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Please take a moment to visit and log in at the subscriber area, and submit your city & country location. We will use this information in future to invite you to any events that we organize in your area. The Arab Centerby Marwan Muasher Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2703/the-arab-center
Muasher, foreign minister of Jordan in 2002-04, distinguished himself as a moderate voice during a career that included stints as Jordan's first ambassador to Israel, its ambassador to the United States, and as deputy prime minister. Much of The Arab Center consists of Muasher recounting his diplomatic experience. A chapter on his time as Jordan's first ambassador to Israel will interest readers curious how an Arab diplomat sees Israel. Other chapters deal with the Abdullah plan of 2002, the Middle East road map, and the Aqaba summit. Muasher blames Israel for undercutting a historic opportunity with a military offensive into the West Bank the day after an Arab summit affirmed the 2002 initiative, but he omits the suicide bombing of a Passover seder at a Tel Aviv hotel the day before. Such an unwillingness to place events in context permeates his book. He rates as a liberal within the Jordanian political context, but that does not translate into a willingness to abandon the traditional Arab narrative blaming Israel for most ills. Israel's participation in the 1991 Madrid peace conference, he writes, "was not genuine." But, of course, Jordan's participation was. He relates how his government used the conference to position itself in an Arab leadership role. Indeed, over the next decade and, even more after 9/11, Jordan joined Egypt and Saudi Arabia as the "new Arab core," both moderate and proactive. Within the context of Jordanian politics, Muasher is often labeled a reformer, pushing for more political and economic transparency and diplomatic moderation. At one point he explains his reasons, recalling that he urged Arab foreign ministers "to create a homegrown blueprint for political and economic reform in the Arab world, lest the United States try to impose its version of reform outlined in the 'Greater Middle East Initiative.'" The Arab reform comes up only really in one chapter, where he observes that Arab governments—and even opposition parties—have used the Arab-Israeli conflict as an excuse to avoid any serious dialogue about reform. Alas, this is a trap from which he himself is unable to escape, arguing that Arab reform "requires a dramatic change of policies by Israel," adding "Israel cannot continue to rule by the sword." Then, how does Muasher explain the worsening of violence and the failure to reform in Gaza following Israel's 2005 unilateral disengagement? The reader never finds out. Muasher's implication that the West should view terrorism in shades of gray rather than as a black-and-white issue is to suggest that some terrorism can be acceptable; he does not recognize that it is this willingness to legitimize terrorism that is at the heart of the political failure of the Arab states. His statement that Islam need not hamper democracy may be true, but his argument—a breezy reference to centuries of Islamic scholarship emphasizing individual reason and freedom—falls flat; early caliphates neither prized liberty nor enjoyed even proto-democracy. Still, he is correct that Arab civil society must "muster the courage to answer religious parties." Muasher's outline of the way forward is equally thin: Recommending that Arab states make a "commitment to political and cultural diversity" and "commitment to peaceful means" is easier said than done. Related Topics: Michael Rubin Spring 2010 MEQ Criminals, Militias, and Insurgentsby Phil Williams Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2704/criminals-militias-and-insurgents
Analysts describing challenges facing Iraq tend to ignore organized crime, which is unfortunate because organized crime, along with corruption more generally, dominates economic life in post-Saddam Iraq and hampers security. Fortunately, Williams, a visiting research professor at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, has filled this gap and does so excellently. If Iraq today ranks among the most corrupt states in the world, just three decades ago it was among the cleanest states in the Arab League. Williams, like Iraqi scholar Kanan Makiya before him,[1] traces the roots of corruption to Saddam Hussein's rule, to decades of wartime economy, and to sanctions. Following the U.S. invasion, Williams identifies two waves of organized crime: One took advantage of the collapse of the state and of the breakdown of social control; the other was defined by political ambition and the need to find resources for militias. The oil industry became the epicenter of corruption, facilitated by an absence of both standardized measures of production and of metering. While oil is the lifeblood for Iraq's recovery, neither the Iraqi government nor the coalition authorities knew exactly how much oil the state produced. Corrupt officials