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WSJ:
"Two days of exhaustive negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State
John Kerry and his Iranian counterpart, Javad Zarif, in the Persian Gulf
nation of Oman resulted in no significant breakthrough in forging a
comprehensive agreement to curb Tehran's nuclear program by a Nov. 24
diplomatic deadline, said senior U.S. and Iranian officials. 'Real gaps'
remain between Washington and Tehran, said an American diplomat, in
describing talks that seek to end a decade-long standoff over the future
of Iran's nuclear program. Lower-level diplomacy between the U.S., Iran
and other world powers continued on Tuesday in Muscat, as Mr. Kerry
arrived in China to brief President Barack Obama on the status of the
nuclear diplomacy. 'What we've said about this is that we may get there
and we may not,' said a senior U.S. official who traveled with Mr. Kerry,
referring to he prospects for a deal by late November. 'I don't think
that anybody has said at any point recently that we are, quote-unquote on
track to reach an agreement by the 24th.' Iran's second-highest official
attending the Oman talks, Abbas Araghchi, described the talks as 'tense'
and said his negotiating team was committed to engaging in virtually
round-the-clock talks to try and reach the deadline. 'We believe that
negotiations over the past two days and discussions were very useful. But
we are not still in the position to say we made progress,' Mr. Araghchi
told Iranian state media in Muscat. 'We are hopeful we will make it,
though it will be very difficult.' ... 'We have not focused in
discussions with Iran on extending those discussions because we want to
keep the focus on closing gaps,' said Ben Rhodes, a White House deputy
national security adviser, in Beijing on Tuesday." http://t.uani.com/1GLEKn9
NYT:
"A five-car convoy opened fire on a compound 30 miles south of
Baghdad, a sneak attack that killed four American soldiers in one of the
deadliest days in the Iraq war. A roadside bomb struck a United States
military vehicle, severing part of a soldier's head. And a militant group
kidnapped and killed an American journalist, dumping him in the street
after firing three shots into his chest. Those acts of terrorism occurred
a world away from Wall Street at the height of the Iraq war. But they now
underpin a lawsuit against some of the world's biggest banks, injecting a
human element into the complex and shadowy world of international
finance. More than 200 people, primarily American service members or
family members of soldiers killed in Iraq, filed the lawsuit on Monday in
federal court in Brooklyn. Citing more than 50 attacks on American
citizens stationed or working in Iraq during the war, the lawsuit accuses
the banks of helping to finance the violent activities through their ties
to Iran. The banks - HSBC, Barclays, Standard Chartered, the Royal Bank
of Scotland and Credit Suisse, European institutions that all have a
major presence in New York - did not deal directly with the militants.
But they have acknowledged transferring billions of dollars on behalf of
Iran, which has long been suspected of funding and training the terrorist
groups that carried out attacks against Americans in Iraq." http://t.uani.com/1tY4aag
RFE/RL:
"Russia will build two nuclear power reactors in Iran under deals
signed in Moscow that call for the eventual construction of eight
reactors in the Islamic state. The November 11 agreements come
before a self-imposed November 24 deadline for a deal between Iran and
six global powers including Russia to curb Tehran's nuclear program,
which the West says may be aimed at building atomic weapons but Iran says
is for peaceful purposes. Russian and Iranian state nuclear companies
signed a contract on the construction of two reactors at the Bushehr
power plant with the possible expansion to four reactors at the facility.
