Friday, August 10, 2012

Gatestone Update :: Khaled Abu Toameh: Attacks on Christians Sharpen with Government Collusion, and more


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Attacks on Christians Sharpen with Government Collusion

by Khaled Abu Toameh
August 10, 2012 at 5:00 am
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If Muslim fanatics cannot tolerate moderate and secular Muslims, why should they be expected to accept those who belong to other faiths?
As all eyes were turned this week toward Sinai, where Muslim fundamentalists killed 16 Egyptian border guards while they were having the Ramadan fast-breaking meal, Christian families were being forced out of their homes in the village of Dahshur, 40 kilometers south of Giza.

Hundreds of Christians fled their homes after being attacked by their Muslim neighbors, who also targeted a church and Christian-owned businesses in the village.

The anti-Christian violence was described as the worst since Muslim Brotherhood candidate Mohamed Morsi was elected as president in June.

But Morsi did not find time this week to visit Dahshur to see for himself how hundreds of helpless Christians were being forced out of their homes.

Instead, he and his security and military commanders rushed to Sinai as soon as they heard about the massacre that was perpetrated against the border guards.

The Egyptian authorities did not even hesitate to use heavy weapons against the Muslim terrorists in Sinai. For the first time since the signing of the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt sent military helicopters and armored vehicles to attack the terrorists in Sinai.

But when it comes to dealing with Muslim terrorists who have been targeting Christians in a number of villages and cities throughout Egypt over the past few months, the Egyptian authorities have endorsed a lenient approach. In fact, the authorities, according to human rights activists, have chosen to turn a blind eye to the plight of the 14-million strong Christian community.

Even worse, the Egyptian government seems to be completely out of touch with reality concerning the dangers facing the Christians. Morsi, for example, has denied that the violence was sectarian, claiming it was an "isolated incident that was blown out of proportion."

This, by the way, is the same argument the Egyptian authorities used each time Israel warned that Sinai was falling into the hands of Muslim terror groups.

One week before the border guards were killed, the Egyptian government dismissed Israeli warnings to Israeli tourists against visiting Sinai. The Egyptians claimed that the Israeli warnings were "exaggerated and unjustified" and accused Israel of seeking to damage Egypt's tourism industry.
In the past two years, tens of thousands of Christians have fled Egypt, mainly due to the rise of Muslim fundamentalists to power. Recurring attacks on Christian families and property and failure of the Egyptian authorities to employ a tougher policy against the fundamentalists have led many Christians to reach the conclusion that they have no future not only in Egypt, but in other Arab countries where radical Muslims are rising to power.

Christian fears are not unjustified. Muslim fanatics will continue to target Christians because they consider all non-Muslims "infidels." If the fanatics cannot tolerate moderate and secular Muslims, why should they be expected to accept those who belong to other faiths?

While the number of Christians in the Arab world continues to decline, Israel remains the only country in the Middle East where they feel safe and comfortable. That explains why Christians living in Israel have been appealing to Israel to open its borders to absorb their brothers who are fleeing from the Gaza Strip, Bethlehem, Egypt, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Sudan.
Related Topics:  Egypt  |  Khaled Abu Toameh

Should the U.S. De-Alert Its Nuclear Missiles?

