Hizballah's
Growing Partnership with Lebanon's Army Provides Operational Cover
by Yaakov Lappin
Special to IPT News
September 20, 2018
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 Hizballah and
Lebanon's official military – the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) - are
increasingly cooperating with one another, Israeli military sources say,
and this relationship is helping the Iranian-backed terrorist organization
run southern Lebanon.
"We actually see them working together," an IDF official said
earlier this month during a briefing to reporters near the Lebanese border.
"We see them go the same villages together. We know who is who.
Sometimes the Hizballah personnel wear LAF uniforms. The LAF, of course,
are allowed to be here."
The cooperation also takes the form of joint vehicle patrols, and the
LAF never enters a southern Lebanese village without gaining prior
Hizballah approval.
This relationship helps Hizballah get around UN Security Council
Resolution 1701, which forbids it from moving armed units into south
Lebanon.
Resolution 1701 does, however, permit the LAF to be in the area,
enabling the Lebanese military to act as a cover for Hizballah's
activities.
With the Syrian civil war beginning to wind down, Hizballah, armed with
a formidable rocket and missile arsenal, is preparing to bring its highly
trained units in Syria back home to Lebanon. Many will head to the southern
Lebanese front with Israel, according to IDF assessments.
The close cooperation with the LAF could allow the Shi'ite organization
to deploy its forces even more effectively, as they prepare for potential
war with Israel.
"The LAF has lost its independence a long time ago,"
Brig.-Gen. (res.) Yossi Kuperwasser, a former IDF Military Intelligence
research division chief, and a former director-general of the Israeli
Ministry of Strategic Affairs, told the Investigative Project on Terrorism.
"Not just LAF – but all of the Lebanese security apparatus – has
lost independence. We see it in ongoing cooperation in intelligence,
operational, and security activities – in all of these fields. This is an
area of concern," he said.
Many in the international community "want to think about the LAF as
a body that is part of the system that can be worked with, and which is not
contaminated by terrorism," Kuperwasser said. "But in reality,
there are many doubts that this is in fact the situation. That should worry
everyone, because no one wants to see Hizballah get more capabilities than
it already has."
Kuperwasser noted that, despite their growing cooperation, Hizballah and
the LAF do not view everything eye to eye. The LAF has a commitment to the
Lebanese state, while Hizballah has many identities, he noted, including
Lebanese, Shi'ite, jihadist, and Iranian, as well as being heavily invested
in Syria.
"Hizballah operates on many fronts. Hence, as soon as it becomes
connected with the LAF, this projects on the LAF's conduct," the
intelligence expert said.
"We see an Iranian willingness to assist the LAF. We see that the
LAF is supposed to be the organization deployed in southern Lebanon,
according to Resolution 1701, and ensures that there is no Hizballah presence
in the area. But in actuality, because of the cooperation with Hizballah,
this has turned into a fiction," he added.
Due to such trends, Israel has repeatedly warned that it can no longer
make a clear distinction between Hizballah and the Lebanese state or the
LAF.
Should any potential security escalation occur, the IDF source said
during the briefing earlier this month, the IDF's response would
"mostly depend on how the LAF behaves."
"If we see the LAF move back and give us space, we will not attack
them. If they take part in hostilities, we will have to attack," he
cautioned.
On a regional level, the Hizballah/LAF cooperation has also caused
significant damage to Lebanon's relationship with the Sunni Arab powers,
particularly Saudi Arabia.
Hizballah chief Hassan Nasrallah maintains cooperation with Yemen's
Houthis forces, who are engaged in a major armed conflict with the Saudis.
"Nasrallah does not care about the Lebanese state. From Lebanon, he
operates in a way that endangers the Sunni moderate states, and the
U.S.," said Kuperwasser. "And all of this happens in Lebanon with
the knowledge of the LAF. This must cast a shadow on the willingness of the
West and the pragmatic Arab states to cooperate with Lebanon."
Hopes that further cooperation with Lebanon can "save the
situation, and foster a different attitude, making the LAF act
differently" still exist in the international community, said
Kuperwasser. "But Hizballah does not read the situation this way, and
neither do the Lebanese, who are continuing their cooperation with
Hizballah."
Hizballah's three components
Hizballah's cooperation with the LAF is just one aspect of its larger
Lebanese military operations, which are made up of three main components.
The first involves defensive units, embedded in every southern Lebanese
village, and in open areas. These units are tasked with challenging a
potential Israeli ground offensive and also have access to underground
bunkers and tunnels. The units maintain war readiness, equipment, and
weapons.
A second component is Hizballah's offensive firepower, which is
estimated to exceed 120,000 missiles, making it one of the largest
collections in the world. This arsenal places almost every area in Israel
within range. Hizballah is expected to focus its heaviest firepower on
northern Israeli border regions and Israeli military targets, but it can
fire thousands of rockets at greater Tel Aviv, and beyond, paralyzing the
Israeli home front.
Its third component is an elite ground attack force, called
"Radwan," which would seek to use newly gained battle experience
from Syria, and cross the border into Israel, where, according to IDF
assessments, its mission would be "to kill as much as they can in
villages and bases, and symbolically attack in Israel, so that after the
war, Hezbollah can claim: 'We won.'"
The IDF is closely studying these threats and drawing up preparations of
its own, designed to crush Hizballah in an unprecedented manner should a
conflict erupt.
The fate of the LAF, it would seem, in any such scenario, would depend
on its ability to stay out of the fighting.
Yaakov Lappin is a military and strategic affairs correspondent. He
also conducts research and analysis for defense think tanks, and is the
Israel correspondent for IHS Jane's Defense Weekly. His book, The
Virtual Caliphate, explores the online jihadist presence.
Related Topics: Yaakov
Lappin, Hizballah,
Syrian
civil war, Lebanese
Armed Forces, IDF,
Yossi
Kuperwasser, Hassan
Nasrallah, UN
Resolution 1701, Southern
Lebanon, missile
arsenal, Radwan
attack force
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