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Introduction
to "Nothing Abides"
Perspectives
on the Middle East and Islam
by Daniel Pipes
New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers
May 2015
For more on this book, please click here.
My title, "nothing abides" derives from a lecture on the
philosophy of history by the German philosopher Georg Wilhelm Friedrich
Hegel (1770–1831). He said of Muslim polities: "In its spread,
Mohammedanism founded many kingdoms and dynasties. On this boundless sea
there is a continual onward movement; nothing abides firm (nichts ist
fest)."[2]
Almost two centuries later, instability, volatility, and perpetual motion
continue to characterize Muslim communities.
Samuel Huntington (1927–2008), the eminent political analyst, coined a
phrase in 1996, "Islam's bloody borders,"[3] that captures the external
dimension of this phenomenon, namely the ceaseless wars waged by Muslims
against non-Muslims, from the Christians of Iberia to the Hindus of Bali.
Together, these three phrases convey the topic of the following chapters
published over the quarter century between 1989 and 2014.
My inquiry during this period has concentrated on the Middle East as
understood from a historical point of view and on the role of Islam in
politics. The book contains five sections.
I. The
Arab-Israeli Conflict
The Arab-Israeli conflict is the single most enduring as well as the
most intensely scrutinized topic of Middle Eastern politics in the past
century. Diplomatically, it compares to the Eastern Question concerning
the future of the Ottoman Empire that earlier haunted European statecraft:
both endured for more than a century, engaged a large cast of regional
and international players, and consumed a disproportionate amount of
attention. I consider my ideas about resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict
as one of my two most significant contributions to American foreign
policy (the other being how to deal with Islamism).
The first chapter, "Peace Process or War Process?" argues
for three points needed to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict: realizing
"that past Israeli-Palestinian negotiations have failed; that their
failure resulted from an Israeli illusion about avoiding war; and that
Washington should urge Jerusalem to forego negotiations and return
instead to its earlier and more successful policy of fighting for
victory." Victory is the key concept: only when one side wins a
clear victory can the war end. And that side must be Israel. This
approach dismisses the diplomacy that began with Kilometer 101 in 1973 as
irrelevant at least and counterproductive at worst.
The Jewish claim to Jerusalem is well known, but what of the rival
"Muslim Claim to Jerusalem"? A historical review suggests that
Muslims value the city only when it has political significance to them
and lose interest when it does not. "This pattern first emerged
during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad in the early seventh century.
Since then, it has been repeated on five occasions: in the late seventh
century, in the twelfth-century Countercrusade, in the thirteenth-century
Crusades, during the era of British rule (1917–48), and since Israel took
the city in 1967." Such consistency over so many centuries and under
so many diverse circumstances challenges assertions that Jerusalem has
vital religious importance in Islam.
A striking contrast exists between the viciousness of most Palestinian
discourse about Israel, such as, for example, comparing it to Nazi
Germany, and the diametrically opposite, sober, and appreciative
statements Palestinians make about Israel as an actual place to live. I
focus on the latter in "The Hell of Israel Is Better than the
Paradise of Arafat." Part one reviews the Palestinian preference to
remain under Israeli rule and part two contains praise for Israel in
contrast to Arab regimes. These outspoken statements friendly to Israel
offer more than tactical ammunition for the Jewish state; they provide
the potential basis for a resolution to the entire Arab-Israeli conflict.
For if the Muslim Arabic speakers most affected by and knowledgeable of
Israel understand and communicate its considerable virtues, the
ear-piercing toxicity of their colleagues could one day find itself
without a constituency.
I argue in "The Year the Arabs Discovered Palestine" that,
contrary to widespread belief, the idea of a Palestinian nation between
the Jordan River and the Mediterranean Sea does not reach back into hoary
antiquity but rather "its origins can be traced with surprising
precision to a single year—1920. In January 1920, Palestinian nationalism
hardly existed; by December of that critical year, it had been born."
This change in the space of one year nearly a century ago has had many
implications for the Palestinian national movement, foreshadowing
"some abiding themes, such as the potential for rapid change and the
major role of the Western powers" and providing insight into
"the most widely supported but possibly the least successful
nationalist cause" of our time.
"Mirror Image: How the PLO Mimics Zionism" follows the
Palestinian career as Zionism's Doppelgãnger, a German word
meaning, roughly, "evil twin." The Zionist movement was unique
among national movements (notably, by establishing the Yishuv, a
"state in the making," an informal government that prepared the
way for the formal state in 1948). In many ways, the Palestinian movement
mimicked these features (the PLO is its "state in the making").