by Peter Huessy
August 10, 2012 at 4:30 am
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Taking our missiles off alert actually makes our remaining forces into even more inviting targets for possible attacks. Today's stability would be undermined significantly.
Supporters of doing away with nuclear weapons are pushing for the de-alerting of our nuclear missiles. This could mean, for example, separating the warheads from the missiles and storing them in a remote area.
These critics worry that in a crisis, an American President would feel hurried in making a decision on whether to use our sea- or land-based missiles before the other side shoots first. One recent editorial warned that in a crisis:
"The decision to launch would have to be made in 13 minutes or less. The theory of deterrence…mean[s] being prepared to shoot fast."
Now it is true that our submarines in port and not at sea could be targeted by an enemy's missiles, and some of our land–based missiles could be taken out if an adversary could effectively launch its own missiles at our hardened, dispersed silos on thousands of square miles covering parts of five states. But neither makes any sense.
Such concerns did have some validity during the height of the Cold War, when, by 1980, the Soviets had over 10,000 missile warheads aimed largely at the US. Those concerns were heightened during the Nixon, Ford and Carter administrations as the Soviets dramatically expanded their deployed nuclear arsenal from the fewer-than-2000 warheads allowed under the SALT I treaty.
The fear then was that Moscow could launch thousands of warheads at America's land-based missile silos, at our submarines in port and our bombers at their bases, and eliminate a large percentage of our strategic nuclear arsenal while still being able to retain many thousands of warheads with which to coerce the US to surrender. In short, our President worried during the Cold War that in a crisis the other side might shoot first and, in a sudden attack, wipe out most of our deterrent in under 30 minutes.
The correlation of forces, as the Soviets termed the geostrategic balance between Washington and Moscow, was deemed to be moving smartly in Moscow's direction at the time of the 1980 election between then President Jimmy Carter and the Republican challenger, Ronald Reagan. A "window of vulnerability," as Reagan termed it, was opening up between the US and the Soviets. Moscow, having expanded its empire by some 18 nations in the era of "detente," was emboldened.
When Reagan became President, nuclear freeze advocates wanted to halt all US modernization plans, including the Trident submarine and its C-4 and D-5 missiles; the modernized Peacekeeper and Small ICBM and Minuteman sustainment program; the acquisition of the new B-1 and B-2 bombers and sustainment of the B-52s.
But, with his landslide 1984 victory over Walter Mondale and the subsequent unfreezing of Peacekeeper acquisition-funds in the spring of 1985, Regan defeated the freeze. This set the stage for the US to move to a far lower, but modernized nuclear force, under CFE, START and Moscow arms reduction treaties, which dropped US deployed warheads to just over 2000, down from 12,000.
The US thus engaged in two parallel efforts which dealt with the concern about the alert status of our nuclear forces. First, the US kept a fully modernized nuclear Triad -- air, sea and land -- which continued to neutralize any attack against the three legs of the US nuclear Triad—bombers, submarines and land-based missiles. Second, through arms control -- dramatic reductions in warheads -- the number of warheads on each missile was reduced but strategic stability was enhanced. Our land-based missiles, Minuteman, were reduced to one warhead per missile, and widely dispersed across thousands of square miles, making them thoroughly unattractive targets.
These streamlinings not only transformed our land-based missiles from attractive targets during the Cold War to unattractive targets in the post-Cold War era, but also from destabilizing elements to extremely stabilizing ones. Any pre-emptive strike now by Moscow against any one element of the US Triad during a crisis is therefore only the most remote possibility. An adversary could hit some of our land-based missiles, or submarines in port, or bombers not airborne, but hitting all three simultaneously would be so fraught with risk as to be a remote worry. Some elements of each leg would survive, particularly our submarines on patrol at sea, so Moscow could only consider an attack a miserable idea.
The conclusion, therefore, that in a crisis our President would have only 13 minutes in which to decide to launch our missiles is nothing but bunk. To claim that an American President would have no choice in a crisis but recklessly to launch our weapons significantly undermines stability: it might even induce our adversaries to decide that in a crisis it would be better for them if they shot first.
