The U.S. Dead Horse

by Daniel Greenfield
September 14, 2012 at 5:00 am

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3345/us-dead-horse

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When Obama arrived in Cairo to tell the Muslims of the world that America does not want to fight, let alone win, he was declaring that America was now the weak horse. What the bearded men understood was that the competition was over and that Islam has won. The Islamists can always win by default if they can convince the fast, strong and agile American horse not to run.

"When people see a strong horse and a weak horse, by nature, they will like the strong horse," Osama Bin Laden famously said. The deceased mass murderer had a point, even if it wasn't a very original one.
Sentimentalists may admire the horse that lets other horses win so they don't get too upset and kick it around in the stable that night, but the crowds do not flock to cheer on losers. Nor can kings and prime ministers be expected to stake their fortunes and futures on the horse that loses so other horses feel good about themselves.
When Obama arrived in Cairo to tell the Muslims of the world that America does not want to fight, let alone win, he was declaring that America was now the weak horse. "We do not want to keep our troops in Afghanistan," he assured the Muslim Brotherhood attendees, and told them that, "events in Iraq have reminded America of the need to use diplomacy."
The bearded men glowering at him heard from the new leader of the United States that he had come "to seek a new beginning between the United States and Muslims around the world… based upon the truth that America and Islam are not exclusive, and need not be in competition." What they understood was that the competition was over and that Islam had won.
Obama condemned unilateral war in his speech, but it did not occur to him that if war can be unilateral, then a cessation of hostilities cannot be. You can stop your horse in the middle of the track and tell the other riders that horse races need not be exclusive or competitive, that all riders can learn techniques from each other and skip the racing and just exchange trophies congratulating each other on making a good effort. And that is a good way to lose the race.
Islamists would not be Islamists if they did not believe that their way is in competition with all other ways. The principle, accepted by so many Christians and Jews in the West, that religions and nations are interchangeable and only individuals matter, is flipped upside down in a region where individuals are so interchangeable that they blow themselves up to make a point about the supremacy of their identification with the nation and the religion.
The Cairo speech sent a message to American allies that the days of the United States protecting them for outmoded reasons of national security or national interest were gone. America was no longer a competitor, but an accommodator, willing to make a deal with whoever came out on top in the horse race of Islamic populism. Our allies knew that their days were numbered and our enemies knew that power was theirs for the taking.
Obama chose to turn America into a weak horse and dragged down Mubarak and a number of other regional allies with him. Netanyahu has resisted accepting the weak horse status assigned to him by Washington and that has been a major source of tension with the Obama White House. The attacks in Cairo and Benghazi are a reminder that the United States cannot opt out of the competition with the Muslim world. All it can do is stop in the middle of the track and offer itself up to them as a dead horse.
Horse racing is a popular sport in the Middle East, though perhaps not as much as camel racing. Camels run somewhat slower than horses, but they do better on rougher terrain. To transform a race from a contest of speed and skill to a contest of endurance and orneriness, the conditions of the race have to be made rougher and more difficult.
Making the conditions of the race more difficult is what the Islamists have been doing to the region all along. They wrecked the track, turned on the sandstorm machines and bet on the strong camel to outlast the weak horse.
Camel racing in the Middle East has depended on imported child jockeys, and while that may seem ugly to Western eyes, like child suicide bombers, it is a reminder that there is no tactic that is considered too dirty when it comes to winning the race. The Islamists may not be able to win on strength, speed or agility, but they can always win by default if they can convince the fast, strong and agile American horse not to run.
The murder of an American ambassador and the sight of his corpse being dragged through the streets by a mob should serve as a reminder that the United States can either be a strong horse or it can be a dead horse, but it cannot, as Obama tried to do, choose not to run.

Related Topics: Daniel Greenfield

A "Palestinian Spring": A Renewed Fatah Bid to Remove Fayyad

by Khaled Abu Toameh
September 14, 2012 at 4:30 am

http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/3346/palestinian-spring-fayyad

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Palestinians noticed that in many cities, Fatah activists were organizing and leading the anti-Fayyad protests. Palestinian Security forces had been instructed not to prevent the protesters from burning posters and effigies of Fayyad.

