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USA Today:
"U.S. and Iranian negotiators in Vienna agreed to extend the
deadline from Tuesday night to July 7 as they remained far apart on key
issues. Even if a deal can be reached by the new date, differences in the
interpretation of the latest interim agreement show the obstacles of
executing an accord. The deadline was extended 'to allow more time for
negotiations to reach a long-term solution' on the Iran nuclear issue,
State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said... In response to concerns
by Western officials that Iran has backtracked from a framework deal
reached in Lausanne, Switzerland, on April 2, Zarif said 'a solution will
be possible' based on that accord. White House spokesman Josh Earnest
said Monday that Obama 'has been very clear' that if 'the Iranians refuse
to agree ... to a final agreement that's consistent with the framework
that was reached in April, then there won't be an agreement.' The
differences in the White House and Iranian interpretations of the
Lausanne deal could be a sign of danger ahead even if a deal is reached.
Olli Heinonen, who spent 27 years as a weapons inspector for IAEA said
that the final deal is likely to be much more specific than the framework
agreement but that 'going back to the history (with Iran) we have seen
differences in views and interpretations in the past.'" http://t.uani.com/1ej3QiV
NYT:
"As a high-level team of Iranian officials flew here on Tuesday for
what appears to be an intensive final week of negotiations for a
comprehensive nuclear accord, President Obama issued a warning that he
was prepared to walk away from any agreement with a verification regime
that consisted of 'a few inspectors wandering around every once in a
while.' ... Mr. Obama, coming off a week of historic, confidence-building
victories at home, made a point at a news conference in Washington of
stressing his determination to get an effective deal. 'Given past
behavior on the part of Iran, that simply can't be a declaration by Iran
and a few inspectors wandering around every once in a while,' he said.
'That's going to have to be a serious, rigorous verification mechanism.
And that, I think, is going to be the test as to whether we get a deal or
not.' In Tehran, Mr. Rouhani said that it was up to the United States to
keep its word. While he, too, was talking tough, the promise that got him
elected - a vow to get Western-led sanctions against Iran lifted - hangs
in the balance in the next few days. 'If we reach a deal, both sides
should be committed to it,' Mr. Rouhani said, the state news agency IRNA
reported. 'If the other side breaches the deal, we will go back to the
old path, stronger than what they can imagine.' ... In a Twitter post on
Tuesday that raised Iranians' hopes an accord might finally be at hand,
Ayatollah Khamenei praised his negotiators as 'trustworthy, committed,
brave and faithful.'" http://t.uani.com/1It0JkC
Reuters:
"The global nuclear watchdog said on Wednesday its boss would fly to
Tehran to discuss some of the last big issues that need to be resolved so
that Iran and world powers can reach a breakthrough final nuclear deal by
a new deadline of next week. Among the main sticking points that remain
to be resolved are issues that involve the U.N. nuclear watchdog, the
International Atomic Energy Agency. The powers want guaranteed access by
IAEA inspectors to Iranian military sites and a response to IAEA queries
about Tehran's past activities that may have been related to weapons
research. The global body said in a statement that its chief Yukiya Amano
would meet Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and other senior officials on
Thursday in Iran. Discussions would cover 'how to accelerate the
resolution of all outstanding issues related to Iran's nuclear program,
including clarification of possible military dimensions.'" http://t.uani.com/1GZsdMF
Nuclear Program & Negotiations
Free Beacon:
"Deputy National Security Adviser Ben Rhodes said Iran would be more
likely to evolve into a rational actor on a world stage with a nuclear
deal than without one. Rhodes made these rather hopeful remarks during an
interview with The Atlantic's Jeffrey Goldberg at the Aspen Ideas
Festival on Monday. 'We believe that an agreement is necessary and has to
be good enough to be worth doing, even if Iran doesn't change,' he said.