There is, in fact, no requirement now to launch "fast:" The widespread force of Minuteman missiles spread over five US states makes any kind of effective attack against the missiles both impossible and irrational. Contrary to conventional wisdom, Minuteman missiles are totally survivable and thus no US President is under any compulsion to "launch fast."
As leading experts on nuclear matters -- such as former General Larry Welch, Ambassador Linton Brooks, Frank Miller, former General Frank Klotz, former Strategic Command head General Chilton, among many others -- have concluded, taking our missiles off alert actually makes our remaining nuclear forces into even more inviting targets for possible attack. Today's stability would be undermined significantly: it could merely make the "other guy shoot fast."
Worse, the Minuteman and the Trident would not even be useable if de-alerted. If the other side decided surreptitiously to re-alert its forces, there might be a "secret race to re-arm," but it would be one-sided in the other side's favor. Our Triad force elements would be totally vulnerable: What threat would there be in our launching a rocket with no warhead on it?
This problem could especially damaging if the US were to collect all missile warheads and store them elsewhere -- an act that would produce the most attractive target ever: a few storage facilities, each with hundreds of nuclear warheads. We would be inviting -- not deterring -- an attack. Even supporters of de-alerting acknowledge this failing.
In short, attacking any or all of our 420-450 Minuteman silos makes absolutely no sense. Each would require an adversary to use two incoming, or attacking, warheads to ensure the silos were destroyed. But even then, there is a high likelihood that many of our land-based missiles would survive — estimates are as high as 30-40%. So there is no vulnerability problem that is begging for a de-alerting solution. There is no requirement or compulsion to "prompt launch," and thus no need to change the alert status of our missiles.
The fear that an American President would be prompted to launch our missiles in port or in silos before they were attacked completely misses the reality of today's deterrent. No rational adversary could believe they would eliminate our deterrent force with an initial attack. Why? Because the US has a survivable and second-strike capability: submarines at sea, ICBMs that survive, and bombers that could be returned to alert and launched for survivability during a crisis.
The US thus has hundreds of warheads that would survive and are capable of deterring any current or foreseeable adversary---but only if we maintain, sustain and modernize our nuclear deterrent forces. We should preserve the stabilizing Triad and continue to maintain a very high ratio of our missiles and submarines and bombers (now over 500) against the array of adversary warheads.
As noted, supporters of de-alerting admit that its benefits cannot be verified, and that in a crisis there would still be a rush to put forces back on alert. But like a three year-old banging his spoon on his high chair demanding the world feed him what he wants, they demand that, whatever the reality may be, we nevertheless have to figure out a way to do what is foolhardy, unnecessary and dangerous.
Underlying the push for de-alerting, though usually unstated, is the assumption that once de-alerted, these forces can safely be eliminated. After all, some have argued, if the forces are de-alerted and war does not break out, they apparently are not needed.
At the moment, therefore, de-alerting is a senseless posture in search of a problem. It is also a backdoor means of reducing US nuclear forces -- a policy that, regardless of its dubious wisdom, its pacifist supporters, insistent on "first the numbers, then the strategy," apparently think must be pursued despite the risks to US national security in inviting adventurism.
In reality, an adversary would have nothing to gain by attacking Minuteman silos in a crisis. Thus, the panic over the deployed US missiles on three Minutemen bases or at two US submarine bases is both misplaced and irrational -- in itself dangerous.
It is misplaced in that the robust US Triad makes a successful adversarial attack impossible. It is irrational in that such de-alerting would in actuality make the geostrategic situation more unstable. And it is dangerous in that it makes the use of nuclear weapons in a crisis more likely than ever, thus creating the very problem it purports to solve.
The US deterrent Triad has kept the peace for well over half a century. As former USAF Chief of Staff and SAC Commander General Larry Welch said: The US nuclear deterrent has worked perfectly. And for nearly seven decades. It is time to drop such errant proposals as de-alerting, and get on with the important job of preserving and updating a deterrent that, as the Constitution requires, so successfully "provides for the common defense."
Related Topics:  Peter Huessy