Iran's first nuclear power reactor, built by Russia, went online at
Bushehr in 2011. Under a separate protocol, also signed on November 11,
Russia and Iran intend to cooperate on the construction of a total of
eight reactors -- four at Bushehr and four elsewhere." http://t.uani.com/1uiBTg9
Nuclear Program & Negotiations
Reuters:
"Iran has stopped a controversial practice that could allow it to
enrich uranium faster, the United States said on Monday, ceasing an
activity one expert saw as violating an interim nuclear deal... The
International Atomic Energy Agency issued a confidential report about
Iran to its members on Friday saying that since its previous report in
September Iran had intermittently fed natural uranium gas into a
so-called IR-5 centrifuge. The IR-5 is one of several new centrifuge
models that Iran has been seeking to develop to replace the erratic,
1970s vintage IR-1 centrifuge that it now uses to produce refined
uranium, a material that can be used to produce a nuclear bomb... Asked
about the matter, U.S. State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki told
reporters that Iran had agreed to cease injecting the gas into the IR-5
centrifuge. 'We raised that issue with Iran as soon as the IAEA reported
it, and it was resolved immediately,' Psaki said. 'The Iranians have
confirmed that they will not continue that activity as cited in the IAEA
report, so it's been resolved.' She did not take a stance on whether the
activity violated an interim agreement reached between Iran and six major
powers last year under which Iran agreed to curb its nuclear program in
exchange for limited economic sanctions relief." http://t.uani.com/1oGrgTK
Reuters:
"Iran has refused five times to let a U.N. atomic agency official,
believed to be an American bomb expert, into the country as part of a
team investigating its disputed nuclear activities, diplomats said. Iran
says it has the right to decide who has access to its territory, adding
it had allowed in other International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) staff
seeking to advance a long-stalled probe into suspected atomic arms
research. But its repeated failure to provide a visa to one specific IAEA
expert may reinforce an impression in the West of a continuing reluctance
by Tehran to fully answer allegations that it has worked on designing a
nuclear-armed missile. For the IAEA 'to be able to address the
outstanding issues effectively, it is important that any staff member ...
with the requisite expertise is able to participate in the agency's technical
activities in Iran,' the agency said in a confidential report to member
states." http://t.uani.com/1Ep7TQW
Al-Monitor:
"In an interview on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's personal
website, top nuclear negotiator and Deputy Foreign Minister Abbas Aragchi
talked about the supreme leader's influence and support for the
negotiators and the negotiation process. In the Q&A, published Nov.
9, Araghchi reiterated that the 'insight' of the supreme leader led to
Iran's nuclear achievements. Aragchi said the administration is simply
the executive branch of the government, and that the nuclear file belongs
to the Islamic Republic of Iran, which is led by Ayatollah Khamenei, and
cannot be confined to one administration or another, even though the
different administrations and negotiators have had different approaches.
He said he viewed Iran not submitting to the world powers over the last
decade with respect to its nuclear program as a victory that was
'indebted' to Ayatollah Khamenei. Araghchi also said Iran 'will never
suspend enrichment,' explaining that there was once a time when the
United States would not accept Iranian enrichment, but now the issue is
simply a matter of the number of centrifuges. On comments by the supreme
leader just before the latest talks regarding Iran's nuclear needs and
others regarding Iran's position toward Israel, Araghchi said all of his
positions were 'precise, timely and helpful.' According to Araghci,
Ayatollah Khamenei's support for the nuclear negotiators, at one point referring
to them as 'children of the revolution,' was very 'effective and
heartwarming.'" http://t.uani.com/1tCDRCM
Sanctions
Relief
Bloomberg:
"Iranian shares rose to the highest since May on optimism the nation
and the group known as the P5+1 may reach a nuclear deal this month,
according to the Tehran Stock Exchange's Chief Executive Officer. The
bourse's benchmark index climbed 3.3 percent this month to 76,560.8
yesterday, the highest since May 24, according to data on the exchange's
website. Top envoys from the U.S., European Union and Iran sat down in
Oman Nov. 9 to build momentum for a final nuclear accord. Investors
traded shares valued at about 4.2 trillion Iranian rials ($158 million)
that day, the most since June. 'One piece of news that has had an impact
on the market is the agreement and the possibility of an agreement, it
means we'll see a better situation in the market,' Hassan Ghalibaf Asl
said in an interview at his office in Tehran on Nov. 9." http://t.uani.com/1zhczY3
Human Rights
AFP:
"A top Iranian judiciary official on Monday denied that a
British-Iranian woman, arrested in June after trying to attend a men's
volleyball match, had been sentenced to jail, media reported. The lawyer
for Ghoncheh Ghavami said earlier this month that the 25-year-old law
graduate from London had been sentenced to a year in prison... But deputy
judiciary head Gholamhossein Mohseni-Ejeie dismissed this claim, saying
that no sentence had been pronounced because the trial was still ongoing.