and insurgents could funnel oil away with impunity. What affected most Iraqis, however, was not oil smuggling but kidnapping. While the Western media focused on political kidnappings—the beheadings of foreigners, for example—what terrorized Iraqis and worried foreigners across the country were kidnappings for ransom. Williams tackles the subject with detail and precision. He turns the same cool professionalism to extortion, government corruption, and the terrorist groups and militias. Refreshingly, Williams does not engage in polemic nor infuse his writing with petty political agendas. He does not solely blame U.S. authorities, the coalition, or Western countries although he also pulls no punches: Of the ballooning of organized crime after Iraq's liberation, he notes, "The U.S. decision to react passively in the face of widespread looting was a major mistake, creating a climate of citizen insecurity and criminal impunity." Western countries also, to some extent, fueled kidnapping: "Profits were significantly enhanced by the willingness of France, Italy, Germany, and several other countries to pay large ransoms." The only disappointment in Criminals, Militias, and Insurgents lies in the conclusion, which is too general and provides little guidance beyond the obvious: Williams recommends constricting the space for organized crime to operate, reducing incentives for criminal behavior, and targeting the most dangerous networks. Alas, the lack of specificity to Williams' antidote illustrates just how crippling the problem of corruption in Iraq has become. [1] Kanan Makiya, "All Levels of the Iraqi Government Were Complicit," Middle East Quarterly, Spring 2005, pp. 81-87. Related Topics: Iraq Michael Rubin Spring 2010 MEQ The Crisis of Islamic Civilizationby Ali A. Allawi Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2705/the-crisis-of-islamic-civilization
Allawi, who at various times was Iraqi minister of trade, minister of defense, and minister of finance following Saddam Hussein's overthrow, ends his book with a plausible conclusion—that, by nature, Islamic civilization must either subsume or be subsumed—but only after long swathes of tangents, contradictions, and loaded assumptions. As for the latter, Islam's purported golden age plagues Allawi, evinced by his obsession over "what went wrong?" He flatly rejects any answer that even remotely involves Islam per se as "patently absurd," arguing that Islamic civilization was at the vanguard of human progress in the medieval era. Of course, the oft-repeated and (overly-dramatized) question of "what went wrong?" is moot. It falsely assumes that if Islamic civilization was at the vanguard of progress in the medieval era, it should be so now. Begrudging the West's meteoric rise, this position ultimately implies that Islam's birthright was somehow usurped. Yet just because Muslims refined the astrolabe—which, as with most Muslim accomplishments, was in the service of Islam (to fix prayer times), something even the most radical Muslim happily permits—does not mean Islam was destined to split the atom. Nothing went wrong. This becomes clear when one ceases comparing Islam to the West—ceases comparing apples with oranges—and compares Islam to itself, appreciating the many constants. Numerous pages are devoted to exploring the thoughts of progressive Islamic thinkers, only to reveal their aberrancy vis-à-vis Shari'a norms and thus their failure to resonate with the Muslim masses. Indeed, Shari'a is the insurmountable wall, the dead-end that repeatedly foils Allawi's strategies or sophistries by his own implicit demonstrations. Apologetics abound: Allawi minimizes the Islamic conquests; he trivializes the issue of blasphemy and apostasy charges, blaming the Western media for "sensationalizing" them; he portrays the dhimmi-status (existence as a subjugated religious minority) as something almost admirable; and there is a curious chapter questioning the West's apparently overdeveloped notions of human rights: "Muslims must themselves decide what human rights mean in Islam." Most vexing are the contradictions and circular arguments. Allawi criticizes the Western notion that Islam's position on usury hampers Muslim economies by boasting that "the arts of commerce and enterprise were honored and celebrated in a religion founded by a Prophet who had been a merchant." Yet he bemoans modern Mecca's transformation into a "tawdry shopping strip"—obliquely finding Western influence. We are told "the moral drive which generates the actions of the ethical human being cannot be left unregulated and entirely answerable to reason or whim. The Sharia—in the broadest sense of the word—becomes the means to effect a true and lasting guidance for the ethical individual." Sentences later, this is reversed: "The outer rules of the Sharia—whether modernized or not—or the acceptance of modern norms or values by a rationalizing Islam do not provide the moral compass which can keep Muslims on an even keel." It is almost impossible to discern what his position is, what he espouses, what he condemns. He vacillates frequently—now condemning the Islamic world, now praising it and condemning modernity. Allawi is fully aware of the crisis of Islamic civilization: Certain fixed aspects of Shari'a are simply at odds with modernity and globalization, and he (wittingly or unwittingly) ultimately demonstrates this. However, due to sympathy or affinity—and, above all, confusion over the significance of Islam's golden age—his book roams freely. Related Topics: History, Islam Raymond Ibrahim Spring 2010 MEQ Fixing Hellby Col. (ret) Lawrence James Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2706/fixing-hell