It is no secret that Fatah has long been trying to get rid of Fayyad who, its representatives argue, had been imposed on the Palestinians by the Americans and Europeans.
Abbas and Fatah have been trying for years to replace Fayyad with one of their own so that they could regain control over the Palestinian Authority's finances.
The US and most Western donors have repeatedly made it clear to Abbas that removing Fayyad from his post would prompt them to reconsider financial aid to the Palestinians.
Fatah leaders in the West Bank were hoping that the street protests would force Fayyad to resign. But the prime minister's refusal to succumb to the immense pressure (and threats) has left most of these leaders deeply disappointed.
For Fatah, the public outcry over the high cost of living provided a good opportunity to resume its efforts to remove Fayyad.
As soon as protesters took to the streets in a number of West Bank cities last week to demand the resignation of Fayyad, Abbas, who was in Cairo, declared that the "Palestinian Spring" had begun and that he supported the "just demands" of the demonstrators.
Abbas's comment was seen as a green light to the protesters to take to the streets and demonstrate against Fayyad.
For several days, Palestinian Authority security forces had been instructed not to prevent the protesters from burning posters and effigies of Fayyad. The security forces also did not interfere as long as the protesters chanted slogans denouncing only Fayyad as an American and Israeli agent.
Some Palestinians believe that the protests actually served the interests of Abbas and Fatah, who have been widely accused of standing behind -- or at least encouraging -- the demonstrations calling for the ouster of Fayyad.
Palestinians noticed that in many cities, Fatah activists were organizing and leading the anti-Fayyad protests.
The unprecedented attacks on Fayyad stood in sharp contrast to the way the Palestinian Authority leadership had reacted in the past to criticism of Abbas.
Several Palestinian journalists and bloggers have been arrested since the beginning of the year by Palestinian security forces for publicly criticizing Abbas.
Abbas clearly had no problem as long as Palestinians were chanting slogans against Fayyad and hurling shoes at the prime minister's posters in city centers.
But as soon as some of the protesters began directing their criticism also against Abbas and demanding an end to the Oslo Accords, Palestinian Authority officials warned that "outside elements" had infiltrated the ranks of the protesters in order to serve "foreign agendas."
The "outside elements," the officials claimed, were linked to Israel, Hamas, Iran and all the enemies of the Palestinians.
Abbas, who did not meet once with Fayyad during the crisis, was hoping that the demonstrations would send a message to the Americans and Europeans that the time has come to replace the prime minister. Instead of working with Fayyad to tackle the crisis, Abbas and his top aides preferred to spend the week in India.
However, when Fayyad announced a series of austerity measures to alleviate the economic hardships, Abbas's office rushed to announce that Fayyad did so "on the instructions of the Palestinian president" -- himself. Abbas was now trying to take credit for complying with the demands of the street.
Abbas and Fatah were also hoping that the protests would achieve other goals.
First, they were hoping that the scenes of anarchy and lawlessness on Palestinian streets would put pressure on many Arab countries to resume financial aid to the Palestinian Authority. Some Gulf countries are reported to have cut off aid to Abbas's authority because they feel that he is not serious about combating corruption and implementing major reforms.
Second, Abbas and Fatah were hoping that the protests would persuade the Americans and Europeans to increase financial aid to the Palestinians.
Third, Abbas was hoping that the demonstrations would prompt the Americans and Europeans to intensify pressure on Israel to accept his preconditions for resuming the peace process: a full cessation of settlement construction and recognition of the pre-1967 lines as the future borders of a Palestinian state.
Fourth, Abbas and his advisors were hoping that the protests would put the Palestinian issue back at the top of the international community's agenda, especially at a time when the Iranian threat appears to have stolen the limelight.
Fifth, Abbas was hoping that by blaming Israel for the economic woes of the Palestinians, he would be able to divert attention from his failure to produce any significant achievement for his people ever since he came to power in 2005.
The 77-year-old Abbas is about to enter his eighth year of his four-year term in office and has shown no sign that he is willing to step down and pave the way for the emergence of new leaders.
The recent protests in the West Bank over the economic hardships do not signal the beginning of a "Palestinian Spring." Rather, they are seen by many Palestinians in the context of the ongoing behind-the-scenes power struggle between Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas's ruling Fatah faction and Prime Minister Salam Fayyad.

Related Topics: Khaled Abu Toameh

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