Indian Shia and Sunni Unite in Hating Israel

by Mohshin Habib
August 10, 2012 at 3:00 am
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Although Shia and Sunnis do not pray together, as both sects have the same goal – hostility to Israel – the Shia cleric, to set a precedent, recently asked the Sunni Imam to lead a prayer service attended by both congregations.
A group of Indian Shia clerics, led by a prominent Shia Islamic leader, Kalbe Jawwad, has demanded breaking ties with Israel. In May Kalbe Jawwad, a cleric and member of the All-India Muslim Personal Law Board, alleged that there has been a "flood of terror attacks in India" ever since Israel established an embassy there, and accused the Congress Party-led government of India of defaming the Muslim community as a whole.
The clerics accuse Israel and the United States of being the "biggest sponsors" of international terrorism, and are recommending that India focus on improving relations with Iran, Syria and the Palestinian Authority.
Maulana Jawwad, the most influential Wakf leader in India, has been organizing Muslims to demonstrate to pressure the central government of India to be more responsive to their demands. Wakf, an Arabic word, means "an inalienable religious endowment in Islamic law, donating building, land and cash for Muslims' charitable purposes."
Jawwad is also celebrated for holding the largest ever anti-U.S.-Israel-Denmark demonstration in Lucknow, the capital city of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh.
Jawwad has invited a leader of the Sunni sect of India -- the Imam-E-Jummah, or Imam of the Friday prayer -- of the highly regarded Shahi Asafi Masque of Lucknow, Mawlana Khalid, to join his campaign.
Although Shiites and Sunnis do not pray together, as both sects have the same goal -- hostility to Israel -- the Shia cleric, to set a precedent, recently requested the Sunni Imam to lead a prayer service attended by both Shia and Sunni congregations.
On 30 March 2012, after the Friday prayer in Lucknow, thousands of Muslims held an anti-Israel protest led by Sunni Maulana Khalid Rasheed, demanding the "liberation" of Jerusalem's Al Aqsa Mosque.
The Shia cleric, Maulana Jawwad, has taken charge of rescuing Karbala Motamadud-Daula, a building occupied by the Freemason Temple since 1879. Maulana Jawwad started a protest movement last year to seek the ouster of illegal occupants from it; and the Shia Central Wakf Board formed a 21-member committee headed by Jawwad.
At the same time, Indian Muslims are concerned about increasing ties between India and Israel, especially after the recent decision to establish an Israeli consulate in Bangalore, cooperation in boosting trade from $5 billion to $15 billion, and initiating an extradition treaty between the two. The Muslims of India, not only Uttar Pradesh, have unbroken relations with the Pakistani Muslims, who migrated from India during the partition of the sub-continent in 1947. Moreover, most of the Indian Muslims, whether Shia or Sunni, do not approve of India's policy on Afghanistan.
There are about 180 million Muslims in India, with approximately 25% of them Shia. In Uttar Pradesh, Jawwad's state, although less than 20% of the population are Muslims, they nevertheless have a strong influence on the society and in politics. The sitting government of Uttar Pradesh has also been supportive of Muslims.
Although the Shia and Sunni have long been mutually hostile, in recent years, as they found a common platform over which to instigate violence -- Israel, Jews and Wakf property -- their antagonism toward one another has significantly decreased.
Related Topics:  India  |  Mohshin Habib

Erdogan's Growing Economic Woes

by David P. Goldman  •  Aug 9, 2012 at 10:21 pm
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Some would call this a bubble:
Since late 2009, Turkey has lost $20 billion of foreign bank assets and taken on $50 billion of foreign bank debt
As we reported Aug. 3, Turkey's banks are still churning out consumer loans at a 30% annual rate, probably to capitalize the interest on loans bearing an 18% interest rate. The current account deficit is running at about $70 billion a year, which means that Turkey's banks will have to double their net external debt position to finance it. The Bank for International Settlements data (whence the chart was drawn) show no lending to Turkey from the rest of the OECD. We believe the money is coming from the Gulf states, whose largesse is not infinite.
Turkish exports declined last month as contracting European markets and adverse exchange rates mainly affected the performance of key automotive and textile sectors.
Turkey's exports declined 5.5 percent year-on-year in June to $10.85 billion, the Turkish Exporters Association (TİM) revealed yesterday, while exports posted a year-on-year increase of 3.6 percent in June.
"The biggest reason for exports decline in June was the shrinking demand in the automotive market. Automotive exports plunged by 22.3 percent. Also the ready-to-wear [retail] sector declined 12 percent as a result of shrinking demand. We are carefully following the declines in our flagship exports," Economy Minister Zafer Çağlayan said yesterday, according to Anatolia news agency.
Erdogan's authority stems first of all from his reputation as an economic wizard, a story which the world continues to buy. Why anyone would buy Turkish banks under the circumstances is a mystery to this former banker, but bubbles, as they say, last until they feel like fundamentals.
An imploding domestic credit bubble, constraints on foreign borrowing, soaring food prices and declining exports look like a toxic combination for Erdogan.
Related Topics:  David P. Goldman

