Tuesday, July 31, 2012

Gatestone Update :: Anna Mahjar-Barducci: Fighting al-Qaeda for a Secular State near Mali, and more


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Fighting al-Qaeda for a Secular State near Mali

by Anna Mahjar-Barducci
July 31, 2012 at 5:00 am
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Azawad, larger than France, and defining itself as democratic, secular and Berber, says it fears that Islamism could be used to "Arabize" its society. Azawad's adversary, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM], is Al Qaeda's richest section in northern Mali.
On April 6, a new state, Azawad, emerged in the heart of the Sahara. A movement almost unknown, called the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which defines itself as a democratic and secular movement. It began to plan this new uprising in October 2011, and launched its first attack on the morning of January 17, 2012, on the town of Menaka in the northeast of Mali. Four months later, after conquering all the Azawad territory, it declared independence,
The MNLA managed to secede from Mali by taking advantage of two historic opportunities:
One came from Libya, in the east: Gaddafi, desperately fighting for his survival, offered the Touareg people weapons, hoping they would fight on his side. The Touareg are a Berber people who call themselves Imazighen, or The Free People. Berbers generally live in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger and Azawad. They are the indigenous people of North Africa, who lived in these lands before the Arab invasions in the 7th century. The Touareg are Muslims who practice a moderate-mystical form of Islam. They do not stick to a strict interpretation of Islam, because they wish to preserve their Berber identity and culture: they are afraid that Islamism could be used to "Arabize" their society.
There are, however, Touaregs who are not mercenaries, and who were comfortably integrated in the Libyan army in the 1960s through the 1980s. Those Touaregs, however, did not fight for Gaddafi in the uprising; instead, they accepted the weapons and used them to take control of their own country. They would die for Azawad, but not for Gaddafi.
Another historic opportunity came from the south: On March 21, a coup took place in Mali, which created a vacuum of power in the country.
The MNLA, that unknown movement, seized this opportunity, and on April 6, declared independence. Further, this is not the first Touareg rebellion in Mali; there were also rebellions in 1963, in the 1990s and again in 2006.
Since that day, the MNLA has been struggling to hold on to that independence. The struggle is both internal and external; the future of the new state is very uncertain. After the declaration of independence on April 6, the MNLA found itself surrounded by many enemies, including two countries, Mali and Algeria, and four terrorist organizations: the al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; the Monotheism Movement for Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO; in Arabic, "Jamat Tawhid Wal Jihad Fi Garbi Afriqqiya"); the Ansar Dine, and the Nigerian group, Boko Haram. But the MNLA is not totally lacking in resources that might allow it to survive.
Azawad, larger than France, is a desert region which comprises about 60% of Mali 's territory, whose neighbors are Algeria to its northeast; Mauritania to its west, Niger to its east; and to its south, Burkina Faso and Mali. Azawad is divided into three regions: The Gao region , which has Gao city as its capital; the Timbuktu region, with Timbuktu city as its capital; and the Kidal region, with Kidal city as its capital.
Despite the size of the area, however, the population is only about 1.5 million, divided into several ethnic groups, mainly: Touareg (the majority), Songhai (the Malian government claims that they are the majority), Moors/Arabs, and Fulani.
Why does the MNLA want independence from Mali ?
Mali became independent from France in 1960; its borders are a legacy of colonialism. The region of Azawad was annexed to Mali by France, even though its population is very different from Mali's. Similarly to the situation in North Sudan and South Sudan, where the Christians in the South are trying to free themselves from domination by the Muslims in the North, the MNLA are also trying to seek a sanctuary from Islamist domination. Since gaining independence from France, the Malian central government has not invested in the development of Azawad -- either in drought-stricken areas, for infrastructure for sanitary conditions, or for anything else.
The Malian government is corrupt, as are many African countries, but the situation in the North (in Azawad) is worse than in the South. As reported by the Touareg media, Toumast Press, the Azawad region has been totally neglected by Mali: "Besides the flag of Mali, no other insignia of the Malian government is visible there. The security of persons and property is non-existent. Populations are not protected when they are hit by natural disasters. The government's resignation is complete. When, during the drought in Azawad in 2010, UNICEF pointed out the state of malnutrition [in Azawad], the [former] Malian President, Amadou Toumani Toure, protested against the report, stating that there was no malnutrition in the country. He said that people [in Azawad] need to change their eating habits, as some were limiting themselves to eating only three dates a day. Which ordinary people, if given the choice, will only eat with just three dates a day? This announcement shows the misunderstanding by the [former] Malian President of the Azawadi population it is supposed to represent."
Since the beginning of the rebellion, one of the main problems of the MNLA, besides Mali, has been Ansar Dine: an Islamist movement formed mainly also of Touaregs. Its leader is Iyadh Ag Ghaly, a charismatic man who became an Islamist in the 1990s after being attracted to the teachings of Pakistani preachers from the vast worldwide Muslim proselytizing organization Tablighi Jama'at, present in Kidal in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
Iyadh is a complicated character, driven by a combination of Islamism and personal interests. In the 1990s and again in 2006, he was one of the leaders of the Touareg uprising, but soon discarded the demands of his own people to make a deal with Mali that was profitable for him, and serving as a member of Mali's diplomatic staff in Saudi Arabia in 2007. In roughly the same period he hooked up with the "Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat" (GSPC) -- believed to be a manipulation of the Algerian Department of Intelligence and Security (DRS). In January 2007, the GSPC changed its name to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM], and is al-Qaeda's richest faction in Northern Mali.
What are the interests of AQIM in Azawad? Simply put, AQIM, or al-Qaeda, wants to disband the MNLA and take control the area. AQIM has no interest in negotiating with Mali. It wants Azawad to become a no man's land, a strategic area in Africa in which it can expand its activities.
When the MNLA was formed, before it started its rebellion, Iyadh was sent as a Malian envoy to negotiate with it. As the MNLA had no intention, even at that time, to give up the fight for independence, Iyadh tried to become one of its leaders. He even fought two battles with the MNLA against the Malian army. But, as the MNLA does not share Iyadh's desire to impose Sharia law in Azawad and does not trust him, the MNLA rejected him. At the same time, Iyadh also tried to be elected as the successor to the leader of his tribe, the important Ifoghas tribe, but was again turned down. Frustrated, in March 2012 he decided to form another group, Ansar Dine. His goal is not to make Azawad independent, but to take revenge on the MNLA, find a role for himself, and make a profitable deal for himself with Mali.
Ansar Dine immediately became the first opponent of the MNLA in Azawad, and therefore also became the reference point for all forces seeking to prevent the partition of Mali and to disband the MNLA. The MNLA declared itself to be the enemy of jihadist groups and drug dealers. Hence, soon after Ansar Dine was formed, AQIM and MUJAO – already present in the region before the MNLA rebellion – joined forces with Iyadh and his organization.
AQIM needed Iyadh for three reasons: First, because he, like members of the MNLA, is also Touareg. AQIM hoped to use him to attain legitimacy among the Touareg local population. Second, as he is a Touareg, he knows how to fight in the dunes of Azawad. And third, because AQIM thought that, as a Touareg, Iyadh could help to negotiate with MNLA and manipulate the new movement.
In mid-May this year, the secretary general of the MNLA, Bilal Ag Cherif, who is from the same tribe as Iyadh, tried to make a deal with him. The MNLA was facing acute financial difficulties, and Bilal believed that, if the MNLA cut a deal with Ansar Dine, it could solve its financial problems as well as stop the fighting between the two groups while somehow maintaining the status quo. The MNLA and Ansar Dine signed a preliminary memorandum of understanding, but no final agreement was reached. When Iyadh insisted on applying the Shariah Law in Azawad, members of the MNLA turned against Bilal, asking him to stop the negotiations.
What Bilal failed to take into consideration was that Ansar Dine was not acting independently. When it began, Ansar Dine was believed to have been manipulated by Mali. After having been being defeated on the ground by the MNLA, Mali presumably hoped to fight this group by supporting Ansar Dine. The strategy was that once the MNLA was dismantled, Mali would be able to negotiate with Iyadh about bringing Azawad back into Mali.
In recent weeks, however, there are increasing indications that Ansar Dine is becoming a proxy of AQIM. Furthermore, in Timbuktu, AQIM has been launching attacks on the city's cultural heritage in the name of Ansar Dine, although the fighters are members of AQIM.
On June 27, the headquarters of the MNLA-led Transitional Council of the State of Azawad (CTEA, established on June 7) was attacked in Gao by AQIM, MUJAO (a Gao-based splinter group of AQIM), and Boko Haram. After that battle, the MNLA was forced to withdraw from the main centers in Azawad and to reassess its political and military plans, even though it succeeded in delivering a painful blow to AQIM by allegedly killing its deputy commander, Mokhtar Belmokhtar.
This was the day on which the MNLA realized that Ansar Dine was not in control of the situation, but rather that AQIM was, and that no agreement could be reached with its proxy, Iyadh. Today the MNLA understands that the fight is against AQIM, and it is reassessing its military strategy.
It seems that the MNLA cannot count on anyone's support. Algeria is afraid to have an independent state in North Africa with a Berber majority: it fears the Berber Kabyles in its own territory might rebel and declare independence from Algeria.. The Algerian regime also fears that the new nation of Azawad might be a threat to the Algerian interests in the Sahara. It is not surprising, therefore, that Algeria's President, Abdelaziz Bouteflika, received a delegation from Ansar Dine. Niger also does not want to see a free State of Azawad: it, too, fears a Touareg rebellion in its Air Mountains.
Then there is the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), which is completely lost. It does not want an independent Azawad, it does not want AQIM, and it does not even want to support Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, the leader of the recent Malian coup d'état.
For now, thanks to the conflicting interests and weaknesses of its enemies, MNLA is managing to survive. This situation is not necessarily temporary: the problems which prevent Azawad's enemies from wiping it off the map, seem to be quite chronic. The biggest resource of the MNLA, therefore, is the strategic disability and limitations of its enemies.
But what can the West do, and particularly America?
It is understandable that the West is reluctant to change the colonial order in Africa, and prefers to maintain the status quo rather than face rebellions around the continent. Even though the MNLA would be natural allies – they are secular, democratic, and anti-terrorism – it would not be easy to support them against Mali, even though they have so far fought the AQIM successfully and killed its deputy commander.
What one has to consider is where things are heading in Azawad. One way or another, the MNLA will survive. Its members are a genuinely secular force with people ready to fight; they would be a strong element on the ground, whether as a fighting movement or as an independent state. They are the only people who understand how to fight in the desert, who are willing to take on Al-Qaeda, and to die for their homeland. But without weapons and without money, it is hard to tell how long they will be able to fight. Ansar Adine is trying to recruit members of the Touareg population only because it seems to have unlimited sources of money. Once the MNLA shows it has financial support, recruits who have joined Ansar Adine for financial gain will come back to the MNLA.
If there will be no MNLA to fight AQMI what will happen? This time, AQIM will not go back to the mountains. This time, its leaders have said they want to stay to expand their activities in neighboring countries, coordinating with the fundamentalist groups al-Shabaab in Somalia and Boko Haram in Nigeria. This would be the worst result both for the West and any hope for Africa.
Related Topics:  Anna Mahjar-Barducci

