U.S. should be wary of Iran's goal to dominate the Middle East
By Joseph Lieberman & Vance Serchuk
November 21, 2013
As nuclear negotiators in Geneva renew their attempts to strike a deal with Iran, predictions of a diplomatic breakthrough are rife. Yet rather than reassure the countries most directly threatened by an Iranian nuclear weapon, the prospect of an agreement with Tehran is provoking unprecedented anxiety among America's Arab and Israeli allies. Why?
Part of the reason is that these countries worry the White House will accept a flawed agreement that ultimately will not prevent Iran's nuclear breakout. While the Obama administration has emphasized in recent weeks that a "bad deal" with Tehran would be worse than no deal, it has failed to build a consensus - in Washington or internationally - about what a "good-enough" agreement must entail: which Iranian nuclear capabilities need to be verifiably abandoned and which safeguards put in place to instill sufficient confidence that Tehran can't continue creeping toward the nuclear finish line.
But the uneasiness of our Middle Eastern allies is also rooted in the recognition that the danger posed by the Iranian regime is about more than its illicit nuclear activities. Iran's pursuit of nuclear weapons is the most alarming manifestation of a much more profound strategic problem: a perceived long-standing hegemonic ambition by Iran's rulers to dominate the Middle East.
This ambition has driven the Iranian government to build up a range of unconventional capabilities alongside its nuclear program over many years. These include Tehran's elite paramilitary force, the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps' Quds Force; its extremist proxies and partners, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Shiite militias in Iraq and the Assad regime in Syria; and a growing arsenal of cruise and ballistic missiles. ...
Could a deal on Iran's nuclear program pave the way to a broader strategic reorientation by Tehran, including an abandonment of its long-cultivated proxies and hegemonic ambitions? Perhaps - though everything we know about the Iranian regime should make us skeptical.
Far more plausible is the possibility that, while Iran's leaders may be prepared to make some tactical concessions on their nuclear activities, they would do so hoping that this would buy them the time and space needed to rebuild strength at home - freed from crippling sanctions - while consolidating and expanding the gains they are positioned to make in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen and Afghanistan.
None of this is to say that the United States shouldn't pursue a nuclear deal with Iran - provided the deal verifiably closes and locks the door against Tehran achieving a breakout capability. As with arms-control agreements with the Soviet Union during the Cold War, Washington should proceed with the explicit understanding that it faces a determined, resourceful adversary with which we are engaged in a long-term geopolitical struggle - and that it is an authoritarian regime whose repression and mistreatment of its citizens we must continue to condemn.
In short, even if we reach an acceptable nuclear agreement with this Iranian government, it is not our budding strategic partner. ...
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