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Dispatch
from Iraq: the Stealth Iranian Takeover Becomes Clear
by Jonathan Spyer
PJ Media
July 31, 2015
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Originally published under the title, "On the Ground in
Iraq, the Stealth Iranian Takeover Becomes Clear."
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A
Shi'a militia billboard in Baghdad
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In late June, I traveled to Iraq with the purpose of investigating the
role being played by the Iranian-supported Shia militias in that country.
Close observation of the militias, their activities, and their links
to Tehran is invaluable in understanding what is likely to happen in the
Middle East following the conclusion of the nuclear agreement between the
P5 + 1 powers and Tehran.
An Iranian stealth takeover of Iraq is currently under way. Tehran's
actions in Iraq lay bare the nature of Iranian regional strategy. They
show that Iran has no peers at present in the promotion of a very 21st
century way of war, which combines the recruitment and manipulation of
sectarian loyalties; the establishment and patient sponsoring of
political and paramilitary front groups; and the engagement of these
groups in irregular and clandestine warfare, all in tune with an Iran-led
agenda.
Power in Baghdad today is
effectively held by a gathering of Shia militias.
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With the conclusion of the nuclear deal, and thanks to the cash about
to flow into Iranian coffers, the stage is now set for an exponential
increase in the scale and effect of these activities across the region.
So what is going on in Iraq, and what may be learned from it?
Shia militias are essentially the
sole force standing between ISIS and Baghdad.
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Power in Baghdad today is effectively held by a gathering of Shia
militias known as the Hashed al-Shaabi (Popular Mobilization). This
initiative brings together tens of armed groups, including some very
small and newly formed ones. However, its main components ought to be
familiar to Americans who remember the Iraqi Shia insurgency against the
U.S. in the middle of the last decade. They are: the Badr Organization,
the Asaib Ahl al-Haq, the Kataeb Hizballah, and the Sarayat al-Salam
(which is the new name for the Mahdi Army of Muqtada al-Sadr).
All of these are militias of long-standing. All of them are openly
pro-Iranian in nature. All of them have their own well-documented links
to the Iranian government and to the Revolutionary Guards Corps.
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Shia
militiamen are becoming a fixture of daily life in the Iraqi capital.
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The Hashed al-Shaabi was founded on June 15, 2014, following a fatwa
by venerated Iraqi Shia cleric Ali al-Sistani a day earlier. Sistani
called for a limited jihad at a time when the forces of ISIS were
juggernauting toward Baghdad. The militias came together, under the
auspices of Quds Force kingpin Qassem Suleimani and his Iraqi right-hand
man Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis.
Because of the parlous performance of the Iraqi Army, the Shia
militias have become in effect the sole force standing between ISIS and
the Iraqi capital.
Therein lies the source of their strength. Political power grows, as
another master strategist of irregular warfare taught, from the barrel of
a gun. In the case of Iraq, no instrument exists in the hands of the
elected government to oppose the will of the militias. The militias,
meanwhile, in their political iteration, are also part of the government.
In the course of my visit, I travelled deep into Anbar Province with
fighters of the Kataeb Hizballah, reaching just eight miles from Ramadi
City. I also went to Baiji, the key front to the capital's north,
accompanying fighters from the Badr Corps.
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Asaib
Ahl al-Haq fighters operating in Baiji in June
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In all areas, I observed close cooperation between the militias, the
army, and the federal police. The latter are essentially under the
control of the militias. Mohammed Ghabban, of Badr, is the interior
minister. The Interior Ministry controls the police. Badr's leader, Hadi al-Ameri,
serves as the transport minister.
In theory, the Hashd al-Shaabi committee answers to Iraqi Prime
Minister Haider al Abadi. In practice, no one views the committee as
playing anything other than a liaison role. The real decision-making
structure for the militias' alliance goes through Abu Mahdi al Muhandis
and Hadi al-Ameri, to Qassem Suleimani, and directly on to Supreme Leader
Ali Khamenei.
No one in Iraq imagines that any of these men are taking orders from
Abadi, who has no armed force of his own, whose political party (Dawa)
remains dominated by former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his
associates, and whose government is dependent on the military protection
of the Shia militias and their political support. When I interviewed
al-Muhandis in Baiji, he was quite open regarding the source of the
militias' strength: "We rely on capacity and capabilities provided
by the Islamic Republic of Iran."
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Iraqi
militia leader Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis (right) with Iranian Quds Force
commander Qassem Suleimani
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The genius of the Iranian method is that it is not possible to locate
a precise point where the Iranian influence ends and the
"government" begins. Everything is entwined. This pro-Iranian
military and political activity depends at ground level on the successful
employment and manipulation of religious fervor. This is what makes the
Hashed fighters able to stand against the rival jihadis of ISIS. Says
Major General Juma'a Enad, operational commander in Salah al-Din
Province: "The Hashed strong point is the spiritual side, the jihad
fatwa. Like ISIS."
So this is Tehran's formula. The possession of a powerful state body
(the IRGC's Quds Force) whose sole raison d'etre is the creation
and sponsorship of local political-military organizations to serve the
Iranian interest. The existence of a population in a given country
available for indoctrination and mobilization. The creation of proxy
bodies and the subsequent shepherding of them to both political and
military influence, with each element complementing the other. And
finally, the reaping of the benefit of all this in terms of power and
influence.
This formula has at the present time brought Iran domination of
Lebanon and large parts of Syria, Iraq, and Yemen. Current events in Iraq
form a perfect study of the application of this method, and the results
it can bring. Is Iran likely to change this winning formula as a result
of the sudden provision of increased monies resulting from the nuclear
deal? This is certainly the hope of the authors of the agreement. It is
hard to see on what it is based.
The deal itself proves that Iran can continue to push down this road
while paying only a minor price, so why change? Expect further
manifestations of the Tehran formula in the Middle East in the period
ahead.
Jonathan Spyer, a fellow at the
Middle East Forum, is director of the Rubin Center for Research in
International Affairs and author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the
Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).
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