The Long War Journal (Site-Wide) |
- President Obama's 'successful' counterterrorism strategy in Yemen in limbo
- Haqqani Network and Jamaat-ud-Dawa: Banned or not?
- AQAP issues guidelines for suicide operations
- Iranian political and military leaders laud Qods Force general killed in Syria
- Jihadists tweet photo allegedly showing deceased Ansar al Sharia leader
- Cameroon strikes back after Boko Haram kidnaps 80 villagers
Posted: 24 Jan 2015 09:50 AM PST
When announcing the US strategy to
"degrade and ultimately destroy" the Islamic State in both Iraq and
Syria, President Barack Obama said he would model it after America's
counterterrorism strategy in Somalia and Yemen, "one that we have
successfully pursued...for years."
Immediately after Obama's speech,
we at The Long War Journal
questioned the wisdom of describing Somalia and Yemen as "successfully
pursued" counterterrorism operations. Al Qaeda's official branches,
Shabaab in Somalia and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen,
remain entrenched in their respective countries, despite some setbacks here
and there. AQAP's core leadership cadre is intact. And both al Qaeda branches
continue to control territory while working to conduct attacks outside of
their countries. [For details, see LWJ
report, US strategy
against Islamic State to mirror counterterrorism efforts in Yemen, Somalia.]
In the four plus months since
Obama described Yemen as a successful engagement, things have gone from bad
to worse. The Iranian-backed Shiite Houthis have broken out from the northern
provinces and overran the capital. Just this week, President Hadi, who was
perhaps America's greatest ally on the Arabian Peninsula as he actively
endorsed and facilitated US counterterrorism operations, including
controversial drone strikes against AQAP, was forced to step down. The prime
minister has also resigned and the government has dissolved.
During this timeframe, the US
drone program against AQAP has stalled. The last US drone strike in Yemen
that has been confirmed by The
Long War Journal took place on
Nov. 12, 2014. This is especially remarkable given that AQAP has
claimed credit for the assault on Charlie
Hebdo's offices in Paris, and the terrorists
themselves said that AQAP sent them.
Unsurprisingly, US officials
are now telling Reuters
that counterterrorism operations in Yemen are "paralyzed"
with the collapse of the Hadi government (the long gap in strikes in the face
of the Charlie Hebdo
attack is a clear indication that US CT operations are in limbo). Yemen's
military is also said to be in disarray.
If US officials expect the Houthis
to be willing participants against AQAP, they are mistaken. The Houthis,
while enemies of AQAP, are no friends of the US. While their movement was not
created by Iran, they have adopted the Iranians' motto: "Death to America."
Additionally, any action against AQAP only serves to strengthen the Houthis,
and by extension, Iran.
Meanwhile, without a central
government and effective military, Sunnis may be tempted to back AQAP against
the Shiite Houthis, thereby increasing AQAP's recruiting pool. There is
already evidence that this is happening.
If this is what a successful
counterterrorism strategy looks like, we'd hate to see failure.
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Posted: 24 Jan 2015 09:56 AM PST
It is very rare that I read an
editorial on a subject that I am deeply vested in and agree with every point
made. Dawn, the
Pakistani newspaper, hit the nail square on the head with an
editorial, titled "Banned or not?". The paper asks
the hard questions about whether the Pakistani government has really banned
the Haqqani network and Jamaat-ud-Dawa. [For LWJ's analysis on this subject, see: Reported ban
of Haqqani Network unlikely to end Pakistan's support of group,
and Pakistan
falsely claims it takes 'immediate action' against terror groups listed by
the UN.]
The editorial is reproduced in
full, below. Keep in mind that asking tough questions about the Pakistani
state's duplicity with respect to terrorist groups requires quite a bit of
courage in that country. The Long War Journal is banned in
Pakistan to this day for noting Pakistan's good-vs-bad Taliban
problem, as well as exposing other issues. But that is a small price to pay.
Brave and insightful journalists, such as Asia Times reporter Syed
Saleem Shahzad, have been tortured and brutally murdered for
questioning the Pakistani state and its links to the Taliban and other
jihadist groups.