'We have not finished examining the case. The court must still give a
ruling on another charge' against Ghavami, Mohseni-Ejeie told reporters
during his weekly news conference. 'The verdict has not been issued,' he
said." http://t.uani.com/1tY6TAF
Opinion &
Analysis
UANI Advisory
Board Member Michael Singh in WSJ: "That President
Barack Obama apparently wrote to Iran's supreme leader regarding the
nuclear negotiations and the U.S.-led campaign against Islamic State
militants in Iraq and Syria is not, itself, of particular concern. The
president is not incorrect in his reported view that it is Ayatollah Ali
Khamenei, rather than Iran's more engaging and pragmatic president, Hasan
Rouhani, who 'will make all the final decisions on Iran's nuclear
program' and regional policies. And engagement is a tool; like most
tools, it should be wielded when appropriate, in combination with other
tools, in support of a strategy, toward sensible ends-not summarily ruled
out. What makes Mr. Obama's missive troubling is what it suggests about
his strategy and ends with respect to Iran. The president's letter
reportedly had two aims: to convey that 'any cooperation on Islamic State
was largely contingent on Iran reaching a comprehensive [nuclear]
agreement' and 'to assuage Iran's concerns about the future of its close
ally, President Bashar al-Assad of Syria.' These messages appear designed
to convey that the U.S. poses no threat to Iranian interests in Iraq and
Syria and that Washington is willing to cooperate with Iran in both
places in exchange for Tehran signing a nuclear deal by Nov. 24. This
message-news of which came not long after a Wall Street Journal report
that the Obama administration views its relationship with Iran as one of
'détente'-reflects a regional strategy in disarray. It implies that the
U.S. sees Iran as a potential partner in Syria and Iraq when, in fact,
Tehran is part of the problem: Iranian support for Mr. Assad has
prolonged Syria's civil war, and its support for sectarian militias in
Iraq has contributed to the alienation of Sunnis in that country and
beyond. Furthermore, this approach risks alienating our Arab allies and
the Syrian opposition, whose support for the U.S. campaign against ISIS
has been dampened by their concerns that Washington is tacitly bolstering
Iran and Mr. Assad, whom they view as primary threats. The president's
message is hard to square with his vision of an inclusive Iraq or his own
explicit calls for Mr. Assad to step aside. The implication that
Washington is prepared to accommodate Iranian policies also relieves
pressure on Tehran to undertake the strategic shift that, if the
historical precedents of states abandoning nuclear weapons programs are
any guide, is vital to a sustainable end to its nuclear ambitions. A thaw
between the U.S. and Iran could promote regional stability-but only if
such a positive development resulted from Iran tempering its regional
ambitions and policies. Not so a Faustian bargain with Iran against
Islamic State that leaves unaddressed Tehran's own contributions to regional
instability. The Obama administration needs not another presidential
letter but, more than ever, a Middle East strategy that effectively
confronts the full range of threats to U.S. interests and rallies the
support of allies." http://t.uani.com/1xsROt8
UANI Advisory
Board Member Henry Sokolski in NPEC: "When it comes
to assessing America's efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring the bomb,
there is a natural tendency to demur and argue that the jury is still
out. Perhaps, but for many, Iran already has become a virtual nuclear
state. Yes, Tehran is not operating all of its centrifuges and, yes, it
might take it another year to get its first bomb. But a. that's not
much time; b. this is hardly as far along as Washington ever wanted
Tehran to get; and c. Washington's ability to block Iran from taking the
final steps to acquiring its first bomb is now marginal at best. For all
these reasons, then, it's not too early to ask whether or not Washington
could have done better in its efforts to scotch Iran's march toward the
bomb. Certainly, if the United States wants to avoid future Irans, which
some experts insist is about to happen, it's not too early to answer this
question now. How well has Washington done? The short answer is it
fumbled on several fronts. The long answer is that on ten specific
points, it could have done better. Washington officials certainly could
have publicly articulated earlier, more consistently and clearly how
great a threat the Iranian regime was to its neighbors, the U.S. and its
allies; and what the U.S. and other states needed to do to block the
threat. In addition, Washington has been far too reluctant to spell out
the limits of IAEA inspections. On the other hand, the U.S. has been too
enthusiastic in promoting the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy in the
Middle East to help it hedge diplomatically and militarily against Iran's