Turkey's Press Freedom Day: 95 Journalists Behind Bars

by BIA Media Monitoring Group
July 31, 2012 at 4:45 am
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The courts sentenced eight suspects to nine years in jail and five suspects to pay fines in the amount of 29,880 TL [$16,580], three of them directly to the person of Prime Minister Tayyip Recep Ergogan.
Turkish courts have sentenced 24 people, including six journalists, to a total of 91 years, nine months and 18 days in prison, as well as to pay 40,000 Turkish Liras in fines during the second quarter of 2012. They now stand among the ranks of some 95 journalists and 35 distributors who spent those three months behind bars. Below you can find the links to our last press release on this report, which we will continue to send regularly in the future
A total of 95 journalists and 35 distributors have spent the Press Freedom Day on July 24, which marks the publication of the first uncensored newspapers 104 years ago, behind bars in Turkey this year. Courts have also sentenced 24 people, including six journalists, to a total of 91 years, nine months and 18 days in prison, as well as to pay fines in the amount of 40,000 Turkish Liras during the same period in connection with charges stipulated in the country's infamous Anti-Terror Law (TMK.)
As of July 2011, some 68 journalists were residing in Turkey's jails. Courts had handed out sentences totaling 44 years and eight months in prison, while prosecutors had demanded 223 years for the suspects.
Journalists poured out onto the streets and flocked into courts to show their solidarity with their colleagues and oppose their plight.
The Third Judicial Reform Package propounded by the government in consequence of the resulting backlash and which introduced a conditional amnesty for press-related offenses also continued to feature in public debates until its ratification on July 2. Journalist associations, however, struck a cautious note and said the legislation would not resolve the fundamental issues in Turkey pertaining to the freedom of expression, as it fell short of preventing courts from qualifying certain press offenses as "acts of terrorism" and their arbitrary extension of detention and arrest periods.
Throughout the trials and the investigations, authorities have persistently confronted the 95 journalists and the 35 distributors with allegations concerning their presumed involvement in the "media outlets of the outlawed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK,)" basing their claims on such "evidence" as "following a news story," "writing a book," "engaging in journalism that is critical toward the government" and "working in the Kurdish media."
The journalists and the distributors are facing charges of committing offenses and/or intentionally aiding and abetting the PKK without being its members. Other journalists are also standing trial on charges of establishing an armed or an unarmed organization, leading it or being a member of it, while some have also received sentences in connection with these charges.
Azadiye Welat's managing editors Vedat Kurşun, Ruken Ergün and Ozan Kılınç, as well asBedri Adanır, the owner of Aram Publishing House and the chief editor of Hawar, are the only journalists standing trial directly in connection with the news stories, commentaries and books they have penned down.
Authorities cited a plethora of reasons to keep the suspects under arrest, including "doubt regarding [the probability of the suspects] running away," "destroying, concealing or tampering with evidence," "putting pressure on the witnesses," "a strong and intense probability of the offense having been committed" and the inclusion in article 100 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (CMK) the offenses attributed to the suspects.
The BIA Media Monitoring and Freedom of Expression Report for April, May and June, 2012 consists of the headings "Journalist Murders / Trials," "Imprisoned Journalists," "Distributors and Employees," "Releases," "Attacks, Threats and Obstructions," "Inquiries, New / Ongoing Trials, Decisions," "Trials Against Kurdish Politicians," "Articles 285-288 of the TCK (Turkish Penal Code,)" "Actions for Libel, Personal Rights and Compensation," "Decisions by the Prime Ministry's Board for the Protection of Minors from Obscene Publications," "Bans, suspensions, confiscations," "ECHR (European Court of Human Rights,)" and "RTÜK (Higher Board of Radio and Television) Decisions."
The report relates trials pertaining to articles 215, 220, 285, 288 and 314 of the TCK, with an emphasis on the number of journalists in prison, the length of their detentions or arrests, investigations and trials regarding the freedom of expression and article 7 / 2 of the TMK that authorities frequently employ to restrict the freedoms of expression and press.
Article 7 / 2 of the TMK is also often accompanied in the trials by article 220 / 7 of the TCK ("aiding a terrorist organization without being a member of it,") and article 314 / 2 of the TCK ("being a member of an armed terrorist organization.")

