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Islamic
State Defeat in Kobani Will Be Hard to Replicate
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Originally published under the title, "A major victory –
but hard to replicate."
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A
Syrian Kurd flashes the V for victory sign during a celebration rally
on January 27.
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The near-complete liberation of the Syrian Kurdish town of Kobani this
week from Islamic State (IS) forces is a remarkable testimony to the
tenacity and courage of the Kurdish resistance on the ground. It also
showcases the awesome efficacy of US air power, when given a clear
mission and properly directed.
It is nevertheless necessary to qualify some of the more hyperbolic
reactions to the announcement of the IS retreat. The relief of Kobani in
no way constitutes a general rout for the IS forces; neither does it
signal a "beginning of the end" for the movement and its
quasi-sovereign entity.
Indeed, the expulsion of the jihadists from the town does not even
conclude the task facing the Kurdish fighters in the immediate vicinity
of Kobani, nor does it offer any general lessons regarding the possible
efficacy of Western support for armed groups in Syria or Iraq.
The relief of Kobani in no way
constitutes a general rout for IS, nor does it signal a 'beginning of
the end' for the movement.
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The defeat does constitute one of a series of significant setbacks
that IS has suffered in recent days. All of these were at the outer
reaches of its advance: Iraqi government forces and Shi'ite militias, for
example, took Diyala province; the Kurdish Peshmerga is conquering ground
outside Mosul.
Still, the "heartland" of the jihadi entity in Syria's Raqqa
province, and the greater part of its conquests in Iraq of last June are
not yet under threat.
Regarding the specific issue of Kobani, the town came close to falling
in early October of last year; the fighters of the YPG (People's
Protection Units) appeared to be preparing for a last stand.
Civilians were long gone from Kobani, but the YPG also sent out all
personnel not essential for the fighting, and all journalists.
The assumption was that IS would surround the town from the north, and
the Kurds would then fight to the death – street by street – until the
inevitable conclusion.
That this did not happen is attributable, in the first instance, to
the commencement of US and allied air attacks on IS forces massing around
Kobani. These began in mid-October and have formed by far the most
intense aspect of the Western air campaign against the terror movement to
date.
Gen. John Allen, the retired US officer responsible for coordinating
the campaign, was initially circumspect about the goal of the air
strikes, describing them as a "humanitarian" effort intended to
buy time for the defenders to reorganize on the ground.
The reinforcement of lightly armed
YPG fighters with the artillery and mortar capability of Iraqi Kurdish
fighters in late October helped stiffen the resistance to IS forces.
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As the weeks passed, however, it became clear that a strategic
decision that Kobani should not fall had been taken. Evidently, the
intention was to crush IS gunmen between the hammer of US air power and
the anvil of ongoing stubborn Kurdish resistance; in so doing, a symbol
of resistance would be created.
This appears to have paid off. The reinforcement of the very
determined but lightly armed YPG fighters with the artillery and mortar
capability of the Iraqi Kurdish Peshmerga fighters who entered Kobani in
late October certainly played a role in stiffening the resistance on the
ground. Yet the raw courage of the YPG deserves top billing in this
regard.
As a result of the Kurdish stand on the ground, the US was able to
take a great cull of IS fighters. The jihadists' assault tactics are
simple (though often effective), and involve human wave attacks. The US
was able to observe the jihadists massing for such attacks on Kobani, and
to target them from the air; IS found no effective response to this.
With regard to the movement's armored capacity, the situation was the
same; the tanks were visible from the air and IS continues to have no
effective defense for them. Hence, the very heavy losses suffered by the
jihadists in trying to take Kobani.
Yet the victory is only partial. It is important to remember that
Kurdish-controlled Kobani, prior to the IS assault in September, did not
consist of Kobani city alone. Rather, "Kobani" constituted an
area stretching from Kobani city to Tel Abyad in the east and Jarabulus
in the west, plus several tens of kilometers in a southern direction
toward the Euphrates. It was this enclave which IS sought to destroy last
autumn, because the enclave jutted into northern Syria and prevented the
Islamists from rapidly moving forces from east to west. It stood in the
way of any future ambition to expand IS territory westward into Aleppo
and Idlib provinces – so Kobani had to be destroyed.
The larger task of reconquering
the 300 villages and the ground that once was a part of the Kobani
enclave remains before the Kurds.
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As of now, the Kurds and their allies have succeeded in saving the
city of Kobani, very close to the border with Turkey. This area became a
symbol, and IS wasted over 1,000 of its fighters trying unsuccessfully to
capture it. But the larger task of reconquering the 300 villages and the
ground that once was a part of the Kobani enclave remains before the
Kurds. One may assume that this effort will be under way in the weeks
ahead. Regarding the larger lessons of the Kobani victory, it would be
mistaken to jump to the conclusion that it illustrates that in providing
support to anti-IS forces on the ground, the West has discovered a
winning formula which can now be replicated elsewhere. This would be a
rash deduction because of the specific nature of the Kurdish fighting
organizations – YPG and Peshmerga.
In Syria, as in Iraq, the Kurds have developed organizations which are
pro-Western in orientation, committed to the mission and efficient. The
problem with the Syrian rebels, as with the Iraqi militias and forces, is
that they cannot manage all three of these. If they are committed and
effective fighters (like Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria or the Shi'ite militias
in Iraq), they will be anti-Western. If they are pro-Western, at least
nominally – like the Iraqi-armed forces or the Syrian Revolutionaries
Front in northern Syria – they will tend to be corrupt or ineffective.
The reasons for this are manifold and open to debate, but it is a
clearly observably empirical reality.
This means that while the West should double down on its support for
the reliable, secular and anti-Islamist Kurdish forces, now controlling a
long belt of territory stretching from the Iraq-Iran border to deep into
Syria, Western policy-makers should be wary indeed of applying any
general conclusions from the achievement in Kobani to forces other than
the Kurds themselves.
Jonathan Spyer is a senior research
fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center,
and a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the
Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).
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