN operations entailed more basic hit-and-run guerrilla
operations, particularly the use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs),
rockets, and mortars. One operational video, for example, dated
25 November 2011, features an IED attack purportedly targeting a
vehicle of "the American enemy" in northern Baghdad. In this
video, the JRTN claims the IED was manufactured locally "and with
[the] co-operation of members of the government army," referring to
the new Iraqi army of the Baghdad government. The fact that the group
might have had local sympathisers in the security forces at this stage is
not surprising. Despite the US withdrawal, most officially advertised
JRTN video operations post-2011 continued to portray attacks as targeting
"the American enemy", as though the perceived occupier was
somehow still present. This was probably related to the fact that in the
immediate aftermath of the US withdrawal, the Sunni narrative of Iranian
influence over a supposed "Safavid" - a pejorative term used in
Sunni discourse to mean an Iranian client - government in Baghdad did not
yet have sufficient currency to give credibility to attacks on Iraqi
government forces that might end up harming civilians through collateral
damage. The available videos on JRTN operations indicate a reach across
predominantly Sunni areas of Iraq, ranging from Diyala province in the
east to Anbar province in the west, and from the Baghdad area and
surrounding belt all the way to Ninawa province in the north.
However, to understand further where JRTN influence was particularly
strong, it is best to examine the JRTN's activist front organisation,
known as Intifada Ahrar al-Iraq (IAAI), or the Uprising of the
Free People of Iraq.
IAAI and Protests in Iraq
The link between the IAAI and the JRTN is demonstrated by numerous
lines of evidence, despite the fact it was initially denied by
IAAI spokesperson Dr. Ghazi Faisal. First, the IAAI regularly shares
official JRTN statements on its official and linked social media pages,
while declining to do so with other insurgent groups. Second, IAAI
discourse exactly mirrors that of the JRTN, using the same revolutionary
rhetoric, the same forms of address in its statements, and the same
superficial anti-sectarian messaging. Third, it is notable that the same
areas where the JRTN was seen as traditionally strong became strongholds
for protests organised by the IAAI in 2013.
Protests that broke out in 2011 were nationwide on the model of the
Arab Spring demonstrations and tended to focus on popular grievances such
as the provision of public services, government corruption, and calls to
end the US occupation and perceived foreign interference. In this
context, the
IAAI announced itself on 24 February 2011, urging a
"violent/tremendous revolution against the occupation, oppression,
and tyranny", and calling on "Iraqis from Arabs, Kurds,
Turkmen, Sunnis, Shia, Muslims, Christians, and the rest of the other
religions, sects, and ethnicities" to rise up. Playing on the notion
of nationwide grievances and resentment at the US occupation, the first
IAAI statement made the US presence in Iraq the focus of its anger,
rather than sectarian-tinged talk of the "Safavid" government.
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Still
frame from an IAAI video showing a May 2011 protest in Rawa, western
Anbar province
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The IAAI also launched a video channel at this point, filming and
uploading footage of some of the protests. Among some of the
demonstrations captured on camera by the IAAI and shared on its channel
was a local protest held in Rawa, in western
Anbar (currently controlled by the Islamic State), in May 2011
featuring a banner reading, "The tribe of the people of Rawa rejects
foreign intervention and demands the departure of the occupier", and
chants of "Iran, out, out. Iraq will remain free. With blood, with
soul, we sacrifice for you oh Iraq." The IAAI undoubtedly hoped to
capitalise on the wave of popular protests, but little ultimately came
out of the 2011 demonstrations.
The IAAI would have to wait until the beginning of 2013 for its status
to become prominent. Unlike the 2011 protests, these demonstrations had a
distinct Sunni sectarian element, focusing on grievances such as
de-Baathification legislation introduced in May 2003 - seeking, at a minimum,
its total repeal - and the detention of friends and relatives by the
security forces. However, the IAAI used the protests to push its
revolutionary agenda, for example releasing a song in March 2013 entitled
"Our people
want the downfall of the government". Other familiar JRTN themes
came out in other songs released by the IAAI in this period, such as the
song "The
People have Revolted", featuring lyrics including, "We
won't stop until Baghdad, bringing down the ruling system and the
constitution" and "we reject all rule of division". At
IAAI protests, there was a familiar JRTN slogan - "Qadimun ya
Baghdad", or "Coming, oh Baghdad" - in reference to
the notion of retaking the capital and overthrowing the government. The
most prominent IAAI protest sites were at Hawija in Kirkuk
province, and the cities of Mosul and Tikrit,
with notable influence also in Diyala and Fallujah
- which gained notoriety for the presence of some protesters waving ISI
flags.