nuclear misbehavior. Beyond these shortfalls, America's wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have tended to crowd out serious thinking about other serious
security concerns like Iran. This and other factors have encouraged
Washington to rely too much on military threats, covert operations, and
manipulating intelligence assessments in its efforts to manage the
Iranian nuclear threat." http://t.uani.com/146tJ0w
Bret Stephens in
WSJ: "I am on record predicting that a nuclear deal
with Iran will founder on the opposition of the Islamic Republic's
Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei. Iranian diplomats, I wrote in May, 'will
allow this round of negotiations to fail and bargain instead for an
extension of the current interim agreement. It will get the extension and
then play for time again. There will never be a final deal.' I was
vindicated on the first point in July, when John Kerry purchased a
five-month extension for the talks with $2.8 billion in direct sanctions
relief for Tehran. I'd be willing to make a modest bet that I'll be
vindicated again when the Nov. 24 deadline for a deal expires. The latest
talks in Oman between Mr. Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad
Zarif seem to have gone nowhere. As Jimmy Carter discovered during the
hostage crisis, the mullahs are especially contemptuous toward those they
see as weak. But let's say I'm wrong. What sort of deal would we likely
get? Above all, it will be a technical deal. Hyper-technical. If you want
to master its details, be prepared to know the difference not just
between LEU (low-enriched uranium) and HEU (high-enriched), but also
between IR1 and the far more efficient IR2 centrifuges. You'll need to
know what a cascade is, and you'll have to appreciate the importance of
footprints when it comes to M&V (monitoring and verification)
mechanisms. You'll have to appreciate that, as in watches, proliferation
resistant is not the same thing as proliferation proof, an important
point if Russia is to turn Iran's enriched uranium into fuel rods for the
reactor at Bushehr. Also, get a handle on PMD (Possible Military
Dimensions) of the Iranian nuclear program, a regular staple of reports
by the IAEA (International Atomic Energy Agency) as well as Iran's
acquiescence to the AP (meaning the Additional Protocol of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty, not the news agency). Meantime, keep a close eye
on Arak (the plutonium-breeding reactor near the city by the same name,
not the liquor). Examine the feasibility of 'snap-back' sanctions. And so
on. The avalanche of fine print will help convey an appearance of
meticulousness and transparency. If this were a nuclear deal between the
U.S. and, say, Finland, no doubt it would be so. But we're talking about
Iran, meaning the abundance of detail will serve a more obfuscatory
function. The Obama administration will count on a broad measure of
public ignorance and media credulity, meaning it can sell a deal by
citing experts who happen to agree with its conclusions. Anyone want to
have a debate about how much U-235 dances on the head of an Iranian
SWU?" http://t.uani.com/1u67yl
David Horovitz in
Times of Israel: "It's almost over. It really
doesn't much matter if a triumphant US Secretary of State John Kerry
announces in the next few hours or days that a dramatic accord has been
reached with Iran to regulate its nuclear program, or if it is decided to
extend the negotiations beyond the November 24 deadline to finalize that
deal. We know where the negotiations are heading. We know that the
conclusion is dire. The P5+1 countries, their approach to talks with the
ayatollahs determined by the Obama administration, have insistently
behaved like the Three Wise Monkeys. Iran pours its energies into mastering
the technology for nuclear weapons. From its 'supreme leader' on down it
makes crystal clear its hegemonic regional ambitions, its contempt for
the West, and its aim to bring about the demise of Israel. And the US-led
international community willfully closes its eyes and ears to the
dangers, wishing them away. Ultimately, the failure is rooted in
President Barack Obama's desire to heal relations with America's enemies
in this part of the world. But what the administration would like to have
perceived as a new generosity of spirit emanating from Washington, a
desire to conquer past animosities, to build new bridges, to play fair,
is regarded in this brutal region, by the purveyors of that brutality, as
weakness. The P5+1 negotiators aim to avoid humiliating Iran, so they
choose not to insist on IAEA inspectors gaining access to the Parchin
facility where they would find evidence of Iran's years of efforts at
nuclear weaponization. And thus Iran can publicly maintain the fiction
that it does not seek, and has not been seeking, the bomb. The P5+1
negotiators back away from the earlier goal of using the economic
pressure of sanctions in order to force Iran into a strategic U-turn - to