THE CALL: The Egyptian Mess

by David Samuels  •  Aug 9, 2012 at 6:09 pm
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With nothing better to do on their Thursday lunch hour, three regulars on The Call -- Pepe Escobar, David Goldman, and David Samuels -- decided to kick around the current mess in Egypt. They agreed that with two months of foreign currency reserves left, Egypt is close to economic collapse. The SCAF is looking to pin the country's deep-rooted economic woes and other ills on the Muslim Brotherhood before staging a coup, which will be quietly supported by the Saudis. In turn, the Muslim Brotherhood is looking for help from Iran, whose interest lies in keeping Egypt weak and divided under MB control.
THE CALL
David Goldman: Let's recap Egypt, shall we? Three independent newspapers ran white spaces on Thursday after the Brotherhood-dominated upper house of parliament named new directors and editors-in-chief for state-owned newspapers, many of them nominees close to the Islamists.
[http://www.naharnet.com/stories/en/49505-egypt-dailies-replace-editorials-with-white-spaces-in-protest]
Morsi issued Presidential decrees dismissing Egypt's intelligence chief, the head of the Republican Guard, the commander of military police and the Governor of North Sinai, appointing Major-General Ahmed Mohamed Zaki as chief of the Presidential Guard, Mohamed Raafat Abdel-Wahid as acting head of the General Intelligence Service, Major-General Magid Mustafa Kamel as assistant to the Minister of Interior – for Central Security affairs, Major-General Osama Mohamed Al-Saghir as assistant to the Minister of Interior – for Cairo Security affairs, and Ambassador Rifa'a Al-Tahtawi as head of the Office of the President of the Republic.
[http://www.ikhwanweb.com/article.php?id=30237]
Analysts say that Mr Morsi's choice of a cabinet made up of relative unknowns - many of whom were promoted from within the ranks of Egypt's vast bureaucracy - was aimed at avoiding any row that might detract from undoing what Islamists say is an excessive concentration of power in the military.
[http://www.thenational.ae/news/world/egypts-salafis-plot-after-being-sidelined-by-morsi
10% electricity shortage –gone in September?]
[http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/minister-no-electricity-shortage-september
Red Sea resorts affected:]
[http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/3/12/49539/Business/Economy/Egypt-diesel-crisis-threatens-tourism-in-Red-Sea-c.aspx]
There were violent protests over water shortages (mainly farmers over irrigation)
[http://www.ooskanews.com/daily-water-briefing/egypt-water-shortage-protests-are-widespread-and-violent_23549]
What I am trying to figure out is what they are going to do about their foreign currency reserves disappearing (down to $5.8 billion in July).
Pepe: House of Saud to the rescue!
David G.: Why, Pepe? The House of Saud didn't put in a penny in July.
Pepe: Not yet. They are waiting for a lot of things to happen. Especially that NAM thing which I will submit to both of you later on.
David G.: Sure. The view of the pro-military, Muburak people is that behind the MB lurks a mass of crazies who will do insane things, like Gamal al Ismaliya and Islamic Jihad -- the guys whom Morsi pardoned.
David Samuels: Don't forget the reception that Morsi's prime minister and apparently anyone with a beard got at the funeral for the Egyptian soldiers killed in the Sinai attack. It's easy to dismiss the throwing of shoes and beatings as a provocation by the Army and Mubarak's men, but when you think about it, the mourners have every reason to be pissed off at the Muslim Brotherhood. At least some of the attackers came from Gaza, whose ruling party, Hamas, has been embraced by the MB as part of the Brotherhood, which in fact they are. More directly, the MB promised an open borders policy with Gaza. If this is the result of that policy, then the families of the dead soldiers have every reason to throw shoes at the PM.
David G.: I agree. But Pepe – what is the NAM?
Pepe: Non-Aligned Movement. 118 countries. Egypt is the current president. Iran is next. Summit in Tehran in late August.
David G.: Geez, Luise -- does that thing still meet? I thought it was kind of like the Shriners or the Freemasons -- still had a building in Philadelphia, but no meetings.