91 years and nine months in jail for violating the TMK

Courts have sentenced 24 people, including six journalists, to a total of 91 years, nine months and 18 days in prison, as well as to pay 40,000 Turkish Liras in fines during the second quarter of 2012 for violating article 7 / 2 of the TMK. Courts had issued sentences totaling 44 years and eight months in prison during the same period in 2011.

Summary of Proceedings for Kurdish deputies

Prosecutors issued 61 summaries of proceedings against 25 deputies of the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP,) which holds 29 seats in Parliament in all.
BDP deputies Adil Kurt, Ahmet Türk, Altan Tan, Aysel Tuğluk, Bengi Yıldız, Demir Çelik, Emine Ayna, Ertuğrul Kürkçü, Esat Canan, Gültan Kışanak, Hüsamettin Zenderlioğlu, Halil Aksoy, Hasip Kaplan, İbrahim Binici, İdris Baluken, Leyla Zana, Nursel Aydoğan, Özdal Üçer, Pervin Buldan, Mülkiye Birtane, Sabahat Tuncel, Selahattin Demirtaş Selma Irmak, Sırrı Sakık ve Sırrı Süreyya Önder consequently received the summaries of proceedings.
Deputy Özdal Üçer, on the other hand, topped the list with nine summaries of proceedings against him.
The charges leveled against the BDP deputies in the summaries of proceedings include "making PKK propaganda" (TMK article 7 / 2,) "Contravening the Law of Assembly and Demonstration" (article 28 / 1 of the 2911th Law,) "praising a crime and the criminal" (article 215 of the TCK,) "Contravening the Law of Political Parties" (article 78 of the 2820th Law,) "insulting a civil servant for his / her duties" (article 125 of the TCK,) "insulting the prime minister" (article 301 of the TCK,) "inciting people to hatred and enmity" (article 216 of the TCK) and "having membership in a terrorist organization by committing a crime on its behalf without being its member." (article 314 / 2 of the TCK.)

Libel

The trials of 16 persons, including nine journalists, were underway during the publication of the report. Courts sentenced four suspects, two of them journalists, to a total of one year and 11 months behind bars and to pay fines in the amount of 12,000 TL on allegations of "libel" and "attacking personal rights."
During the same period last year, courts had sentenced eight suspects to nine years and four months in jail and five suspects to pay fines in the amount of 29,860 TL, three of them directly to the person of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

Bans, Confiscations

Officials removed a book from the Education Ministry's "100 Essential Works" on the grounds it contained obscenity.
Officials also banned a song, censured a comic strip and returned a magazine back to its publisher on the same charge. They also banned a May 1 celebration banner of the Turkish Communist Party (TKP) upon the allegation that it contained an insult.
Authorities also shut the weekly Demokratik Vatan ("Democratic Homeland") down for a month on the charge they had made propaganda on the PKK's behalf.

Appeals to the European Court of Human Rights

A journalist filed a suit at the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) during the second quarter of 2012 on the charge that Turkey had violated the "ban on torture" and "the right to freedom and security."

Higher Board of Radio and Television

Turkey's Higher Board of Radio and Television (RTÜK) issued 96 warnings and 68 fines against broadcasting stations, while it also issued 18 warnings and two fines against radio stations.
RTÜK cited a number of reasons for its warnings and fines, including articles pertaining to "rating symbols [regarding age-restricted content,]" "human dignity and the right to privacy," "the presumption of innocence," "proper use of the Turkish language," "exploiting people through fortune-reading and superstitions," "the right to rebut," "contests and lotteries," "explicit publications," "the rule of law," "discrimination," "tobacco and tobacco products," "news presentation" and "advertisement, sponsorship and product placement." (EG / BA)
(BIA) Bianet Independent Communication Network publishes regular reports on the freedom of expression in Turkey, detailing the developments and setback on media freedom and freedom of speech during the three months which the report covers. The reports list the writers and journalists that are facing prosecution as well as the legal and social developments. We bring our report to your attention with the hope that it would serve as an informative tool for your work on freedom of expression in Turkey.
PLEASE CONTACT: Emel Gülcan Emel@bianet.org. If you have any comments or questions, we will be more than happy to help.
Related Topics:  Turkey

