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What's
Ankara Doing in Syria?
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Originally published under the title "Ankara's Next
Move."
After its incursion into Syria, Turkey will have to decide whether to
declare "Euphrates Shield" a success or to continue seeking to
destroy the Kurdish-led SDF in the face of US opposition. The Turkish incursion
into the north Syrian town of Jarabulus and its environs, which began
on August 24, is the latest dramatic re-shuffling of the deck in a long
and agonizing conflict.
But what is its deeper significance? Does it represent a decisive
Turkish entry into the broader effort to destroy the self-proclaimed
Islamic State? Or is it, rather, the opening shot in a broader effort by
Ankara to destroy the extensive gains made by Syria's Kurds and the
putative federal entity they have established in the country's northeast?
And what will it mean for US relations with both the Turks and the Syrian
Kurds?
As it currently appears, Turkey's intervention resembles previous
foreign interventions into the Syrian war in the following way: It
appears to have been more of an effort to stem an imminent unwanted
outcome than an expression of a broader strategic plan.
Turkish intervention appears
intended more to avert an unwanted outcome than to realize a broader
strategic plan.
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Much as Turkey might like to, it does not currently have either the
diplomatic or military ground prepared to embark on a wholesale campaign
of destruction against the Syrian Kurds. It does, however, have the power
to prevent further Kurdish expansion. It appears that it has just
exercised this power. What will follow will depend on whether Ankara can
content itself with this limited achievement.
Observe: The Turkish incursion came following the taking by the
Kurdish-led, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) of the strategic
town of Manbij. Manbij is of significance in the fight against Islamic
State because it was the last exit the jihadists controlled into Turkey.
Its loss is therefore an important step in securing the isolation of ISIS
territory from the outside world and hence from sources of revenue and
supply.
Turkey, however, is less concerned about the pace of the war against
ISIS. From Ankara's point of view, the taking of Manbij represented not a
significant step in the war against ISIS, but rather a further advance by
the Syrian Kurds, in the direction of uniting their cantons of Cezire,
and Afrin along the Syrian-Turkish border, and thus achieving control of
the entire long border between the two countries.
Turkey is determined to stop
further Syrian Kurdish advances along its border.
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Turkey is currently facing a renewed insurgency by the Kurdistan
Workers Party (PKK) in the southeast of the country.
The Syrian Kurdish YPG is closely associated with the PKK. A further
advance by the SDF would mean the entirety of an international border
falling into the hands of a hostile insurgent organization from a Turkish
point of view.
Turkey had hitherto been deterred from taking any such determined
action against the Kurds because of the real possibility of Russian
action against a Turkish incursion.
Relations between the two countries were at a nadir following the
Turkish downing of a Russian Sukhoi Su-24 bomber on November 24, 2015.
Rapprochement of some kind with Moscow was thus a necessary prelude to
any incursion. And rapprochement came with the meeting between Presidents
Erdogan and Putin on August 9.
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Erdogan
(left) and Putin hold a joint press conference in St. Petersburg on
August 9.
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The details and dimensions of any agreement reached between Moscow and
Ankara remain unclear. The Russian media has been critical of the scale
of the Turkish incursion into Jarabulus. But clearly the rebuilding of
relations opened up enough diplomatic space for the Turks to dare to
attempt the operation.
Nevertheless, any expectation that Turkish-Russian rapprochement must
involve a Turkish abandonment of the Sunni Arab rebels of northern Syria
appears at least for now to have been incorrect. On the contrary, the
rebels formed the main ground component in the Turkish push into
Jarabulus.
The US stance toward the Turkish move is perhaps most interesting of
all. The Americans were apprised of an upcoming Turkish incursion. But
the entry into Syria was earlier and on a larger scale than had been
expected. The Americans, having supported the SDF's difficult fight for Manbij,
appeared to change direction – calling for the withdrawal of Kurdish
fighters to east of the Euphrates River and conditioning further US
support on this action.
The US supplied close air support to the Turks in the first two days
of the operation. This was withdrawn once the Turks began to capture
ground and villages south of Jarabulus.
The subsequent clashes between Turkish supported rebels and the SDF
constituted an indisputable case of fighting between two US client
groups. The SDF is the main component in the US war against ISIS (it
constitutes a "Kurdish- American juggernaut," in the words of
one American analyst of Syria).
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A
Turkish-backed rebel stands guard in Jarabulus.
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The rebels used in the Jarabulus operation, meanwhile, consisted
specifically of groups vetted by the CIA and receiving American support
via the Military Operations Center in southern Turkey.
Were the fighting to spread, therefore, this would represent a disastrous
situation in which two US proxies would be firing US supplied ammunition
at one another.
To prevent this, the US appears to have put pressure on both sides.
The Kurds, first, were clearly told that they would be left to face
Turkish armor and artillery without US support if they continued to push
west.
But US Defense Secretary Ash Carter on Monday noted that Washington
also called on Turkey to "stay focused on the fight against ISIL and
not engage Syrian Defense Forces." Carter called on the Turks to
keep their forces north and west of Jarabulus.
As of now, a tentative cease fire has been announced by the US between
the Turks and the SDF-supported Jarabulus Military Council. It is not
clear if this will hold, or indeed even if it exists. Turkish officials
denied that any such truce has been agreed.
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SDF
fighters on the outskirts of Manbij, June 10, 2016.
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Much now depends on Turkish intentions. The Kurds and their allies
expended much blood and effort in taking Manbij from Islamic State. It is
beyond doubt that they will fight to defend it should the Turks and their
Syrian rebel allies seek to conquer it.
At the same time, if the Turkish intention is merely to prevent
Kurdish efforts to push further west, toward Jarabulus and al-Bab and
thence toward uniting the cantons, it is likely that for now at least a
further deterioration can be avoided.
US inconsistency left many Kurds furious. But the SDF is too
successful an alliance to be entirely abandoned. Turkey would undoubtedly
prefer a situation in which the rebel fighters under its sponsorship were
chosen by the US as a replacement in the war against ISIS.
This appears unlikely, however. The forces aligned with Turkey consist
mainly of Islamist organizations, including hard-line Salafi jihadist
groups ideologically close to al-Qaida.
Gen. Joseph Votel, head of US Central Command on Wednesday confirmed
continued US support for the SDF.
It is now Turkey's decision whether to declare Operation Euphrates
Shield a success or to continue to seek to destroy the SDF, even in the
face of US opposition, and with the presence of 300 US special forces
personnel deployed with the SDF.
Perhaps the Turks will conclude that the Obama administration's record
in defending its allies so far suggests that its objections can be
brushed aside. This would not be an entirely groundless assumption. But
if Turkey acts on it, it will open a new and very costly front in its war
against the Kurds. As of now, Ankara looks most likely to follow a more
cautious path.
Jonathan Spyer is director of the
Rubin Center for Research in International Affairs and a fellow at the
Middle East Forum.
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