Pepe: I know. It's like a rerun of Return of the Living Dead.
David S.: There is something good to be written about the Western propensity to apply the state model to parts of the world where national states are only one of many relevant actors – and where the real battle is between those groups for control of the letterhead with the name of a country on it. "Hi, we're Egypt." "No, WE'RE Egypt!"
David G.: My core scenario is that the SCAF wants to dump the blame for disintegration on Morsi. Let there be a gigantic devaluation while he's there, blame him for it (it's his economics guys in the cabinet) and discredit him. AFTER the devaluation, the Saudis come in (when everything is cheap).
David S.: Yep. That's what I imagine is happening, too. It's a page from the old CIA handbook from the 50's on how to stage a coup.
Pepe: I basically agree with David's scenario. But the guys who run the MB - I mean Shatter, not Morsi - are also very cunning. There will be a counterpunch.
David S.: The only counterpunch I see is to ally with Iran. Which doesn't seem smart.
Pepe: That's exactly what we'll see after NAM. So, gentlemen, here are my thoughts on NAM:
Tehran sent VP Hamid Baghaei to Cairo specifically to invite Morsi for the NAM summit in late August in Iran. Egypt is NAM's current president. Iran is next. We're talking about 118 non-aligned countries here. That's quite a lot of the real "international community". What I'm getting from Cairo is that Morsi will probably send his FM, Mohamed Kamel Amr.
This could be very big; there have been no diplomatic relations for 3 decades now. If it happens, that means Morsi trying an opening to counterbalance the Pentagon-SCAF-Saudi relationship. SCAF, of course, controls everything in terms of national security.
Before that Morsi will have to follow the money, i.e. appease the Saudis. But Tehran may do it for him, because Ahmadinejad will meet King Abdullah in person at an OIC meeting in Saudi Arabia in a few days. Ahmadinejad was personally invited by the King. I'd give an arm to be a fly on the wall. Or, in a more Monty Pythonesque way, two arms, two legs and would be yelling "that's just a scratch."
David S.: But an alliance with Iran would seem to help the Salafists and the army at the same time, not Morsi, right?
David G.: Here's an interesting way to look at it: The Egyptian stock market has the market capitalization of a medium-sized US company, say, 3M. Its returns are enormously dispersed. Huge returns to luxury real estate developers, steel and telecom, big drop for agribusiness, cement, etc. My guess is that anything that is likely to be an international tradeable is a store of value and people are buying it; anything tied to local prices is getting killed.
What practically can Iran do for the MB?
David S.: Iran's interest is a weak Egypt ruled by the MB.
David G.: Sure. What can they do to help it along? They're not going to cough up a lot of money.
David S.: Have Obama invite Morsi to the WH in September to balance Pentagon support for the SCAF? Wait, he did that already.
Pepe: Barter. Sell them cheap gas, even cheap Iranian cars.
David S.: Cheap gas is a good one. But the Saudis can give cheap gas to the army and let them distribute it through their own structure.
David G.: I suppose if Egypt allied with Iran and broke the boycott Iran would have oil to spare (they've got supertankers full of it just offshore).
Pepe: I agree. It will all hang on those meetings, between King Abdullah and Ahmadinejad, and an Egyptian visit to Tehran.
David G.: I have grave doubts any of this will occur. If Morsi shifts to Iran, the SCAF will have all the pretext in the world to kill him.
Pepe: By the way, China would LOVE a closer Egypt-Iran relationship. They will help - silently. Morsi won't shift. He will hedge his bets. Khatter, actually - he's the poker player.
David G.: Why would they get involved right now? Egypt's financing requirements are enormous. The trade deficit is $36 billion; they make $5 billion a year from the canal, and they might get $7 billion in net tourist receipts and a couple of bn in remittances -- I make the financing requirement north of $20 billion a year. That's just way out of Iran's range.
