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How Palestinians Keep Shooting Themselves in the Foot
by Hisham Jarallah
August 17, 2012 at 5:00 am
August 17, 2012 at 5:00 am
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Instead if
using the billions of dollars that were given to them by Americans and
Europeans to create new jobs, the PLO leadership stole most of the funds and
later blamed Israel for damaging the Palestinian economy.
As the Arab countries continue to impose strict employment restrictions on
Palestinians, Israel is opening its doors to Palestinian workers from the West
Bank. Palestinians say, in fact, that Israel is becoming one of the largest
employers of Palestinians in the Middle East.
Figures
released this week by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics in
Ramallah showed that at least 80,000 Palestinians were now working in Israel
and even in Jewish settlements.
In the first quarter of 2012, according to the bureau, there were only
77,000 Palestinians working in Israel and the settlements. In the second
quarter of the ear, the number grew to 80,000; and earlier this week, the
Israeli government issued work permits to another 10,000 Palestinians from the
West Bank.
The move has been received with a sigh of relief among Palestinians,
especially as it comes on the eve of the Muslim holiday of Eid al-Fitr, marking
the end of Ramadan.
The figures also showed that Palestinians employed by Israelis earn more
than those who work for their Palestinian brethren in the West Bank and Gaza
Strip. A Palestinian construction laborer often earns more than a senior
ministry official in the Palestinian Authority government in the West Bank or
the Hamas administration in the Gaza Strip.
What is interesting about the bureau's report is that the number of
Palestinians working in Jewish settlements has increased despite calls from the
Palestinian Authority to boycott the settlements.
Mahmoud Abbas and Salam Fayyad's attempts to prevent the workers from going
to the settlements has failed largely because they were not able to provide
them with alternative employment. Despite the billions of dollars that were
showered on the Palestinian Authority in recent years by the international
community, Abbas and Fayyad still have not been able to solve the problem of
unemployment in the Palestinian territories.
The Arab world, which once used to absorb hundreds of thousands of
Palestinian employees, is beginning to close its doors in the face of Palestinians.
Many of the Arab countries accuse the Palestinians of being ungrateful. Others
do not want to see Palestinians at all: they consider Palestinians
troublemakers and a source of instability.
Some Arab countries such as Lebanon, Egypt, Kuwait and Jordan even impose
apartheid-like regulations and laws that prevent Palestinians from earning a
decent living.
The Palestinians could have built one of the best economies in the region
after the beginning of the peace process in 1993. But instead of using the billions
of dollars that were given to them by Americans and Europeans to create new
jobs, the PLO leadership stole most of the funds and later blamed Israel for
damaging the Palestinian economy.
Suicide bombings and financial and administrative corruption are the main
reason why the Palestinian economy remains as weak as ever. The Palestinians
are experts in shooting themselves in the foot and then blaming Israel.
Hisham Jarallah is a journalist based in the West Bank
Related Topics: Hisham Jarallah
Alawites in Syria and Alevis in Turkey: Crucial Differences
by Stephen Schwartz
August 17, 2012 at 4:30 am
August 17, 2012 at 4:30 am
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Most
significant is the political difference. Alawites support a brutal
dictatorship, while Turkish and Kurdish Alevis defend electoral democracy.
Sectarian differences, threatening to ensnare Muslims outside Syria's
borders, have emerged as a key aspect of the horrific bloodshed there. Since
February 2011 the Syrian protestors, mainly following Sunni Islam, have
mobilized against the Baathist government of Bashar Al-Assad, as a further
chapter in the "Arab Spring." As of the end of July 2012, fatalities
in the Syrian fighting are estimated at more than 20,000.
In Syria, Al-Assad's state, military, and irregular militias draw
significantly on a small – and, to the world, mysterious – variant of Shia
Islam known as Alawites. Of Syria's population of 22 million, at least two
million are Alawites; it is common to see them credited with 12 percent of the
country's inhabitants. They mostly reside in the Syrian province of Latakia,
from the northwest border with Turkey along the Mediterranean coast, and in
southern Syria. Alawites are also found in Lebanon, and among Syrians and
Lebanese abroad.
In Turkey, northward beyond the uneasy Syrian-Turkish frontier, and
concentrated in eastern Anatolia, another Shia sect, the Alevis, comprise,
according to many estimates, a quarter of the Turkish census, or 20 million out
of 80 million. They include, in addition, a million in the Turkish diaspora in
Germany, and still more in the ranks of emigrants from Turkey to the
Netherlands and other Western European lands.
It is easy to conflate the Alawites and Alevis. Superficially the Alawites
and the Alevis may seem related closely or even identical, especially because
of their corresponding names; moreover, about a half million Arab Alawites also
live on the Turkish side of the border with Syria.
