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Syria's
Civil War Could Stabilize Its Region
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WT title: "Like-to-like
ethnic migration in the Middle East: Syria's civil war could end up
stabilizing the region"
Population shifts resulting from Syria's four-year long civil war have
profoundly changed Syria and its three Arabic-speaking neighbors: Iraq,
Lebanon, and Jordan. (Turkey and Israel have changed too, but less so.)
Ironically, amid tragedy and horror, as populations adapt to the brutal
imperatives of modern nationalism, all four countries are becoming more a
bit more stable. That's because the fighting has pushed peoples to move
from ethnic minority status to ethnic majority status, encouraging like
to live with like.
Before looking at each country, some background:
First, along with the Balkans, the Middle East contains the most
complex and unsettled ethnic, religious, linguistic, and national mix in
the world. It's a place where cross-border alliances deeply complicate
local politics. If the Balkans set off World War I, the Middle East might
well spark World War III.
Second, historic tensions between the two main Muslim sects, Sunni and
Shi'i, had largely subsided before Ayatollah Khomeini's rise to power in
1979. Driven by Tehran's aggression, they have since flared anew.
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The brutal 8-year
war, 1980-88 between Iran and Iraq did much to exacerbate Sunni-Shi'i
hostility.
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Third, the imperialist European powers nearly ignored the identity of
the peoples living in the Middle East as they defined most of the
region's borders. Instead, they focused on rivers, ports, and other
resources that served their economic interests. Today's jumble of
somewhat randomly-defined countries (e.g., Jordan) is the result.
Finally, Kurds were the major losers a century ago; lacking
intellectuals to make their case, they found themselves divided among
four different states and persecuted in them all. Today, they are
organized for independence.
Returning to Syria and its Arab neighbors (and drawing on Pinhas
Inbari's "Demographic
Upheaval: How the Syrian War is Reshaping the Region"):
Syria and Iraq have undergone strikingly similar developments. After
the demise of monstrous dictators in 2000 and 2003, each has broken into
the same three ethnic units – Shi'i Arab, Sunni Arab, and Kurd. Tehran
dominates both Shi'i-oriented regimes, while several Sunni-majority
states (Turkey, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar) back the Sunni rebels. The
Kurds have withdrawn from the Arab civil wars to build their own
autonomous areas. Once-ambitious dictatorships barely sustain functioning
foreign policies. Also, the century-old boundary separating Syria and
Iraq has largely vanished.
Syria: The part of Syria still ruled by Bashar al-Assad is
becoming more Shi'i. An estimated half
of the pre-war Syrian population of 22 million has been driven from its
homes; of them, the 3 million refugees, mostly Sunni, who fled the
country are unlikely to return both because of the continuing civil war
and the Assad regime's revocation of their citizenship. The regime
appears also to have intentionally reduced its control over the area near
the border with Jordan to encourage Sunnis to flee Syria. In another ploy
to increase the Shi'i population, reports indicate it has welcomed and
re-settled about 500,000 Iraqi Shi'is, conferring Syrian citizenship on
some.
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Bashar al-Assad must
have been a better ophthalmologist than dictator.
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Iraq: The Syrian civil war provided the Islamic State (or
ISIS/ISIL) with an opportunity to move into Iraq, seizing such cities as
Fallujah and Mosul, leading to an exodus of non-Sunnis (especially Shi'is
and Yazidis), and remaking Iraq along ethnic lines. Given the country's
intermingled population, especially in the Baghdad area, It will be years
– perhaps decades – before the sides sort themselves out. But the process
appears inexorable.
Lebanon: Sunnis are growing more powerful, beating back the
Iranian influence. The million new Sunni refugees from Syria now
constitute 20 percent of the country's population, roughly doubling the
Sunni community. Also, Hizbullah, the dominant Shi'i organization in
Lebanon, is neglecting its own constituency and losing influence
domestically by fighting on behalf of the Assad regime in Syria.
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Hizbullah militiamen
in Syria reduces the groups influence in its home country, Lebanon.
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Jordan: The recent influx of Syrian refugees follows an earlier
wave of approximately one million Iraqi refugees. Together, the two
groups have lowered the percentage of Palestinians in Jordan to the point
that the latter probably no longer constitute a majority of the country's
population, a shift with major political implications. For one, it
reduces the potential Palestinian threat to the Hashemite monarchy; for
another, it undermines the Jordan-is-Palestine
argument championed by some Israelis.
In brief, Iraq and Syria are devolving into their constituent
religious and ethnic parts, Lebanon is becoming more Sunni, and Jordan
less Palestinian. However gruesome the human cost of the Syrian civil
war, its long-term impact potentially renders the Middle East a less
combustible place, one less likely to trigger World War III.
Mr. Pipes (DanielPipes.org,
@DanielPipes) is president of the Middle East Forum. © 2015 by Daniel
Pipes. All rights reserved.
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text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an
integral whole with complete and accurate information provided about its
author, date, place of publication, and original URL.
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