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No Confidence in Maliki?
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A flurry of media reports has pointed to a
supposedly eroding support base for Iraq's premier Nouri al-Maliki.
For example, an Associated Press piece
last week entitled "Al-Maliki Quickly Losing Trust in Iraq"
characterized the "root" of the current "stand-off" in
Iraqi politics as the "unresolved power struggle between Iraq's three
main groups: the majority Shiites and minority Sunnis and Kurds."
The AP report added that "Al-Maliki, a
Shiite, is under fire for breaking promises to share power with his partners
in a unity government that includes the Sunni-dominated Iraqiya bloc, Kurdish
parties and loyalists of radical Shiite cleric Muqtada Al Sadr.'
What the AP report and other news
organizations have in mind is the current talk of a no-confidence vote
against the premier. The MPs who are raising this prospect include members of
Iraqiya -- led by Maliki's rival Ayad Allawi and featuring the Speaker of the
Parliament Osama al-Nujaifi -- Massoud Barzani and Muqtada al-Sadr, both of
whom are allies in Maliki's coalition.
On this basis, al-Arabiya writer Musa
Keilani declared that Maliki "is facing an alliance of four major
political blocs in a confrontation that could bring down his government and
produce a new interim prime minister."
However, these reports are generally based on
sensationalist narratives, and in the case of the AP, there is too much focus
on the sectarian paradigm. None of this is to deny that the four
aforementioned figures in Iraqi politics have publicly criticized the prime
minister and are toying with the idea of a no-confidence vote, but the
evidence suggests that Maliki is likely to emerge from this crisis unscathed.
To begin with, the media reports overlook
internal divisions within the factions of Maliki's opponents. In particular,
Iraqiya can only be called a political bloc in the loosest sense of the word.
It is a coalition that is torn by infighting, with constant reports of
defections and splits, something that was partly the reason behind the bloc's
eventual decision at the end of January to end its boycott of the parliament.
In addition, certain key members of Iraqiya
such as the deputy Prime Minister Saleh al-Mutlaq, who in December issued
overblown statements comparing Maliki to Saddam, have effectively reconciled
with Maliki.
This is not to say that the concerns over
Maliki's behavior raised by members of the opposition are not justified. One
can point to many signs of monopolization of power in the premier's hands.
For example, he is still maintaining his hold on the positions of defense and
interior ministers that should have been granted to Allawi's bloc as per the
Arbil agreement forged by Barzani. Further, as Judith S. Yaphe points out, "As the U.S.
military, in particular the U.S. Special Forces, transferred responsibility
to their Iraqi counterparts, Maliki created several special brigades within
the army as counter-terrorism brigades and moved them out of the defense
ministry to report directly to him." None of this, however, makes Maliki
the equivalent of Saddam.
Amid the talk of a no-confidence vote, Al-Sumaria News reported that several MPs from Iraqiya
came out in support of the premier, including Ibrahim
al-Muhairi -- an Arab MP from Kirkuk -- and Yassin al-Obeidi, also from
Kirkuk. Meanwhile, the Iraqiya Hurra bloc, which in April split from the White Iraqi National
Movement (a bloc that defected from Iraqiya last year), has urged lawmakers
from Ninawa, Salah ad-Din, and Diyala, among other places, to reject a no-confidence vote against the premier.
This Sunni Arab and Iraqiya support for
Maliki -- undermining the AP's obsession with sectarianism -- exists for two
reasons. First, these backers appreciate Maliki's stance on dealing with the
Kurds, towards whom Maliki has adopted a delicate and careful
carrot-and-stick approach.
While the premier has made a number of
concessions (e.g. allowing the Peshmerga to annex the disputed Khanaqin
district in Diyala province last year), he is also perceived to have taken
tough stances on issues like Kirkuk and what is considered to be illegal exportation of oil by the Kurdistan Regional Government,
such that he is seen by many Shi'a and Sunni Arabs as someone who will
preserve Iraq's territorial integrity. This was the rationale given by the
Iraqiya MPs who signed a statement in support of maintaining Maliki's
position as premier.
Second, there is growing frustration among
Iraqiya members with Allawi, who spends much of his time abroad and is
detached not only from the situation on the ground but also from ordinary
members and supporters of his own bloc.
