FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
January 14, 2015
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UANI Fact Sheet on Nuclear Negotiations Resuming This Week
New York, NY - As nuclear negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran resume this week for the first time in 2015, United Against Nuclear Iran (UANI) is releasing a comprehensive fact sheet on the status of negotiations, the state of the Iranian economy, and the prospects of renewed congressional action on Iran.
1. Timeline of Negotiations
- November 24, 2013: Joint Plan of Action (JPA) interim agreement signed in Geneva
- January 20, 2014: JPA goes into effect for six months
- July 20, 2014: JPA extended until November 24, 2014
- November 24, 2014: JPA extended for second time, with deadlines of March 1, 2015 to reach a political framework agreement and June 30, 2015 for a final comprehensive agreement
This Week
- January 14, 2015: Meeting between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif
- January 15-17, 2015: Scheduled bilateral meetings between Iran and P5+1 countries in Geneva
- January 18, 2015: Negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran resume in Geneva
2. Current Status of Negotiations
The interim agreement is intended to build confidence between the P5+1 and Iran and provide time for additional negotiations that will ultimately lead to a final comprehensive agreement, resolving all outstanding concerns about Iran's nuclear program.
The main points of contention surround:
- the size of Iran's enrichment program
- the status of Iran's heavy water reactor at Arak
- the status of Iran's fortified underground enrichment facility at Fordow
- the scope of Iran's R&D activities, including advanced centrifuges
- Iran's ongoing ballistic missile program
- the resolution of the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA) long-standing probe into the "possible military dimensions" (PMD) of Iran's nuclear program
On all these issues, the U.S. appears to have retreated from its original positions and ceded ground. Conversely, Tehran has shown no signs of relinquishing its hardline positions on the remaining issues in dispute.
Rhetoric Versus Reality
Arak Heavy-Water Reactor
In 2013, the Administration position appeared to be that the heavy-water reactor at Arak would be shut down. In reality, it appears the reactor will merely be redesigned to reduce output.
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"They certainly don't need a heavy-water reactor at Arak in order to have a peaceful nuclear program."
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"The issue of heavy water reactor... has been virtually resolved... Iran has offered a proposal to... redesign the heart of the Arak facility and these six countries have agreed to that."
Ali Akbar Salehi, Iranian nuclear chief, 4/19/2014
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Fordow Fortified Underground Enrichment Facility
In 2013, the Administration position appeared to be that the Fordow facility would be shut down. In reality, it appears the facility will merely be repurposed.
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"Now, in terms of specifics, we know that they don't need to have an underground, fortified facility like Fordo[w] in order to have a peaceful nuclear program."
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"There's no dispute over whether reactors should be built in Arak or if Iran should enjoy enrichment technology or about Fordow or the end of so-called (nuclear) military activities."
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R&D, Advanced Centrifuges
Iran has not indicated that it will accept any limitations on its R&D, including the introduction of advanced centrifuges 24 times more efficient than Iran's currently deployed model.
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"They don't need some of the advanced centrifuges that they currently possess in order to have a limited, peaceful nuclear program."
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"All should know that negotiations will not stop or slow down any of Iran's activities in nuclear research and development."
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Size of Iran's Enrichment Program
The Administration appears to have retreated from its original position that Iran will need to "dismantle a significant amount of its nuclear infrastructure." Reports indicate that the Administration has agreed to allow Iran to operate 6,000 centrifuges from its initial bargaining position of 500 centrifuges. Tehran is still unsatisfied.
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"Iran does not need nearly the centrifuge capacity that it has today... As part of a comprehensive solution, we will require that Iran dismantle a significant amount of its nuclear infrastructure related to uranium enrichment."
White House Press Secretary Jay Carney, 1/23/2014
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"We will not retreat even one step from the country's nuclear rights; no machine or equipment will be dismantled... and the most important of all, the industrial enrichment will be materialized powerfully and within the framework of the country's needs."
Senior Nuclear Negotiator Abbas Araqchi, 10/25/2014
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Ballistic Missile Testing
The Administration appears not to have taken any concrete steps to compel Iran to rein in its ballistic missile program, as required by UN Security Council resolutions.