'If 10 or 15 years from now, Iran is the same as it is today in terms of
its government, the deal has to be good enough that it can exist on those
merits. That said, we believe that a world in which there is a deal with
Iran is much more likely to produce an evolution in Iranian behavior than
a world in which there is no deal.' ... Rhodes repeated his belief that
Iran would have a better chance of joining the world community during his
long answer to Goldberg. 'In a world of a deal, there is a greater
possibility that you will see Iran evolve in a direction in which they
are more engaged with the international community and less dependent upon
the types of activities that they've been engaged in,' he said." http://t.uani.com/1KsNbXY
FT:
"While diplomats seek a nuclear deal with Tehran, Washington is
trying to reassure Middle East allies that it will not let Iran become
the dominant power in the region. A decision to resume military aid to
Bahrain, announced late on Monday, is the latest move by the Obama
administration aimed at mending fences with allies in the region amid
concerns about the likely financial benefit that Iran will reap from a
nuclear deal." http://t.uani.com/1R4wtSP
AFP:
"Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu insisted Tuesday that the
deal being negotiated between world powers and Iran would allow it to
develop nuclear weapons, hours before a deadline to reach an accord
expired... 'We believe that it is a fundamental mistake to enable such a
terrorist regime to get to nuclear weapons, which is what the proposed
agreement will give them,' the prime minister said ahead of a meeting
with Italian Foreign Minister Paolo Gentiloni. 'It will give them a
definite pathway to nuclear bombs -- not a bomb, but nuclear bombs.'
Netanyahu added that the lifting of sanctions against Iran would allow it
to 'replenish their coffers with many billions -- actually perhaps up to
hundreds of billions of dollars -- to enable them to continue their
terrorism and aggression.' 'This is something that is wrong,' he said.
'It is dangerous. It is dangerous for Israel, for Italy, for Europe, for
the United States, for the world.'" http://t.uani.com/1Krd0pT
Sanctions
Relief
FT:
"Iran is finalising details of new and more lucrative contracts for
multinational energy companies as it hopes to secure $100bn of fresh
investment in its oil and gas sector once international sanctions are
lifted. Mehdi Hosseini, an adviser to Iran's oil ministry and the man
tasked with drafting the Iran Petroleum Contract expects Hassan Rouhani,
the president, to approve the new contract in the coming months, with
details to be announced by the end of the year... Details of the scheme
and the dozens of available upstream offshore and onshore oil and gas
projects will be released at an investment conference in London, probably
in December." http://t.uani.com/1LD99qD
Human Rights
IHR:
"Iranian authorities have executed at least 570 prisoners in the
first half of 2015, an increase of about 40% compared to the first half
of 2014. According to reports by Iran Human Rights (IHR), at least 1,900
people have been executed since the election of President Hassan Rouhani
in June 2013. Despite the highest execution rate in more than two
decades, Iranian authorities haven't met any major criticism from the
international community." http://t.uani.com/1INIyCa
Domestic
Politics
AFP:
"Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on Tuesday unveiled
the main points of the Islamic republic's next five-year plan, with the
focus on the military and economic growth. According to extracts
published by the official IRNA news agency, the 2016-2021 plan allocates
at least five percent of the budget to defence 'as part of the regional
balance of power' and to protect national interests. The plan includes
developing ballistic missile capabilities, arms production and modern
weaponry, the agency said... On the economy, Khamenei wanted 'quick and
sustainable' growth of eight percent over the five years." http://t.uani.com/1R4pB7W
Reuters:
"To Iran's leaders, solving a nuclear standoff with the West might
be a question of maintaining geopolitical influence and prestige. To its
ordinary citizens, it's about money, food and jobs. Years of tightening
international sanctions, designed to counter Iranian evasion and secrecy
and guarantee that Iran's nuclear program can have no military dimension,
have closed hundreds of factories and halved living standards. No wonder,
then, that the desire runs deep for negotiators to do a deal in Vienna by
their self-imposed deadline of July 7." http://t.uani.com/1Jv249h
NYT:
"In the little shade provided by Tehran's Freedom Tower, a group of
about 200 Iranian hard-liners, some with hats made of folded newspapers
to protect them against the sun's rays, sat in the searing heat Tuesday