Kudos to Dawn for its cogent
editorial.
IT ought to be a straightforward answer to a simple question:
has the Pakistani state taken any measures in recent weeks against, among
others, the Haqqani network and Jamaatud Dawa that impact on the legal and
operational status of those groups on Pakistani soil?
Unhappily, even in this most
straightforward of cases, the Pakistani state is being anything but direct
and honest.
The Foreign Office tells the media
to check with the Interior Ministry and Nacta; the otherwise voluble and
media-attention-loving Interior Minister Nisar Ali Khan goes silent;
anonymous bureaucrats and unnamed officials give contradictory statements;
parliament is given ambiguous answers to direct questions; and nowhere does
anyone in any relevant public office show any inclination to inform the
public of what is or is not being done in their name.
Meanwhile, the conspiracy theories
are growing more feverish: an outright ban, frozen bank accounts,
restrictions on foreign travel of JuD leaders -- whatever new measures have
been taken, it has all been done at the behest of the US to placate an angry
India and assist the Afghan government.
Such conspiracy theories do more
than confuse the public; they strike at the heart of the consensus this
country needs, that the fight against militancy is Pakistan's own and not
imposed by the outside world on a hapless nation.
All the confusion can be cleared
up by a simple, authoritative statement by the interior ministry, or -- given
the implications for national security policy -- by the Prime Minister's
Office. But, in a way that echoes the old practice here of saying one thing
(or saying nothing) and doing another, the government has chosen to remain
silent -- just as the state alternates between remaining silent about drone
strikes and condemning them.
Just as once upon a time the
army-led security establishment cut clandestine -- sometimes, public -- deals
with militant groups while claiming it was opposed to religiously inspired
militant groups existing on Pakistani soil. And just as the state banned
Lashkar-e-Taiba, but allowed it to first morph into Jamaatud Dawa and now, to
some extent, into the Falah-i-Insaniyat Foundation.
A simple path towards clarity --
at least in terms of designation and profiles -- in the present instance was
offered by the Supreme Court on Thursday: make public the names of proscribed
groups and translate anti-terrorism laws into local languages to increase
awareness.
As the Supreme Court observed,
often the public is unaware that groups operating as social welfare networks
or collecting charity are in fact designated by the state to be terrorist
groups. That has the effect of allowing the groups to grow and even gain public
affection by pretending to be something they most certainly are not.
Perhaps it will be easier to begin
to believe that the era of good militants/bad militants is over if the state
can bring itself to name and ban all militant groups.
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Posted: 24 Jan 2015 07:12 AM PST
A senior sharia official in al
Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Harith al Nadhari, sets forth
guidelines for "martyrdom," or suicide, operations in a
newly-released video. Al Nadhari's video, which is more than ten minutes
long, was released by Al Malahem Media, AQAP's propaganda arm, via one of its
official Twitter feeds.
Tweets promoting the video include
a hashtag in Arabic that reads, "#The
Inviolability_of_Sacrosanct_Blood," meaning Muslim blood. Al Qaeda and
other jihadist organizations have attempted to rein in the violence unleashed
by their members. Indiscriminate killings of civilians in the Muslim-majority
world have, at times, damaged the jihadists' cause by undermining their
perceived legitimacy. Indeed, today's jihadists have killed far more Muslims
than non-Muslims throughout the history of their operations.
AQAP has also had its operations
against Houthis, who are Shiite Muslims, questioned. While AQAP is opposed to
the Houthi rebels who have rocked Sanaa's government, the group's operations
have generated additional controversy by hitting civilian gatherings.
Nadhari clearly has these issues
in mind as he addresses what AQAP, an official branch of al Qaeda, believes
are proper restrictions on suicide attacks. Nadhari begins by saying that one
of the "worst predicaments" a jihadist can find himself in is the
"unjust shedding of inviolable blood." Nadhari cites early Islamic
literature and scholars throughout his video to buttress his point.
Nadhari argues that "killing
a believer" is more important in the eyes of Allah than the "end of
the world." He warns that hellfire awaits those who do not heed his
warning.