What the Iranian People "Really Think"... and How to Help Them

by Harold Rhode
July 31, 2012 at 4:00 am
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We should be extremely suspicious of public opinion surveys that purport to reveal what Iranians -- or anyone else in totalitarian countries -- "really think." They are not going to speak openly to anyone other than intimates and long-trusted friends, or it might not be "good for their health." Many Iranians would appreciate all forms of aid that might help them bring down the regime.
In totalitarian societies, people are wary of telling others what they "really think." Given the Iranian government's ability to suppress its internal opponents, we should be extremely suspicious of public opinion surveys: the Iranian people are simply not going speak openly to anyone other than intimates and long-trusted friends, or it might not be "good for their health."
Even so, this does not mean that we cannot know what they are thinking. In such circumstances, the joke, the proverb, and satire are key: today's joke and proverbs about their rulers are stinging to say the least. Iranians know how to insult their leaders subtly, without making direct references to the tyrants that rule them.
For example, a well-known satirist, known as Aali Payam, recently stood before an audience in Iran and said: I will not speak about the [Iranian] elections any more... We are at a sensitive time... They [the Iranian government] took a colleague in for questioning and asked him, "Don't you realize we are at a sensitive period?" The colleague replied: "We have been at a sensitive period for the last 333 years. Did you hear that Qaddafi told Saddam [both in hell] to get ready, they are going to have a guest? One of these days Bashar Assad will arrive!" As the satirist cannot criticize the Iranian government directly, he does the next best thing: he pokes fun at Syria's Bashar Assad, one of the Iranian regime's strongest allies, to imply that if the Iranian regime supports Assad, Qaddafi and Saddam, Assad's days on earth, like Saddam's and Qaddafi's, are numbered. (See video)
Another video called "2 + 2 = 5" makes the point even more clearly. Elementary school boys are in a classroom. Suddenly the teacher comes in and the boys instantly stop their banter. The teacher tells them that the principal is about to speak to the whole school over the Public Address system with an important message, which turns out to be that their teachers are about to teach them an important message. Thereafter, the teacher writes on the board: 2 + 2 = 5. The boys say that the answer is 4. The teacher sternly repeats 2 + 2 = 5, and tells the boys to write this in their notebooks. Most of the boys follow the teacher's instructions, but one insists that the answer is 4. A moment later, three older students with red arm-bands come into the class and the boy who said "4" is told to go up to the board. The teacher yells at him to write 2 + 2 = 5. The boy writes 2 + 2 = 4. The three older students with red arm-bands then take out guns and shoot the boy. As blood spurts out, the boy falls to the ground. The teacher then instructs the three boys with the red arm-bands to remove this "object from the room." The other boys are petrified. The teacher tells them to write in their books 2 + 2 = 5. All do so, except one boy then erases the "5" and writes "4." [Note: This video was clearly made by Iranians outside the country: it has subtitles in English and Thai.]
When Iranians escape their country, they are usually perfectly willing to say privately what they think, so long as they can maintain anonymity. They know that members of the Iranian regime are skilled at spying on Iranians abroad and could threaten their relatives still living in Iran. In totalitarian societies, only family relationships can be trusted; Iran is no exception.
During the past year, more and more Iranians have been finding ways to communicate with their friends and relatives abroad in ways which should encourage the world to ratchet up the pressure on the regime.
It is now quite common to hear Iranians say that life is becoming unbearable in Iran. During the past year, the cost of living has become so expensive that even middle class people can no longer afford the basic necessities of life. People are finding ways to tell their friends and relatives outside the country that they are waiting for the day that this regime is gone so that they can lead some sort of normal life.
Throughout history, when Iranians perceive their rulers as weak and believe they have the backing of strong powers either inside or outside their country, they have revolted. We do not have to bomb their nuclear facilities to help them. (Many Iranians inside the country apparently oppose an all-out attack on the nuclear facilities, not because of Iranian patriotism, but because they may die in the attack.) Many Iranians, would, however, deeply appreciate all other types of aid.
This could include anything which shows we do not support the regime, ranging from publicly reprimanding the regime for violating human rights, condemning the regime for the way it puts down riots, supplying to the leaders of the opposition communications equipment which cannot be monitored by the regime, or, the next time an Iranian naval vessel provokes the U.S. in the Gulf, responding forcefully – either by taking over the ship and holding the occupants for interrogation, or any response which would signal that we were actively standing up to the regime.
Instead, we keep missing -- or sidestepping -- opportunities to do so. On July 28th, for instance, the Syrian foreign minister flew to Tehran to meet his Iranian counterpart. After the meeting they held a joint news conference, venting anger at, and lies about, their enemies, who, they claimed, stand behind those wishing to overthrow the Syrian regime. We could have condemned both; so far we have chosen not to do so. To the Iranian people, our lack of a reaction reveals weakness and shows them they have no external support to move against their regime.
If we give them some sort of indication that we would back them, the Iranian people will understand the encouragement. After a few times, the Iranians would almost assuredly get the message and take matters into their own hands.
Helping them liberate themselves would be a win-win situation for the West, and would help put the Iranian people out of the misery imposed on them by their tyrannical regime.
Related Topics:  Iran  |  Harold Rhode

