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Iraq: A satellite state of Iran?
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How much influence does Iran wield in Iraq?
This question has long been a matter of debate and in light of the US troop
withdrawal has become all the more relevant, especially with rumors of
Iranian plans to have Mahmud Shahrudi, who is an Iraqi-born member of Iran's
Guardian Council and advocates clerical involvement in government, succeed
the quietist Ali al-Sistani in Najaf.
Unfortunately, partisan politics on the left
and right have precluded serious analysis on the subject.
In any event, we can begin by noting that
Iraq has close economic ties with Iran. According to the Iranian ambassador
to Baghdad, quoted in a report by the Tehran
Times, trade transactions between the two countries over the past Iranian
calendar year (ending on 19th March 2012) amounted to more than $11 billion.
He also noted that around 1.2 million Iranian
pilgrims visited the Shi'a holy cities of Najaf and Karbala in that same year.
In the aftermath of the 2003 invasion, a lifting on import tariffs by the
Coalition Provisional Authority led to an influx of cheap goods from Iran,
and shopkeepers in Karbala
have not been unaware of the increase of Iranian products on sale in their
stores.
Nor is there a shortage of signs in Farsi
advertising accommodation for pilgrims, and many Iraqis in the city have now
learnt the Persian language. Unsurprisingly, these developments have provoked
suspicions of Iranian cultural infiltration.
When there was a US troop presence in Iraq,
Tehran provided backing for small Shi'a militant organizations known as the
"Special Groups." These militias came into increasing conflict with
the central government as the sectarian civil war began to subside in 2007-8.
Nonetheless, after the American withdrawal,
the Special Groups have had no casus belli, and so it is that they have
either disbanded or turned to the political process.
A case-in-point is the League of the
Righteous, led by Qais Khazali, who is at odds with Muqtada al-Sadr and his
followers that comprise an important part of the ruling coalition. By backing
the groups that can give rise to internal Shi'a rivalries, Iran can increase
its own influence by playing a role as mediator, adviser and kingmaker.
Linked to this point is the fact that in the
aftermath of the 2010 elections, which entailed a prolonged stalemate among
Iraq's political factions, the Sadrists and the strongly pro-Iranian Islamic
Supreme Council of Iraq [ISCI] eventually joined the current Prime Minister
Nouri al-Maliki's State of Law bloc on Iran's advice.
Thus, it cannot be denied that the Iranian
influence exists economically and politically.
Oddly enough, both the US and Iran backed
Maliki for a second term as prime minister following the 2010 elections, but
of the two countries, it was Iran that showed a degree of influence on the
political process in advising the Sadrists and ISCI to unite with Maliki. The
US in contrast had no role in suggesting or facilitating coalition-shuffling.
Yet it does not follow that the Iraqi
government simply subordinates what it perceives to be its own interests to
those of Iran. Iraq is still a leading customer for US arms, despite Iranian
disapproval, and will probably remain so over the coming years.
It is also notable that the negotiations over
the question of an extension of the US troop presence were conducted in such
a way as to exclude the Sadrists from the Iraqi government's decision-making.
The reason the discussions broke down was
because of a universal consensus among Iraq's political factions that no
legal immunity could be granted to US troops; otherwise all agreed on a
postponement of the withdrawal deadline. The voices of pro-Iranian factions
were completely irrelevant.
Further, while the Iraqi government has
generally not come out in support of the Syrian uprising (with the Sadrists
declaring Bashar Assad to be a "brother" solely by virtue of his
supposed Shi'a identity), it is not necessarily the case that this stance is
due to Iranian influence, for it is clear that the Iraqi government is also
keen to avoid actively aiding the Assad regime, as evinced by Baghdad's
warning to Tehran in March that it would not permit arms shipments to
Syria to pass through its territory or airspace.
This announcement came partly in response to
American concerns that Iraq was in violation of the UN Security Council
Resolution 1747 that bans arms exports from Iran.
What then of the rumors that Iran is aiming
to have Shahrudi succeed Sistani in Najaf? If this were to happen, it would
indeed have a profound impact on Iraqi politics, shifting the country towards
a much more decisively pro-Iranian alignment.
Nevertheless, there are numerous obstacles
that render the prospect of Shahrudi acquiring a position of dominance in
Najaf unlikely, primarily because such a move would probably encounter
stringent opposition from the Dawa party that is led by Nouri al-Maliki and
is the most powerful Shi'a political faction in Iraq (far more so than either
the Sadrists or the ISCI).
The Dawa party, unlike the Sadrists or ISCI
but in keeping with the consensus in Najaf that itself hinders the
possibility of a Shahrudi takeover, has generally not embraced Khomeini's
doctrine of velayat-efaqih (governance of the jurist).
Besides, al-Maliki and his bloc, whose
greatest concern has always been consolidation of their own power base, are
aware of Sunni Arab and Kurdish anxieties about shifting towards an Iranian
model of government, and accordingly, as
analyst Reidar Visser notes, have been working with al-Iraqiya – the main
opposition bloc – and the Kurds to block attempts by ISCI and the Islamic
Virtue Party – a branch of the Sadrist movement – to introduce clerical veto
in Iraqi law, such as is practiced in Iran.
In short, Iraq is not a satellite state of
Iran. In general, the Iraqi government thinks it is in its best interests to
maintain good relations with both Iran and the United States. Although
Iranian influence in the country is undoubtedly present economically and
politically, it does not follow that Iraq complies with Tehran's wishes.
When it comes to Iraqi politics, what matter
more than any foreign influence are the rivalries between and within the
various factions, often entailing personal power struggles going back many years.
In the end, the formation of the current
Iraqi government as per the Arbil compromise struck by Massoud Barzani had
nothing to do with the US or Iran, but was rather rooted in the problem of
the personal animosity between Maliki and Ayad Allawi, who is leader of the
opposition bloc but like Maliki a Shi'ite and has many Shi'a groups in his
bloc such as the White Iraqi National Movement.
Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at
Brasenose College, Oxford University, and an adjunct fellow at Daniel Pipes' Middle
East Forum.
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