Caliphate
Dreaming: Georgetown Panel Reveals ISIS's Appeal to the Faithful
by Andrew Harrod
Jihad Watch
November 11, 2014
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[Ed. note: Title differs slightly from publisher's.]
The caliphate "is not something bad . . . for the majority of
Muslims," concluded visiting professor Emad Shahin during a recent briefing titled
"Boko Haram, ISIS, and the Caliphate Today" at Georgetown
University's Prince Alwaleed Bin Talal Center for Muslim-Christian
Understanding (ACMCU). A small conference room housed around twenty
people, as panelists pledged to
"help explain" the allegedly "confusing phenomena" of
Nigeria's Boko Haram and the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS)'s
"overlapping language of political Islam" and the
"caliphate and . . . sharia." The panel, however, merely
reinforced that ISIS's brutal "caliphate" has ample
justification in Islamic history and appeal among modern Muslims.
According to Shahin, a "very idealized historical legacy" of
past Muslim caliphates, such as the Abbasids (c. 750-1519 AD), dominates
Muslim thinking. It was then that Islam's "expansion and
extension" occurred, he noted, alluding to a brutal
"legacy" far less appealing to non-Muslims. The Turkish
Republic's 1924 abolition of the last caliphate—a "symbolic unity of
Muslims"—was a "devastating shock."
Since then, the concept of the caliphate, something Shahin pointed out
has been "embedded all along" in Islamic political programs,
became the "raison d'être" of Islamist groups like the Muslim
Brotherhood. Muslim intellectuals advocating a Muslim confederacy
alongside a caliphate envisioned "something like the Vatican and the
European Union." Shahin concluded that the caliphate, as exemplified
by Tunisia's Ennahda and Turkey's AKP Islamist parties, signifies
"good governance" for many Muslims.
Shadi Hamid of the Qatar-funded
Brookings Institution—and a former student of Shahin's at
Georgetown—continued this analysis, stating that there is "something
powerful about the idea" of a caliphate for the "vast majority
of Muslims, even those who are quite secular." Growing up in
Pennsylvania, he heard Muslims ask, "How did we go from there to
here?" while contemplating Islamic society's fall from its
supposedly glorious past to its all too dismal present. Consequently,
ISIS's caliphate declaration was a "pretty great marketing
move," even though, he claimed, the "vast majority of Muslims
disagree profoundly with" the group.
Hamid described the Muslim Brotherhood as one of the "deeply
illiberal" yet "mainstream Islamist movements committed to the
democratic process" which, in the wake of Egypt's popular uprising
in 2013, provided a source of recruitment for groups like ISIS. Recruits
who are initially "vaguely sympathetic" to ISIS and join for
economic reasons, "over time . . . start to take on the
ideology." It helps that ISIS is "perhaps the richest extremist
group in modern history," having captured oil reserves and received
"a lot of private funding from Gulf countries," often while
governments turned a "blind eye."
Hamid explained that ISIS supporters see Muhammad's "prophetic
model" as a guide. It is a popular assumption that Muslims are
"just like anyone else" in respecting humane values, but, he
stressed, "Islam is a construct" requiring interpretation. He
conceded that "very problematic and uncomfortable" doctrines
exist in the orthodox "pre-modern Islamic tradition" desired by
Salafists and other Islamists. Sharia law, for example, legitimates
slavery, an abhorrence that ISIS practices today.
Shahin attempted to counteract ISIS's legitimacy by referencing
"benchmarks" from the "rightly guided" caliphate that
existed for thirty years after Muhammad's death. Under this
"prophetic model of the caliphate," a caliphate proclamation
was an orderly process requiring territorial control and consensus among
Muslim leaders. Yet Shahin referenced no such development amidst Islam's
past successive caliphates, regimes no less turbulent than other
historical empires, beginning with the strife-torn "prophetic
model" itself. Caliphates have risen and fallen according to the
violent tides of Islamic history, a pattern ISIS clearly seeks to
emulate.
Hamid considered "governance and democracy" central concerns
to any anti-ISIS strategy in a Middle East marked by widespread
"collapse of the regional order." ISIS, which he described as
"primarily not a terrorist organization," had exceeded the
"very low bar" of regional governance "in recent
decades." Hamid criticized an American-supported, regionally
dominate "Saudi counter-revolutionary axis" and instead advocated
a "get serious" approach to an insurgent overthrow of Syria's
Bashar Assad, however unlikely to combat ISIS or regional instability.
Meanwhile, in yet another erroneous analysis of jihad, Shahin cited the
"root causes" argument that seeks to blame Western colonialism,
poverty, and oppression rather than acknowledge its roots in classical
Islam.
Tamara Sonn, Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani Professor in the History of
Islam at Georgetown, complained of ISIS and Boko Haram using
"similar language" concerning the caliphate, claiming that the
result has been "a great deal of confusion of what actually Islam
stands for." Given that Sonn's chair is named after the former
ruling emir
of Qatar, one of ISIS's primary funders, it is little wonder that such
"confusion" reigns.
Sonn's protestations notwithstanding, her fellow panelists unwittingly
exposed the longstanding caliphate visions anchored in Islamic canons to
which ISIS has pledged allegiance. The panel also revealed that there is
an abundance of support for ISIS from Muslims worldwide, demonstrating
that, for many Muslims, there is nothing confusing about ISIS. The
analysis of ISIS's governance, meanwhile, indicated that this brutal
movement cannot simply be written off as crazy and raised doubts about
hastily considered Middle East democracy promotion. Ultimately, the
panelists offered nothing to blunt Islam's often dangerous political
edge.
Andrew E. Harrod is a freelance researcher and writer who holds a
PhD from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and a JD from George
Washington University Law School. He is a fellow with the Lawfare Project;
follow him on twitter at @AEHarrod. He wrote this essay for Campus Watch, a project
of the Middle East Forum.
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