Just Whack the Jewish Piñata

by Mudar Zahran
July 31, 2012 at 3:00 am
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Egyptian activists seem to believe that Egyptian actor Adel Imam — possibly the most famous Arab actor — took Mubarak's side amid the Egyptian revolution that toppled him in 2011. As a result Imam has been blacklisted by Egyptian activists, but nonetheless Imam has made a comeback with a miniseries that is full of anti-Semitism and demonization of Jews and Israel. Is this just plain hate for Jews or is it a stunt by Imam to win the public? And if so, what does it mean for Egypt and the Arab world?
First, it is worthwhile to examine who Adel Imam is. In 1994, the Los Angeles Times described Imam as a popular actor, noting that: "His expressive and not particularly handsome face has become the mirror of the Egyptian middle class, with its tribulations, celebrations and frustrations."
In fact, Imam's popularity earned him the position of a Goodwill Ambassador for the United Nations Higher Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). On its website, the UNHCR notes that Imam "mobilizes many other celebrities, business community and media for the refugee cause." Furthermore, the UNHCR's website edition of Imam's biography describes him as the "Arab Charlie Chaplin", and the "most famous actor in the Arab world."
The above strongly suggests that Imam is, indeed, a heavy-weight Arab celebrity. Nonetheless, Adel Imam's popularity suffered a major blow when he allegedly sided with the Egyptian regime amid the revolution that toppled President Hosni Mubarak in 2011. Shortly after Mubarak was overthrown in February 2011, Dubai-based TV network Al-Arabiya reported that Adel Imam had been blacklisted by Egyptian political activists of the 25 January revolution, along with other Egyptian actors and actresses, because Imam was one of the "Egyptian actors, musicians, and media figures that showed support for the country's former President Hosni Mubarak". Al-Arabiya confirmed that Imam's pro-Mubarak stance was "the big surprise" for Egyptians as "it contradicted his previous leading roles in many nationalist and anti-establishment films". However, Al-Arabiya notes that this should not be a surprise as Imam was known to be a close friend of Mubarak's family. Since then, Imam made several media appearances, including one on Al-Jazeera, claiming he was supportive of the revolution, but his name remained on the blacklist, signifying the potential damage to his career.
This July, Imam made a comeback with a miniseries titled "The Naji Attalla's Squad." The miniseries will air all through the Muslim holy month of Ramadan which began on July 2th for most Muslim countries. The Naji Attalla's Squad tells the story of Naji Attalla, a retired Egyptian military officer serving as a senior diplomat at the Egyptian embassy in Tel Aviv, where he runs a thriving gambling business under the cover of his diplomatic immunity. Attalla draws the attention of the Israel Security Agency -- better known as the Shabak -- who freeze his assets because of the unexplained funds compared to his income. Choosing to take revenge, Naji Attalla (Imam) puts together a group of ex-servicemen who had served under him, with the purpose of going to Israel to rob Bank Leumi where his frozen assets are kept.
In an interview with the Egyptian Private TV network, Dream, Imam described the mini-series as "A historical landmark". Let's see what Imam's "historical" miniseries has looked like so far.
Imam's first appearance in the miniseries begins with him telling a joke. Imam says: "One time, a Jewish guy went to France, he found a French girl, he spent a night with her and then gave her 50 Euros, the next day, he spent another night with her and gave her 50 Euros, third night was the same and the fourth was the same. The lady got impressed, she told him: A generous Jew? 200 Euros in one job! I love Jews now and by the way my aunt lives in Tel Aviv, the Jewish guy responded: I know, as she's the one who sent you the 200 Euros".
In another scene, Imam is shown making another joke about Jews being too cheap to a laughing and an impressed Jewish Israeli real estate agent. In another scene, an Egyptian diplomat who was newly-appointed to Tel Aviv is shown telling Imam how he feels like he is in a nightmare for having to live among Israelis, noting he could not forget "their despicableness...and our folks still getting killed in Gaza and Palestine", to which Imam responds "it is better to get know your enemy...in order to know how they think, as they (the Jews) have always been trying to learn how we think".
In a different scene the Egyptian Embassy's driver tells the fresh Egyptian diplomat "May God burn them (Israelis) in hell, when Hamas carries out an operation against them, or when Hezbollah fires a couple of rockets my heart will be jumping with joy".
Throughout the miniseries, Israelis are portrayed as Arab-hating bigots; one scene shows an female Israeli student giving a speech to a large crowd of students at Tel Aviv University, complete with the University's coat of arms behind her. The Egyptian actress spoke in Hebrew, with Arabic captions, saying Israel did a great job "killing thousands of Arabs in Lebanon and Gaza", and ended her passionate speech with her and the crowd chanting "Death to the Arabs". The miniseries does not stop with portraying Israelis as prejudiced against Arabs, but also as prejudiced amongst themselves: In one scene, a Jewish Bank Leumi manager of Iraqi background is shown chastising one of his employee of a European background for missing days at work, telling him "Whom do you Ashkenazim think you are? You think you are a big deal? We Sephardim have held this country on our shoulders".
The miniseries is a joint project between a private production company and the Production Section at the Egyptian TV, a state-owned and run institution, as confirmed by the Alarab website.
This miniseries is not the first, nor will it be the last, demonization of Jews and Israel in the Arab mass media. Nonetheless, the weight of the Arab star, Adel Imam, is huge, and therefore the miniseries is likely to have a more lasting effect in the minds of the younger generation in post-Mubarak Egypt.
Imam's act is nothing new. Before him, a less popular Egyptian actor, Muhammad Sobhi, earned himself greater fame when he starred in a miniseries names "A Horseman Without A Horse", which revolved around an alleged Jewish manual to control the world, better known as the Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
At the time, Western criticism of the miniseries served its star, Muhammad Sobhi. As that contributed to Sobhi's fame, Adel Imam too might end up with more fame and public acceptance if his new miniseries brings about a Western or a Jewish uproar.
In the Middle East, the oldest publicity trick seems to still work: When you are need of social acceptance – or forgiveness in Imam's case – just hit the Jewish piñata.
Will Egypt and other Arab Spring nations move forward or will they keep blaming their shortcomings on "the evil Jews"?
Related Topics:  Egypt  |  Mudar Zahran