For example, the Palestinian emphasis on the centrality of Jerusalem, the
global status of Yasir Arafat, and the dependence on foreign backing. I
argue that "the PLO can be understood only with reference to its
Zionist inspiration. Indeed, imitation offers important insights into the
PLO's future course."
"The Road to Damascus: What Netanyahu Almost Gave Away in
1998" contains a scoop about the Israeli-Syrian negotiations of
August and September 1998. Completely secret, these talks were conducted
by an unlikely pair of amateur Americans—the businessman and former
ambassador Ronald Lauder and the editor of the journal Middle East
Insight, George Nader. They approached an agreement but were thwarted
in the end by the Israeli defense and foreign ministers, whose objections
overrode Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu's hopes for a deal. Given what
has occurred in Syria since 2011, Israel is very fortunate those
objections prevailed. This case study remains of interest for the insights
it offers into Arab-Israeli diplomacy, Israeli politics, and the man who
both then and now heads Israel's government.
II. Middle
Eastern Politics
"Understanding Middle Eastern Conspiracy Theories"
introduces an extensive subject by examining the nature of the conspiracy
mentality, the gullibility of the people who hold them, and their
leaders, concluding with a case study of Iraq and Iran. This chapter
provides the context for the next one, which asks how governments should
respond to the irrational world of conspiracy theories. The Central
Intelligence Agency commissioned me to explain how these operate, which I
later published as "Dealing with Middle Eastern Conspiracy
Theories." I argue that ignoring the phenomenon of conspiracism, as
Washington tends to do, neglects key aspects of the Middle East;
therefore, government agencies should devote serious attention and
generous resources to understanding this type of thinking. Beyond paying
them heed, I suggest developing policies with a specific awareness of the
region's conspiracist mindset. This, in turn, leads to an interesting
question: should the US government take advantage of vulnerabilities
presented by conspiracism, or work to diminish this dangerous attitude?
The answer is not self-evident.
Before the Syrian civil war erupted, area specialists generally
scoffed at seeing the rulers' Alawi identity as defining their place in
Syria, preferring to emphasize their geographic or ideological features.
I begged to differ and concentrated instead on Alawi tensions with
Syria's majority Sunni community. The centerpiece of my argument appeared
in a 1989 analysis, "The Alawi Capture of Power in Syria." I
provided background on the Alawis and on their despised place in Syrian
society until 1920, then traced their dramatic and unexpected ascent over
the course of the next fifty years, culminating with Hafez al-Assad's
seizure of power in 1970. The most striking aspect of this analysis is
that Alawis are not Muslims, which in itself led to their consequently terrible
relations with Sunnis over the centuries. Two mid-nineteenth-century
observations about the Alawis capture their longstanding characteristics:
"They are a wild and somewhat savage race, given to plunder, and
even bloodshed, when their passions are excited or suspicion
roused"; and Alawi society "is a perfect hell upon earth."
Westerners remained largely oblivious to these tensions through
forty-five years of Alawi rule, from 1966 to 2011, only to watch them
erupt in the horrific conflagration of the most vicious civil war in the
modern Middle East.
First presented as my testimony to the House Committee on Government
Reform, "The Scandal of US-Saudi Relations" describes a pattern
of American obsequiousness—both public and private—in the areas of
energy, security, religion, and the treatment of Americans in the
kingdom. Example after example demonstrate how weakly the American side
behaves when confronted with Saudi will. Contrary to the usual logic,
Riyadh sets the terms of this bilateral relationship; a change has taken
place, "with both sides forgetting which of them is the great power
and which the minor one." This chapter documents that claim,
explains it, and offers a specific policy recommendation to correct the
problem.
I wrote "Obituary for Nizar Hamdoon (1944–2003)" for two
reasons. First, I've never met a diplomat quite like him when he served
as Saddam Hussein's ambassador extraordinary and plenipotentiary to
Washington in 1984–87, just as full diplomatic relations between the two
countries were reinstated, and as the Iraq-Iran war reached its apogee.
Hamdoon took seriously his task to develop American support and did so
most impressively, even as he worked for a monstrous tyrant. Second, he
contacted me in May 2003, a few months after the fall of Saddam and just
weeks before his own death. I did not manage to ask him the barrage of
questions I had prepared but I did get some valuable information while
sitting with him in a New York City Starbucks, some of which I record in
this obituary.
