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Al
Nusra Atrocities against Syrian Druze Belie Its Rebranding
by Daveed Gartenstein-Ross
and Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi
Foreign Affairs
October 5, 2015
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Originally published under the title "Druze Clues: Al
Nusra's Rebranding and What It Means for Syria."
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Syria's
Druze community has borne the brunt of Al Nusra sectarian killings and
forced conversions.
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The market for extremism has been so disrupted by the self-proclaimed
Islamic State (also known as ISIS) and its penchant for extraordinary
brutality that even a group as notorious as al
Qaeda is now able to reposition—or, one might say, rebrand—itself.
In Syria, al Qaeda has tried to paint itself as a more reasonable
jihadist force with which other rebels on the ground and outside states
can cooperate.
One indication of al Qaeda's success in this regard is that its Syrian
affiliate group, Jabhat al Nusra, now openly receives financial and
other material support from major U.S. allies, an arrangement that would
have been unthinkable four years ago. Al Nusra plays a critical role in
Jaysh al Fatah, the rebel coalition fighting against Syrian leader Bashar
al-Assad in northern Syria. Jaysh al Fatah, in turn, is backed by Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and Turkey. (The United States and other Western countries
are more suspicious of the coalition and find regional powers' decisions
to back it alarming,
but they have not gone out of their way to end the support.) Despite the
more reasonable face that al Nusra has tried to show the world, its treatment
of the Druze of Idlib province is little better than the brutality ISIS has inflicted on Yezidis, Kurds, and other
minorities unfortunate enough to find themselves within their reach.
Al Nusra's treatment of Syrian
Druze rivals the brutality ISIS has inflicted on Yezidis, Kurds, and
other minorities.
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There are several reasons al Nusra has been able to curry favor with
regional governments despite its treatment of minority groups. For one, Sunni states' competition with Iran looms as their
greatest concern, leading them to support an organization that has been
effective at weakening the Iran-allied Assad regime even if its behavior
is otherwise concerning. In addition, whereas ISIS is eager to fight every actor and state that
falls short of its extreme ideals, al Nusra has skillfully integrated
itself into the anti-Assad forces, making it appear as a more organic
part of the landscape. Further, even if al Nusra doesn't do the right
things with respect to protecting minorities, it is at least willing to
say some of the right things, in contrast to ISIS' open brutality.
Finally, whereas ISIS has embarked on a campaign of mass slaughter and
brutality against religious minorities, al Nusra has instead favored
reeducation and forced conversion. But the group's endgame is the same:
to extinguish disfavored religious minorities (those who are not eligible
for the status of dhimmis, or protected—albeit subjugated—minority
groups).
Going
Mainstream
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Al
Jazeera broadcast a fawning interview with Al Nusra emir Abu Muhammad
al-Julani in May 2015.
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As early as July 2014, al Qaeda emir Ayman
al-Zawahiri issued a directive to Abu Muhammad al-Julani, al Nusra's
emir, ordering him to improve
its ties with the Syrian population and other rebel factions. These
decrees codified, to some extent, al Nusra's preexisting strategy of
collaboration with other Syrian rebel groups and ingratiating itself with
the Syrian population rather than dominating it.
The group's implementation of sharia law has been relatively gradual
in the areas that it has come to control, and al Nusra's preference for
fighting with partners and as part of coalitions is designed to ease
locals' fears about their intentions. For example, in March 2015, al
Nusra and several other prominent rebel groups, including the hard-line
Salafi organization Ahrar al Sham, formed the Jaysh al Fatah coalition.
The group's preference for working with coalition partners and its
behavior following its victories are designed to signal that al Nusra is
open to sharing power with other organizations. After Jaysh al Fatah
captured Idlib city, Julani stated
that al Nusra would not "strive to rule the city or to monopolize it
without others." This approach allowed al Nusra to amass
considerable public support, even though there were a few periods in
which it got caught up in infighting with other rebels.
Al Nusra has worked to ingratiate
itself into the Syrian opposition and appear more moderate to an
international audience.