Pepe: True. But they could help with around $5 billion or so. A bargain in terms of a geopolitical coup. The feeling I get from Tehran is that they will do whatever it takes to get closer to Egypt.
David G.: The other way to read this is that the MB might flirt with Tehran to frighten the Saudis into coughing up more money.
Pepe: Exactly!!!! That's the al-Shatter poker play, as I see it.
David G.: Sure, William Shatter. He was great in Star Trek.
Pepe: The MB goes Star Trekking!
David G.: The problem from the Iranian standpoint is that they are aware that they might be used to frighten the Saudis. If the Egyptians squeeze $5 bn out of them (and money is tight) and then turn around and take more from the Saudis and dump them, they won't like it.
Pepe: Coming back to Sinai, I'd like your thoughts on this. Morsi had already promised to open the Rafah border crossing and wants tighter relations with Hamas. So no wonder many in the Egyptian press and blogs are claiming the Sinai killing was an Israeli false flag. Target; to close Rafah for good. That's exactly what Morsi did – falling into an Israeli trap. Thoughts?
David S.: It's not an Israeli trap. Although it seems possible, even likely, that the Israelis warned SCAF, which chose for whatever reasons not to act.
Pepe: Speculation - in Egypt - was that Israel provided the patsies.
David G.: Pepe, how does Israel get patsies? Do they have their own false-flag terrorist operation recruiting and training Arab terrorists?
Pepe: Of course they do. That's what trillions of Arabs over the years all over the Middle East have been telling me...
David S.: The Israelis were waiting at the border for these guys and blew them away.
So, if the Israelis knew about the plot, which they clearly did, and chose to notify SCAF, though a military channel, knowing the information might not make it to the government, which I'm sure is what happened – because they could hardly notify the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo that the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza was part of an upcoming attack -- there is a possible ounce or two of situational complicity in what SCAF then did with the information, which appears to be nothing.
David G.: I follow your drift. They set it up.
Pepe: Makes totals sense.
David S.: It's not so direct, but functionally, to some degree, I guess. Nothing in the Middle East happens by accident, especially in the summer.
David G.: Israelis and SCAF vs. MB. Makes sense.
David S.: You know about a plot, you inform the Egyptians, you don't choose to disrupt the plot, you guard your own border. You have acted properly, but also facilitated the attack and the political consequences of the attack. So, the literal version of the Egyptian street conspiracy theory is nonsense, but functionally, it's not wrong.
To further my theory, the Egyptians asked for Hamas to extradite three planners of the Sinai attack, including the guy who planned the Gilad Shalit kidnapping – a request which I imagine that neither the MB in Cairo or Hamas in Gaza has any intention of meeting. Which again makes it Israel and SCAF against the MB.
Pepe: Haven't seen that kind of analysis in the Egyptian press so far. That's much more plausible than a simple "Israeli false flag".
David G.: Let me call your attention to the first item in my list of gleanings from the press: "Has Morsi created a ticking timebomb in Egypt? Even those who did not vote for the new president are pinning their hopes on him meeting his October 8 deadline to restore law and order, stamp out chaos on Egypt's roads, end the fuel shortage, make bread affordable, tackle litter and sanitation problems and start rebuilding the tourism industry."
David S.: Wow!
Pepe: He wants to do all this in TWO MONTHS? Forget it.
David G.: Morsi has been making Idi Amin like pronouncements. Again: my prior is that SCAF is setting him up for failure. Get a big currency devaluation later this year and he looks really bad. Like maybe, dead. But remember he has some very unhappy, maybe even desperate people to assuage.
Pepe: Unhappy, desperate, hungry, illiterate and at the same time hopeful. A tragedy, really.
David: I feel all Greek about it.
Pepe: You betcha!
Related Topics:  David Samuels