James, a U.S. Army colonel and a psychologist deployed to Abu Ghraib in the wake of the prison's scandals, tells of his efforts to "fix hell" there—in other words, to help repair the image of the U.S. Army in Iraq. The author seeks to explain the psychodynamics and the culture that allowed for the twisted and sometimes depraved behavior of eight army guards. James was also charged with establishing rules and procedures involving the interrogation of nonmilitary enemy combatants. The book reads well, with crisp sentences and easily digestible ideas, and without foggy psychological theories or obscure military jargon. Indeed, several chapters of the book have the feel of the "leadership" style books fashionable in recent years. It also raises three issues of enduring interest concerning the Middle East. First, what is the best way to incarcerate, interrogate, and possibly reintegrate nonmilitary combatants? Are harsh interrogation procedures more or less effective than a compassionate, empathetic approach in eliciting information from such combatants? James recommends more efforts at rehabilitation and suggests interrogators become much better educated in the social relations of the Arab and Islamic worlds. Second, can the hyperbolic anger in young Islamist Iraqis be classified as a new psychological disorder, given that the offenders do not display symptoms associated with psychosis? Unfortunately, James does not give an answer. He admits to being overwhelmed by the breadth and depth of hate being inculcated in the Muslim world's youth. He is not optimistic about the collective mental health of a generation of impoverished Muslims who are nourished on grievance, resentment, and revenge for crimes sometimes real but usually imagined. Third, how did Abu Ghraib happen? In James's view, the Abu Ghraib disaster resulted from a perfect storm. The soldiers were young, many of them adolescents far away from home for the first time; there was a loss of control among the noncommissioned officers; the mission was never clearly defined; the rules of interrogation were never understood; and the officers did not make their physical presence visible, demonstrating that they were in command. Finally, weak leadership allowed the few sadistic elements that exist in all armies to express themselves without fear of consequences. James's personal account gives students of the Middle East a fresh prism through which to view one of the most notorious scandals involving the U.S. Army in recent years. Fusing the perspectives of a mental health professional and a professional soldier creates an informative and highly readable book. Related Topics: Counter-terrorism, Iraq Mark Silinsky Spring 2010 MEQ Iraq in Transitionby Peter J. Munson Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2707/iraq-in-transition
Munson, a U.S. Marine officer with broad experience in the Middle East, synthesizes a narrative of the war in Iraq with explanations of the social, cultural, and political roots of the postwar conflict. He states, "The intent of this book is to describe how the legacies of Saddam Hussein's rule and the longer sweep of history in Iraq produced the conditions that fueled insurgency, sectarian warfare, and intra-sectarian political maneuvering and violence." Munson is careful not to argue that events were predestined although he does argue that had U.S. policymakers been more aware, they could have mitigated the crisis. Munson understands historiography and integrates historical background into the narrative. He includes canonical studies of Iraq and also draws upon more recent works. However, he borrows too much from these headline-grabbing but often flawed works, rather than fact-checking from scratch and, thus, sometimes repeats their errors. Hence, he labels Douglas Feith head of the Pentagon's Office of Special Plans when he was in fact undersecretary of defense for policy. Likewise, he exaggerates the role assigned to Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmad Chalabi by the Pentagon while at the same time misstating basic biographical information, seemingly unaware that Chalabi had returned to Iraq—the Kurdish part at least—in 1991 and not, as Munson writes, in 2003. Unlike many instant Iraq experts, Munson recognizes that power among tribal, religious, and other groups was not constant over time though he does not delve deeply enough into its ebb and flow. Saddam balanced the army, the party, tribes, and clergy, empowering some to