It was clear that the IAAI was not going to be reconciled to the
system, whatever concessions the government might make. Rather, its aim
was to revive a full-blown insurgency through confrontation, and the
government played right into the IAAI's hands with the Hawija massacre in
April 2013, which resulted in the killing of dozens of apparently unarmed
protesters by security forces. Following the incident, the JRTN's
military spokesperson released a statement
invoking the traditional Quranic justification for defensive jihad, while
emphasising that the "patience of this oppressed people will not
last and the peacefulness of their demonstrations and sit-ins will not
continue". The immediate aftermath of the massacre led to an apparent
upsurge in JRTN activity, with reported attacks at Mosul airport, and
in Abu Ghraib, east Mosul, Fallujah, the Hamrin Mountains, the Tariq camp
near Fallujah, Tikrit, and Tuz Khurmato. The JRTN also briefly seized
control of the town of Sulaiman Bek.
ISIL exploited the new level of
instability in Iraq arising from JRTN actions in 2012.
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Subsequent violence in Iraq has never dipped below pre-Hawija massacre
levels, so the incident, the wider Sunni demonstrations, and the JRTN's
involvement in the post-incident escalation can be interpreted as a key
turning point in the revitalisation of Iraq's Sunni insurgency. At this
stage too, focus on the "Safavid" angle becomes more apparent
in the JRTN's propaganda, with an official JRTN video on the "operations of
liberating Sulaiman Bek" featuring an "assault on the
Safavid militias and destruction of a tank". Similarly, a JRTN video
from the Fallujah area on 25 April 2013 is entitled "Bombing of a
base of the Safavid militias in Fallujah." However, evidence is
lacking of co-ordination in this upsurge between the JRTN and the ISI -
which had become the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in April
2013 following the decision by emir Ibrahim al-Badri (alias Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi) to expand into Syria and attempt to subsume Jabhat al-Nusra.
Furthermore, in the protests themselves, the issue of people showing up
with ISI/ISIL banners was a localised problem in Fallujah and Ramadi, and
not one affecting IAAI protest sites in particular.
What can be said with certainty though is that ISIL, having already
intensified operations in 2012, exploited the new level of instability in
Iraq - which had arisen thanks in no small part to the actions of the
JRTN - to accomplish some of its most daring operations yet. The most
notable of these was the Abu Ghraib prison break in July 2013, in which
hundreds of jihadi veterans of the insurgency against the US were
released, significantly strengthening ISIL's ranks. To better scrutinise
any seeming alliance of convenience and co-ordination between ISIL and
the JRTN, it is necessary to more closely examine the events of late
2013/early 2014, as the security situation in Iraq descended into a
full-blown insurgency with the loss of government control over
significant cities, beginning with Fallujah and culminating with Mosul,
Tikrit, and other towns in the north and west of the country in the
summer of 2014.
Descent into Chaos
The fall of Fallujah from government control in early January 2014 can
be ascribed in large part to failures on the part of then Iraqi prime
minister Nouri al-Maliki, who decided to dismantle the Ramadi protest
site by force in December 2013 on the grounds that it was a base for
ISIL, despite the fact that ISIL militants had only occasionally appeared
when the site was largely empty and the protests were dissipating on
their own. Later that month, security forces arrested Sunni member of
parliament Ahmad al-Alwani, killing his brother and five of his guards
during the operation, causing widespread anger across Anbar province.
