The Islamic
State Caliphate Turns One
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Originally published under the title, "Dear Media: ISIS Is
Neither Winning nor Losing Despite the Sinai Attack and Others It
Claims."
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A
year after its proclamation, assessments of ISIS's caliphate fluctuate
greatly.
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As we pass the one-year anniversary since the announcement of ISIS's
so-called "caliphate" demanding the allegiance of the world's
Muslims and ultimately sovereignty over the entire world, much of the
commentary has been far too ephemeral. The media has had a tendency to take
whatever comes out immediately in the news -- such as the attack today in Sinai claimed by ISIS and its threat to Hamas in Gaza -- as indicative of long-term
trends.
This is true both on the ISIS home fronts in Iraq and Syria and on the
international stage as a number of official "province" (wilaya)
affiliates have been announced in Sinai, Nigeria, Libya, Algeria, Yemen,
Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan/Pakistan and, most recently it seems, the Caucasus
area. In addition, the international export of the ISIS brand has recently
seen a wave of ISIS-claimed (but not confirmed) massacres in Sinai,
Kuwait and Tunisia.
Illustrating the problem of the tendency to jump on developments as they
come are the various proclamations that ISIS is either winning or losing in
Iraq and Syria. For instance, the claim that ISIS is winning/on the march was
renewed in the wake of ISIS's capture of Iraq's Anbar provincial capital of
Ramadi and various towns in the Syrian Homs desert, including the ancient
locality of Palmyra/Tadmur.
ISIS faces little local opposition in
the heartland of its territories, including the cities of Mosul and Raqqa.
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What such a generalized assessment fails to take into account is some
broader context: first, as emerged from documentary evidence circulating on the ground since the
end of April, ISIS leader Baghdadi had ordered for a mobilization in the
Syrian provinces to reinforce the fighting fronts in Anbar and Salah ad-Din
provinces, particularly calling for would-be suicide bombers and operative
commandoes. Unsurprisingly then, a wave of suicide bombings proved key in
throwing Iraqi forces in Ramadi into disarray. Second, the Assad regime's
loss of towns in the Homs desert reflects more its own forces' weakness than
ISIS's strength, as the regime has also lost other peripheral areas – in the
south, on and near the border with Jordan, and in the north in Idlib province
– to an assortment of Syrian rebel forces.
However, while ISIS could mobilize forces in Syria to reinforce fighting
fronts in Iraq, it logically follows that ISIS can only focus on so many
fronts at once. At the same time, largely unnoticed was the Syrian Kurdish
YPG's push with coalition air support towards the key northern border town of
Tel Abyad, which ISIS has now lost. Further, ISIS attempted to keep up
momentum by launching a new offensive in the north Aleppo countryside in late
May, aiming to retake its one-time "Emirate
of Azaz" from which it strategically withdrew in February 2014.
However, that offensive has largely stalled as various rebel groups including
al Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra mobilized reinforcements to halt further
ISIS advances, leading ISIS to resort to economic siege by preventing trucks carrying fuel
extracted from ISIS-held areas from entering rebel zones.
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An
ISIS fighter plants a flag in the northern Syrian village of Sawran, May 2015.
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The picture that thus emerges is an organization that is neither winning
nor losing: rather, like any long war, there is much ebb and flow. Yet some
constants have definitely become clear. Most notably, in the heartland of
ISIS territories, including control over major cities like Mosul and Raqqa,
there is a lack of local opposition to fundamentally undermine its rule, and
that dynamic is highly unlikely to change for the foreseeable future. In
part, this is because of ISIS's comprehensive state presentation and
bureaucratic structure that bring a sense of order amid years of chaos. The
internal security apparatus and intelligence gathering is also rigid, being
able to suppress signs of rebellion within ISIS's own ranks and playing
members of the same tribe against each other, helping to suppress a
repetition of the "Sahwa" phenomenon that rolled back ISIS's
predecessor Islamic State of Iraq in the Iraq War.
Airstrikes on oil infrastructure have
not critically undermined ISIS finances.
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Linked to the state presentation is the problem of ISIS financing. Since
ISIS assumes all aspects of a state from education to services, there are
plenty of avenues for income beyond oil and gas infrastructure and
antiquities smuggling: foremost in taxes, ranging from school registration fees to garbage disposal and landline phone subscriptions. This is by far the most important
revenue for ISIS, and thus the state presentation, while needing critical
analysis, also needs to be taken more seriously in this context.
Airstrikes on oil infrastructure have not critically undermined ISIS
finances, as ISIS has simply responded by raising taxes in various parts of its territories. The
problem is compounded by the fact that ISIS territories do not exist in
isolation from their wider milieu. People in rebel-held areas, for example,
readily do business in ISIS territory, finding the security situation there
ideal, as one contact in Azaz put it to me. This prevents the drying up of the
cash flow in ISIS-held areas.
The growth of the ISIS brand outside
of Syria and Iraq has been greatly exaggerated.
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In short, don't bet on a collapse-from-within of ISIS in Iraq and Syria.
But what of ISIS on the international stage and its competition with al Qaeda
for leadership of the global jihad? The list of countries where ISIS now has
officially claimed affiliates may seem impressive at first sight, but in
truth, the growth of the ISIS brand has been greatly exaggerated. Since ISIS
presents itself as a state, true success in measuring the ISIS affiliates
abroad depends on the emergence of a state structure on the model of
governance in Iraq and Syria, embodied in the various Diwans (state
departments) of ISIS. Only two known locations outside Iraq and Syria have
seen ISIS affiliates replicate this structure to a reliable degree: the
cities of Sirte and Derna in Libya.
However, already that structure in Derna has been virtually dismantled by other rebel factions in the city
that became fed up with the ISIS presence. That should tell a lot about ISIS
as a brand abroad, where it is more accurate to see it as a terrorist threat,
but nowhere nearly as entrenched as in Iraq and Syria. Indeed, that should
not come as much of a surprise: ISIS does not have the same organic roots and
financial means in areas outside Syria and Iraq.
None of this is to downplay ISIS as a problem inside and beyond Iraq and
Syria. But overall, some sober perspective is needed when one can fall for
ISIS's impressive media strategies to garner attention. ISIS as a brand is
here to stay with us for the long-term, but it does not constitute an
existential threat, nor is it a mighty juggernaut.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a research
fellow at the Middle East Forum's Jihad
Intel project.
Related
Topics: Iraq, Radical Islam, Syria
| Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
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