The president of Egypt, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, who took office in June
2014, remains a mystery; does he fundamentally differ from Husni Mubarak,
or is he but a younger clone of the longtime dictator? I look at a
student paper written by Sisi in 2006 when he spent a year in the United
States, to determine the answer to "What Egypt's New President
Really Thinks." He turns out to be "a work in progress, a
fifty-nineyear- old still trying to discover who he is and what he thinks
even as he rules a country of eighty-six million. On-the-job training is
literal in his case." This means he can be influenced, which offers
opportunities for foreign governments.
III. Islam in
Modern Life
The final three sections take up my other central interest, the role
of Islam in public life. Two themes recur here: a recognition that the
dream of applying Islamic law looms over Muslim life, giving it similar
rhythms regardless of time and place; and the need to take Muslim
experience into account, which means noting changes over time, rather
than simply assuming the static authority of scripture.
"Islam currently represents a backward, aggressive, and violent
force. Must it remain this way, or can it be reformed and become
moderate, modern, and good-neighborly?" Against the growing and
vocal body of analysts who answer that the Muslim faith cannot advance
because its features are immutable, I argue that change for the better is
possible in "Can Islam Be Reformed?" In it, I contend that
Islam does not have an essential and unchanging core; Muslims and
non-Muslims alike should work toward the reformation of the religion by
building on the "medieval synthesis" that made Islam a flexible
faith until two hundred years ago.
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Ludwig van Beethoven,
needed to modernize.
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A great debate exists between those who argue that becoming modern
requires emulating the West and those who disagree, saying alternative
routes to modernity exist. As its title "You Need Beethoven to
Modernize" implies, I come down on the side of the importance of
Westernizing. To be fully modern, I find, "means mastering Western
music; competence at Western music, in fact, closely parallels a
country's wealth and power." I establish this point by looking at
two civilizations, Muslim and Japanese. "Muslim reluctance to accept
Western music foreshadows a general difficulty with modernity; Japanese
mastery of every style from classical to jazz help explain everything
from a strong yen to institutional stability." Beethoven's music is
not in itself functional, but unless you master it, you cannot enter the
inner sanctum of modernity.
I delivered "Denying Islam's Role in Terrorism: Why?" at the
Institute for Counter-Terrorism in Herzliya, Israel. In it, I document
and explain a curious pattern: the Establishment in the West (including
politicians, the police, the press, and the professorate) routinely
denies that Islamism represents the leading global cause of terrorism,
even though it and everyone else knows otherwise. About five daily
assaults in the name of Islam since 9/11 notwithstanding, Islamic motives
are rarely noted. While euphemism, cowardice, political correctness, and
appeasement all contribute to this pattern, I argue that two other, quite
respectable reasons are paramount: not wanting to create even more
trouble by offending Muslims and a widespread awareness that implicating
Islam implies a major shift away from how secular Western societies are
presently ordered. Unless the number of casualties of Islamist terrorism
increases substantially, I predict no changes to the current state of
denial.
Ayatollah Khomeini's 1989 edict against Salman Rushdie stands out as
one of the most original and consequential political developments of
recent times. Ignoring international boundaries and established freedoms,
the Iranian despot sentenced to death the author of a novel called The
Satanic Verses "and all those [knowingly] involved in the
publication." While Westerners offered respectable resistance to
this Diktat, I argue in "The Rushdie Rules Ascendant" that the
passage of time has weakened their will, and especially that of liberals.
That's because, now, "defenders of Western civilization must fight
not just Islamists but also the multiculturalists who enable them and the
leftists who ally with them." This augurs badly for the continued
maintenance of traditional freedoms in the West.
IV. Islam in
the United States
In a sociological survey, "Faces of American Islam: Muslim
Immigrants," the late Khalid Durán and I cover a range of topics:
demography, geography, history, motives, religion, socioeconomics,
children, sex, and institutions. We conclude that immigrants, not
converts, are the key Muslim protagonists in the United States; that
developing a distinctly American form of Islam will be a great challenge;
and that "both the United States and Islam are likely to be deeply
affected by their mutual encounter." These being two of the most
powerful cultural forces in the world (along with the Chinese
civilization), the result of their interaction is not only unpredictable
but also very consequential.
In contrast to the grand sweep of the last chapter, "CAIR:
Islamists Fooling the Establishment," written with Sharon Chadha,
examines in close detail the Council on American-Islamic Relations, the
most aggressive and arguably the most effective of American Islamist
groups. Our exposé reveals CAIR's connections to terrorism as well as its
efforts to stymie counterterrorism, its ties to non-Muslim political
extremists, the irregularities about its funding, its real goals, and its
reliance on intimidation. Chadha and I conclude this 2006 analysis
asking, "How long will it be until the Establishment finally
recognizes CAIR for what it is and denies it mainstream legitimacy?"
