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The Other Side
of Autocracy: State Collapse in Yemen
by Jonathan Spyer
PJ Media
January 22, 2015
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Originally published under the title, "Yemen Joins List of
Collapsed Mideast States."
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Houthi
rebels stationed at an entrance to Yemen's presidential palace on January
22
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This week in Yemen, an Iran-backed Shia militia captured the
presidential palace. The president has since resigned. It was the latest
stage in the slow advance of the Houthis, who entered the capital Sana'a in
September of last year.
The latest Houthi victories do not bring the Shia rebels undisputed
control of the country. They do, however, ensure the undisputed presence of
the Iranian clients in the central government.
The situation in Yemen exemplifies in acute form most of the phenomena
which are currently tearing much of the Middle East apart: the
fragmentation and weakness of central governments; growing sectarian
divisions; the presence and power of a strong, Iranian backed
political-military force; the importance of local and tribal power
structures; Saudi support for the Sunnis; and the existence of a powerful
Sunni Jihadi organization, committed both to local struggle and to
terrorism against the West.
The latest Houthi victories ensure
the undisputed presence of Iranian clients in the central government of
Yemen.
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The uprising of the Houthis was launched in 2004. The movement derived
its popular support from the 30% or so of Yemenis who belong to the Zaidi
Shia community, concentrated in the north of the country.
While protesting undoubted discrimination against the Shia, the evidence
of Iranian backing for the Houthi militia — officially known as
"Ansarullah" (fighters of God) — was apparent from the outset.
The stance of the Houthis is reflected in the group's unambiguous slogan:
"God is Great, Death to America, Death to Israel, a Curse on the Jews,
Victory to Islam."
The physical proof of Iranian aid is also apparent. On January 23, 2013,
the Yemeni coast guard apprehended an Iranian ship — the Jihan 1 — which
was carrying weapons, explosives, and other military equipment from the
Revolutionary Guards Corps intended for delivery to the Houthis.
As of this week, the Houthis have an accepted role in the government of
Yemen. After fighters of the militia surrounded the presidential palace,
President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi confirmed the terms of an agreement signed
after the Houthis entered the capital last September.
The disputed terms relate to a new constitution, to which the Houthis
are demanding amendments. This is less important, however, than the now
demonstrated fact that the Shia, Iran-backed militia is the real force in
the capital, able to bend the president to its will after killing a number
of his guards and threatening his palace.
Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula
remains the most formidable local franchise of the global al-Qaeda
network.
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The Houthis are not, of course, the only militia force active in Yemen.
Further south, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) remains the most
formidable local franchise of the global al-Qaeda network. It claimed
responsibility for the recent terror attack on the offices of the Charlie
Hebdo magazine in Paris.
Strong in southern and central Yemen, al-Qaeda has launched a campaign
of violence against the Houthis. It also strikes at government and military
officials. Operating under the name of Ansar al-Sharia, AQAP now
effectively controls a number of provinces in the south and east of the
country.
The presence of the Houthis in the capital and the Sunni jihadis in the
lawless territories to its south is compounded by the weakness and
corruption of the central government, which barely exists outside of
Sana'a, and now only exists within it by the grace of a pro-Iranian Shia
militia.
The central government barely exists
outside of Sana'a, and now only exists within it by the grace of a
pro-Iranian Shia militia.
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There are no easy solutions in Yemen. As of now, the U.S. is continuing
with pinpointed strikes against AQAP, while largely preferring to ignore
the no-less-potent threat of the Houthis. This relates, presumably, to the
Obama administration's larger policy of outreach to Iran. But in practice,
there is probably little the U.S. or any other outside force can do.
The issues at stake in Yemen are the product of the profound failure of
the Arab state which underlies all that is taking place in the Middle East
today. The U.S. experience in the 2003-11 period in Iraq shows that
nation-building from the outside is not going to succeed.
Fascinatingly, it is the Arab state, not the Middle Eastern state, which
is in a process of eclipse. Israel, Turkey, and Iran, in their different
ways, are functioning sovereign entities. Kurdish Northern Iraq is also increasingly
coming to resemble a successful semi-sovereign concern. The Kurdish
enclaves in the northeast are the most peaceful and best administered parts
of the former Syria.
But from the Mediterranean coast, via Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and now down
to Yemen, there is a single line of non-functioning (or in the Lebanese
case, barely functioning) territories, in which the state has given way to
wars between rival successor entities, usually organized on a sectarian
basis. The Houthis and AQAP are the local Yemeni variant of this.
The Arab states which have not collapsed are ones which are homogenous
in sectarian terms and/or possessed of a powerful, dictatorial central
government. There are two states — Egypt and Jordan — where a real chance
existed of jihadis gaining a foothold in the way that they have in Yemen,
Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, but where this has not yet taken place. In both
cases, an authoritarian central government at the head of a strong state
apparatus has prevented the jihadis from establishing their mini-emirates
(though in Sinai, the battle is surely still on).
Can these authoritarian regimes be a model for the future of the region,
or are they simply a guarantee of its further stagnation? Perhaps the
latter. But for the moment and for the foreseeable future, the choice is
between leaders like Sisi, or situations like that of Yemen. Authoritarian
clients, or the Houthis and al-Qaeda. No third way has yet made itself
apparent.
Jonathan Spyer is a senior research
fellow at the Global Research in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, and
a fellow at the Middle East Forum. He is the author of The Transforming
Fire: The Rise of the Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).
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