on blue plastic chairs next to blaring loudspeakers. Speakers railed
against the devil, a.k.a. the United States, and its 'oppressive'
actions, drawing the usual chants of 'Death to America' from the
participants. They called for a 'good nuclear deal' in the negotiations
this week in Vienna, meaning one with few, or preferably no, Iranian
compromises... In the distance Ali, 35, revved his 250-cc Honda
motorcycle, shaking his head. The reality of those demonstrating was
completely different from the one he lived in, he said. A factory worker,
he said he had increasing trouble making ends meet, even working a double
shift. 'I do not care about nuclear energy. These people do not represent
me,' he said, pointing at the rally far off across the square. 'They are
200 out of 12 million.' Ali, who asked that his last name be withheld to
avoid retribution, said there were many more like him. 'I want a normal
life,' he said, driving off into the traffic. Few Iranians are as
outspoken. Yet, most urban Iranians, forbidden to organize or hold
demonstrations, want no part of confrontational policies, at home or
abroad, asking instead for a more relaxed atmosphere, socially and
politically." http://t.uani.com/1INFh5E
Foreign Affairs
AP:
"A nuclear deal may serve Russia's own needs on a strategic level,
and work against the United States. It could strengthen Tehran as a
regional power allied with Moscow, both as a proxy backing the Syrian
government and as a rival to U.S-backed Saudi Arabia in the struggle for
Mideast influence. Economic interests also play a role in Moscow's
support for a nuclear deal, even if the lifting of sanctions trigged by
an agreement would hurt Russia in the short run. These would put more
Iranian oil on the market in competition with Russian crude. But Moscow
is reportedly working on a solution by offering cash for Iranian oil.
Tehran then would spend the money on Russian goods. And Russia can sell
the Islamic Republic state-of-the-art drilling equipment and other
technology it needs to rebuild its sanctions-battered oil sector. And in
the long run, the Kremlin, which already helped construct Iran's working
reactor, will benefit from an already signed multibillion-dollar deal to
build two additional reactors and supply them with fuel. More such
projects are planned, along with military cooperation and Russian arms
sales to Tehran, including the long-delayed transfer of S-300 advanced
air defense systems." http://t.uani.com/1dxmhzE
Opinion &
Analysis
UANI Advisory
Board Member Michael Singh in WSJ: "The deadline in
the Iran nuclear negotiations has just been extended. But if an agreement
is ultimately reached, Tehran is expected to receive a substantial
financial windfall. Critics have argued that an influx of funds will
permit Iran to expand its destabilizing regional activities. The Obama
administration has argued that Iran will use the funds primarily for
domestic needs. Who is correct? An estimated $100 billion to $140 billion
in Iranian foreign exchange reserves are being held in escrow in banks
overseas (primarily oil revenues that U.S. sanctions block from being
repatriated to Iran). It is not clear how much of these funds would be
made available to Iran under a nuclear agreement, or when. U.S. officials
have reportedly indicated that Iran would receive $30 billion to $50
billion after completing initial steps to comply with an agreement (deactivating
centrifuges in excess of those it is permitted to operate, reducing its
stockpile of enriched uranium, and converting its heavy-water reactor).
That work could take six months or more. In his most recent budget,
Iranian President Hasan Rouhani proposed government expenditures of
approximately $300 billion. While some domestic programs were
increased-health-care spending rose 59%-so were security expenditures.
Saeed Ghasseminejad and Emanuele Ottolenghi of the Foundation for Defense
of Democracies noted that funding was up 48% for the Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps and 40% for the Ministry of Intelligence and
Security; overall defense spending, which amounts to 3% of Iran's gross
domestic product, rose 33%. These figures likely understate Iran's security
spending; as the Congressional Research Service recently noted, the
Revolutionary Guard Corps spends 'significant amounts of unbudgeted funds
on arms, technology, support to pro-Iranian movements, and other
functions.' The Obama administration's position assumes that while Iran
was willing to substantially increase security spending when sanctions
were in effect it will not do so in the wake of a deal, when economic
conditions would improve. This thinking is likely based on the notion
that in the wake of a deal Iran will feel pressure to satisfy public
expectations that the deal will yield tangible benefits and spend more at
home. But there are good reasons to think this will not be the case.