The similarity of their common designation – Alawite and Alevi both mean
"devoted to Ali," the son-in-law and cousin of Prophet Muhammad –
denotes that they are Shia in origin. Shiism is defined essentially by
reverence for Ali, the fourth caliph, or successor, to Muhammad as leader of
the Muslims, before he was murdered in 661 CE. Mainstream Shiism recognizes 12
imams or religious guides, beginning with Imam Ali; and Alawites and Alevis are
known as "Twelvers" in honoring them.
While they are "Twelvers," Alawites and Alevis hold to principles
and practices that set the two communities off from the rest of the global Shia
community. Alawites and Alevis view Imam Ali as embodying the divine. In this
they are far from conventional Shia doctrine, according to which Imam Ali was
noble, but purely human. But notwithstanding these points of resemblance
between the Alawite and Alevi believers, they are, in reality, markedly unalike
from one another.
First, as indicated by a Swedish academic, Marianne Aringberg-Laanatza, in a
contribution to the 1998 volume, Alevi Identity, Syrian Arab Alawites,
and Turkish and Kurdish Alevis, are nationalistic, and represent conflicting
ethnicities.
Syrian and Turkish Alawites speak Arabic; Syria – both Alawite and Sunni –
has considered Turkey, in the main, an opponent of its historic interests.
Turkish Alevis, however, speak Turkish; and Kurdish Alevis speak Turkish and
Kurdish. The majority of Kurds desire autonomy, if not full self-determination,
free of Arab or Turkish domination. This aspect of their cultures is central to
the religious life of the Alevis and distinguishes them from the Alawites as
well as from established Shiism. Alawites and Alevis do not share a liturgical
language, as Turkish and Kurdish adherents to conventional Sunnism and Shiism
possess in Arabic.
Second, neither Alawites in their majority, nor Alevis as a whole, pray in
mosques or support clerics as mainstream Shias do. Yet Alawites do not even
maintain their own places for worship, except for shrines to their leaders
(sheikhs), while Alevis congregate in a ceremony called the "cem"
(pronounced "jem") in a meeting-house or "cemevi."
Third, Alawite religious literature is apparently limited to the Koran and
the collected sermons of Imam Ali (entitled Nahjul Balagha or Peak of
Eloquence). An enigmatic volume of purported Alawite scripture, the Kitab
al-Majmu or Book of Collection, may not exist. Alawite teachings are
transmitted incrementally through the lifetimes of selected disciples, but
denied to most acolytes, and kept rigorously secret.
Alevis, on the other hand, possess an extensive and widely-read religious
literature, mainly composed of spiritual songs, poems, and epic verse. The
Alevi "cem" combines singing, music, and dancing. Alevis consider
themselves spiritual Muslims, or Sufis. Their recitations are drawn from the
outstanding and beloved Turkish poet, Yunus Emre; the Kurdish Sufi, Safi
Al-Din; the Persian-Turkish Sufi, Hajji Bektash, and the Turkish poet, Pir
Sultan Abdal, among others.
Fourth, the Alawites and Alevis emerged at distant times and places. The
Alawite faith was founded early in Islamic history, in the ninth century, by
Abu Shuayb Muhammad ibn Nusayr, a Shia adherent, and may reflect the survival
of Phoenician paganism as well as pre-Islamic Persian religions.
The creed of the Alevis, however, more a movement than a sect, began among
14th century mystical dissenters in Central Asia. Parallel with the
Alawite faith, Alevism preserves pre-Islamic elements of Turkish shamanism and
Kurdish angel-worship. Alevism became a significant factor among Anatolian
peasants supporting Shah Ismail, a Kurdish Shia Sufi, who conquered Persia in
the 16th century. Shah Ismail was also a poet whose works are
featured in the Alevi "cem." The appearance of Shiism in
Turkish-ruled Anatolia led the Ottoman sultan, Selim I, a Sunni, to fight an
unsuccessful war against Shah Ismail and Persia. In its aftermath, the Alevis
would suffer under the Ottomans for assisting Shah Ismail's armies.
Fifth, Alawites consider women inferior and exclude them from sacred
observances. By contrast, Turkish and Kurdish Alevis are confirmed supporters
of gender equality, and women participate in leading the Alevi "cem."
But most significant is the political difference between them. Although both
Alevis and Alawites are opposed to Islamist ideological governance, Alawites
support a brutal dictatorship, while Turkish and Kurdish Alevis defend
electoral democracy.
Although the Turkish and Kurdish Alevis may be labeled by some as "the
same as" Syrian or Turkish-Arab Alawites, their history, culture, and
attitudes are clearly disparate. As Prof. Aringberg-Laanatza concludes,
"The Turkish Alevis... do not relate themselves in any way to the Alawites
in Syria." Aringberg-Laanatza sees "to some extent... a common
historical background based on elements of Christians converted to these
special forms of Islam." That is, however, a slim reed on which to lean
any claim of Alawite-Alevi commonality.