Nine years later, that recognition has yet to be conferred, so our data
retains its pertinence.
In "Barack Obama's Muslim Childhood," I establish that
Barack Hussein Obama was born and raised a Muslim, provide confirming
evidence for this from recent years, survey the perceptions of him as a
Muslim, and place this deception in the larger context of Obama's other
autobiographical fictions. In brief, the record points to Obama being
"child to a line of Muslim males, given a Muslim name, registered as
a Muslim in two Indonesian schools." Further, "he read Koran in
religion class, still recites the Islamic declaration of faith, and
speaks to Muslim audiences like a fellow believer. Between his
non-practicing Muslim father, his Muslim stepfather, and his four years
of living in a Muslim milieu, he was both seen by others and saw himself
as a Muslim." This deception points to a deep character flaw.
V.
Individuals and American Islam
US promoters of Islamism, both Muslim and non-Muslim, have great
importance shaping the future of American Islam. Will they manage to keep
radical interpretations dominant, or will they lose ground as other
Muslims reclaim their faith?
The press lavished praise on an Egyptian-born professor of law at the
University of California at Los Angeles as a moderate, but I sensed
otherwise. In "Stealth Islamist: Khaled Abou El Fadl," I
establish that the media's darling is in fact an Islamist, and all the
more dangerously so for misleading potential critics. That he got away
with this duplicity despite a long bibliography available in English,
"points to the challenge of how to discern Islamists who present
themselves as moderates" and the need to do serious background work
before anointing anyone as a reformer. "Failing proper research,
Islamists will push their way through Western institutions and ultimately
subvert them." How many more individuals are like him, burrowing
into the system?
"Waging Jihad through the American Courts: Iqbal Unus" tells
how a nuclear physicist of Pakistani origin living in the Washington, DC,
area with close links to many Islamist organizations thwarted
counterterrorism work through his legal challenge to both the US government
and a private counterterrorism researcher, Rita Katz. Although his legal
case never had a chance of success and was, in fact, dismissed with
prejudice by the presiding judge, it nonetheless brought a raft of
benefits to Unus and his colleagues, from gumming up the works to
gleaning information to winning public sympathy. In response, I call for
changes in the legal system to prevent such predatory legal tactics.
My connection to the third individual began with a crudely written
summons for me to appear in federal court in Texas. To make the crazed
legal proceedings more endurable, I researched the plaintiff with the
intent of publishing what I discovered about him. I held off, however,
until a key ally of his switched sides, bearing important information.
The result is "A Palestinian in Texas: Riad Hamad," a
cautionary tale of "immigrants who bring with them the bad habits
imbued by tyrannical politics and radical ideologies."
Finally, I look at an Islamist fellow traveler, an eight-term
congressman from Cleveland, in "Lefty for Radical Islam: Dennis
Kucinich." In his 2004 presidential effort, Kucinich set a number of
precedents in his appeal for Muslim votes—claiming to keep a Koran in his
office, rousing audiences to proclaim Allahu Akbar, and visiting Muslim
organizations Introduction xvii during his campaign travels. Although
"seeking the Islamist vote in 2004 was a sure way not to reach the
White House," his tender treatment of Islamists offered innovative
methods that other Democratic Party politicians will likely adopt.
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Dennis Kucinich
visiting a mosque in Seattle.
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Editorial
Practices
These chapters appear essentially unchanged from their original
publication: I have corrected typographical errors and other minor
mistakes, and added clarifications to once-familiar references that have
become obscure. Further, some texts reflect the original work that the
author submitted rather than the final publication. Where I have updated
a text, an elevated, hollow dot, °, indicates the beginning and end of
the new information.
© Transaction Publishers.
[1] Percy
Bysshe Shelley, Ode to the West Wind and Other Poems (New York:
Courier Dover, 2012), p. 15. I thank Anne Mandelbaum for pointing out
this poem as well as for her generous help with the editing of my
writings.
[2] Lectures
on the Philosophy of History, trans. into English by J. Sibree
(London: George Bell and Sons, 1902), p. 454. In German: "Viele
Reiche und Dynastien hat der Mohammedanismus bei seiner Ausbreitung
begründet. Auf diesem unendlichen Meere wird es immer weiter, nichts ist
fest." Vorlesungen über die Philosophie der Geschichte
(Frankfurt am Main, Suhrkamp, 1970), p. 431.
[3] Samuel P.
Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order
(New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996), p. 254.
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