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"They have to deal with matters related to their ballistic missile program that are included in the United Nations Security Council resolution that is part of explicitly, according to the Joint Plan of Action, the comprehensive resolution negotiation."
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"Iran's missiles are not up for discussion under any circumstances... Iran's missiles are only our concern... We don't accept any intervention from anybody on this issue."
Defense Minister Gen. Hossein Dehghan, 4/16/2014
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Possible Military Dimensions of Iran's Nuclear Program
Reports indicate that despite the Administration's pronouncements, the P5+1 will not obligate Iran to " come clean" on its atomic bomb research, as required by the IAEA.
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"What we have said consistently is that the JPOA talked about past and present concerns, which is IAEA-speak for possible military dimensions. And we have said that these will have to be addressed to be able to achieve a comprehensive agreement."
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"We don't have any more problems with IAEA on the nuclear issue. There are no more questions that we haven't answered. In other words, we can say Iran's nuclear activities is a closed case already."
Ali Akbar Salehi, Iranian nuclear chief, 4/19/2014
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In sum, vast gaps between Iran and the P5+1 remain on many key issues. It is unclear how these gaps can be bridged in the current talks, unless the U.S. continues to withdraw from its original positions with 'creative' solutions in deference to Iran's uncompromising approach.
Notable & Quotable
"We currently produce 2.5 tons [of enriched uranium] but will need 30 tons eventually. They refuse... and ask that we reduce the number of centrifuges. We must have that right in eight years... we are ready to do this in stages. They can set the first step but we want to set the last step."
"Today, no one speaks of enrichment outside Iran. Today no one has a word about (Iran's right of) enrichment in principle since today enrichment and moving towards industrialized enrichment has been accepted as an inalienable reality and no one doubts about it anymore... Today, no one speaks of suspending enrichment. Today no one speaks of closing Fordo (enrichment facilities) or Arak (heavy water reactor) (both in Central Iran)."
"If there is no clear statement from Iran on giving up nuclear weapons, there will be no agreement... France will not yield on that point. It will remain absolutely firm."
"Have no doubt that the nuclear issue will be resolved in Iran's favor and we will soon celebrate Iran's victory."
"The main reason we don't have a deal yet or even the outlines of a deal is because Iran has taken a rigid position, an unrealistic position. It hasn't been prepared to reduce its operational enrichment capacity and it's insisted on, you know, very early lifting of sanctions before it has even demonstrated compliance with its obligations to the satisfaction of the IAEA."
"Americans have very clearly surrendered to Iran's might and this is obvious in their behavior in the region and in the negotiations, and the enemies' reservations vis-a-vis Iran are completely felt."
"Failure to reach agreement on a comprehensive nuclear deal within the time frame set by the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) is Iran's fault. The P5+1 (lead by the U.S.) offered Iran an extremely reasonable - even generous - face-saving proposal that would allow Iran to pursue its peaceful nuclear power program with a limited enrichment capacity and defer coming to terms with the IAEA on its past nuclear weapons program in exchange for graduated sanctions relief. Iran, however, continues to take extreme and inflexible positions. It refuses to reduce its existing centrifuge force of nearly 10,000 operational centrifuges, insists on rapid expansion to industrial scale enrichment and demands immediate and total removal of all sanctions... Whatever Iran's motivations, we will be in exactly the same spot we are today in seven months, unless Iran begins to show some realistic flexibility. The P5+1 should not make any new offers until Iran reciprocates with a serious proposal of its own. More important, the U.S. and its allies need to begin preparing for a resumption of the sanctions campaign in July if there is no comprehensive agreement or enough progress to justify another extension."
3. State of the Iranian Economy Under the JPA
Table of Percentage Changes in Key Economic Indicators, Iran
↑ 1.5%
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↑ 4%
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↑ 40%
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Increase in Iran's oil exports from 1 million barrels per day (bpd) before the interim agreement to about 1.4 million bpd. This has provided Iran a windfall of some $10 billion in extra revenue.
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↑ 17%
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Increase in the value of Iran's total non-oil trade turnover (exports and imports) in the first 11 months of 2014 compared to the same period of the previous year.