In an attempt to ease tensions, the army was ordered to withdraw from
Fallujah and Ramadi in the hope that the local police could deal with the
situation, but the result was that ISIL - in co-ordination with other
insurgents, including the JRTN - exploited the security vacuum to seize
control of Fallujah and parts of Ramadi, although Ramadi was re-taken by
security forces and pro-government militias several days later. Media
coverage at the time tended to portray Fallujah as having fallen under
ISIL control, when in reality a variety of Sunni militant groups had
taken over the city in conjunction with ISIL, including the JRTN, the
IAI, Jaish al-Mujahideen, and the 1920s Revolution Brigades.
ISIL of course would have an interest in downplaying the presence of
the other smaller factions, and vice-versa. On account of the other factions,
though, ISIL initially had to adopt a more conciliatory approach, not
targeting the families of local police. In line with its approach in
Syria whenever it entered an area where other factions were present, it
also set up a Virtue
and Vice Committee/Islamic court. Gradually, ISIL began to subsume
its rivals through a mixture of co-option and coercion, providing
incentives to pledge allegiance, so that by May-June 2014 it had become
the dominant group in the city. Evidence for the JRTN's presence in
Fallujah was found on the IAAI's media channel. For example, on 10
January, the IAAI uploaded a video featuring
insurgents in Fallujah, one of whom proclaimed that its aim was to
conquer Baghdad, and that they were not members of Daesh, a pejorative
term for ISIL based on its Arabic acronym.
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Still
frame from a 2014 IAAI video showing a purported Shia tribal council in
Karbala. Note the portrait of Ali to emphasize a Shi'i identity.
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Throughout the beginning of 2014, the IAAI also released videos of
self-proclaimed "Military Councils for the Revolutionaries of the
Tribes" in a variety of locations across Iraq, playing on typical
JRTN themes of superficial cross-sectarianism, including supposed Kurdish
and Shia tribal
councils. In mid-January it also announced the formation of a unifying
body known as the General Military Council for Iraq's Revolutionaries
(GMCIR), which features a political wing where the participation of the
JRTN is openly acknowledged. It is also clear that the GMCIR includes
other insurgent factions ideologically close to JRTN, such as the 1920s
Revolution Brigades.
Like the fall of Fallujah, the capture of cities in the north of Iraq
- above all Mosul and Tikrit - was not the work solely of ISIL, which
changed its name to the Islamic State in June 2014. Indeed, the wider
insurgency beyond the Islamic State initially seemed ecstatic about the
lightning offensive across northern and western Iraq. However, rather
than a case of co-dependence between the Islamic State and other
factions, as had been the case for some time in Fallujah, it is clear
these advances against the government were being spearheaded by the
former - which by then represented by far the most powerful insurgent
force in the country - and the other factions were trying to ride this
wave in a bid to carve out their own spheres of influence. However, the
Islamic State was no longer in the business of compromise and issued a
charter for Mosul in mid-June, shortly after capturing the city, making
clear that not only had the era of "Safavid" government passed,
but also that of Baathism.
By mid-2014, JRTN was visibly
marginalized even in Tikrit, the spiritual heartland of Baathism.
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Furthermore, in a statement issued by
its newly formed "Committee to Administer the Affairs of the
Mosques" in Mosul, the Islamic State explicitly affirmed that it
would not tolerate any other group displaying banners. Within
approximately one month, following on from the group's declaration of a
caliphate on 29 June, a sophisticated administration was emerging within
Mosul, with various declared diwans (Islamic State departments),
such as the Diwan al-Taaleem, issuing examination timetables for Mosul
University's various colleges.
A similar pattern of the marginalisation of the JRTN and other
non-Islamic State militants emerged even in places where the JRTN would
be expected to have had more influence, including Tikrit - the spiritual
heartland of Baathism - with other groups pushed out to the rural peripheries.
The fate of JRTN forces in places such as Mosul was best summarised by an
account given to IHS Jane's in late December 2014 by a Mosul resident,
"They are present but have no influence; some of them gave
allegiance, some of them were detained, and some of them fled." Were
the 'alliance of convenience' more than a short-term, pragmatic gambit,
the Islamic State might have made some concessions to JRTN sensibilities,
but in fact the group indulged in all its worst excesses to the anger of
the JRTN, including the destruction of shrines and heritage sites - which
was particularly offensive to the JRTN's Sufi image - the genocidal
targeting of Yezidis, and the displacement of Christians from Mosul.
