Israel
Sees Short and Long-term Repercussions in Iranian Sanctions Relief
by Yaakov Lappin
Special to IPT News
January 25, 2016
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 Away from the
vociferous disputes that continue to rage around the Iranian nuclear deal,
the Israel's Military Intelligence Directorate and General Staff have been
engaged in detached analysis of the short and long-term effects, and they
have come away with three central conclusions.
Details of their assessments, though shared with defense reporters over
recent months, were publicly presented for the first last week by IDF Chief
of Staff Lt.-Gen. Gadi Eisenkot during a conference in Tel Aviv, organized
by the Institute for National Security Studies.
The most immediate consequence of the nuclear deal will be felt in the
realm of expanding Iranian regional influence, and the looming increase in
the trafficking of weapons and funds to terror organizations, made possible
by sanctions relief.
Iran now sends Hizballah between $800 million to $1 billion every year,
according to Israel Defense Forces (IDF) assessments. There is every reason
to expect Hizballah's funding to significantly increase in the next two
years, as Iran stands to earn many billions of dollars in oil and gas
sales, and receives access to $100 billion in previously frozen assets.
Iran sends Hamas in the Gaza Strip tens of millions of dollars per year,
instructs it on how to mass produce rockets, and tries to smuggle weapons
into Gaza. Iran's budget for Hamas will grow, too.
Additionally, the Iranian military industry, already considered to be an
advanced stage of development by Israel, will receive much more investment,
allowing Iran to design and produce more accurate missiles, rockets,
drones, and other types of weaponry that it can then traffic to its
regional proxies through its Revolutionary Guard-Quds Force (IRGC)
networks, or point at Israel directly from Iranian missile bases.
IRGC-Quds Force activities in Syria, where Iran oversees and
participates in battles to save its ally, the Assad regime (Iran has lost
between 300 to 400 of its security forces in Syria's battles), and seeks to
convert its presence on the Syrian Golan into terrorist bases against
Israel, can also be expected to be expand.
"The assessment is that as the economic situation in Iran improves,
bigger assets will be diverted [to these things]," Eisenkot said Jan.
18.
Regarding the Iranian nuclear program itself, the military divides its
view between the short and long-term.
Since the end of 2005, Iran topped the list of strategic threats to
Israel due to its military nuclear program. With Iran inching toward
nuclear breakout capabilities, the IDF had to be ready to respond to any
potential imminent developments.
The nuclear deal changes that situation, at least for the next five
years. Although Israel will make every effort to monitor and scrutinize
Iran's activities, the expectation within the defense establishment is that
the risk of an imminent Iranian breakout to the bomb has substantially
decreased for the next few years.
The thinking in Israel's military establishment is that the Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Khamenei has not forfeited his ambition to build nuclear
weapons. Far from it. He has, however, taken a tactical 'pause' to achieve
sanctions relief and assure the future of his regime.
After the five-year mark passes, the next decade carries increased risks
of Iran secretly developing nuclear weapons.
Alternatively, Iran can wait out the agreement's sunset clause, and
reactivate its nuclear program in 10 to 15 years, after it has amassed far
greater regional influence, military capabilities, wealth, and
international legitimacy.
This is one reason why Eisenkot has said that whoever is in his position
a decade from now will face significantly more complex challenges. Iran
then will be a significantly more formidable enemy than it is today.
In the meantime, Iran will continue its proxy war against Israel, and
Hizballah armed with over 100,000 surface to surface rockets and missiles,
will work with Iran to make some of those projectiles accurate,
satellite-guided threats, which it can try to direct against strategic
sites in Israel.
Israel, for its part, is developing an advanced multi-layer rocket and
missile defense system to counter this.
Despite its heavy losses in Syria's civil war, Hizballah's home turf of
Lebanon remains the base of the most formidable conventional military
threat facing Israel today.
Hizballah has built rocket launchers into civilian homes in 240 Shi'ite
villages and towns across southern Lebanon, set up underground command and
control bunkers, and built rings of protection around them.
One out of every 10 homes in Lebanon has been turned into a hidden
Hizballah rocket launcher, with roofs that open specially for the launch. A
decade ago, Hizballah had just 10 percent of its current number of
projectiles.
Meanwhile, Hizballah, which has been operating under direct Iranian command
since the 2006 Second Lebanon War, is seeking to become a Shi'ite hegemonic
force in Lebanon.
It remains deterred by Israel's overwhelming firepower, its wish to
avoid opening a second front, and its awareness of Israel's deep
intelligence penetration into the organization.
But Hizballah is gaining valuable experience in operating ground forces
in Syria, and that experience will be brought to bear in cross-border raids
against Israel in any future clash.
None of these developments can be separated from the Iran nuclear deal.
The more powerful and influential Iran becomes, the more confident, daring,
and wealthy Hizballah will be, and the bigger its stockpiles of projectiles
(already one of the largest in the world) will become.
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