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Russia in
Syria: Putin Fills Strategic Vacuum in the Middle East
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On Wednesday, Russian aircraft carried out the first bombings of rebel
positions in Syria. The operation was not a surprise. It was the latest,
most dramatic episode in a significant increase in Russian support for the
beleaguered regime of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad that has been under
way since the beginning of last month.
This sharp increase in Moscow's aid to Assad has brought the marines of
Russia's 810th Independent Naval Infantry Brigade to the port of Latakia,
Syria's principal port city.
At least 500 of these elite troops are assembled close to the Russian
naval depot at Tartus, on Syria's west coast, having arrived from their
base with the Black Sea fleet in Sevastopol, on the disputed Crimean
Peninsula, in the past month.
Moscow is sending hardware as well as troops: 28 combat aircraft at the
last count — four Sukhoi Su-30 fighters, 12 Su-25 strike aircraft, 12 Su-24
attack fighters — along with numerous attack helicopters, seven state-of-the-art
T-90 tanks, surface-to-air missile systems and advanced artillery.
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Satellite
imagery published by IHS Jane's Intelligence Review shows
infrastructure development and newly paved surfaces at the Istamo weapons
storage complex.
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Infrastructure work is under way, too. The focus is on the Bassel
al-Assad air base outside Latakia city. But the naval depot at Tartus is
also being expanded.
Satellite imagery recently published by IHS Jane's Intelligence
Review (in an article co-written by this reporter) shows additional
infrastructure development at the Istamo weapons storage complex near
al-Sanobar, also in Latakia province. Newly paved surfaces at Istamo were
apparent. Temporary housing for up to 2000 personnel, of a type used by the
Russians, also was visible near al-Sanobar.
Russian intervention in Syria
represents a strategic move of wide import and profound implications.
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All this represents a strategic move by President Vladimir Putin, of
wide import and profound implications. The Assad regime is a longstanding
ally of Moscow. This alliance goes back to the 1960s, when radical and
pro-Soviet Arab nationalists first took power in Damascus. Putin has been
backing the regime in its war with the rebellion against it since 2011.
Russia's help has already proved invaluable. Moscow's veto power at the
UN Security Council made sure that no coordinated international action
against the regime could take place in the early, optimistic days of the
uprising. The continued supply of Russian weapons made sure that Assad's
armouries remained well-stocked.
Nevertheless, the present move is of an unprecedented scale. So why is
it happening, why now, and what is Moscow seeking?
Saving an
eroding regime
The most immediate reason for the sharp increase in Russian assistance
to the Assad regime is that the dictator has been losing ground to the rebellion
in recent months. Worse, from Moscow's point of view, the rebels' gains
were bringing them close to the parts of Syria whose retention by the
regime is essential for Russia.
Pro-regime forces have been losing
ground to the rebellion in recent months.
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Assad's main problem, throughout the civil war, has been the shortage of
men willing to take a bullet for him. This shortage of manpower was a
product of the regime's narrow support base. The Alawi sect, to which the
Assads belong, comprises only about 12 per cent of the population of Syria.
The rebellion, meanwhile, was based among the country's Sunni Arabs,
comprising about 60 per cent of the population. (Kurds, Christians, Druze
and Shia make up the bulk of the remainder.)
The increasingly Islamist rebellion found its ranks further strengthened
by foreign volunteers. Assad had no similar line of support from young
ideologues committed to his cause. But he did have assets and a strategy.
His main asset was the loyalty of his allies. In contrast to Western
countries that ostensibly supported the rebellion but did little
practically, Assad's Russian and Iranian allies did all in their power —
diplomatically, politically and militarily — to keep their client in his
seat.
The Iranians mobilised regional assets, including the capable Hezbollah
militia in Lebanon, to join the fight and lessen the manpower problem. The
Russians were there with weapons and diplomatic backing.
In terms of strategy, the dictator sought to lessen the problem of
manpower by retreating from all areas not considered vital. The result of
this strategy has been the emergence of the de facto partitioned Syria of
today. Assad effectively has ceded huge swathes of eastern, northern and
southern Syria to his enemies.
Today, Islamic State controls most of eastern Syria. The Kurdish PYD
(Democratic Union Party) rules a large area in the northeast and a smaller
enclave in the far northwest. Islamist rebels, including Jabhat al-Nusra,
also known as al-Nusra Front, the local franchise of al-Qai'da, rule a
swathe of the northwest. Western-backed rebels and al-Nusra control
Quneitra province adjoining the Golan Heights and much of Dera'a province
south of Damascus.
The erosion of regime enclaves was
in danger of reaching a point where Assad's survival is longer viable.
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The regime still holds Damascus, the western coastal area and the line
of cities to the capital's north (Homs, Hama and part of contested Aleppo).
The problem with the regime's strategy of retreat and consolidation is
that it can be carried only so far. At a certain point, the erosion of the
regime enclave will reach a point that makes Assad's survival no longer
viable. In recent months it has looked as if Assad was in danger of
reaching this point. This is the immediate precipitating reason for the
increased Russian intervention.
A new, more effective rebel coalition called the Jaysh al-Fatah (Army of
Conquest) declared its foundation on March 24. Backed by Qatar, Turkey and
Saudi Arabia, this alliance achieved a string of battlefield successes
against the regime in the vital northwest of the country this past northern
spring and summer.
On April 25, this force took the strategic town of Jisr al-Shughur. This
raised the possibility for the rebellion of moving the frontline into the
populated areas of Latakia province. This would have brought the rebellion
close to the Mediterranean, including to Russia's naval depot at Tartus. It
also would have called into question Assad's ability to defend any of the
remaining areas under his control.
