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The
Greatest Threat in Syria Comes from Iran
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Originally published under the title, "Why the Hezbollah
clash matters."
As the Assad regime is losing its grip over the country, Iran and its
proxy, Hezbollah, both active defenders of the regime, are gaining
greater freedom of action and trying to change the status quo along
Israel's northern border. Both are ideologically committed to the
destruction of Israel and are trying to establish a new operations stage
against Israel on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights -- something that
Assad has resisted for years.
Hezbollah seeks an additional arena from where it can harm Israel, as
conducting operations against the Jewish state from Lebanon is
problematic due to domestic political constraints (primarily fear of
escalation and spillover effects on the Lebanese economy). Iran has a
perennial interest in bleeding Israel. Creating a new threat from Syria
serves this purpose. A new front in Syria will also to enhance its
ability to deter an Israeli attack on its nuclear installations.
A new front in Syria will enhance
Iran's ability to deter an Israeli attack on its nuclear installations.
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The helicopter
attack in Syria on senior commanders of Hezbollah and Iran, just
beyond the border with Israel, seems to signal that Jerusalem will not
tolerate the opening of a new front. It is not clear that the
Israeli-enunciated red line will be effective. Hezbollah's response --
attacking an Israeli military convoy in the border area between the Golan
Heights and Lebanon -- was measured, but indicated a tit for tat modus
operandi.
Israel's counter-response was also measured, showing that the
government was reluctant to escalate intentionally and preferred to
contain the violence. This is also what transpires from Israel's behavior
in its war against Hamas during the summer of 2014. While Israel's
cautious response is laudable in many respects, the limited Israeli
military response to Hezbollah's attack does not enhance deterrence.
Deterrence can be enhanced, however, if Israel makes preparations for
a large-scale operation against Hezbollah. This means building the
necessary ground forces and training for Lebanese scenarios. Such a
build-up process is not clearly evident so far, and Hezbollah might
deduce that its huge arsenal (over 100,000 missiles) creates an effective
deterrent. As the number of attacks on Israel from southern Lebanon
increased in recent months, the long period of quiet since 2006 seems
more fragile. Perhaps Hezbollah is less afraid to hit Israeli targets.
Deterrence against highly motivated rivals such as Hezbollah is always
temporary and wears off with time. Israeli restraint is not conducive to
restoration of deterrence. Therefore, the capability to destroy the
Hezbollah missile threat is needed for deterring this radical
organization, but also in case Israel finds it necessary to address such
a threat before it attacks the Iranian nuclear infrastructure.
Deterrence against highly
motivated rivals is always temporary, wearing off with time. Israeli
restraint is not conducive its restoration.
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The attempts to change the security equation in the north call for a
reassessment of Israel's policies toward Assad. If he is no longer able
to resist the desire of Iran and Hezbollah to perpetrate terrorist acts
against Israel from beyond the Golan Heights, his usefulness for Israel
becomes limited. It is true that the civil war in Syria, where bad guys
fight bad guys, is a convenient strategic development. Moreover, Israel
(among other actors) has very limited influence on the outcome of the
bloody struggle, but the survival of the Assad regime should no longer be
a factor in Israel's strategic calculations.
Actually, the fall of the Assad regime is nowadays an Israeli
interest. The demise of this regime would be a terrible blow to its
regional allies -- Iran and Hezbollah. Damascus, an old ally of Tehran,
is the linchpin of the Shiite crescent. And Iran is the most dangerous
enemy of Israel and the main source for regional instability. The fall of
Assad would also weaken Hezbollah considerably. It would reduce
Hezbollah-Iranian influence in Lebanon and make the Hezbollah military
build-up a more complicated enterprise. A Hezbollah without Iranian
control of Damascus might spare Israel the need to intervene militarily
in Lebanon in order to deal with the missile threat.
An Israeli predisposition to
discard Assad is useful in Jerusalem's relations with Saudi Arabia,
which loathes the Syrian regime.
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If Assad falls, it is not clear what will happen in Syria, but it is
certain that Sunni radical groups will be more influential and the
struggle over controlling parts of the country will continue. Yet,
substate groups are generally less of a security threat than states.
Assad-led Syria still has a chemical weapons arsenal and there are
reports that it is trying to revive its nuclear weapon program.
An Israeli predisposition to discard Assad is also useful in
Jerusalem's relations with Saudi Arabia, which loathes the Assad regime
and understands that its fall will curtail the growing Iranian influence
in the Middle East. It is the Iranian threat that constitutes the
strategic glue between the two states.
Of course, the Obama administration does not grasp the Iranian threat
and continues its ill-advised attempts to reach an agreement with Iran,
which allows Tehran to keep its option to build nuclear weapons. It tries
to strengthen Shiite control of Baghdad, seems to cooperate with Assad
against ISIS, which turned out to be a mere strategic distraction, and
accepts the Shiite Houthis' takeover of Yemen. Therefore, the
Syrian-Lebanese nexus could become another issue of divergence between
Jerusalem and Washington. Consequently, the paralysis of Barack Obama's
Middle East policy increasingly becomes an Israeli concern as well.
Efraim Inbar is director of the
Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, a professor of political
studies at Bar-Ilan University, and a Shillman/Ginsburg fellow at the
Middle East Forum.
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