Consequently, the JRTN
distanced itself from these Islamic State actions in its statements,
while sticking to its standard practice of not mentioning the Islamic
State by name and blaming its deeds on supposed agents of the Baghdad
government and Iran.
JRTN Decline
As the JRTN's influence declined in the face of the Islamic State's
local dominance, the group tried to portray itself as defiant on the path
of the so-called 'revolution' despite its clear distancing from the
Islamic State's worst actions. In mid-to-late 2014, unverified local
reports emerged that the US-led international coalition against the
Islamic State was reaching out to the JRTN in a bid to form a local Sunni
force to combat the Islamic State - although this has since been denied
by US
ambassador Brett McGurk. In a statement circulated
on JRTN social media pages, but not its official website, this
outreach was portrayed as a sign of desperation and a list of JRTN
demands was posted, reflecting the US' inherent inability to come to an
understanding with the JRTN.
JRTN has become totally
marginalised and reflects a bygone era of Iraq's once-diverse Sunni
insurgency.
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The actual party in desperation was the JRTN, however, which in the
past six months has tried to turn to Saudi Arabia and aligned Arab states
in a bid to bolster its position - largely through the provision of
funding. This has been reflected in effusive
praise for the deceased Saudi King Abdullah as a champion of the
cause of the "Arab Islamic Ummah", congratulations extended to
the new monarch King Salman, and a eulogy
to the Jordanian pilot Muaz al-Kasasbeh who was burnt alive by the
Islamic State, portraying him as a "martyr" carrying out the
obligatory duty of defending the "Arab Islamic Ummah" and its
heritage. Most recently, the JRTN
has declared its firm support for the Saudi-led coalition's Operation
Decisive Storm against Zaidi Houthi militant group Ansar Allah in Yemen,
hailing it "the great historic operation" to halt Iranian
expansionism. The IAAI also released a song praising the operation.
In an audio
message attributed to Douri in April, prior to reports of his claimed
death, he clearly distances himself from 'takfiri' thought - a reference
to the Islamic State - and hails the old pan-Arab nationalism of former
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, while trying to tie his cause to
that of Saudi Arabia. The veracity of his claimed killing is now readily
in doubt following another
audio message released in May. As far as dating the speech goes, it
is almost certainly from after the reported claims of his killing, as he
makes reference to a controversy postdating his alleged death over the
status of the town of Nukhayb in Anbar province. In this recording, the
denunciation of the Islamic State is even clearer, as he condemns the
June 2014 massacre of Shia security forces by Islamic State militants at
Camp Speicher in Tikrit and makes clear that there is no alliance between
the JRTN and the Islamic State, stating about the latter, "They
declare the Baath to be kuffar [disbelievers]." Undoubtedly part of
this speech reflects justifiable pushback against portrayals of the Islamic
State as Baathism resurrected. It also seems that Douri is not under any
illusions about the Islamic State's strength relative to his group, as he
speaks of the current fighting in Anbar and how 90% of the province is
under the control of the Islamic State and affiliated "armed
men".
In conclusion, therefore, the JRTN cannot be seen as the local Sunni
force that will turn the tide against the Islamic State. It has become
totally marginalised and reflects a bygone era of Iraq's Sunni
insurgency, which used to be much more diverse. Now is the era of the
Islamic State, and policy-making and analysis must do away with notions
that the Islamic State is maintaining localised power and territorial
control in Iraq because of any 'alliance of convenience' with Baathists, or
that the Islamic State is somehow Baathism in disguise. The fact that
senior figures within the group might have had a past in Saddam Hussein's
security apparatus does not automatically make those figures Baathists in
secret alliance with the JRTN. Rather, the true ideological forerunner
lies in the Islamist and Salafist ideas that gained currency in the last
decade of Hussein's rule thanks to the regime's efforts to seek an
Islamic facade, fused with the brutal jihadism brought to Iraq by the
founder of the ISI's predecessor Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, and his contingent following the US-led invasion.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a
research fellow at Middle East Forum's Jihad Intel project.
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