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The Paris
Attacks Reflect Intelligence Failure, Not Change in ISIS Strategy
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The recent attacks in Paris carried out by the Islamic State have led to
widespread speculation about a possible shift in
strategy on the part of ISIS. Taken in conjunction with the downing of a
Russian passenger plane over the Sinai and the bombings in the
predominantly Shia Dahiyeh suburbs of Beirut, it is argued that ISIS is
lashing out at the "far enemy" as it comes under pressure on the
home fronts in Iraq and Syria, such as its recent loss of control of
Sinjar, a town that formed part of a key route connecting the de facto ISIS
capitals of Raqqa in Syria and Mosul in Iraq.
Further, Iranian-backed forces – including Lebanese Hezbollah and Syrian
President Bashar Assad's army, backed by Russian airstrikes, were able to
break the long-standing ISIS siege of Kweiris airbase to the east of Aleppo
city despite ISIS mobilization calls in Aleppo province to counter the
offensive. On a more general level, internal documents suggest that ISIS is
facing problems of cohesion in its military ranks, as
the General Supervisory Committee issued an amnesty for deserters last
month, whereas the normal ruling for fleeing from battle without
appropriate justification is execution.
The Paris attacks required extensive
planning and procurement predating ISIS's latest setbacks.
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While it certainly is valid to point to these developments as setbacks
for ISIS, they are too ephemeral in nature to tie them to the Paris attacks
in particular. The sophisticated nature of the Paris attacks would have
required planning and procurement of provisions predating ISIS's latest
setbacks. Though it will still take time for more precise details to
emerge, nothing so far definitely shows that the Paris attacks differ
significantly from prior failed plots involving sleeper cells operating in
Europe – including returned foreign fighters in their ranks – with
suspected links to low to mid-level ISIS operatives in Iraq and Syria.
In fact, Abdelhamid Abbaoud, a key figure in the Paris attacks, was openly flaunting his role in establishing cells to
conduct attacks in Europe in an interview with ISIS's magazine Dabiq
in February. If he was assigned a general role by the highest echelons of
ISIS to conduct attacks in Europe, this assignment apparently took place almost a year ago.
Concerns regarding these networks have long been on the radar of Western
intelligence services, and the fact the Paris attacks came to fruition
represents a significant failure in detection more than anything else. The
reason we have come to associate ISIS with lone wolf attacks rather than
well-planned operations is because lone wolf attacks are usually harder to
foresee and easier to carry out.
The fact that the Paris attacks came
to fruition represents a significant failure in detection.
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A similar analysis of the problem of sleeper cell networks applies to
the situation of ISIS in Lebanon. Lebanon is a target for ISIS as it
constitutes a part of the greater al-Sham region over which ISIS claimed
geographical coincidence when it officially declared its expansion beyond
Iraq in April 2013. Indeed, the Dahiyeh suburbs were already the subject of
ISIS-claimed bomb attacks in January 2014. Only the Russian aircraft
downing can be tied to recent developments as ISIS seeks to gain
credibility for fighting back against the Russian intervention in Syria
that has provoked widespread anger among Sunni Muslims.
As for the recent setbacks for ISIS within Iraq and Syria, they do not
represent a decisive shift away from the overall reality of stalemate that
was apparent months ago amid proclamations that ISIS was on the march and
"winning," following the capture of Palmyra and Ramadi. Even now,
ISIS has more recently made advances further west through the Homs desert
with the capture of the town of Muhin from regime forces. In addition,
there are still no effective ground forces to challenge ISIS control of the
most important population centers of Raqqa and Mosul cities, as well as the
majority of Deir az-Zor province and the towns of western Anbar province
and eastern Aleppo province.
ISIS seeks to exploit and reinforce
Muslim vs. non-Muslim divides in Western countries.
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The larger fallacy in viewing the attacks in Paris and elsewhere as a
shift in strategy is the premise that the ISIS state-building project and
the notion of attacking the far enemy are mutually exclusive. In fact, the
latter is meant to complement the former in undermining the ability of
ISIS's enemies to harm its state structure. ISIS hopes to confuse enemy
consensus on what to do about the terrorist group, as many ponder whether
any intervention is justified at all given the risk of retaliatory terror
attacks or fear "mission creep." ISIS hopes to sow division and
discord on the enemies' home fronts. It wants to instill terror in its
enemies and reinforce Muslim versus non-Muslim divides in civilian
populations.
Looking foward to the question of responses to these attacks, it is
tempting to look to the intense French airstrikes launched on Raqqa as the
way forward. However, reports
indicate that no major damage has been inflicted on ISIS military
assets by these strikes as ISIS has learned to keep them out of the sight
of coalition bombing. The U.S. has also decided to go after trucks carrying
oil in ISIS territory in the belief that oil is the key lifeline for ISIS
funding. Such a policy reflects a serious over-estimation of the
contribution of oil to ISIS income, which actually relies far more on
confiscation and taxation.
More airstrikes and tougher talk
will not lead to the defeat of ISIS.
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Worse, the U.S. bombing overlooks the fact that those who transport oil
from ISIS-controlled oil fields are not necessarily affiliated with ISIS.
The end effect instead is likely to be significant humanitarian harm – not
only to civilians in ISIS territory but also those living in rebel-held
areas of Syria, which suffered a major fuel crisis when last cut off from
trucks delivering oil from ISIS-held territory on account of an ISIS-imposed
blockade in the early summer.
In short, one should have no illusions that simply intensifying
airstrikes and more tough talk can lead to the defeat of ISIS. As before,
we must have a realistic view of the true scale of commitment required to
defeat ISIS: namely, an extensive international presence on the ground to
enforce a political settlement acceptable to all major actors and to assist
a massive nation-rebuilding project. Unless international consensus emerges
for such an undertaking, one must not harbor pretenses about destroying
ISIS.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a
research fellow at Middle East Forum's Jihad Intel project.
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