Because all will stand before
Allah on the imagined day of judgment, Nadhari argues, jihadists cannot hide
behind the orders of their leaders. Orders issued by one's emir, or leader,
should not be "considered a license to shed inviolable blood." Both
the emir and the one who follows his instructions will be thrown into hell,
Nadhari says.
Nadhari's argument is the same one
al Qaeda uses against the Islamic State, which al Qaeda accuses of spilling
Muslim blood.
AQAP's ideologue goes on to set
forth six recommendations, or guidelines, for conducting
"martyrdom" attacks.
First, jihadists should avoid
using explosives or other methods "of mass killing" in mosques,
markets, stadiums or other areas where Muslims congregate in large numbers.
Second, Nadhari says that
jihadists should avoid killing Muslims even if they are being used to shield
their enemies. Only in "extreme" circumstances, with guidance from
"highly knowledgeable" scholars, should jihadists carry out such
operations, Nadhari says.
AQAP's third, fourth and fifth
recommendations address the role of jihadist leaders and who is allowed to
"issue fatwas concerning martyrdom-seeking operations." Only those
individuals who have the proper understanding of sharia law and "Islamic
doctrines" should issue such fatwas, Nadhari says. Jihadist leaders must
"train and instruct" their fighters on the "correct
jurisprudence," such that the "martyrdom-seeker" only moves
forward when he is completely certain of the "legitimacy of his
target." And leaders must not send suicide operatives to attack
"suspicious or controversial targets."
Sixth, and finally, Nadhari says
that suicide operatives are at fault if they attack without
"wisdom," even if their intentions were good.
AQAP is clearly concerned about
how the jihadists' operations are perceived throughout the Muslim-majority
world. And Nadhari's guidelines demonstrate, once again, that al Qaeda
continues to believe that the jihadists' indiscriminate violence remains a strategic
liability for their cause.
A prominent al Qaeda
ideologue
Al Qaeda has consistently elevated
Harith al Nadhari's media profile, meaning al Qaeda considers him to be a key
ideologue for the organization. In addition to having his work promoted by AQAP,
Nadhari's writings have been featured in Nawa-e-Afghan Jihad ("Voice of
the Afghan Jihad"), a magazine that publishes the works of top al Qaeda
leaders and their closest allies. For example, an edition of the magazine
published last year included a piece from Nadhari on "ideology and
teachings."
Nadhari praised the
attack on Charlie
Hebdo's offices earlier this month. Another AQAP ideologue subsequently
claimed responsibility for the massacre on behalf of the
organization.
In addition to the Charlie Hebdo
attack, Nadhari regularly comments on events far from Yemen. In August 2013,
he discussed the
turmoil in Egypt.
In July 2014, Nadhari joined other
senior AQAP leaders in defending Ayman al Zawahiri and veteran
jihadist ideologues against their critics. Nadhari's message was clearly
aimed at supporters of the Islamic State, an al Qaeda offshoot that claims to
rule as a "caliphate" over large parts of Iraq and Syria. And in
October 2014 he was among the al Qaeda ideologues who attempted to portray the
US-led bombing campaign in Iraq and Syria as part of a
"Crusade" against the Islamic world.
It is possible that Nadhari also
serves as one of Nasir al Wuhayshi's deputy general managers in al Qaeda's
global network. Documents recovered in Osama bin Laden's compound show that al Qaeda's
general manager has deputies who are appointed to help him
carry out his work.
Nasir al Wuhayshi serves as both
AQAP's emir and as al Qaeda's general manager, but his deputies have not been
publicly identified.
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Posted: 24 Jan 2015 11:55 AM PST
The death of Brigadier General
Mohammad-Ali Allah-Dadi, the latest Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods
Force (IRGC-QF) officer killed abroad, has generated an outpouring of
condolences and support from Iran's political and military elite.
Allah-Dadi, who had a
distinguished career and solid Iran-Iraq War background, was killed by an
Israeli helicopter assault in the Syrian city of Quneitra, in the Golan
Heights. The strike also killed six members of Hezbollah [see LWJ reports, Senior Qods
Force general killed in suspected Israeli airstrike, and Hezbollah commanders
killed in suspected Israeli airstrike.]
