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The
End of the 'Wrong Side of History'
by Jonathan Spyer
PJ Media
March 5, 2014
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President Barack Obama, in criticizing Russian leader Vladimir Putin's
conquest of the Crimean Peninsula, described Putin as standing "on
the wrong side of history." This curious and arresting phrase
has become a
frequent cliché among western liberals.
It is testimony to their self-confidence, and to their belief that
they have accurately read the deeper currents and inevitable direction of
human affairs. These, in the view of the president and his supporters,
point inexorably toward greater cooperation between peoples; a decline in
attachment to particularist ethnic, national or religious histories; and
a decline in the use of force to settle disputes between states.
The unspoken assumption behind all this, of course, is that being on
the right side of history also means accepting the unmatched dominance of
the U.S. in global affairs, and in turn the unchallengeable domination of
the U.S. by people supporting the particular progressive world view of
the president and his supporters.
That is, Obama and his supporters use the word "history" to
refer to themselves.
The problem with all this is that in the last five years, many players
on the world stage have learned that if "history" and
"Obama" are synonyms, being on the wrong side of Obama is a not
particularly uncomfortable or worrying place to be. So the threat of it
has rather less impact than the president might hope or assume.
This is not a marginal point. Rather, it is the key factor defining
the direction of strategic affairs globally, and in the Middle East in
particular.
Let's examine the record:
In the Middle East, declining respect for being on the wrong side of
the United States is the single factor which underlies the direction of
events in the key conflict zones of the region.
In Egypt, the current de facto administration of General Abd al Fattah
al-Sisi came into being on July 3, 2013, as a result of a military coup
against a U.S.-supported Muslim Brotherhood government. Sisi as of now
appears to command immense popularity among the Egyptian population.
He has paid no apparent price for directly challenging the will of the
U.S. administration. He is likely to win the Egyptian presidency this
year and to set in motion another long period of de facto military rule
in Egypt. He is also in the process of reviving Cairo's relations with
Russia.
In Syria, an anti-American dictatorship is holding its ground, despite
ostensible U.S. support for its overthrow, and despite the dictator
Assad's responsibility for the deaths of over 140,000 of his countrymen
over the last three years. Iranian and Russian aid to the Assad regime
have proved decisive. Bashar Assad was smart enough to stick with allies
who would stick by him.
In Iran, the regime has stage-managed the emergence of a supposed "moderate"
president. The true powers in that country, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei
and the Revolutionary Guard Corps, have as a result obtained sanctions
relief. This in turn is enabling them to continue to develop their
missile program and uranium enrichment capacity undisturbed. They are
also proceeding apace with their program of regional outreach, and are
currently aligned with the dominant forces in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
But even among the supposed allies of the U.S. in the region, it has
become apparent that defying the will of the patron carries no particular
price. The Saudis united with their Gulf allies to crush an
Obama-supported uprising against the emir of Bahrain in 2011.
More recently, the Saudis have pursued their own policy of arms supply
to Islamist and jihadi rebels in northern Syria. In February, it became
clear that the kingdom intends to supply Chinese-made shoulder fired
anti-aircraft systems to rebel elements in Syria. This is in direct
contravention of U.S. wishes.
Washington evidently (and justifiably) fears that such systems could
end up being used against western targets. The Saudis are going ahead
anyway.
So what do General Sisi, Bashar Assad, the Iranian mullahs, the Saudi
monarchy and of course Vladimir Putin all have in common? They are all on
the wrong side of "history" (i.e., the wrong side of the U.S.
administration and its supporters). And they have all come to the
conclusion that this doesn't matter, and they will experience little
difficulty in pursuing their wishes regardless.
Which brings us to the latest interactions between President Obama and
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. It appears that the
administration believes that even if no-one else much listens anymore,
surely the small state of Israel can be frightened and bullied into
getting on the right side of "history." Hence the thinly veiled
threat in Obama's recent interview with Jeffrey Goldberg, according to
which failure to reach an accord with the Palestinian Authority will lead
to Israel's facing international isolation and the closing of the
"window" for a peace deal.
All this is quite surreal, of course, given the very obvious
insurmountable gaps between the sides, because of the PA's insistence on
the "right of return," rejection of mutual recognition between
the sides and rejection of defensible borders for Israel. These stances
lie behind the PA's rejection of Secretary Kerry's framework for
continued negotiations.
But the U.S. administration should also understand that Israeli
determination to act in their country's own self-defined interests is no
less deeply rooted than that of the other players on the global stage
noted above.
Israelis remember that they buried 1,100 of their own citizens in the
period 2000-2005 because of a mis-reading of history and the consequent
placing of trust in an enemy committed to their demise. They will be
unlikely to rush to repeat the experiment. The waving of the bogeyman of
increasing isolation will not induce them to do so.
As for inducements to get on the right side of "history" –
the president might note that all the players noted above, Israel
included, are operating on similar lines. These involve the protection
and assertion of clearly defined national interests, the use of force
where deemed necessary, the judicious backing of allies and the effort to
deter enemies.
Those who operate along those lines most effectively will
get to write the history, in which they will portray themselves as
the natural and inevitable victors. Those who fail to do so will find
that efforts to equate their own preferences with the natural tide of
human events will be a subject for the increasing derision of their
peers, and probably also of history.
Jonathan Spyer is a senior research fellow at the Global Research
in International Affairs (GLORIA) Center, and a fellow at the Middle East
Forum.
Related
Topics: US policy
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