Iran's security spending is driven by more than tensions over its nuclear
program. The Revolutionary Guards are heavily engaged in Syria, Iraq,
Yemen, and Afghanistan; none of these conflicts will end if an Iran deal
is reached-and the situations may get worse. To the extent that a deal is
seen as a 'win' for pragmatists led by President Rouhani, Iran's supreme
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, may want to placate hard-liners by
boosting his financial support to the security apparatus they dominate.
Iran's security spending goes to both foreign endeavors and monitoring
its own people, an imperative that is likely to grow if the deal permits
greater economic and diplomatic openness to the outside world... The
Obama administration has also argued that unfreezing Iran's assets will
not lead to an increase in its destabilizing regional activities because
'the cost of Iran's support for terrorism and regional interventions is
relatively small.' This conflates two very distinct activities. It is
arguably correct that the cost of individual terrorist acts is small;
this is one reason that terrorism is so widespread and difficult to
prevent. There is, however, little reason to believe that Iran's
sponsorship of terrorist organizations and efforts to coopt or subvert
governments (see: Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Iraq) is inexpensive.
Consider that Iran's declared military budget is $12 billion to $15
billion. Iranian annual support for Syria's Assad regime was recently
estimated at $6 billion to $15 billion. Iran's funding of Hezbollah has
been estimated at $200 million per year, though that may have increased
with the organization's heavy losses in Syria. Iran also funds
Shiite militias in Iraq, and it sponsors groups in Gaza, Yemen, and
elsewhere. In short, Iran is likely to spend any financial windfall from
a nuclear agreement on both domestic and foreign priorities-as it has
done in good economic times and bad. The two are not mutually exclusive,
and Iran is not likely to reorder its priorities. The agreement terms
reportedly under discussion provide Iran with substantial economic relief
while demanding precisely nothing from it regarding its sponsorship of
terrorism and destabilizing regional behavior. Good policymaking demands
that the benefit of any nuclear agreement be weighed against this cost,
rather than pretending it does not exist." http://t.uani.com/1JwPWre
Sen. Mitch
McConnell in Politico: "The Obama Administration
recently announced another extension of nuclear negotiations with Iran
after failing to abide by its own, already-extended June 30 deadline.
President Obama and Secretary of State Kerry should use the opportunity
to pause negotiations, take a step back and re-examine the point of the
talks in the first place. Because, as a senior Democrat Senator recently
put it, 'the trend lines of the Iran talks are deeply worrying' and 'our
red lines have turned into green lights.' This pause should allow time
for the P5+1 to agree on the basic objectives of a deal: to establish
complete agreement on 'anytime, anywhere' inspections, to complete the
disclosure of previous Iranian military-related nuclear research
(including access to Iranian documents, facilities, scientists and
officials), and to agree on the phased relief of sanctions tied to
Iranian compliance. Reaching the best deal acceptable to Iran, rather
than actually furthering our goal of ending Iran's nuclear program, is a
flawed premise. Establishing an internationally recognized Iranian
nuclear program is not in the interest of the American people. But it now
seems to be the premise upon which the Obama Administration is
approaching these talks. Consider the worrying interim agreement
announced in April. It proposed bestowing international blessing for Iran
to become a 'nuclear threshold' state-forever on the edge of obtaining a
nuclear weapon-and a global go-ahead for Iran to pursue a 10-year nuclear
research and development program. The interim agreement would also allow
Iran to continue to enrich uranium, to retain thousands of nuclear
centrifuges and to pursue development of even more advanced centrifuges. That
deal was bad enough, but apparently it was the high point-nearly every
day since seems to bring news of a further weakening of an
already-weakened Obama Administration position, encouraging hardliners in
Tehran to insist upon additional concessions. This, as Iran pursues a
full-spectrum campaign to expand its sphere of influence and undermine
America's standing in the region. Beyond its nuclear program, Tehran is
also working overtime to expand its ballistic missile and conventional
military capabilities and to support terrorist proxies like Hezbollah,
the Assad regime and Houthi insurgents in Yemen. Iran's aggressive
behavior poses grave challenges to the world, to the region, to allies
like Israel and to our own country. It also presents a host of problems
for President Obama's successor in the Oval Office. Entering into a bad
agreement with Iran now would only make those problems worse. And yet,