Twenty Questions for the White House about David Plouffe

by David Samuels  •  Aug 9, 2012 at 2:52 pm
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1. Did David Plouffe disclose the $100,000 he received from MTN during the vetting process before he was named Senior Advisor to the President? Did he disclose MTN 's heavy involvement in Iran, and the fact that MTN's Iranian partner, Irancell, is wholly owned by the Revolutionary Guard -- or did he have no idea of the link between the two companies?
2. If Plouffe had no idea of the link between MTN and Irancell, was it his normal practice in private life to simply cash checks from anyone who wrote them even after he gave back the $50,000 he took for a speech to a pro-government group in Azerbaijan? Does the President approve of David Plouffe using his name to get money from anti-democratic thugs? If he disapproves of such conduct, has he ever voiced his disapproval to Plouffe?
3. Did anyone independently check David Plouffe's fees, or does the vetting process for the position of Senior Advisor to the President rely on the appointee's own sense of what's appropriate to disclose? Is that normal? Did Plouffe have a special waiver of some kind to not disclose his fees? Did Plouffe receive the MTN fee AFTER the disclosure process was over?
4. When and how did the White House learn that Plouffe had received $100,000 from MTN? Did anyone then ask Plouffe to explain the payment?
5. Has David Plouffe explained why he thought that taking $100,000 from MTN was proper conduct for someone who was taking a job at the White House three weeks later? To whom? What was his explanation?
6. As Senior Advisor to the President, did David Plouffe ever formally or informally offer the President or other members of the White House staff his opinions about US policy towards Iran? Did he ever participate or sit in on formal meetings or informal discussions in which US policy towards Iran was discussed? How many meetings? When were they, and what was discussed?
7. Would it be correct to assume that the President is currently aware that David Plouffe, his 2008 campaign manager and now one of his senior advisors in the White House, took $100,000 from a company whose joint venture partner is wholly owned by the Revolutionary Guard? Was he disappointed or angry, or does he simply see the fee and the resulting fuss as "politics as usual"?
8. If Plouffe did disclose the MTN fee as part of the normal vetting procedure, did he also disclose the MTN connection to Irancell? Did anyone bother to Google MTN? Who was responsible for overseeing the vetting process?
9. Is it normal for White House appointees who are about to start work in three weeks in highly sensitive jobs inside the White House to take $100,000 from foreign companies that may have links to unfriendly governments or to friendly governments with business before the US government? How do such payments normally affect a person's involvement in related government work? Did this happen with Plouffe?
10. Are there other people working in the White House who have taken large amounts of money from companies owned by the Revolutionary Guards or other organizations that are listed by the US State Department as active global sponsors of terrorism? How can you be sure?
11. In a case where someone -- David Plouffe or anyone else -- took $100,000 from a company owned by a hostile foreign organization that sponsors global terrorism and then went to work in the White House, and didn't disclose that information, does the President believe that person should continue to serve in a senior government position after that information became known ?
12. Does the President think that Plouffe's actions here were proper? Did Plouffe's actions reflect good judgement?
13. Didn't the President campaign against this kind of revolving door money and insider lobbying system in the campaign that he picked Plouffe to run in 2008?
14. How does David Plouffe square the campaign he ran in 2008 with his actions in this case, and with the other large consulting fees he took from large corporations and foreign governments in the months before he went to work in the White House?
15. Does the President think that David Plouffe's actions in the MTN-Irancell case are a good example of the kind of government he promised the American people in 2008, or have his ideas about good government changed now that he is in office?
16. Was the purpose of MTN's $100,000 payout to influence Plouffe's judgment about the way the US government treats Irancell and other Iranian companies that operate to fund the Revolutionary Guard? If not, what was the purpose of MTN's payment to Plouffe?
17. Is it fair to call David Plouffe's behavior in the months before he went to work in the White House "influence-peddling"? If not, what would you call it?
18. Is Plouffe planning to resign? And if not, is the President going to ask him to resign?
19. If the answer is no -- is that because the President thinks Plouffe's judgement was not influenced by receiving $100,000 from MTN three weeks before he assumed a senior position in the White House, and would be forced to live on a government salary?
20. Does the President believe that $100,000 is not enough money to influence David Plouffe's judgment? Just to be clear -- how much money would be enough?
Related Topics:  David Samuels

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Posted by solsticewitch13 at 11:13 AM

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