As for Muqtada al-Sadr, it is certainly true
that he has made numerous fiery statements against the premier, declaring in
Najaf that the move to withdraw confidence from Maliki's government is an act
of "divine will."
However, as is the case with Iraqiya, members
of the Sadrist movement have come out in support of Maliki. This includes
Grand Ayatollah Kazem al-Haeri, who, viewed as a spiritual leader by many
Sadrists, issued a fatwa against voting for secular candidates and
implicitly forbidding withdrawal of support for Maliki.
Interestingly, Sadr rejected this fatwa, and
according to sources in Najaf and sheikhs in the Sadrist movement interviewed
by al-Hayat, he would only accept such a fatwa from Grand Ayatollah Sistani
or Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Ishaq al-Fayad (who, like Sistani, opposes
Khomeini's doctrine of velayat-e-faqih), since he views both clergymen
as voices for Iraq, not foreign powers.
This point tells against Nimrod Raphaeli's view that Sadr is simply "Iran's
mouthpiece in Iraq." The cleric's ties to Iran notwithstanding, it is
more accurate to describe Sadr as a wildcard, whose primary concern is
contesting for a position of leadership of the Shi'a political factions in
Iraq. What stance Sadr will eventually take is difficult to tell, as reports have already emerged of an upcoming meeting
between Maliki and Sadr as regards the political process.
Yet more generally, the Sadrists are likely
to end up backing Maliki, for not only are they too distant from Iraqiya to
cement any sort of alliance to establish a government, but the premier has
also granted positions to Sadrists in the ministries of housing and planning,
which has allowed the movement to expand its support network.
As for the Kurds, it is clear that Barzani's
stance against Maliki is not the consensus among the Kurdish parties.
Talabani -- the president of Iraq and the leader of the Kurdistan Democratic
Party (KDP) -- is firmly opposed to any withdrawal of support from Maliki, as
Kurdish MP Mahmoud Othman recently confirmed.
This is partly rooted in the fact that Maliki
has granted significant concessions to the Kurds, as noted above. On the
other hand, it is also fair to say that many of the outstanding issues
between Baghdad and Arbil have yet to be dealt with, above all the question
of Kirkuk's status, which Maliki's side has not yet shown any real intention
of resolving. This makes for a valid concern for those on the Kurdish side
who are frustrated with Maliki.
In any case, the lack of unity among any
opposition to Maliki means that there is unlikely to be an absolute majority
no-confidence vote in the Council of Representatives (the Iraqi parliament,
with 163 votes required) now or even until the next elections in 2014.
Talabani is a key figure to keep in mind
regarding any unseating of the premier. Since he has now made it clear that
he will not submit a request to the Council of Representatives to withdraw
confidence from the Prime Minister, it follows, as Reidar Visser has also noted, that the only option
remaining for those who wish to get rid of Maliki is to request for the Prime
Minister to be summoned for an inquiry (see Article 61, Section 8 B2 of the Iraqi constitution).
Only one-fifth of the Council of
Representatives is required to submit a request, but the actual inquiry is a
murkier area. Visser further draws attention to the fact that the Iraqi
Supreme Court recently ruled that an inquiry involving a government minister
must pertain to a "specific criminal charge or constitutional
infraction."
General charges along the lines of
corruption, which is endemic in Iraq anyway, will probably get nowhere. The
question of federalism -- raised last year after some provincial councils in
predominantly Sunni areas declared autonomy -- is also problematic: both
sides -- the central government and the provincial councils -- had little
understanding of observing the constitution.
In sum, Maliki's position as premier will remain safe. The disputes discussed here are likely to persist for at least many months to come. In truth, therefore, the attempts to initiate a no-confidence vote against Maliki are little more than a waste of time.
Instead of offering constructive criticism
and trying to reach an accord with the premier, numerous members of the
opposition-- in particular Ayad Allawi and other senior figures in Iraqiya --
have developed an obsession with attacking Maliki, which distracts from more
serious problems such as corruption, over-dependence on oil revenues,
excessive bureaucracy, reasoned criticism of monopolization of power by the
central government, and poor public services.
One would hardly be unjustified in concluding
that Maliki has been better suited than Allawi for the role of Prime Minister
all along.
Aymenn
Jawad Al-Tamimi is a student at Brasenose College, Oxford
University, and an adjunct fellow at the Middle East Forum.
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