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Since Zawahiri's last decree earlier this year, al Nusra has worked to
further ingratiate itself into the Syrian opposition while
making itself appear more moderate to an international audience. In March
2015, the Qatari channel Al Jazeera aired an interview
with Abu Sulayman al-Muhajir, an Australian cleric who is also one of
the organization's top religious officials. Muhajir compared al Nusra to
ISIS, stating that his organization's primary goal was to topple Assad
and to "restore the right of the Muslim people to choose their
leaders independently." Al Jazeera also conducted a rather fawning
interview with Julani, who also asserted that al Nusra's sole goal was to
topple the Assad regime. The interview created the impression that al
Nusra was willing to protect religious minorities; Julani promised
that his fighters would target neither the Druze nor the Alawite
(although he did say that the Alawite would have to renounce elements of
their faith that contradicted Islam, which Al Jazeera's English-language
reporting omitted).
Besides the Al Jazeera interviews, most of al Nusra's efforts to take
itself into the mainstream have been on the ground in Syria, through its
cooperation with other rebel groups. Keen
observers of the Syrian conflict have recognized the effort to legitimize al Nusra within
the Syrian opposition. "The slow 'mainstreaming' of Jabhat al Nusra
thanks in no small part to Al Jazeera will haunt Syria and its people for
a long time," said Emile Hokayem, Senior Fellow for Middle East
Security at International Institute for Strategic Studies, via Twitter.
The Lebanon-based anti-Assad Druze politician Walid Jumblatt has been one of al
Nusra's most visible supporters, frequently telling the media that they
should not
be seen as terrorists.
ISIS itself has even helped to foster the view that al Nusra is a more
moderate group that would protect religious minorities; in the tenth
issue of Dabiq, ISIS' English-language magazine, it
published a withering attack on the organization. A generic photo of the
Druze in Dabiq was captioned "The wretched Druze, an apostate
sect under the protection of the Julani front." It was followed by a
lengthy screed about how the Druze and other "apostate" sects
cannot be afforded the second-class dhimmi status given to Jews
and Christians. Dabiq likewise took al Nusra's apology for a June 2015 massacre in one of
the Druze villages in Idlib as indicative of the group's protection of
the sect. "So according to the Julani front and their allies,
spilling the blood of the apostate and treacherous Druze is
oppression!" the publication thundered. Al Nusra has not directly
responded to ISIS' attack on its policies toward the Druze.
It might appear that al Nusra straddles two identities: one is a rebel
group fighting the Assad regime in Syria, and the other is an al Qaeda
affiliate and a proponent of religious extremism. But there is, in
reality, more harmony between these two priorities than might initially
be evident. Ever since the defeat of al Qaeda in Iraq (the affiliate that
would later become ISIS), top al Qaeda commanders have explored how to
repair the organization's reputation. They appear to have settled for
trying to be seen as fulfilling the aspirations of various local groups.
In a letter from an unknown al Qaeda official to the affiliate
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, the official criticized al Qaeda
in Iraq for killing tribesmen and inciting a rebellion and stressed the
importance of gaining public support, noting that "people's support
to the mujahidin is as important as the water for fish." In a May
2010 letter, former al Qaeda leader Osama
bin Laden himself proposed commencing a "new phase" in al
Qaeda's operations that would "regain the trust of a large
portion of those who had lost their trust in the Mujahidin." He
emphasized minimizing Muslim casualties and directing affiliates to exert
caution when civilians could be harmed, and he also urged a new media
strategy.
ISIS' unchecked atrocities make al
Nusra and al Qaeda appear more reasonable.
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As the Arab Spring brought sweeping changes to the Middle East and
North Africa, al Qaeda has been able to put their plan to rebrand into
action. In September 2013, Zawahiri released a document entitled "General
Guidelines for Jihad" that made public al Qaeda's new,
population-centric approach. Zawahiri instructed affiliates to minimize
violent conflict with Shiites and non-Muslims in order to prevent local
uprisings and to abstain from attacks that could result in Muslim civilian
casualties. And though ISIS' rise has been a disaster for al Qaeda in
many respects, al Qaeda's rebranding campaign has benefited from the new
group's emergence because ISIS' unchecked atrocities make al Qaeda appear
more reasonable.
In other words, rather than trying to carry out two incompatible
missions, al Nusra's activities in Syria fundamentally advance al Qaeda's
long-standing desire to be seen in a new light. Indeed, today Syria is
perhaps the foremost testing ground for al Qaeda's rebranding strategy.