This had to be stopped. The Russian deployment is part of a concerted
effort to stop it. Moscow is set to shore up the regime's crumbling
defences.
In his speech at the UN General Assembly this week, Putin spoke of
Assad's armed forces as those who were fighting "terrorism face to
face". But it should be understood that the immediate danger to
Assad's regime in Syria's west is represented not by Islamic State but by
the rebel Jaysh al-Fatah coalition. Since Russia's goal is the preservation
of the regime, Moscow's efforts to protect Assad are set to be directed
against the Syrian rebels rather than Islamic State, whose main forces are
located farther east. This was reflected in the choice of targets in the
bombing raids on Wednesday.
So Russia's intervention represents a sharp increase in the dimensions
of a longstanding policy rather than a radically new departure for Moscow.
Putin's intention throughout has been to demonstrate the value of alliance
with Moscow by showing how he protects his friends (and, while he's doing
it, to hold and expand Moscow's only naval base outside of the former
Soviet Union).
How far will
Putin go?
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According
to Kremlin chief of staff Sergey Ivanov, the goal of the Russian
deployment is "strictly to provide air support for the government
forces in their fight against Islamic State."
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According to Sergey Ivanov, head of Russia's presidential
administration, the goal of the Russian deployment is "strictly to
provide air support for the (Syrian) government forces in their fight
against Islamic State."
Putin undoubtedly is concerned about Islamic State's rise and what its
proliferation could mean for the restive Caucasus region and central Asia.
One of Islamic State's main military commanders, Abu Omar al-Shishani, is
of Chechen-Georgian origin, and volunteers from the Caucasus are among the
most brutal of the jihadi fighters in Syria.
But the deployment of the Russian forces in Syria indicates beyond doubt
that the main concern of the Russians is to defend Assad against the
rebels. The proclamations against Islamic State are a feint to add moral
authority to the defence of the dictator.
In so far as Islamic State represents a threat to Assad, it does so in
the Damascus area and in the Homs province. Islamic State forces are
pushing across the desert, past Palmyra, nudging against Homs province and
in some parts of Damascus, including Qadam and the Yarmouk camp.
But the Russians are not deploying in any strength in this area. Their
deployment is on the western coast, a considerable distance from Islamic State
but close to the lines of Jaysh al-Fatah (and taking in Russia's naval
assets in Tartus). The Russians have begun flights of Pchela-1t unmanned
reconnaissance vehicles out of Latakia. These UAVs are conducting patrols
over rebel-held territory to the immediate east of Latakia, not over
Islamic State-held areas.
Given the scale of the deployment, there are no indications that Russia
is set to take part in a major campaign to reconquer areas lost to the
Assad regime. Rather, as it appears, the Russian intention is to prevent
the rebels from pushing further into regime-held areas.
This will enable Moscow to preserve its assets in western Syria (it has
little interest in or need for land farther east). No less important, it
will enable the Russians to keep the Syrian war going.
Putin sees the eastern Mediterranean as the back yard of the West. In
strategic terms, maintaining assets in an ongoing conflict in the West's
back yard is a natural goal as a means to offset the West's holding of
assets in Russia's back yard: the former states of the western Soviet
Union, most importantly Ukraine. So Russia's determination to keep Assad in
the game has a logic far beyond Syria. But almost certainly it does not
include the costly and probably unachievable goal of winning complete
victory for Assad.
The bear is
back
The intervention is the latest bold move by a Russian President who
perceives a strategic vacuum in the eastern Mediterranean, deriving from
the US desire to avoid major commitments in the area. The failure to act
following the regime's use of chemical weapons in 2013 and half-hearted
efforts by Western countries on behalf of the rebels reflect this Western
determination to stay out as much as possible. In such a situation, Putin
is likely to have calculated that a firm move on his part on the regime's
behalf in Syria would be without negative international consequence for
Russia.
Framing the intervention in terms of the joint opposition to Islamic
State would further contribute to lessening any chance of Western
objection. As of now, this assessment seems to have paid off. The West
appears to be backing off from its previously stated goal of demanding
Assad's departure. The result of Putin's move and Western acquiescence to
it is to introduce a new and powerful strategic player into the Middle
East.
Russia appears to be making additional moves to consolidate its
cooperation with other forces aligned with Syria. This week, Iraq announced
an agreement with Moscow for sharing intelligence on Islamic State.
Supporters of the so-called resistance axis in the region (which includes
Iran, Iraq, Assad's Syria, Hezbollah and Palestinian Islamic Jihad) are
depicting the Russian intervention as part of a larger process in which
Moscow is concluding an overall alliance with this axis. One of these,
Ibrahim al-Amin, editor of pro-Hezbollah newspaper al-Akhbar , has
named the new alliance as the 4+1 bloc (Russia, Iran, Iraq, Syria plus
Hezbollah).
Russia has returned as a determined
player in the Middle East for the first time since the collapse of the
USSR.
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Moscow certainly would deny the establishment of any such alliance. And
it is notable that Russian diplomacy in the region has included an attempt
to keep channels of communication and cooperation open with the enemies of
Iran and Assad, including Israel and Saudi Arabia.
The precise contours and implications of Putin's intervention into Syria
are not yet clear. Russia's economy is weak and this may well prevent
Moscow doing much more than keeping its allies in the game. But what may be
asserted with certainty is that Russia has returned as a determined and
visible player on the ground in the Middle East for the first time since
the collapse of the Soviet Union.
Moscow looks poised to call the next round of shots in the contiguous
area that once comprised the now collapsed states of Iraq and Syria. This
represents a new strategic reality in the Middle East. For now, it's Moscow
rules in the eastern Mediterranean.
Jonathan Spyer is director of the
Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and a fellow at the
Middle East Forum.
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