diminish the role of others. By addressing tribalism in isolation, Munson misses the broader context. And while he castigates officials for not understanding the complexity of Iraq, he seems to repeat their error in his discussion of religiosity in the prewar period by remaining too focused on Sunni Islam. When and how, Munson might have asked, did the Shi'i rank-and-file become so adamantly religious in a society that once leaned toward moderation? Munson concludes by questioning the wisdom of a policy emphasizing democracy. While there are valid arguments to suggest democracy is not compatible with Iraq's governance, Munson does not make them. He cites false analogies to the U.S. occupations of Germany and Japan and also to U.S. support for South Vietnam's government, but curiously, he skips over any discussion of South Korea where the analogy to Iraq is perhaps truest. Likewise, while it is easy to criticize democracy, Munson does not suggest an alternative. After all, was it not decades of dictatorship in Iraq that led to sectarian conflict and state failure in the first place? Despite its foibles, Iraq in Transition is one of the better post-Iraq war overviews, a well-written summary of developments after coalition forces occupied Baghdad. While the authors of the first versions of the history of this period were sweeping in their judgments, Munson is more nuanced and has a better grasp of government and military decision-making. Related Topics: Iraq Michael Rubin Spring 2010 MEQ Jihad and Genocideby Richard L. Rubenstein Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2708/jihad-and-genocide
Jihad and Genocide offers a timely and important contribution to the study of Islamism, one of the most dangerous phenomena of our times. Rubenstein argues that while the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the United States was based on calculation, rationality, and power, Islamist terrorism and jihad are based on irrationality: The goal is not just to win a war, but to kill all enemies and infidels, especially Jews. Rubenstein, 85 and a noted Holocaust specialist, draws parallels between current Islamic terrorism and the Nazi programs of extermination. "Having spent most of my career writing and teaching about the Holocaust," Rubenstein writes, "I now find myself once again confronted by sworn enemies of the United States and Israel who have promised to exterminate my people. With knowledge gained over many decades, I feel I have no option but to take these people at their word." He warns that just as Hitler and the Germans told the world that they would kill the Jews, and then did, so jihadists today say and do likewise. In a lengthy discussion of the Nazis and Islam, Rubenstein persuasively shows that Hitler was an admirer of Islam. Contemporary comparisons of Israel with Nazi Germany particularly concern Rubenstein. In ways, he finds that Islamist propaganda is worse than that of Nazi Germany because it is more overt about the goal of killing Jews. However, one should be careful in comparing Islamism to National Socialism in this manner. Also unconvincing are his concepts of defeat and rage and his comparison of Hitler and the Germans to the Muslim world. Rubenstein ignores the Weimar political culture's widespread anti-Semitism, including anti-Semitic scandals and discussion groups and the role of the Communist Party. For instance, he cites Ruth Fischer as an important leader of the German Communist Party but does not mention that she was an anti-Semitic Jew during the early Weimar period. Anti-Semitism in Weimar Germany was not just right-wing and Nazi-style, as Rubenstein says, rather it was a "cultural code," to quote German historian Susanne Wein.[1] Also not persuasive are Rubenstein's explanations of Jews as objects of hatred because of their roles as capitalists, traders, financiers, and professionals prior to World War II, similar in his view to hatred toward the Chinese in South Asia, the Lebanese and Chinese in West Africa, or the Armenians in the Ottoman Empire. In fact, such resentment against trade, finance, and capitalism have been made most particularly against Jews since the early Christian times. Rubenstein also obfuscates on the subject of genocide, the Holocaust, and anti-Semitism when he refers to a "Museum of the Bosnian Holocaust" or a "Museum of the Chechen Holocaust." The author begins with important aspects of Muslim history, looking specifically at Muslim involvement in mass murder from the Armenian massacres to the attacks of 9/11 and today's Iranian threat against Israel. Rubenstein also decodes some leading jihadist theorists, including Sayyid Qutb, Abdullah Yusuf 'Azzam, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, and Osama bin Laden. Urging the world to listen carefully to them, he is shocked and astonished that days after 9/11, George W. Bush declared that "Islam is peace." Jihad and Genocide stresses the importance of Islamic doctrines such as Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb. Refuting apologist claims about jihad, Rubenstein argues that