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What to expect from Egypt's Morsi
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What to make of Muslim Brotherhood candidate
Mohammed Morsi's election as president of Egypt? What seems to be the most
likely outcome is something analogous to the "constitutional
settlements" of the early Roman Empire. That is, the military, like the
Emperor Augustus in antiquity, will entrust to itself management of foreign
policy, while granting Morsi (and a parliament, if new elections are allowed)
- akin to the Senate in Rome - considerable autonomy with regards to the
direction of domestic affairs, even as the military has assumed control over
the drafting of the constitution.
Indeed, such a settlement would work well for
the military, because, despite its extensive control of the economy, the
burden of resolving the economic crisis would ultimately rest in Morsi's
hands. Currently, as
Reuters reports, the country's depleted foreign reserves can only cover
"three months of import coverage," while the local currency debt
has increased to 600 billion Egyptian pounds ($99 billion), up from 500
billion before the unrest began in January 2011.
The International Monetary Fund has indicated
that a $3.2 billion loan will only be granted if the country gets its
finances in order, but the prospects of such a resolution appear to be bleak.
Having Morsi take responsibility, therefore, can prove useful in directing
potential civilian anger away from the military. On the other hand, the
perception of a settlement between the military and the president could help
to attract foreign investment.
With the military managing foreign policy,
the chances of a full-blown war between Egypt and Israel are slim, despite
bellicose rhetoric emanating from some quarters of the Muslim Brotherhood
calling for the liberation of Jerusalem and establishment of a "United
Arab States." For one thing, Egypt lacks the means to launch and
sustain a war against Israel. At the same time, however, one should not
expect Egyptian firmness in dealing with rocket fire against the Jewish state
or militant activity in the Sinai Peninsula.
In fact, one could well see the military
adopt an approach toward militancy not dissimilar to the methods of the
Pakistani security forces: that is, targeting those perceived to pose a
direct threat to Egypt's stability, while lacking resolve at best, and at
worst playing a double game with other militants in order to continue
receiving U.S. aid.
As for the domestic scene, it is probable
that the Islamization trend that has been apparent over the past five or so
decades will not only continue but could also accelerate. When the likes of
Hosni Mubarak were in charge, the arrangement was such that Islamist ideology
was allowed to disseminate at ground level. Now that Egypt has an elected
Islamist president, it is to be expected that sentiments on the ground will
only become more hard-line.
Although it is easy to dismiss outlandish
claims that Morsi wants to reinstate the discriminatory jizya poll tax -
essentially the equivalent of a Mafia protection racket - on Christians (the
report is an uncorroborated
rumor that can be traced to one obscure Arabic website), there is
evidence that he would like to restrict the rights of non-Muslim minorities
and women. Just under half of voters chose Ahmed Shafiq, but that will not
act as a firm barrier against a gradualist approach to implementing Islamic
law that many in the Brotherhood see as the ideal strategy to adopt.
In
an interview with Jeffrey Goldberg in the Atlantic magazine last year,
Morsi made it clear that neither he nor the Brotherhood could tolerate the
idea of a Christian or woman running for the presidency of Egypt.
While much has been made of a recent
announcement by an advisor to Morsi that there are plans to appoint a
Copt and a woman as vice-presidents, it should be appreciated that such
positions are likely to be no more than symbolic. In fact, problems of
discrimination against non-Muslims and women will in all likelihood only
worsen under Morsi's presidency. Further, the spike in Salafist mob attacks
on Coptic churches since the ousting of Mubarak - attacks usually sparked by
the flimsiest rumors and trivialities - is unlikely to subside, and the
authorities will probably continue to do nothing about it.
In the long run, chaos and instability are
most likely to dominate the country's future. Unlike Iran, which has, since
the mid-1980s, implemented a major family planning program that has dramatically
slowed population growth, Egypt's population (83 million as of October 2011)
continues to grow. It
could reach 100 million by 2020, with more than 99 percent of the
population living on an area of land around the Nile only 2.5 times the size
of Israel.
Even assuming Egypt can escape from its
current economic crisis, there is no sign its economy can keep up with the
pace of population growth even to sustain present standards of living. The
Muslim Brotherhood and other Egyptian Islamists have on past occasions denounced
family planning as a Western conspiracy to keep the number of Muslims in
the world in check. They have shown no intention of implementing a program to
reduce the birth rate.
Egypt is unlikely to become a "Somalia
on the Nile" as economist and columnist David P. Goldman has
predicted, but in the long-term, internal stability is a remote possibility.
Update from June 29, 2012: Concerning
Egypt's economy and the Muslim Brotherhood's plans, Martin
Kramer summarizes the situation well:
The Muslim Brotherhood is in a bind, because
it has to deliver. For the masses of people who voted for the Muslim
Brotherhood, the revolution wasn't about democracy and freedom. It was about
bread and social justice.
The Brotherhood has a so-called
"Renaissance" plan for the overhaul of the Egyptian economy. I
won't pretend to judge its feasibility. Could modernization of tax collection
double or triple tax revenues? Can Egypt double the number of arriving
tourists, even while contemplating limits on alcohol and bikinis? Can a
renovation of the Suez Canal raise transit revenues from $6 billion a year to
$100 billion? Can Egypt's economy surpass the economies of Turkey and
Malaysia within seven years? These are all claims made at various times by
the economic thinkers of the Muslim Brotherhood, who trumpet Egypt's supposed
potential for self-sufficiency.
To these big promises, one can add Morsi's
pledge to tackle congestion problems within the first 100 days of his
time in office.
Kramer goes on to suggest that the
Brotherhood will try to solicit aid from Gulf Arabs and the West, drawing
attention to remarks
made by Khairat El-Shater, the deputy supreme guide of the Brotherhood,
back in February, when he "strongly" advised Europeans and
Americans to "support Egypt during this critical period as compensation
for the many years they supported a brutal dictatorship."
However, the question of the Brotherhood's
relations with the U.S. and the West at large is a tricky issue. It should
not be forgotten that the Islamists have spent the past thirty years
attacking Mubarak and the establishment for supposedly being too close to the
U.S. and the West, and the popular sentiment in Egypt is deeply
anti-American.
That the military will continue to receive
Western aid is almost certain, but Kramer correctly notes that the
Brotherhood is trumpeting an image of self-reliance. A perception of economic
dependence on America and the West could backfire on the Brotherhood. This is
not like the North Korean regime that has a philosophy of autarky but can
portray its reliance on foreign aid as tribute to the greatness of the
nation.
As for the Gulf Arabs, let's just say that
they have frequently proven themselves to be remarkably stingy when it comes
to helping Muslim brothers in need. Saudi Arabia in particular is still
angered by the 'betrayal' of Mubarak (hence its uncompromising stance on
Bahrain).
* * *
Fawaz A. Gerges
appears to agree with my idea of a "constitutional settlement"
along the lines of the early Principate but with unfounded optimism
proclaims:
After decades of persecution and
incarceration, what is unfolding today clearly shows the weight and influence
of the Muslim Brothers, most of whom are centrist and modernist and accept
democratic values, in shaping the political future of their society…Arab
Islamists are traveling a similar path as did the Christian fundamentalists
and later the Christian Democrats and Euro-communists in Western Europe who
in the 20th century subordinated ideology to interests and political
constituencies.
As Jonathan
Schanzer aptly comments on Twitter: "Fawaz Gerges just slobbers all
over the Brotherhood here. Behold, the personification of MidEast studies
failures today."
Aymenn
Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University, and
an adjunct fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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