The Call for July 30, 2012: Why All Players Are Weak and No-One Wants to Win

by David P. Goldman  •  Jul 30, 2012 at 11:15 pm
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David Samuels, Pepe Escobar and David Goldman
Key takeaways
  1. No-one will win in Syria because none of the external actors wants any side to win – except for the Obama administration, which is ineffectual. There is only one leader who really supports the Muslim Brotherhood, and that's Barack Obama. The Saudis, Turks, and others will use the Brotherhood as cannon fodder in Syria but will never let them get close to real power. There is a parallel to Egypt where the armed forces are seeking to put the burden of a worsening economic crisis on the Muslim Brotherhood government. The only real friend the Muslim Brotherhood has is Barack Obama, and he isn't in charge.
  2. Washington's much-vaunted reliance on Turkey as an ally in the region is delusional. Turkey's position is inherently weak. Saudi Arabia and Russia are promoting the image of a strong Turkey because of their own weakness, but this cannot last forever. Turkey is floundering, and the position of the Syrian Kurds has become a major embarrassment and potential threat.
  3. America's energy policy in the region has failed because America doesn't have an energy policy. China is the big winner in Africa and Central Asia at American expense.
Syria Update: Who Wants the Muslim Brotherhood To Have Power?
Pepe Escobar: The Syrian government has cleared one of the key neighborhoods where the rebels were in control. The rebels said they were controlling 20% of the city. Which doesn't make sense to me, Aleppo has 2.5 million citizens, the suburbs are very spread out, this means they were controlling 400-500,000 thousand people, in different neighborhoods – that's very hard to do.
The government strategy is to clear one neighborhood at a time. It's going to be very bloody because they are going to use tanks and helicopters gunshots. At least 200,000 people already left, some people went to the border and some went to the Sunni heartland. There is a mixed population living in Aleppo – composed of Alawites, Kurds and Christians. If the rebels continue to advance at the pace they have been for the past five to six weeks, and they keep receiving more anti-tank RPG's (effective Russian ones) in large quantities, the Syrian government is not going to able to clear the neighborhoods of rebels in a few days like they say they will.
David Samuels: There isn't any functioning civil authority in these places. So what does it mean to "win the battle of Allepo"? You send in tanks, they shoot some people, you blow up some houses, 20 fighters get killed, the other 60 pull out and so then you've "won" the battle of Allepo – except no one is there. Half the people have left, there is no functioning civil authority, the moment you pull out the tanks, more people are going to form themselves into some entity with a flag and say they now control it. People have been saying for months "oh this is going to be dominated by Al'Queda", there will be a vacuum where Al-Queda where come in, the Salafists are coming in, and people have been discounting that. The New York Times seems to sign-off to the fact that this is ostensibly happening and they seem to suggest in part because that's what the Saudis and the Qataris are paying for (they're paying for the Salafists to have weapons, they're not paying for socialist Kurds to have weapons).
Goldman: Syria really looks like it's becoming a dumping ground for all the unwanted militants hanging around everywhere else in the world. It's the Russian front for jihadists.
Escobar: That's why the Iraqis aren't letting the Syrians into their countries.
Goldman: No, they're sending the people they don't want to Syria, quite the contrary. This is consistent with the presumption that the Saudis, Qataris, and Turks want to make it impossible for Assad to govern but without actually making it possible for anyone else to govern. If any of those people were to form a government they wouldn't like them.
Escobar: The elements of the FSA are very good at bickering among themselves, but their only platform is "we want regime change now". There isn't any hint of a political debate about the future of the country or what kind of government they're going to have, if there are any qualified people they would have appoint to be ministers, nothing, absolutely nothing. And I'm sure if there was a Gallup Poll in Syria tomorrow, with everybody, in the big cities, in the Sunni plain, in the Alawite mountains, along the border with Turkey, you would probably get like 90 percent rejection of the Syrian National Council. The secular parties are wacko Marxists. The only ones who talk to the so-called "international community" or even to Kofi Annan for that matter are the Syrian National Council, which is distrusted by the majority of the population.
Samuels: But this points to a larger problem in this concept of Arab Spring. It was presented as a positive set of revolutions. But what if it was simply, the decay of these existing autocratic, kleptocratic, hereditary regimes that are ruling half these countries. Those things collapse; there is no real civil society underneath that. So what comes after? There is no set of ideas that impelled a revolution really. There was a profound dissatisfaction with being stolen from and with the stagnation and the lack of jobs. People say "revolution" "Arab Spring" it all sounds pretty hopeful, but it looks like what you actually see more and more is a process of social atomization and the only thing that is left there is the Muslim Brotherhood or some other form of Salafist organization (for lack of a better word).
Goldman: I agree with that, and your observation brings up a second order problem: who wants the Muslim brotherhood to take power? The Muslim Brotherhood obviously does, the Saudis don't and the Turks don't, for different reasons. The biggest supporter the Muslim Brotherhood has is Barack Obama. But Obama has certain limits to what he can do because it's an election year.
Turkey and Pipelinistan
Samuels: I still have not figured out to my satisfaction the relationship between the Turks and the Obama administration. From what I hear, Hillary Clinton at least, supposedly thinks of her opposite number [Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu] as a moron. And they're fully aware of the nature of the government, it doesn't seem like they're deluded that Erdogan is someone that he's not.
I think that looking at external actors is the right way to make sense of Syria. Which brings me back, I guess this question is really directed toward Pepe, leading into the Pipelinistan discussion: I still can figure out US-Turkish policy?
So Hilary Clinton thinks that her opposite number is a moron. Everyone knows that Erdogan is prone to these fits of rage, that the Ergenekon scandals were a bunch of trumped up fooey. Everyone also knows that the Turkish economy is a bit of a bubble. And so when I look at this there must be some larger overriding, economic, strategic, interest in this close tie the US has with Turkey. It isn't sentimentalism for US-Turkish ties and it's not an Arab country, and so what is the hard economic interest the US has to be pursuing?
Escoabar: Very good question. I will try to answer from an energy point of view. Basically starting with the first Bush administration, what they wanted from Turkey is to ideally isolate Iran in terms of distribution of energy from southwest Asia towards Europe. This is practically impossible for a number of reasons. First of all, in terms of energy, Turkey depends on Iran's oil and gas as a transit country between southwest Asia or the Middle East and Europe. The Turkish energy policy basically boils down to "we are the crossroads" we are in the center of the action, in terms of the Caucuses, Asia, we don't have oil and gas, in fact Turkey imports 90% of their oil and 93% of their gas. But they are surrounded by the major powers that produce oil and gas in the region. So they need a working relationship with their rivals, even if they don't agree in political terms. At the same time they cannot antagonize Russia, because Russia is now their number one trade partner, and they depend on the oil and gas that they buy from GazProm. What does Erdogan think in Ankara? If we can't have a working relationship with both Russia and Iran, we build ourselves as a transit energy country to the Europeans, we sell to the Europeans the idea that if they want to break their dependency on Gazprom, which they are always talking about in Brussels, they can rely on us as a transit country bringing gas in from Turkmenistan and from Iran. Or even from Iraqi Kurdistan. At the same time they want to bi-pass Iran from a geo-political point of view. To establish a purely commercial energy relationship (not a political alliance) and this will more or less appease our friends in Washington.