that seems exactly what the Obama Administration intends to do. It seems
intent on muddling toward an unacceptable deal with Iran instead of
pausing for a thoughtful reexamination of the P5+1's bottom line. Their
current course would only grant Iran additional legitimacy as it seeks to
blame the West for anything short of instantaneous sanctions relief. It
would also allow Iran to continue to press for additional concessions on
verification and disclosures on the possible military dimensions of its
nuclear research. Until we know more about Iran's previous research, no
nation can be sure of what Iran may have developed covertly already. But
we can be sure of one thing: Iran would use funding derived from any
sanctions relief to support proxy forces and advance its stockpile of
missiles. I hope the Obama Administration will make the right decision
now and press pause before heading further toward a bad deal with Iran; I
hope the administration will have the courage to explain why a deal that
undermines international security is worse than no deal at all." http://t.uani.com/1GO0qMJ
Michael Herzog in
FT: "Israel is not at the table negotiating the deal
on Iran's nuclear programme. Yet it is Israel's national security,
perhaps more than anyone else's, that will be affected. Threatened by
Iran's nuclear and hegemonic ambitions, Israel and most of its Arab
neighbours question whether the expected agreement will stem either. The
choice is not between a good deal and a bad deal. A good deal -
permanently rolling back Iran's nuclear capacity, as was done in Libya -
is no longer possible. The question is whether the deal is acceptable,
given the confines of the framework agreed in April. That framework in
effect legitimises Iran as a nuclear-threshold state and focuses on
stopping it from crossing that threshold. In the first decade the deal
limits Iran's capacity to quickly make enough nuclear material for a
weapon. But in the second decade Iran is allowed to reduce its breakout
time almost to zero, as restrictions on enrichment and stockpiling of
uranium expire. Iran's nuclear threshold status could trigger nuclear
proliferation. Regional rivals, not least the Saudis, may race to catch
up. It could also embolden the Iranians to advance their radical and
sectarian agenda. In addressing these risks, the context of the deal
matters no less than its fine print. The six world powers negotiating
with Iran should insist on certain critical elements: anytime, anywhere
inspection and verification; irreversible conversion of excess enriched
material in Iran; significant restrictions on research and development
relating to centrifuges; a clear and binding pathway to resolving
concerns expressed by international inspectors about the possible
military dimensions of Iran's programme. Sanctions relief should be
phased over years and be conditional on Tehran meeting these
requirements. But that is not enough. The key to stopping Iran from
crossing the threshold at short notice is deterrence. Most of all, the US
needs to make clear there will be punishing consequences for violations.
In addition, the international community should formally affirm its
determination to prevent Iran from acquiring enough fissile material for
a weapon, even after the restrictions lapse. The US should also adopt a
tough stance against Iran's hegemonic regional ambitions, to reassure
traditional allies who have lost faith in American political will to
guarantee their security. Unfortunately, US deterrence has been badly
eroded of late, both due to its reluctance to project power in the
region, and its overeager approach to negotiating with Iran... Viewed
from the region, one thing seems obvious: the best chance to prevent Iran
from acquiring the bomb comes if the US reasserts its willingness to use
military force." http://t.uani.com/1JvcEgy
Aaron David Miller
in CNN: "Any really good deal was lost once Iran
mastered the fuel cycle; the international community conceded Iran's
right to enrich uranium and the regime created a vast nuclear
infrastructure. The issue for any deal now is managing and reducing risk
through constraints on Iran's enrichment, stockpile, limits on research
and development, punitive measures should Iran cheat, and inspections.
But even all of this can't, won't, and never was intended to eliminate
Iran's nuclear weapons aspirations. The agreement will produce a slower,
smaller, more easily monitored Iranian nuclear program. And this, to be
sure, is a rational, logical response if the goal is to defuse an
emerging crisis and to buy time. Diplomacy is always worth pursuing
before turning to military action. But we should be under no illusion
that this agreement will produce an end state, one in which Iran will
give up its nuclear weapons aspirations. It's the cruelest of ironies
that the key to getting Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons aspirations
may have nothing to do with anything in the agreement. Tehran's interest
in acquiring nuclear weapons potential isn't really a technical matter.