For Alawites and Alevis, as the axiom goes, analysts should make
distinctions, not confuse them.
Obama Administration "Caused Serious Damage to Israel's Deterrence toward Iran"
Aug 16, 2012 at 6:10 pm
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Ha'aretz Senior Defense Analyst Amos
Harel, a regular on our "Gate" blog, just published his evaluation of
Washington-Jerusalem relations. The key thought:
The Israeli leadership is taking a dangerous gamble here, that has to do
with more than the repeated winding of the spring, exhausting security
officials and, lately, pulling at the already fraying nerves of the Israeli
public. This last series of publications has managed to unhinge the Obama
administration as well – to which the Americans repaid us with a sharp
statement made by the U.S. army chief Martin Dempsey this week, saying that the
IDF can't destroy Iran's nuclear program, only, at most, delay it.
On the face of it, there isn't much news in Dempsey's comments. But the
timing, wording, context (in a press conference, alongside Panetta) are what
count here. Washington has stuck a proverbial pin in the Israeli balloon. Its
message was clear: You better sit tight, the Iranian issue is out of your
league. Dempsey's statement, thus caused serious damage to Israel's deterrence
toward Iran, since leaders in Tehran now understand that Israel lacks the real
possibility to disrupt their plans.
Whether Israel has the capacity or not remains the question. IDF Gen.(res.)
Yitzhak Ben Yisrael rebutted Gen. Dempsey Aug. 16, contending that "The
Americans know we can clobber Iran's nuclear sites like they can but I think
Gen, Dempsey was referring to what happens after an Israeli strike on
Iran." On paper, Israel has enough bunker-buster bombs and enough platforms
to deliver them to destroy a great deal of Iran's dug-in enrichment capacity,
even without the deployment of sabotage teams on the grounds. But it is not an
easy exercise to fly 1,600 kilometers through hostile airspace, drop a series
of bunker-busters directly into the crater left by the previous one, and get
home.
A parallel question is: Why would Israel bluff? A year ago, Israeli threats
helped push the U.S. and other Western nations to tighten sanctions on Iran.
One could argue a year ago that there was some probability that sanctions might
work. The probability now is vanishingly small. Dennis Ross, Obama's former
chief Iran planner, warned in
an interview today that the Israelis are not simply bluffing:
"Part of the motivation for being as public as they have been is to
motivate the rest of world," Ross, who served as the top Obama White House
Iran strategist from 2009 to the end of 2011, told Al-Monitor in an
interview Tuesday.
"The second reason is to condition the rest of the world not to be
surprised if or when they are going to act militarily," Ross said.
"And to get the Israeli public ready as well."
That doesn't mean that they have made a decision. It's not about to happen
tomorrow." Ross continued. "If it happens tomorrow, it's rather late
in terms of getting the Israeli public ready. But I do think it means one
cannot just dismiss it. Those who say it is just a bluff are misreading."
A careful reading of the transcript
of Israeli Ambassador Michael Oren's talk before a Bloomberg conference
yesterday shows that Israel is concerned not simply about Iranian bomb
acquisition but the entire array of forces around it. Dempsey warned that
Israel could only delay, but not destroy, Iran's nuclear weapons program. That,
said Oren, was good enough for Israel. The situation was changing so quickly
that a few years could mean a radically different environment:
One, two, three, four years are a long time in the Middle East -- look
what's happened in the Middle East in the last year alone" in terms of
political change, Oren said yesterday at a Bloomberg Government breakfast in
Washington. "In our neighborhood, those are the rules of the game."
From the Israeli standpoint, a great deal that is happening on its borders
may reflect Iranian maneuvering for a response to an Israeli strike. The Muslim
Brotherhood move against the Egyptian military this week opens a threat in Gaza
and Sinai, and it is noteworthy that Ambassador Oren referred to the terrorist
organization Islamic Jihad as "owned and operated by Tehran." Lebanon
has a new outbreak of sectarian violence, with the kidnapping of forty
individuals (including Saudi and Turkish nationals) by Shi'ite militia. Iran,
the US alleges, is organizing a militia in Syria, and the disposition of
Syria's chemical weapons stockpiles represents an opportunity for Iran to
acquire a WMD second strike capability out of Syria. This is a troublesome
issue, as Oren observed, given that the chemical weapons are dispersed
throughout the country and often close to civilian areas.
I stick by our basic conclusions of last Sunday's call: not just the timing
of Iranian nuclear weapons development but the sudden instability around its
borders make a compelling case for Israel to strike.
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