This is what they have been thinking and trying to apply for ten years now. The framework is the book that [Foreign Minister] Davutoglu wrote in 2000 - The Zero Problems with our Neighbors Doctrine. The problem is the relationship with Iran, especially after the sanctions this year, now they don't know where this is heading. They don't know if they try to seal some kind of deal with Iran on an energy angle and how Washington would view that. Washington already said: "we don't want any deals, at least not for the moment". Russia is telling Turkey: It terms of geo-political power play in the Middle East, in terms of regime change, we don't support you. And be very careful because if you antagonize our interests in terms of building pipelines that bypass us (and GazProm from Russia, you're going to be in trouble. And especially these past few weeks, this thing that happened three weeks ago in Irbio in Iraqi Kurdistan. It is very important in my opinion. Because what Turkey has been trying to organize for the past few months crumbled completely. (Which was the regime change story in Syria from a Turkish point of view). The Assad government basically struck a deal with the Syrian Kurds and the deal was brokered by Barzani from Iraqi Kurdistan. The deal was brokered and signed in Kirkuk on July 10th, three weeks ago. So the deal was, on the part of the Assad regime: I know that you don't support us in Damascus, and at the same time we know that you don't support your position even though you are nominally a part of the opposition. But what we propose is we leave you alone in northeast Syria, and in return you don't interfere and you don't support your position in the Sunni plains, in northern Syria or even in Damascus and Allepo. And then you can have Kurdish media, you can teach Kurdish in school, if there are any political prisoners we're going to release them, you're going to have semi-autonomy in your region, and the Kurds say "OK, Good!". Because it is exactly what they wanted from the beginning, and they don't trust the Syrian National Council. The people who control the Syrian National Council, they are hardcore Sunnis with some Salafists infiltrated among them. They don't even recognize that the Kurds are an integral part of the Syrian state. They have always been trying to find a spokesperson for the SNC (Syrian national council): one week they find a token Kurd, the next week they find a token Christian, and these people last one week or two weeks. And then they disappear completely, because nobody trusts them. So when this deal was cut three weeks ago you can imagine the reaction in Ankara. And in fact the title of my piece in the Asia Times was inspired by a columnist in the Hurriyet (Turkish newspaper) who wrote about the Kurdish Spring. And the Turks they never saw it coming, although we could see that sooner or later there would be a Syrian counter-punch using the Kurds.
So the Syrian Kurds they look at this and say "hmmm interesting maybe we can do the same thing" - except instead of a relationship between Syrian Kurdistan with Turkey we can do it with our cousins in Iraq, so Iraqi Kurdistan can help us as well. They can help us even in terms of building pipelines, and then depending on the next government in Damascus, we can have a cut in terms of being a transit country between Iraq and the Eastern Mediterranean. So if you build a pipeline from Kirkuk through Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean, depending on what the next government in Damascus is going to be, the central government gets a cut, but also the regional government, the Syrian Kurd government also gets a cut. And honestly, Ankara will be freaked out completely. What are we going to do? These people are going to harbor PKK guerillas, not only Iraqi Kurdistan but also but also Syrian Kurdistan. They are going to do deals with Iraqi Kurds bypassing us, Turkey? And also sooner or later there going to have guerilla cells all over the place and they're going to start linking with the PKK in Anatolia as well, and there going to dismember our country. So this is what they are thinking in Ankara.
For me the most spectacular aspect of all this is that apparently they (the Turks) never saw it coming. But it was so obvious. Especially for the past few months. It was one of the few cards that the Assad regime had left to play.
Samuels: My question for you is, if you look at US interest in terms of equipment and pipeline materials, where are US companies most deeply involved now and what are the links to Turkey? I'm trying to find somewhere because I resist the idea that Barack Obama embraces Turkey as America's partner and the Muslim world is based solely on his sentimental attachment to the Ottoman Empire. Why Turkey? What's the angle?
Escobar: Look, there is something very important in terms of the NATO strategy. Turkey as the eastern arm of NATO, in trying to more or less control the region by using the Turkish military. You can see parallels with what the Bush administration what thinking about 10 years ago. Why not use NATO and especially Turkey as the Eastern arm of NATO to impose some sort of order in the neighborhood (the Black sea, parts of the Middle East, Southeast Asia...)?
This is not going to work, first of all because the Turkish army is not competent enough to do that. Number 2: they need the energy, they import almost all of their energy. Their only sources and the sources that are guaranteed are Russia and Iraq. They cannot import directly from Central Asia because the pipelines go through the ancient Soviet pipeline system and if they want to buy from Turkmenistan, the only way (transit way) would be through Iran because Iran and Turkmenistan have a swap agreement. So Iran could buy gas from Turkmenistan and then through a pipeline Turkey would get it; and they could use it for internal consumption or they could sell the surplus as well. They still do have transit rights, which comes back to the original Davutoglu idea: we have to make a lot of money by being a transit rights country. Anyone selling energy to Europe and the rest of the world has to go through here, through our pipelines, so we can make a fortune out of this. And even Syria in fact, we can say that their unofficial energy foreign policy was to become an energy transit hub as well. Because until the beginning of the uprising, 16 months ago, they were making some money out of it, through the Arab gas pipeline and through one of the pipelines that come from Iraq. Now, one year later, the 10 billion dollar deal was struck and is at the center of this whole discussion. This deal was sealed by Iran, Iraq and Syria a year ago. This pipeline is supposed to run from Iran, across Iran and to Syria's coast. Why would so much money be invested – to sell a lot of gas to Europe. How is this being done? By bypassing Turkey. For me this explains a lot of the Turks' animosity. The regime changed their ties with Syria. If this pipeline is built, it would completely isolate Turkey, out of this position that they tried to consolidate for these past few years as a transit hub.
Goldman: The revenues which Turkey might derive from pipeline shipments are in the order of hundreds of millions of dollars a year, but that the political repercussions of having control of the pipelines are strategically much more important. The financial figures are very important here. Turkey's current account deficit is in the range of 8 to 10% of GDP (70-80 billion dollars a year). And the total amount that you could imagine the Turks under any circumstance earning from pipeline revenues, is two orders of magnitude smaller than that. If they earned a billion dollars it would be extraordinary. So, it is not going to make a dent. However a lot of people are willing to finance the Turks because the prospect of Turkish instability frightens them for whatever reason. The main money financing the current account deficit of Turkey is coming from the Gulf States. It is coming through the inter-bank market, in the form of three month loans. The total of such financing is over $60 billion. The Arabs don't want Erdogan to be destabilized, but on the other hand, he is on a very short leash. These are funds that could be pulled at any moment, at which point Turkish currency would collapse.
Now the Saudis clearly don't want the Turks to be destabilized, the Russians don't want the Turks to be destabilized and the Americans don't want the Turks to be destabilized. No one wants them to run anything but no one wants them to be unstable. Form the Russian standpoint, they have 10 or 11 million foreign workers from Turkey or the Turkic Republics now working in Russia, most of them organized by Turkish construction companies. The remittances of these workers are an important factor in Turkey's economy. Were it to be the case that Turkey itself became destabilized and radical elements infiltrated the foreign worker pool- this could be extremely dangerous for Russian stability. So, Russia prefers to have Erdogan there, riding herd over the Islamists. They prefer Islamists they know, to a bunch of Islamist crazies who are not in anybody's control. The Saudis want a big Sunni military to oppose Iran, which limits Iran's flexibility in the region. For the same reason they finance the Pakistanis; those are their two possibilities – the only two big Sunni armies near Iran.
Samuels: Your analysis suggests that Obama's policy towards Turkey is a perfectly smart one- which is that they don't think that the Turkish government is anything other than what it appears to be however they have an interest in saying: "Oh yeah, you're a terrific important partner, here's a phone call, the President needs to speak to you. You're the leading edge of blablablablabla." And nobody wants Turkey to become a further headache for everybody.
Goldman: Another way to put the matter is that Putin and Prince Bandar have a smart policy towards Turkey and Obama is simply following the path of least resistance by going along with them.
Samuels: I think that very well may be true but it also means that the idea of it that a lot of commentators here have had (some of them for it and some against) is that Turkey as a significant arm of American foreign policy is wrong – it has no such arm; we just have an idiot child we have to humor.