it is not the internal struggle of a Muslim, but an expression of war, violence, and hatred of non- Muslims and insufficiently Islamic fellow Muslims. He sees jihad as one of the greatest threats to world peace in general and to Jews and the state of Israel in particular. Rubenstein urges the Western world to listen to Islamist declarations of war and considers the widespread Western silence about the genocidal consequences of jihad as dangerous. One book will not change the world, but books like this give one hope. [1] Susanne Wein, "Antisémitisme dans les mouvements ouvriers des années 1920? Enquête sur la presse ouvrière de Brême de 1924 à 1928," in Philippe Mesnard, et al, eds., Témoigner entre histoire et mémoire (Paris: Editions Kime, 2008), pp. 125-55. Related Topics: History, Radical Islam Spring 2010 MEQ Jihad. Les textes fondateurs de l'islam face à la modernitéby Johan Bourlard Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2709/jihad-les-textes-fondateurs-de-islam
In a short, dense book, historian Bourlard provides the public with clear and valuable information on the roots of jihad in the founding texts of Islam, a subject of obviously central importance these days. Bourlard's study benefits from objectivity, brevity, and clarity while providing a profusion of sources. Le Jihad is needed because the public largely sees jihad as a Muslim version of the Christian crusade. In fact, jihad and crusade are radically different ideologically, if not actually opposed, emerging from two different world-views. Contrary to the concept of crusade, jihad is an unending commitment to God that permeates an all-encompassing Muslim religious and legal view of the non-Muslim world. This hegemonic understanding emerges from Muhammad, whose words and deeds establish forever the immutable, perfect, and divinely inspired conduct that every Muslim must emulate in deeds and words. As Bourlard explains, over two hundred verses in the Qur'an mandate jihad, and these are then underscored in the Sunna and the biographies. Bourlard argues that the jihadist outlook is intrinsic to the whole body of Muslim and Islamic religious, legal, and foundational teachings. Muslim scholars disagree about the means to be employed for achieving the jihadist goal, whether by war or da'wa (proselytism), but they never disagree on jihad's aim, which is Islamization of the entire world. The author then discusses the meaning of jihad in modern times, emphasizing that Muslim scholars praise it as a holy and perpetually just war expressing God's will. Bourlard concludes that jihad is an integral part of Muslim spirituality, an act of piety confirmed by several Qur'anic verses, combining prayer and war, as Muslims execute God's will. Jihad operates as the fusion between faith and politics. For this reason, says Bourlard, the jihadist tactic of contemporary terrorists aimed at destabilizing Western societies and imposing Islamic world supremacy reproduce the traditional, jihadist pattern. Therefore, it is impossible to declare that today's Islamist terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. The author discusses modern initiatives by Muslim scholars. Those who view jihad as an exclusively spiritual effort are simply inventing a new concept. Bourlard notes that Muhammad himself linked faith and war; who can disentangle these after Muhammad associated them? Another school, while not criticizing jihad, promotes principles of Islamic tolerance that allegedly have enlightened the West. In his assessment of such trends, the author concludes that most are apologetic stratagems more than genuinely constructive approaches. Related Topics: Radical Islam Bat Ye'or Spring 2010 MEQ Lion of Jordanby Avi Shlaim Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2710/lion-of-jordan
Shlaim, a Baghdad-born Israeli and professor of international relations at the University of Oxford, has written a substantial biography of King Hussein of Jordan. Lion of Jordan represents a hagiography of the "plucky little king," who led his country for almost fifty years through peace and war. Shlaim's biography would carry more weight if it included some criticism of Hussein. It would have been better if the word "lion" had not appeared in the title, as if produced by the king's private office. His obvious admiration for King Hussein severely hampers his ability to provide his readers with a more balanced and critical biography. Further, the book's authority is undermined by Shlaim's obsessive criticism of Israel. For example, when Shlaim examines the September 1970 Jordanian civil war and mentions that some 3,400 Palestinians may have died, he refrains from criticizing the Jordanian king for ordering the crackdown on the Palestine Liberation Organization. Instead, Shlaim states that King Hussein acted with "courage and decisiveness" to "defend his rule against the combined Palestinian-Syrian challenge." He admits that the Jordanian army had "clear superiority in numbers and armament," and yet he does not note disproportionate force here. Describing Israel in similar circumstances, Shlaim remarked that "as always, mighty Israel claims to be the victim of Palestinian aggression, but the sheer asymmetry of power between the two sides leaves little room for doubt as to who is the real victim."