Instead, it has everything to do with the regime's character -- its
regional aspirations and its own self-image as a great power. Arguably,
and paradoxically, nuclear weapons may be most useful if they're not
used. Indeed, for a highly suspicious regime -- grandiose and insecure at
the same time -- nuclear weapons offer more than a means to intimidate
Israel. They can function as a hedge against foreign pressures to undermine
the regime, be a way to intimidate weaker regional states, and can send a
message of defiance to the international community that Iran will not be
treated as a second-class power. This raises the real possibility that
the drive to become a nuclear weapons threshold state is inextricably
linked to Iran's unique identity -- its sense of entitlement and
vulnerability -- that has driven it toward the nuclear weapons option. If
this is in fact the case, only transformation of the regime into
something else -- a more moderate, normal state -- might allow for the
possibility that Iran would give up permanently its desire to remain a
nuclear weapons threshold state. So, will Iran transform? Obama has
argued that regardless of Iran's behavior at home and in the region, a
constrained nuclear program is worth achieving in its own right because
Iran will be less dangerous. But the odds of a quick transformation are
pretty small. And freed from sanctions relief and open for business, Iran
will have additional resources to pursue its regional aspirations. Nor is
it likely that Iran is likely to open up at home. After all, the point of
the nuclear agreement isn't to undermine the mullahs' control; it's to
manage public expectations through an improved economy in order to secure
the revolution. More likely what we're witnessing in this nuclear
diplomacy is a transaction, not a transformation. In exchange for
constraints on its nuclear program, Iran will get sanctions relief, an
improved economy and a defusing of the issue that has made it an
international outlier. Ultimately, the deal would be good for the mullahs
because, arguably, they've traded constraints on nuclear weapons they
really don't have to (or even want to) develop now for sanctions relief
that will position them to continue their rise in the region and their
control at home. It's a smart play -- for them. But as I know well, the
U.S. State Department mantra has been that we should not make perfect the
enemy of good. On the Iran deal, the perfect was never available. The
problem now is that 'good' might not be either." http://t.uani.com/1GN3Uhv
James Stavridis in
FP: "The headlines: A charismatic and wily Iranian
leader seeks to expand the borders of his nation, pushing aggressively
against neighbors in the region and especially to the West. Iran exerts
dominance in a wide range of regional capitals, from Baghdad to Beirut.
Trade routes are opening, and wealth will begin into flow to the nation,
enabling further adventurism. Sound familiar? Actually, this describes
the foundation of the Persian Empire about 2,500 years ago by Cyrus the
Great. The empire at its peak ruled over 40 percent of the global
population, the highest figure for any empire in history. It stretched
from the littoral of the eastern Mediterranean to the coast of the
Arabian Gulf, encompassing what are today Libya, Bulgaria, Turkey, Egypt,
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Oman, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and
Afghanistan. Cyrus the Great said, 'You cannot be buried in obscurity:
You are exposed upon a grand theater to the view of the world.' We don't
tend to think of today's Iran as an imperial power, but the Iranians
certainly do - indeed, it is woven into their national DNA and cultural
outlook. And we need to decide how to deal with the reality of Iranian
geopolitical outreach, which will only increase if the sanctions come
off. Tehran's geopolitical strategy - underpinned by the Shiite faith as
a religious movement - is taken directly from the playbooks of the first
three Persian empires, which stretched over a thousand years. Iran seeks
regional dominance, a significant global level of influence, and the
development of a power center that is not a bridge between East and West,
but rather a force in its own right. As the West grapples with the significant
issues surrounding Iran's pursuit of weapons of mass destruction - and
rightly tries to resolve them through diplomacy - we need to be keenly
aware of the imperial ambitions of Iran and how they will be
significantly empowered by the lifting of economic sanctions. A full
lifting of the economic sanctions would, by some estimates, cause a surge
of revenue to Iranian coffers in the range of $100 billion a year or
more, by putting to work as much as a third of the economy that has idled
due to the economic barriers. Some of this would be used to improve the
economy in Iran, of course, but it would at a minimum provide much
additional funding for external activities around the region and the
world." http://t.uani.com/1It58nC
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Eye on Iran is a periodic news summary from United Against
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