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The
Jihadi Connection between Sinai, Gaza and Islamic State
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Ansar
Bayt al-Maqdis terrorists preparing to decapitate alleged Mossad spies.
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What kind of relations do the jihadists of northern Sinai and Gaza
have with Islamic State, and with Hamas? Egyptian President Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi declared a three-month national emergency this week, following
the killing of over 31 Egyptian soldiers in a suicide car bombing carried
out by jihadists in northern Sinai.
No organization has issued an authoritative claim of responsibility
for the bombing, but it comes amid a state of open insurgency in northern
Sinai, as Egyptian security forces battle a number of jihadist
organizations. Most prominent among these groups are Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis
and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen; the attack on the Sinai military base
came a few days after an Egyptian court sentenced seven members of Ansar
Beit al-Maqdis to death for carrying out previous attacks on the army.
In subsequent days, Egyptian officials pointed an accusing finger at
the Hamas rulers of Gaza, asserting there is "no doubt that elements
belonging to Palestinian factions were directly involved in the
attack." Cairo is now set to build a new barrier separating the
Strip from northern Sinai.
In a number of Arabic media outlets, unnamed Egyptian government
sources openly accused Hamas members of aiding the assault, assisting
with planning, funding and weapons supply.
Are the Egyptian claims credible? Are there links between Hamas or
smaller jihadist movements in the Gaza Strip and the insurgents in
northern Sinai? And no less importantly, is the armed campaign in
northern Sinai linked to Islamic State? First, it is important to
understand that jihadist activity in northern Sinai is not a new
development. Long before the military coup of July 3, 2013, and indeed
before the downfall of president Hosni Mubarak in February 2011, this
area had become a lawless zone in which jihadists and Beduin smugglers of
people and goods carried out their activities.
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis emerged from this already existing jihadist
milieu in the period following Mubarak's ouster.
At this time, Egyptian security measures in the area sharply declined.
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has not confined its activities to the Sinai
area; rather, it has directly engaged in attacks on Israeli targets.
Recently, the group beheaded four Sinai locals who it accused of being
"spies for the Mossad," also carrying out two rocket attacks on
Eilat this past January.
The claim of links between Hamas and Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis has been
raised in the past. In September, Egyptian security forces claimed to
have found uniforms and weaponry identifiable as belonging to Hamas's
Izzadin Kassam brigades.
There is a burgeoning and violent
salafi jihadist subculture that encompasses northern Sinai and southern
Gaza.
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It is worth remembering that the current Egyptian government has,
since its inception, sought to link salafi jihadist terrorism with the
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, as part of its strategy of marginalizing and
criminalizing the Brotherhood.
The current statements seeking to link Hamas directly to Ansar Bayt
al-Maqdis may form part of this larger strategy.
For its part, Hamas indignantly denies any link to this week's
bombing.
But what can be said with greater confidence is there is, without
doubt, a burgeoning and violent salafi jihadist subculture that
encompasses northern Sinai and southern Gaza – with various organizations
possessing members and infrastructure on both sides of the border.
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis itself and Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen both have
members in Sinai and Gaza. Working tunnels smuggling goods and weapons
exist between Gaza and northern Sinai, despite Egyptian attempts to
destroy them.
It is also a fact that Hamas is aware of these tunnels and makes no
attempt to act against them, benefiting economically from their presence.
From this standpoint, Hamas authorities in Gaza are guilty by omission
of failing to act against the infrastructure supplying and supporting
salafi guerrillas in northern Sinai, whether or not the less verifiable
claims of direct Hamas links with them have a basis.
Given this reality, it is also not hard to understand the Egyptian
determination to build an effective physical barrier between the Strip
and Egyptian territory.
What of the issue of support for Islamic State? Should these jihadist
groups be seen as a southern manifestation of the Sunni jihadist wave now
sweeping across Iraq, Syria and increasingly, Lebanon? From an
ideological point of view, certainly yes.
From an organizational point of view, the situation is more complex.
According to Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi, an expert on jihadist groups
currently based at the Interdisciplinary Center Herzliya and the Middle
East Forum, neither Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis nor Majlis Shura al-Mujahideen
have formally pledged their allegiance to the caliphate established by
Islamic State in parts of Iraq and Syria.
Nevertheless, Tamimi confirmed, both organizations have expressed
"support" for Islamic State and its objectives, while not
subordinating themselves to it through a pledge of allegiance.
Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis is known to maintain contacts with Islamic State,
which has advised it on the mechanics of carrying out operations. Islamic
State, meanwhile, has publicly declared its support for the jihadists in
northern Sinai, without singling out any specific group for public
support.
Tamimi further notes the existence of two smaller and more obscure
groups in Gaza with more direct links to Islamic State.
These are Jamaat Ansar al-Dawla al-Islamiya fi Bayt al-Maqdis (The
Group of Helpers/ Supporters of the Islamic State in Bayt al-Maqdis),
which carries out propaganda activities from Gaza and helps funnel
volunteers to Syria and Iraq, and the Sheikh Abu al-Nur al-Maqdisi
Battalion, a Gazan contingent fighting with Islamic State in these
countries.
So, a number of conclusions can be drawn: Firstly, Hamas, in its
tolerance of and engagement with smuggling tunnels between Gaza and
Sinai, at least indirectly permits the jihadists networks operating these
tunnels to wage their insurgency against Egypt – even if the claims of a direct
Hamas link to violent activities in Sinai have not yet been conclusively
proven.
Secondly, the most important organizations engaged in this insurgency
support Islamic State, and are supported by them, though the former have
not yet pledged allegiance and become directly subordinate to the latter.
Islamic State is not yet in northern Sinai, but its close allies are.
Their activities are tolerated by the Hamas rulers of the Gaza Strip – as
long as they are directed outward, against Egypt and Israel.
Jonathan Spyer is director of the Global Research in International
Affairs (GLORIA) Center and a fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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