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↓ 23%
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Reduction in inflation, from about 40 percent at the beginning of Rouhani's tenure to 17 percent by the end of December 2014.
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↑ 64%
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Notable & Quotable
"The two great issues that the government has been grappling with were the inflation and the recession. We have now finally managed to reduce the 40 percent inflation down to 17 percent... The country's economic growth was minus 6.8 two years ago, but the statistics issued by the Central Bank last night showed a four percent positive growth during the six months of the current [Iranian] year."
Iran "doesn't lose much if negotiations fail, and it will continue its path. In regards to sanctions, as the President has said, conditions have changed and there are cracks in the wall of sanctions and we have gained more experience in solving problems."
4. Status of Congressional Action on Iran
The new Republican-controlled Congress has made clear that it
wants to be more active in the nuclear negotiations with Iran, including by passing sanctions legislation that would take effect if a
political framework agreement between Iran and the P5+1 is not reached by the March 1 deadline. The credible threat of looming sanctions would enhance the P5+1's negotiating leverage with Iran by increasing pressure on the Iranian regime to choose between its nuclear program or a functioning economy. However, White House officials continue to sharply oppose new sanctions legislation, warning it would "blow up" the negotiating process and blame would then lie at the feet of the U.S. instead of Iran.
U.S. Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) said Iran-related bills would probably come to a vote in February. The Senate will likely
consider resurrected versions of two bills first introduced in the last Congress
. U.S. Senators Mark Kirk (R-IL) and Robert Menendez (D-NJ) have jointly sponsored the bipartisan "Kirk/Menendez" bill, which would impose robust new sanctions on Iran if a deal is not concluded by the set deadlines. Another measure, authored by new Senate Foreign Relations Chairman Bob Corker (R-TN) and Sen. Graham, would require congressional authorization on any final nuclear deal reached with Iran.
Although the White House has threatened to veto any Iran sanctions legislation, Republicans are confident they can obtain a veto-proof majority.
5. UANI Statements & Resources
- 1/9/2015: "Remember to hold Iran accountable for its victims" (Palm Beach Post)
"As the international community represented by the P5+1 proceeds with negotiations with Iran, President Barack Obama should make it clear that the United States will not renew diplomatic relations with Iran, or end the U.S. sanctions, until Iran ends its support for terrorists. We must hold the Iranian regime accountable for the murder of innocent human beings and its threats to peace... since the 1990s the No. 1 obstacle to peace between Israelis and Palestinians has been the government of Iran."
"After more than a year of negotiations, there is simply no evidence to suggest that additional attempts to incentivize the Iranians to change course through more concessions or sanctions easing will be effective. Rather, Iran's refusal to make significant and timely concessions warrants a re-imposition and ratcheting up of sanctions... Iran must understand that there will be catastrophic economic consequences resulting from a failure to reach a final and acceptable agreement."
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During his 2013 speech before the UN General Assembly, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani proposed his WAVE [World Against Violent Extremism] initiative, supposedly to promote 'tolerance over violence, progress over bloodletting, justice over discrimination, prosperity over poverty, and freedom over despotism.' Yet Iran is in no position to instruct the international community on how to build a less violent world free of extremism. WAVE is merely a cynical ploy to mask the Iranian regime's notorious record of violence and extremism, including its role as the leading state sponsor of terrorism, its egregious abuse of human rights and decades of anti-American, anti-Western vitriol."
"As the international community seeks to negotiate a deal with Iran over its nuclear program, we must not give Iran a free pass on its support for Bashar al-Assad. If we fail, we may as well admit that we have learned nothing from history."
"There should be no doubt that the failure to achieve a workable agreement on Iran's nuclear program falls squarely at the feet of the Iranian leadership. The P5+1 was more than generous in its proposals and compromise offers made to Iran in recent days. Iran should not expect that delaying an agreement or creating an impasse in negotiations will cause the P5+1 to become more generous over time. Simply put, the elements of a 'bad deal' do not change. Any deal that leaves Iran with short term nuclear weapons breakout capacity, does not provide for a full and comprehensive verification system, and fails to fully resolve all questions related to PMD (Possible Military Dimensions) is a bad deal."
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