[1] Bias aside, the biography is well written and is probably one of the best available, a testimony to the greater weaknesses or even stronger biases of other accounts of Hussein's life. King Hussein was an important twentieth-century leader who transformed his country and saved it from the hands of radical Arab nationalism, Palestinian nationalism, and Islamism. For all that, he still awaits a proper biographer. [1] Avi Shlaim, "How Israel Brought Gaza to the Brink of Humanitarian Catastrophe," The Guardian (London), Jan. 7, 2009. Related Topics: Jordan Seth Frantzman Spring 2010 MEQ My Prison, My Homeby Haleh Esfandiari Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2711/my-prison-my-home
Repressive regimes rule by fear. Yet these very regimes are among the most fearful. Hence, in the paranoid mind of Iran's security apparatus, Esfandiari, a 67-year-old Iranian-American grandmother and director of the Middle East Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, became a central figure in an alleged U.S. and Zionist plot to overthrow the Iranian regime, despite her advocacy of dialogue with the Islamic Republic. My Prison, My Home is Esfandiari's account of an 8-month ordeal that started with a staged robbery against her as she was on her way to the airport on December 30, 2006. Her robbers turned out to be security officials, who took her passports and then, when she went to the police station, subjected her to repeated interrogations, eventually taking her to Evin prison where she was held for 105 days. In her narrative, Esfandiari intertwines her own life story with the history of U.S.-Iran relations. Her love for her country of birth and a desire to see a better Iran shines through her writing. Esfandiari's descriptions of her interrogations offer a valuable glimpse into the uninformed and often skewed reality of Iranian intelligence groups. For example, they assumed that blank wrapping paper, found during a raid in the apartment of Esfandiari's mother where Esfandiari was staying, must have had invisible ink writing on it: "I laughed, despite the gravity of the situation," she writes. Esfandiari withstood her ordeal with grace, never admitting any guilt. In the end, through a barrage of international coverage, enough pressure was put on the Iranian regime to free her. Outside pressure worked for her, but as she writes, "What of others?" Esfandiari also infuses her book with a message about the importance of engagement. She believes in engaging the Iranian regime because "thirty years of estrangement have yielded nothing of value." But after being imprisoned for advocating dialogue, aside from saying she believes in exchanges between Americans and Iranians, she does not say exactly how the regime should be engaged or at what cost. Esfandiari's book is not the first to describe experiences under interrogation in an oppressive regime, nor is it the best. Natan Sharansky, former Soviet dissident, imprisoned from 1977-86, recorded similar observations about the primitive methods of his captors in his memoirs, highlighting that they were part of a system of slavery with which he would never be able to reason.[1] While Sharansky may have added greater depth and broader perspective, My Prison, My Home is, nonetheless, a valuable addition to the accounts written by former dissidents. Not only does Esfandiari add a corrective to the somewhat whitewashed accounts of Iranian history that too often omit the unseemly side of Iranian repression, but as the genre grows, its mass may give strength to others destined, unfortunately, to share Esfandiari's experience. [1] Natan Sharansky, Fear No Evil, Stefani Hoffman, trans. (New York: Random House, 1988), p. 41, 261, xiv. Related Topics: Iran Spring 2010 MEQ North Africa: Politics, Region, and the Limits of TransformationEdited by Yahia H. Zoubir and Haizam Amirah-Fernández. London and New York: Routledge, 2008. 394 pp. $160 ($45.95, paper) Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2712/north-africa-politics-region-transformation
This impressive book, edited by Zoubir, director of research in geopolitics at Euromed Marseille, and Amirah-Fernández, of the Autonomous University of Madrid and senior analyst at the Elcano Royal Institute for International and Strategic Studies in Madrid, provides the reader with ample coverage of contemporary developments in the Maghreb, that North African region consisting of Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania. The book opens with a foreword by William B. Quandt, University of Virginia, who rightly notes that "with a population of around 85 million, this region provides relief from the horrific events of the eastern Arab world, while nonetheless reminding us of how challenging the processes of economic and political reform can be." The volume provides a broad range of important and up-to-date