Senior Iranian officials have and
are continuing to weigh in on the event, brandishing Iranian deterrence and
even threatening retaliation against Israel in their statements. The broad
amount of commentary and deep retaliatory sentiment in honor of Allah-Dadi
stands in contrast to the somewhat more muted coverage of the recent (Jan.
10, 2015) funeral
service of Hossein Ahmadi, another Qods Force officer
"martyred" in Syria. Clearly, the killing of Allah-Dadi struck a
chord.
The Secretary of Iran's Supreme
National Security Council (SNSC), Admiral Ali Shamkhani, claimed that
"the current of resistance would answer the terrorist action of the
Zionist regime with revolutionary intensity and determination in a time and
place of our choosing." Such open-ended threats were not limited to
Shamkhani. In a prepared statement, Major General Mohammad-Ali Aziz-Jafari,
the Commander of Iran's IRGC proclaimed that
"These martyrdoms have proved that we must not distance ourselves from
Jihad; the Zionists must await our destructive thunderbolts, in the past they
have seen the emergence of our anger."
Brigadier General Esmail Qaani,
the Deputy Qods Force Commander echoed Shamkhani's sentiments, adding a twist of
his own against Israel: "We will certainly provide the answer to your
brashness and thuggery in our own time and place, and know that we will be
[the] file against your spirit and life."
Even former President Ali-Akbar
Hashemi Rafsanjani, the current Chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council,
used similar language,
as he proclaimed, "To quote the Secretary-General of Lebanon's
Hezbollah, the Zionists [should] go prepare their refuge."
Framing the strike
as part of an attempt to blunt Iran's regional preeminence was Brigadier
General Hossein Salami, the IRGC Deputy Commander who stated, "The
Zionists engaged in such a crime due to the defeats they have suffered from
Hezbollah in Yemen, Bahrain, Iraq, and Syria." Salami too issued a
warning: "The Zionists should know that they will see the ruinous
thunderbolts of the IRGC in action, as in the past."
Praising Allah-Dadi more
specifically, and linking his legacy to Iran's Islamic Revolution was Major
General Mostafa Izadi, a Deputy in Iran's General Staff Armed Forces, who eulogized that
"The martyr [Shahid] Allah-Dadi was the type of person who really knew
himself, and found this luck to be present in different stages of the
Revolution."
An inspection of Allah-Dadi's
recent arrival in the Syrian theater points to
his having been tapped for the role by Qods Force Commander Major General
Qassem Soleimani. Such affinity between Soleimani and Allah-Dadi helps to
indicate why Soleimani took time out of his day as Qods Force Commander to
personally perform the
Ziarat-e Ashura prayer
during Allah-Dadi's funeral service.
Additionally weighing-in was
Hojjat al-Eslam Mohammad-Hassan Abutorabi Fard, the Deputy-Speaker of Iran's
Parliament. Implying that Hezbollah would be in charge of the response, he noted: "Until
present, the Zionists have received several slaps from the Islamic Resistance
and Hezbollah, and the response of Hezbollah to this Zionist crime will be
exceptional and special."
Parliamentary Speaker Ali Larijani
on the other hand, chose to praise Allah-Dadi's
"martyrdom" without linking it to a threat against Israel. The same
went for Yazd Governor Seyyed Mohammad Mir Mohammadi, in charge of the city
housing the Al-Ghadir IRGC unit which Allah-Dadi formerly commanded. Mir
Mohammadi stated:
"Martyrdom is the art of men of God."
Iranian cabinet ministers too,
have offered their condolences. Foreign Minister Mohammad-Javad Zarif called the
attack an "insane act," while Intelligence Minister Hojjat al-Eslam
Alavi stated that
Allah-Dadi was killed while engaged in "an advisory function to help the
innocent government and nation of Syria against Takfiri-Salafi
terrorists."
And of course, the set of
condolences included those of Hossein Dehqan, Iran's Minister of Defense.
