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Syria's
Interlocking Conflicts
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There
are no less than five major identifiable conflicts taking place in
Syria today.
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The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces last Friday announced the
commencement of an operation to conquer the northern Syrian city of
Raqqa. The operation was designated "Euphrates Wrath."
Raqqa is the capital of the "Caliphate" maintained by the
Islamic State organization. In tandem with the effort currently under way
to recapture the Iraqi city of Mosul from IS, the loss of Raqqa would
represent the final eclipse of the Islamic State as a quasi-sovereign
entity. At this point, it would revert back to the
guerrilla/insurgent/terrorist force which it constituted prior to the
outbreak of the Syrian civil war.
Conquering the city is likely to be a slow business. However, the
final outcome is not in doubt. The Islamic State, whose main slogan in
Arabic is "Baqiya watatamadad" (remaining and expanding) has
been in reality contracting since the high point of its advance in the
autumn of 2014. Its eventual demise, at least as a quasi-state entity, is
assured.
But Syria is host not only to the war against IS, but to a series of
other, interlocking conflicts. And one of these additional conflicts pits
the two main candidates for the leading role in the fight against IS in
Raqqa against one another.
Observe: there are in Syria today no less than five identifiable
conflicts taking place.
Deep differences between Kurds and
Turkish-backed rebels have hampered the fight against Islamic State.
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These are: Turkish-backed Sunni Arab rebel and Islamist organizations
against the Assad dictatorship, western backed SDF (Syrian Democratic
Forces, dominated by the Kurdish YPG) against IS, Kurdish YPG against the
Assad regime, the aforementioned Sunni rebels against IS and, lastly, the
Sunni rebels against the SDF.
The problem for those seeking to cobble together a force to take Raqqa
city and by so doing destroy the Islamic State, is that the two eligible
forces to carry out this action are the mainly Kurdish SDF and the
Turkish-backed, mainly Islamist Sunni rebels – but these forces are at
war with one another.
After the SDF announced the commencement of the Raqqa campaign this
week, Turkish President Recep Tayepp Erdogan expressed his opposition to
the decision, repeating his assertion that the Kurdish YPG are merely
"another terror organization...a side branch" of the PKK.
Following the SDF's announcement, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of
Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford met with Turkish Chief of Staff General Hulusi
Akar in Ankara. After the meeting, Dunford said that the US would work
together with Turkey to develop a long term plan for "seizing,
holding and governing" the city.
YPG
and YPJ fighters at the funeral of three comrades killed fighting
Islamic State.
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Dunford stated that the US considered the largely non-Arab SDF
"wasn't the solution" for "holding and governing"
largely Sunni Arab Raqqa.
A judicious reader will notice that Dunford's statement doesn't say
that the SDF is unsuitable for the job of capturing the city, only for
holding it afterwards.
The root of the deep differences between the SDF and the Turkish supported
rebels are to be found not only in the soil of northern Syria. Rather,
they are inextricably linked to the long insurgency fought by Turkey's
Kurds against a succession of governments in Ankara since 1984.
The fragmenting of Syria formed a historic opportunity for the Syrian
Kurds, which they have seized. The PYD, the Syrian Kurdish franchise of
the PKK organization, established three self-governing cantons along the
Syrian-Turkish border in 2012. In 2015, against the background of the
fight against IS, they managed to unite two of these – Jazeera and
Kobani. On March 17, 2016, the ruling coalition in these areas announced
the formation of the "Federation of Northern Syria – Rojava."
The US has since October 2015 found the Kurdish YPG to be a formidable
and useful ground partner to coalition air power against IS. But the
Kurds themselves, while welcoming the alliance with the US, have long
sought another objective – namely to unite the three cantons, connecting
Jazira/Kobani with Afrin in the far north west of the country.
From a Turkish point of view, the prospect of a PKK-linked party
controlling the entirety of the 800 km border between Syria and Turkey is
entirely unacceptable. Since mid-2015, a Kurdish insurgency is once again
under way against the Turkish government. As part of the general
post-coup crackdown, Erdogan this week arrested Turkey's most prominent
Kurdish politician, Salahattin Demirtas of the HDP.
A
Turkish-backed rebel stands guard in Jarabulus.
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Since 2012, the instruments Turkey chose to use to contain the Syrian
Kurds were the mainly Islamist rebel movements of northern Syria, from
the more moderate elements across to Jabhat al Nusra and possibly at one
time also ISIS.
By mid-2016, supporting ISIS was no longer an option, and the rebels
by themselves were too weak for purpose. So in August, Turkey boldly
launched a direct intervention into northern Syria. ISIS were the
ostensible target. But the clear purpose was to bisect Syria's north,
rendering a sufficient area impassable that the danger of the Kurds
linking up their cantons would disappear.
This process is not yet complete. The Kurds are still west of the
Euphrates, in the town of Manbij. And the crucial IS-held town of Al-Bab
remains unconquered. The Turks would like to help their rebel clients
take the town and end any further possibility of Kurdish unification. But
here, in the usual labyrinthine way, other players enter the picture.
Al-Bab is close to Aleppo. It is possible that the Russians have warned
Erdogan that the town remains out of bounds.
But the point to bear in mind is that the process of coalition
building against IS in Syria is complicated by the fact that two
potential members of the coalition – the US-backed SDF and the Turkish
army with their Sunni Arab allies, are currently engaged in a direct
conflict with one another.
In this regard, it is worth noting the yawning gap between the
military achievements of the Syrian Kurds and their dearth of similar
successes in the diplomatic and political fields. While YPG commanders
call in US airstrikes against IS, no country has recognized the
Federation of Northern Syria, and it has received little media coverage.
Dunford's hurried visit to Ankara reflects the diplomatic state of
play. Namely, that the agenda of a Turkish government, even one that
openly supports Sunni jihadis, must be indulged. That of a Kurdish ally
can be dismissed. The Kurds may have little choice in the matter. But
they should be careful not to find themselves quickly abandoned once
Operation "Euphrates Wrath" is done.
Jonathan Spyer, a fellow at the
Middle East Forum, is director of the Rubin Center for Research in
International Affairs and author of The Transforming Fire: The Rise of the
Israel-Islamist Conflict (Continuum, 2011).
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