Goldman: Yes, but both the Saudi and the Russian policy are expressions of their weakness and lack of strategic depth. In the case of Russia, their problem is demographic decline – they can't do without these immigrants, so they have to do the best they can in controlling the flow, but that doesn't mean they'll succeed in controlling the flow over in the long term. That's a serious problem for them. And from the Saudis' standpoint, their problem is that they want other people do to the fighting for you. So when you have a big checkbook and you want other people to do the fighting for you, there are lots of kinds of ways in which you can get into serious trouble.
And finally, there is the Turkish economic situation. You can finance a current account deficit of 10% of GDP for quite some time as Greece demonstrated but you can't do it forever. They can't sustain it forever and at some point, that economy blows up. So, all these efforts to keep things stable are across the board expression of weakness and not strength and are temporary arrangement at best. So to describe them as smart is, I think, charitable.
Escobar: David, in your scheme, how do you explain Ankara's eagerness for regime change in Syria? It's not going to change the overall picture that you painted.
Goldman: Are they in fact eager for a change? What are they doing- are they actually sending heavy weapons to the opposition?
Escobar: No they are the logistics space for the whole opposition basically.
Goldman: So when they say they are eager for regime change, are they doing things that would actually cause the Assad regime to fall by putting decisive force into the hands of the FSA? Or are they keeping the thing at a low boil, which makes trouble for Assad but doesn't necessarily force them out? That's the question.
There is a parallel to Egypt.The Muslim brotherhood now has for the first time, a government, in Egypt. Ordinary economic life in Egypt is skating on extremely thin ice. There are endemic shortages of water, with violence associated with water distribution, including in some places a shortage of drinking water, which is obviously serious. The shortage of fuel is endemic and is the fuel shortage is reportedly exacerbated by the refusal of Egyptian banks to lend to state-owned corporations which are supposed to buying and distributing fuel, which would be very serious. We just saw a big spike in interest rates in the last bond auction by the Egyptian central bank from about 11% to 16%. This is the first time this has happened in a while, which suggests there is some problem in the banking system. There are spot shortages of food, and the country is almost out of foreign exchange. Meanwhile the price of wheat has just spiked, and there is talk about raising food prices which would cause substantial problems.
There is a parallel between the Egyptian and the Syrian situations: Nobody has an interest in creating a stable regime where the Muslim Brotherhood could or could be seen to governThey are not going to be given, or will be able to create a situation, where they can credibly exercise power and bring about stability because nobody wants them to.
Escobar: And when you say nobody you mean specially the SCAF in Egypt?
Goldman: Yes I mean SCAF, the Saudis, the Turks, the people with money, the people with guns.
Samuels: And this new pipeline which was supposedly about to be completed in the gulf, what impact does it have Pepe Escobar?
Pepe Escobar: GoldmanThat is the the Habshan- Fujairah pipeline that carries oil from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah in the Gulf of Oman. It is an internal UAE pipeline, a very short one that allows them to export by the Red Sea and not by the Straight of Hormuz.
Goldman: The pipeline cost them basically nothing and they built it in only a few months.
This was a solution that was already there for the Emirates, it cost them practically nothing and it is a short internal pipeline. In the big game, if you want to by-pass the Straights, you have to do something like what the Clinton administration did, like building the BTC pipeline. So instead of having Iran sending oil and gas directly to Europe, which would cost like 800 million dollars, they spent almost 5 billion building a gigantic pipeline from Baku through Georgia and then to the Turkish Mediterranean.
Turkey does not want to do this anymore because they need Iranian energy, and this brings us back to the center of the whole game. If they were no sanctions against Iran by the Europeans, any European energy analyst would tell you, "We will go to Tehran tomorrow sit down with them, invest in their energy infrastructure and buy all the oil and gas they can produce".
I'm sure it will be in the interest of Washington, if Washington considers Western Europe a privileged ally, not to apply the sanctions. Washington should say: "Even if we do not support their geo-political goals, or their nuclear energy program, why not buy oil and energy from them for Europe, because Europe needs it. Otherwise, they are going to be hostages of GazProm. You see how the whole situation is interlinked. The possibility of a diplomatic solution on a commercial trade level is there.
Goldman: We're not here to agree about everything, and I appreciate the view.
Samuels: Again I want to have a sense from Pepe about Pipelinistan. If you look at this big spidery net of pipelines, I understand they are an important geo-strategic chip to think about. Once they are built it is kind of hard to build a new one. It takes at least two years and lots of money to build one, so you don't just build a new one, and once it is in place you are also responsible for the mortgage too. If you build a pipeline through Turkey and suddenly Turkey is in trouble, then you are responsible because you want to save you pipeline. If you look at the areas that are unsettled now and you look at areas of big American economic involvement (whether that be building a pipeline or providing machinery). Where are the areas of particular focus and concern for the US when you think about oil transit?
Escobar: Africa, because it took the West five to six years to realize that China made really good deals with at least four or five African countries in terms of supplying energy. Angola is one of them, Sudan as well (500,000 barrels of oil a day from Sudan to China). Now we don't know what is going to happen because of the dispute between the two Sudans, who is going to control the pipeline and the oil leaving the port of Sudan. This is a huge problem.
The Americans were out of this picture during the first Bush administration and until the second part of the second Bush administration. The problem was that America had no counter-strategy. Now Bush's strategy in Africa was a military strategy (to set up AFRICOM). Bush sent delegations to these African countries offering much better deals than the Chinese: "We are going to build your pipelines and you will sell your oil and gas to us, and not to China". They did not have a commercial policy.
Samuels: So you are indicting Barack Obama for neglecting US-Africa policy?
Pepe: Apparently, yes…In central Asia as well they had a very capable diplomat in Richard Morningstar during both Bush administrations. He used to shuttle to Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, virtually every month. But they never proposed anything practical to these extremely unreliable regimes, especially Turkmenistan. The only thing the Americans decided was "You have to bypass Russia" and Turkmenistan said "How? Our whole system is linked to Russia's pipelines, we cannot bypass Russia!"
The Chinese meanwhile sent a delegation to Ashkhabad, and said they wanted a certain quantity of natural gas and said they would build the pipelines for you (you don't have to do anything) but export the gas to us for a reasonable price. And then China said they would build hospitals roads, mosques, whatever you want. And the Turkmenistan government said yes.
My problem with the American energy strategy around the world is that there is no American energy strategy around the world.
Samuels: You are saying that America struck out in central Asia, so the idea of an American energy strategy in central Asia that connects to American geo-political hopes for Turkey is two separate fantasies, and neither one is going to be realized anyway?
Pepe: Yes, it did not work because it was not a coordinated offensive. For example, in 2005, 2006 these American delegations going to Central Asia had approached Turkmenistan and said: "We will help you build a pipeline to Turkey (Turkey is our ally, a transit country to Europe, Turkey has no gas). If you sell your gas to Turkey and Turkey transports gas to Europe, we will help you build a pipeline". The US never proposed something like this… Instead the Chinese proposed the same thing and they got the deal.
Samuels: I always imagined this would be what American energy policy in central Asia and Africa was about - and you're saying it could have been a plausible policy but it simply never was the actual policy.
Pepe: There is another problem looming in South America, all those absurd quantities of oil that Brazil is discovering. The whole world is going to jump over there in the next 3 or 4 years to get the best plots, the best fuel for exportation. The Chinese will be there, the Russians, the American big oil will be there. But I wonder what American big oil will offer, that will be so much better than what the Chinese and Russians will offer. Obama already said he would be Brazil's first customer.
Goldman: If the US Administration doesn't care about oil supplies in Canada and lets China movein, what makes you think the US even knows where Brazil is on the map? here doesn't seem to be a coherent energy policy in the Obama administration, I doubt he's had a conversation with his energy secretary since he hired the guy. I don't remember who the secretary of energy is…
Samuels: A good fade-out for this scene is everyone Googling to find out who the Secretary of Energy is.
Related Topics:  David P. Goldman
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