information and analysis on the reality of life in the North African region. The book offers a deep and wide ranging analysis of issues relating to each of the five separate countries and also looks at regional and international relations, including such topics as the relations between France and the Maghreb, and the politics of Berber (Amazigh) identity in Algeria and Morocco. One can find a relevant discussion related to almost any geopolitical or regional issue of recent years in North Africa: security, geopolitics, Islamism, democracy, terrorism (including reverberations from "the global war on terror"), migration to the European Union, intra-Maghreb migration, intra-Maghreb relations (including the failure of the Arab Maghreb Union), the challenge of multilateralism in managing bilateral disputes in the Maghreb, and Europe's Mediterranean policies, putting a special weight on France and Spain. North Africa fills a vacuum in the scholarly Maghreb literature and is a must-read for anyone wishing better to understand the region. Most of its components stand on their own and can be used in university studies. Related Topics: North Africa Yehudit Ronen Spring 2010 MEQ Political Islam, World Politics, and Europeby Bassam Tibi Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2713/political-islam-world-politics-and-europe
Tibi, a leading figure in the debate over the future of Islam in Europe, is a Muslim believer born in Syria and professor in international relations at Goettingen, Germany. His challenging volume presents an exceptionally broad and detailed survey of main topics that will likely become a standard reference work on Islamist ideology in Europe. Tibi is committed to a moderate and pluralistic form of Islam, which supports democratic principles, for a Europe in which Muslims could live on equal, non-confrontational terms with their non-Muslim and non-religious neighbors. His approach will doubtless be especially provocative to those who deny that a moderate Islam is possible, much less can flourish, or who see the new presence of Islam in Western Europe as a threat to a major component of Judeo-Christian civilization. Tibi writes, "It matters whether a political jihadist Islam or a civil Euro-Islam will prevail among Muslims living in Europe." He further declares, "I want to warn against any indiscriminate criticism of the Islamic diaspora in Europe and propose my concept of Euro-Islam as an alternative to jihadism." Tibi has summarized "Euro-Islam" by posing the question, "Europeanizing Islam vs. the Islamization of Europe?" He reproaches historian Bernard Lewis for "an exaggeration" when Lewis warned that Europe would become "an Islamic space" by the end of the twenty-first century. But Tibi acknowledges that "it is certain, however, that Muslims are on their way to becoming in the next few decades a very powerful and major sector of the European population." For him, European ideals of freedom should include acceptance of Muslims who become "Europeans of the heart," but "Europeans themselves are challenged to deliver what the 'idea of Europe' promises." He avers that he has "failed to become a European in Germany" since "European societies continue to be ethnically-exclusive entities." His solution, nevertheless, is founded on the introduction of European Enlightenment principles into the Islamic intellect; in sum, "the idea of Europe endorsed by a liberal and reformed Islam." Much of Tibi's writing in this book is autobiographical, describing his own journey from the Arab world and his encounters with German leftist intellectuals. He is also well-known as a critic of the Islamist intellectual Tariq Ramadan. Tibi combatively distinguishes his vision of "Euro-Islam" from the views of Ramadan, who holds that Europe is part of the Dar al-Islam, or Islamic territory. Tibi condemns this attitude as "religious imperialism" and "an offense to the idea of Europe." He also thoroughly dismisses the multiculturalism that, according to him, results in ghettoization, radicalization of the young, and the institutionalization of Islamist ideology. Instead, Tibi proposes "cultural pluralism." Thus his instincts and attitudes are moderate in all aspects. Related Topics: Muslims in Europe Stephen Schwartz Spring 2010 MEQ The Search for Al Qaedaby Bruce Riedel Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2714/the-search-for-al-qaeda
