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Hamas
was Defeated, Until the Next Time
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Executive Summary: During Operation Protective Edge, Hamas was
clearly defeated, but not destroyed. Israel was successful in significantly
degrading the military capabilities of Hamas and forced it to accept the
Egyptian-Israeli ceasefire unconditionally. Despite criticism of Israel's
"disproportionate" response and over seventy Israeli
casualties, the operation was supported by many key international actors
and the fighting caused little damage to Israel. As there is no political
solution to the conflict in sight, Israel may be forced to "mow the
grass" again and more vigorously so.
Hamas was clearly defeated by Israel in "Operation Protective
Edge,' but not destroyed. Its destruction was not a goal of Israel's
military campaign. What Israel wanted was a weakened Hamas to continue to
rule Gaza. The separation between Gaza and the West Bank serves Israel's
interest in weakening the Palestinian national movement, which has been
and remains a mortal enemy (not a peace partner), at least for the
foreseeable future.
Israel decided to once again "mow the grass" in Gaza under the assumption that
it is engaged in a protracted intractable conflict where a patient
strategy of attrition is needed to significantly degrade the capabilities
of Hamas to harm Israel. This was achieved. About one third of Hamas'
missile arsenal and most of its missile production infrastructure was
destroyed. Most of the attack tunnels (32) were probably demolished, and
almost one thousand Hamas fighters and a few of its leaders were
eliminated. More targeted killings and an earlier removal of some of the
self-imposed constraints on the use of airpower might have speeded Hamas'
acceptance of a ceasefire and might have spared Gaza much destruction.
The Hamas defeat is clear, because it finally capitulated to the
Egyptian cease-fire proposal that Hamas had been rejected since July 15.
The unlimited ceasefire, as Egypt and Israel demanded, constituted the
precondition for future negotiations, and it had no input from Qatar and
Turkey, both Hamas supporters. All crossings into Gaza will continue to
be controlled by Israel and Egypt, making sure that the rearmament of
Hamas will not be easy. Egypt even forced Hamas to swallow a bitter pill
such as the presence of the Palestinian Authority (PA) at the Rafah
crossing. The Hamas "victory speeches" cannot erase the fact
that Hamas eventually gave in unconditionally to Egyptian-Israeli
pressure.
Despite much criticism abroad of Israel's "disproportionate"
use of force, Israel was allowed for 50 days to pulverize Hamas
installations and their surroundings. It was clear that a large number of
Arab states tacitly supported the Israeli endeavor to administer a heavy
blow on Hamas. Important international actors, such as India, China and
Russia, were rather mute on the Gaza issue for their own reasons.
Moreover, the US, the EU and parts of the international community
demanded demilitarization of Gaza too. This is of course not attainable
without collecting Hamas weaponry by force, but it delegitimizes Hamas
violence, while lending legitimacy to Israel's defensive measures.
Any assessment of "Protective Edge" must also calculate the
cost to Israel of this offensive. The "Iron Dome" system
neutralized almost all rockets fired at Israel's population centers. Most
of the country was little affected by the Gaza war, although the sound of
sirens probably had a negative psychological effect. Disciplined behavior
on part of the civilian public minimized the loss of lives. But the death
toll was 72 (over sixty soldiers) and hundreds of wounded. Limited damage
was caused primarily to property in the proximity of the Gaza. Direct and
indirect costs of the war that amount to several billions of dollars are
bearable for the strong Israeli economy.
The caution and the reluctance to use ground forces displayed by
Israel were useful in garnering domestic and international legitimacy,
but might have a corrosive effect on Israel's deterrence. Such qualities,
commendable in a democracy, do not enhance Israel's deterrence in the
Middle East. Eagerness to fight, determination and ruthlessness are the
prerequisites for building deterrence.
Unfortunately, the military campaign against Hamas underscored
tensions in US-Israel relations. The ambiguous attitudes and actions
toward Israel on part of the US administration signal less willingness to
back its Middle East ally. Moreover, the US was largely irrelevant in the
Gaza outcome, as it foolishly tried to involve Turkey and Qatar in
management of the crisis and it failed to perceive the centrality of
Egypt in the Gaza equation. The Gaza war was another example of the
confused Obama administration foreign policy towards the Middle East. The
American misfortune is also an Israeli loss as Jerusalem needs and
prefers a strong and relevant America.
"Protective Edge" left Gaza in Hamas hands. There is a
widespread feeling of unease among Israelis with this outcome. The
frustration is understandable, but not warranted. It is beyond Israel's
abilities to impose its preferred leaders on its Arab neighbors. But it
is not easy to come to terms with the thought that there is no resolution
to the conflict in sight and with the realization that another round of
violence is around the corner. Nevertheless, polls have shown for some
time that most Israelis understand this predicament, and during the war
Israeli society displayed tremendous resilience and solidarity. Indeed,
routinization of protracted conflict remains a main challenge for Israeli
society.
The domestic political impact of the Gaza war will depend upon the
length of the period of calm to be achieved. The longer calm will
prevail, the more Prime Minister Netanyahu will be its main beneficiary.
The next scheduled election is in November 2017, which is plenty of time
for Netanyahu to recover, if the calm holds. If deterrence does not hold
and Hamas decides to challenge Netanyahu by firing into Israel over the
next three years, the Prime Minister may be forced to "mow the
grass" again and more vigorously.
Prof. Efraim Inbar, director of the Begin-Sadat Center for
Strategic Studies, is a professor of political studies at Bar-Ilan
University, and a Shillman/Ginsburg fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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