Dehqan's history of support to Hezbollah is well-known,
as evidenced by his recent reference to
Israeli activity in Quneitra circa 1982. Dehqan stated that
"This terrorist action of the Zionist regime in the Golan [Heights] is
the continuation of the crimes of the regime in Palestine, Syria, Iraq, [and]
Lebanon."
Recently, pictures have emerged
from the ceremonies and funeral service
of Mohammad-Ali Allah-Dadi. One notable photo is
of current and former IRGC Commanders (skipping over Yahya-Rahim Safavi)
Rezaie and Jafari. At the service, Major General Jafari took his praise of
Allahdadi in a different direction than his earlier prepared commentary.
While it is expected for the Islamic Republic's elite to praise their
deceased colleague and continue their vitriol against Israel, Jafari morphed Allah-Dadi's
death abroad into part of the foreign policy legacy of the Islamic Republic:
"The Islamic Revolution outside the country's borders is advancing with
speed and is after the conquest of fortifications, and is the realization of
the ideals of the deceased Imam (Ayatollah Khomeini) and the martyrs."
Recent developments in the Middle
East only underscore this point for Iranian elites, and perhaps more so for
the scores abroad, like Allah-Dadi, who serve[d] under them.
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Posted: 23 Jan 2015 07:14 PM PST
Earlier today, published reports
cited family members of Mohamed al Zahawi, the leader of Ansar al Sharia in
Benghazi, as saying that Zahawi had succumbed to injuries sustained during
fighting last year. Zahawi's death had been rumored for months, but there was
never any confirmation. His family told the press that he had been
hospitalized since receiving his wounds. A Libyan military official said that
Zahawi had been seriously wounded during fighting in September 2014. You can
read our coverage here.
More evidence of Zahawi's demise
has surfaced online. Jihadists have posted a photo, shown above, that
allegedly shows Zahawi after his death.
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Posted: 23 Jan 2015 07:12 PM PST
Cameroonian armed forces rescued
approximately 24 hostages on January 19 just one day after Boko Haram
terrorists raided Mabass village, located in northern Cameroon, and abducted
nearly 80 villagers. Local military sources estimated that 50 children were among
those abducted and scores of homes were also destroyed in the attack.
More details on the incident were
reported by Reuters:
"According to our initial information, around 30 adults,
most of them herders, and 50 young girls and boys aged between 10 and 15
years were abducted," a senior army officer deployed to northern
Cameroon told Reuters.
He said the early-morning attack
had targeted the village of Mabass and other villages along the porous
border. Soldiers intervened and exchanged fire with the raiders for around
two hours, he added.
Government spokesman Issa Tchiroma
confirmed the attack, in which he said three people had been killed, as well
as the kidnappings. He was not able to say with certainty how many people had
been taken in the raid.
"There was a Boko Haram
attack on several localities in the Far North region. The assailants burnt
down about 80 homes and kidnapped several inhabitants including women and
very young children," he said.
The attack on Sunday reportedly
included hundreds of Boko Haram militants who went house to house taking
women and children before attempting to flee back over the border into
Nigeria.
Deutsche Welle provided some
sobering claims about the challenges in securing the porous border areas
between Cameroon and Nigeria:
Half of the 500 kilometer (311 miles) border that Cameroon
shares with Nigeria is already occupied by Boko Haram on the Nigerian side,
and DW's
correspondent said it would be easy for them to cross over and kidnap more
Cameroonians or send in suicide bombers.
The release of some of the
hostages while Cameroon's forces were in pursuit came after Chad had begun
deploying troops to the country to assist in the fight against the
extremists.
Thousands of Chadian troops have
arrived in Cameroon in some 400 military trucks, accompanied by military
helicopters.<
The weekend clash and mass
abduction by Boko Haram is setting the stage for the much touted intervention
by neighboring Chad. Last week, the Chadian Parliament voted 150 to 0 to
provide military assistance to both Cameroon and Nigeria to help battle Boko
Haram. Chadian Government officials have since disclosed that the deployment
of its forces to Cameroon includes around 2,000 soldiers, armored vehicles
and attack helicopters, according to Al Jazeera America.
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