Old Wine in
New Bottles
But despite al Nusra's softened image, its brutality toward the Druze
is clear. The Druze in Idlib inhabit a region known as Jabal al-Summaq,
over which al Nusra gained control in the summer of 2014. Al Nusra's emir
for the area, Abu Abd al-Rahman al-Tunisi, forced the Druze to issue a
statement from representatives of the various villages agreeing to renounce their religion. This was the second such
statement that the Druze were compelled to issue, with the first coming
when ISIS had control over Jabal al-Summaq. In the statement, the Druze
agreed to allow their shrines to be leveled, to abide by al Nusra's
regulations on public morality, and to submit to lessons on Islamic
doctrine and jurisprudence.
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Some
of the Druze villagers slaughtered by al Nusra on June 10, 2015 in the
village of Qalb Lawze.
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In June, al Nusra militants slaughtered
20 Druze villagers in the Idlib village of Qalb Lawze. The incident
received plenty of media attention, and al Nusra issued
an apology—but nowhere does the statement refer to the Druze. Indeed,
al Nusra's public rhetoric suggests that it views the process of coerced
conversion codified in the Druze leaders' public renunciation as a fait
accompli. The statement of apology affirms that "since the
beginning of the conflict in the land of Sham, [Jabhat al Nusra] has not
directed its weapons against anyone except those gangs from the criminal Nusayri
army, deviant Khawarij, and corrupt factions, who transgressed and
assaulted the lives and honor of the Muslims." Nusayri is a
derogatory term for Alawites, in this context referring to Assad's
Alawite-dominated army. Khawarij, originally meaning a sect in
early Islamic history notorious for its extremism, is now a standard
Sunni rebel term for ISIS. From al Nusra's perspective, this language,
which does not mention the Druze sect at all, makes sense: the Druze of
Jabal al-Summaq, after undergoing two separate renunciations of their
faith, are no longer Druze in their view. The coerced renunciations of
their faith have made them Sunnis.
Following the massacre, al Nusra appointed a new emir for the area,
Abu Qatada al-Iraqi (not to be confused with ISIS'
emir in Mosul). Iraqi began his term by delivering a speech at a
mosque in Kaftin. In a recording of the speech, he does not mention the June
massacre at all but focuses instead on what is seen as the real problem:
lack of proper observance of sharia. Although this is a common complaint
by jihadists attempting to force citizens to conform to hard-line
religious law, the problem may be particularly acute in Jabal al-Summaq
because the Druze had been compelled to "convert" to begin
with.
Al Nusra's atrocities against
Syrian Druze belie its efforts to portray itself as more moderate.
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"In the area recently there has been some neglect in the realm of
sharia dress," said Iraqi. He vowed that "if we see any woman
displaying her adornment and unveiled, we will detain her husband, but if
she is not married, we will detain her siblings or father. . . All must
embrace sharia dress." He also called on locals to refrain from shirk
(idolatrous practices) and observe the closure of shops during prayer
time. For any inquiries on adherence to sharia, Iraqi said locals could
consult him in his base in "Qalb al-Islam, Qalb Lawze
previously." (The Islamized renaming of Qalb Lawze mentioned in
Iraqi's speech comes amid demographic shifts, with an influx of Syrian
Turkmen into the village.)
Although al Nusra has been attempting to portray itself as a more
moderate jihadist group, its treatment of the Druze belies these efforts.
Although al Nusra is capable of appearing moderate in comparison with
ISIS, the latter group is a particularly poor point of comparison.
Unfortunately, al Nusra's mistreatment of the Druze and other
religious minorities is unlikely to undermine its rebranding campaign or
the efforts of the broader al Qaeda organization to reposition itself.
Indeed, al Qaeda's rebranding may be an issue that observers wake up to
only after they have lost the ability to stop it and are left dealing
with a world where the jihadist organization has far more ability to
operate than it did before the Arab Spring. Yet al Nusra's determination
to stamp out non-dhimmi religious minorities in Syria demonstrates
that al Qaeda's intentions remain unchanged, even if the group is making
its tactics more palatable to the masses.
Daveed Gartenstein-Ross is a
Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, CEO of the
consulting firm Valens Global, and an adjunct assistant professor at
Georgetown University. Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a research fellow at
Middle East Forum's Jihad Intel
project.
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