dismantle the facilities and equipment that have brought it so far along
the road to nuclear weapons - and instead now work for an accord that
would, in theory, keep Iran some 6 to 18 months from the ability to
produce the fissile material for a bomb. This very framework is a tacit
admission that Iran, if left unchecked, would push full speed ahead to
the nuclear weapons it risibly claims not to seek. But the negotiators
prefer not to acknowledge this logistical flaw at the heart of their
approach. The P5+1 negotiators would have us believe that a better deal
is simply not possible - not the best negotiating strategy. When you tell
the world that a better deal is out of reach, you can be dead certain
that the Iranians are listening, and are not going to agree to a better
deal. The P5+1 negotiators would have us believe that there was
insufficient international resolve to force Iran into the corner, that
the sanctions regime was not sustainable, that an imperfect deal is far
better than no deal at all, that Iran's nuclear scientists have the
knowhow now and nothing can change that. Lousy arguments, one and all.
Statecraft in the face of an extraordinarily dangerous regime required
mustering the international resolve to reverse Tehran's drive for the
bomb; it required maintaining the unity of purpose to ensure sanctions
were kept in place and ratcheted up as required; it required making plain
that there would be no deal at all unless the necessary terms were
reached, with the combined threat of more sanctions and a military
readiness to underpin that stance; and it required the dismissal of
ridiculous, extraneous, defeatist arguments such as the one that holds
that the Iranians have the knowhow anyway... Let nobody kid themselves.
Whether the deal now taking shape ostensibly keeps Iran six months or
eighteen months from the bomb makes no significant difference. An
arrangement that depends on verifying Iranian good behavior and taking
speedy counteraction in the event of bad behavior is simply not workable
- and both sides know it." http://t.uani.com/1stX49w
Borzou Daragahi,
Erika Solomon, Najmeh Bozorgmehr & Geoff Dyer in FT:
"Iraq's national security adviser Falah Fayadh was in Washington
struggling to arrange delivery of US fighter jets to aid the country's
fight against a surging Sunni Arab insurgency when the shocking reports
began flooding in. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, known as
Isis, had swept through the country's second-largest city, Mosul, and was
hurtling toward Baghdad. It was June 10. Mr Fayadh rushed back to the
Iraqi capital as residents began making plans to flee Baghdad for the
south of the country or go abroad. Bank officials feared runs on
deposits. Iraq's Shia-led government pleaded with the US for help. But
Washington's reply was chilly. 'They said they were studying the matter,'
says Mr Fayadh, 'and hinted that they were not satisfied with the
government.' It would be two months before the US came to the aid of
Baghdad by launching air strikes to support Iraqi forces defending the
capital from Isis advances. Meanwhile, Washington's arch-rival in the region,
Iran, began sending weapons, ammunition, crucial intelligence and senior
advisers within 48 hours of the Mosul crisis. 'From the first day we sent
a request to the Americans for training and weapons,' says General Qassem
Atta, head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service. 'The US excuse for
not sending it [help] was to wait for the new government to be
established. We had no choice...but to go to Iran. We had to defend
ourselves.' ... in more than a dozen interviews, Iraqi and Iranian
insiders say the Obama administration's decision to wait and insist on
the removal of prime minister Nouri al-Maliki before taking action
strengthened Iran's position in Iraq. The US position, they argue,
further enmeshed Iran in its neighbour's vital affairs, deepened ties
between the two countries' security institutions and stifled attempts to
wean the country from Tehran's grasp. Questions about the roles of Iran
and the US - which announced the deployment of up to 1,500 extra troops
last week - in Iraq come at a critical juncture in relations between
Washington and Tehran. Officials from the two countries are struggling to
forge a deal on the Iranian nuclear programme while coming to an
understanding on their shared interest in fighting Isis. The US has
dangled the option of more co-operation against the Islamist group in the
event of a nuclear deal. But by giving Iran first crack at shaping Iraq's
security response to the Isis threat, the Obama administration may have
weakened its hand. In the space of a few days Iran reformulated the
ultimately failed Iraqi security infrastructure that it took Washington
nearly nine years and billions of dollars to build. Iran's rapid response
may greatly impact the future of Iraq and the nature of the war against
Isis, now encompassing Iraq, Syria and increasingly ensnaring Lebanon.