Riedel, formerly a senior advisor to three U.S. presidents on Middle East and South Asian issues, argues that "the Arab conflict with Israel, especially the perceived grievances of the Palestinian people, is the all-consuming issue" for Al-Qaeda's terrorists. From this claim springs his contention that forging "a just, two-state peace" between the Israelis and Palestinians should be the centerpiece of U.S. strategy for defeating its terrorist foe. This argument is marred by a questionable methodology that, more than anything, seems to consist of trotting out only the data that bolster the book's conclusions. To be sure, Riedel can cite the vehement anger of Al-Qaeda leaders and operatives at Israel's creation, and he notes Osama bin Laden's claim on the sixtieth anniversary of the Jewish state's birth that "the Palestine question is my nation's central issue." But this is not the arch-terrorist's only statement on the matter. In his famed 1996 declaration of jihad against the United States, bin Laden outlined three grievances: U.S. military presence in Saudi Arabia, U.N. sanctions against Iraq, and American support for Israel. It was the U.S. presence in Saudi Arabia, and not Israel's creation, that he described as "the greatest disaster to befall the Muslims since the death of the Prophet Muhammad."[1] Similarly, Riedel stacks the deck in favor of his thesis by claiming that bin Laden became a terrorist due to Saudi Arabia's endorsement of the Oslo peace process. Though his open letter to Sheikh bin Baz, "The Betrayal of Palestine,"[2] was indeed bin Laden's first public pronouncement intended for a wide audience, it does not contain a call to jihad against Saudi Arabia or the United States over the issue. Bin Laden would not issue such a call until his message "The Invasion of Arabia,"[3] which centered on U.S. presence in the Saudi kingdom. Nor does Riedel provide much reason as to why the United States is more likely to succeed in forging peace between Israel and the Palestinians now than in the past. Indeed, one of the world's most intractable conflicts seems to have grown more difficult with Hamas's visible rise in Gaza. Riedel acknowledges this in a roundabout way by claiming that "the key to success will be to persuade Hamas to become part of the process." Though he provides several steps designed to accomplish this, he does not address the complexities of negotiation with a terrorist group that proclaims Israel's destruction as its very raison d'être. Riedel does get a number of significant points right, including Pakistan's centrality to the fight against terrorism and the continuing relevance of Al-Qaeda's central leadership. But his argumentation does not support the audacious claim that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is Al-Qaeda's "all-consuming issue." Though solving this conflict would be an astonishing accomplishment for a large number of reasons, the reader is left with the impression that Riedel exaggerates both the likelihood of a solution and also the impact this would have on Al-Qaeda's war against the United States. [1] Bruce Lawrence, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama bin Laden (London: Verso, 2005), p. 25. Related Topics: Radical Islam, Terrorism Daveed Gartenstein-Ross Spring 2010 MEQ Triple Crossby Peter Lance Middle East Quarterly http://www.meforum.org/2715/triple-cross
Lance, an investigative journalist with five Emmy awards, indicts U.S. intelligence and security services for incompetence and dishonesty by focusing on the saga of Ali Mohammed, a Special Forces advisor, FBI informant, CIA operative—and also a highly placed Al-Qaeda member who served as bin Laden's bodyguard, trained bin Laden's forces, built and trained a terrorist cell in New York, and provided classified intelligence to Islamists. He was ultimately caught, yes, but almost by accident. How did this happen? How could this man get away with a double life for so long? Lance at times argues that individual soldiers "let down their guard." But the cultural and organizational context of the time also was important. The U.S. military culture of the 1980s was heavily shaped by multiculturalism; service members learned to keep their derogatory opinions on racial and religious issues to themselves—but, perhaps, at some cost to security. What were soldiers expected to do when they heard Ali Mohammed's anti-Americanism spoken in the language of Islamic jingoism? How many of them were reluctant to make an issue of even borderline seditious comments out of fear of being accused of insensitivity to Islam? Additionally, Mohammed was selected by Army leaders to give lectures on Islam, and in this capacity he may well have indoctrinated soldiers at Fort Bragg on Islamic superiority. Lance also brings up the still-relevant issue of transferring killing skills. Soldiers are schooled in many disciplines, but the chief job of soldiers is to close with the enemy and kill him. Military training reflects this mission. Mohammed was, by any standards, a first-rate, highly trained killer who passed on the skills he learned to those who would later kill Americans. How many more jihadis or future jihadis are currently serving in the uniforms of the U.S. armed forces? What skills and classified information will they pass on? Related Topics: Radical Islam, Terrorism Mark Silinsky Spring 2010 MEQ To receive the full, printed version of the Middle East Quarterly, please see details about an affordable subscription. This text may be reposted or forwarded so long as it is presented as an integral whole with complete information provided about its author, date, place of publication, and original URL. | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
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