Iran
vs. Turkey, the MidEast's Perpetual Rivalry
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W.T.
title: "Middle East rivalry between Iran and Turkey
interminable"
News
that Iran's and Turkey's governments reached an accord on Idlib, a Syrian town now the
focus of American interests, brings relations between the two of the
largest and most influential states in the Middle East momentarily out
of the shadows.
Their
rivalry goes back a half-millennium, included eleven wars, and now remains, in the
words of the Washington Institute's Soner Cagaptay, the region's
"oldest power game." What does the recent accord signify and
how will their competition influence the region's future?
Iranian
and Turkish parallels are noteworthy. Both countries have populations
of 80 million. (Egypt, the region's third large country, has 96
million.) Both boast ancient civilizations, long imperial histories,
tensions with Russia, and a successful avoidance of European
colonialism. In modern times, each came under the rule of a ruthless
modernizer after World War I, followed more recently by an even more
repressive Islamist.
Ruthless
modernizers: Iran's Reza Shah (L) visited Atatürk in 1934.
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The
current leaders, Iran's Ali Khamene'i and Turkey's Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan, enjoy near-absolute power and both feverishly try to hide this
reality under a large and noisy apparatus of elections, parliaments,
cabinets, laws, and NGOs. Both aspire to lead the entire Muslim
community, perhaps someday claiming to be caliph. In an era of muted
anti-Zionism from Arab states, Tehran and Ankara now lead the charge,
with the Islamic Republic of Iran loudly denying the Holocaust and the
Republic of Turkey comparing Israelis to Nazis.
Even more
repressive Islamists: Turkey's Erdoğan (L) visited Khamene'i in 2012.
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In
several ways, Iranians lead Turks, but the latter are catching up.
Ayatollah Khomeini came to power in 1979 and Erdoğan in 2002. Iran has
long enjoyed massive oil and gas reserves but Turkey recently built an
impressive economic base. Tehran deploys forces abroad, dominating four
Arab capitals, while Ankara still fights domestic opponents, especially
Gülenists and Kurds. Both governments despise the West but Iran's is
openly hostile while Turkey's formally remains in NATO and ostensibly
seeks European Union membership.
Their
most major difference concerns the attitudes of their subjects. Whereas
Khamene'i enjoys the support of only about 15 percent of the populace,
Erdoğan can count on some 45 percent, affording Erdoğan a legitimacy
and confidence that Khamene'i can only dream of. In part, this results
from longevity under Islamist rule, in part from difference in per
capita income, which is only US$4,700 and stagnant in Iran, $10,700 and
rising in Turkey.
Select economic
indicators (World Bank).
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Regime
collapse in Iran is within sight and will diminish Islamism,
encouraging Muslims to move toward a more modern and moderate form of
their religion. The Turkish government's greater popularity and more
advanced version of Islamism gives it greater staying power that makes
it the more worrisome long-term opponent. Thus, the Middle East is
likely to witness a grand switch, with Iran on course to moderation and
Turkey becoming the region's supreme danger.
Bilateral relations flourished during
the first years of Erdoğan's rule (2002-10), when they shared a
Islamist worldview and a suspicion of U.S. intentions in Iraq. But
relations then soured, primarily because both regimes seek foreign
influence and, as neighbors, they inevitably clash. The civil war in
Syria, where Tehran backs Shi'ite-oriented jihadis and Ankara backs
Sunni jihadis, is their biggest but not only problem. Other matters also aggravate
relations, such as their supporting opposing sides in Yemen, Turkish installing a NATO radar tracking
Iranian activities, and Iranian support for Al-Qaeda against Turkey.
Tensions
have reached the point that Ali Vaez of the International Crisis
Group finds Tehran and Ankara "on a collision course." Left
unchecked, he expects the present dynamics to point "toward greater
bloodshed, growing instability and greater risks of direct ... military
confrontation." More poetically, Cagaptay observes that the Middle
East has room for "one shah or sultan, but not a shah and a
sultan."
In
this context, the Idlib accord looks flimsy and transient. Tehran and
Ankara will probably soon turn against each other and with renewed
vigor continue their perpetual rivalry.
Washington Times
illustration.
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