Critics argue this will favour Tehran and its allies by further cementing
the role of Shia and pro-Iranian militias in the country's security
institutions. 'The US didn't move quickly enough to help Iraq while it
[Isis] was invading Mosul and left other countries to build up their
influence,' says Nabeal Younes Mohamed, a political-science professor and
adviser to one of Iraq's leading Sunni politicians. 'Iran acted quickly
to keep its influence.' ... It may be too early to determine the ultimate
ramifications of Iran's role in the war against Isis. But Baghdad's
dependence on Iranian firepower and personnel, including Qassem Soleimani
the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards' elite Qods Force, Tehran's
overseas paramilitary unit, may limit future US policy leverage. It could
also further complicate the dispute over Tehran's nuclear programme and
the situation in Syria, where the US finds itself avoiding conflict with
Bashar al-Assad's Iranian-backed regime. While Iran's physical footprint
in Iraq is likely to be similar to the hundreds or several thousand of
advisers the US has authorised to deploy, its reactivation of Shia
militias and its role in organising the so-called 'popular surge' of volunteers
gives Tehran a far more robust force on the ground. One Iraqi official
told Randa Slim, an analyst at the Middle East Institute who travels
frequently to Baghdad and other regional capitals, that Mr Soleimani was
'the commander of the Iraqi armed forces' during the first two weeks
after the fall of Mosul. 'During that time, while the US was hedging and
wondering what to do, Soleimani rushed to the aid of Iraq,' she said...
The phone calls to Baghdad and Erbil, the capital of the autonomous
Kurdistan Regional Government, began on June 10. 'They said if you want,
we are ready to help,' said Gen Atta, who is among the senior Iraqi armed
forces officers long sceptical of Iran's influence in his country. 'In
the early days they even offered troops.' In addition to artillery and
mortar units, Tehran began passing on intelligence. 'First and foremost
it was the Revolutionary Guard which came to help,' said Mowafak Rubayie,
Iraq's former national security adviser. 'They came after two days. They
were the first to come in and save [the] day.' In contrast the US
response was 'selfish' says Sadi Ahmed Pire, a leader of the Patriotic
Union of Kurdistan, one of the dominant parties in the KRG. 'We said, 'we
are the ones fighting terrorism on behalf of the rest of the world.'' ...
Tehran's early response to the Isis incursion promises to shape Iraq's
national security framework for years to come. The Kurds' once-promising
attempt to wean themselves off the Islamic Republic's influence by
strengthening a partnership with Turkey appears in shambles. The Shia
militias had been mostly dormant since 2010 after Mr Maliki launched a
messy war to stamp out forces loyal to radical cleric Moqtada al-Sadr. Mr
Sadr's forces, now rebranded the Peace Brigades, and other Iranian-backed
or trained Shia militias, have reassumed their robust role in Iraq's
public life. The volunteer forces, which many Iraqi officials now want to
incorporate into the security services, are potentially an even more
fervent force propelling the type of Shia populism advocated by Iran's
leaders. 'I think in the long term Iran's role is going to have a
negative impact on the Iraqi people,' said Mr Nabeal Younes. 'We need
help at this time, but it doesn't mean we agree on such an
influence.'" http://t.uani.com/1AXzcpd
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Eye on Iran is a periodic news summary from United Against
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email Press@UnitedAgainstNuclearIran.com
United Against Nuclear
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