"The American Military Advisor"
by Michael J.
Metrinko
Middle East Quarterly
Spring 2009, pp. 70-74
http://www.meforum.org/2127/the-american-military-advisor
In August 2008, the Peacekeeping and Stability Operations
Institute and the Strategic Studies Institute at the U.S. Army War College
in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, jointly published a manual entitled, The
American Military Advisor: Dealing with Senior Foreign Officials in the
Islamic World.[1] Authored by
Michael J. Metrinko, a leading U.S. government expert on the eastern
Islamic world, the 95-page manual is a refreshing and blunt how-to guide
for civil affairs and political affairs officers, excerpts from which
follow. Metrinko brings to bear considerable experience. He was a Peace
Corps volunteer in Turkey and Iran and spent fourteen months as a hostage
when Iranian students seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran in 1979.
Subsequent to the 9/11 attacks, Metrinko reentered government service.
After assignments in Yemen and Iraq, he spent four years on provincial
reconstruction teams in Afghanistan and eighteen months interfacing with
the new Afghan National Assembly as an advisor on parliamentary affairs
for the U.S. embassy in Kabul. —The Editors
The American Advisor
Newly appointed U.S.
officials prepare for their first consultation with tribal elders
and influential Islamic clergy in Khost, Afghanistan, September 19,
2006. No matter how moral, professional, and correct she might be,
an American female officer assigned such duties would have to
overcome certain negative assumptions in foreign eyes. The female
advisor may be able to overcome these cultural inhibitions, but it
will be a difficult, uphill battle, consuming inordinate time and
energy and possibly detracting from the advisory mission. U.S.
Navy photo. |
In the post-9/11 world, an advisory position at the
political and strategic level in the Islamic world can have great and
immediate consequence for U.S. interests, and can make the American
advisor a prime figure in the decision-making process of foreign leaders.
The advisor is as likely to be dealing with a civilian counterpart as he
is with a foreign military officer, and the range of duties will go far
beyond mere military tasks. The position has become a critical one in
today's world where stability, peacekeeping, and obtaining civil support
are considered equally important to kinetic offensive and defensive
operations, and where "nation-building" has become a de facto and integral
part of the military mission …
The American advisor must take care not to let himself be
regarded as just another person who has come to pass out gifts in order to
curry favor. He must not be regarded as simply a source of material
assistance, supplies, high tech presents, and trips abroad under the
rubric of training. In resource-strapped Afghanistan, for example, local
and even senior officials became accustomed to requesting telephones,
office furniture, office supplies, security accessories, equipment of all
sorts, vehicles, and a wide variety of other items from Provincial
Reconstruction Team (PRT) commanders, American officials, and other
foreign visitors and donors. On many occasions, the Afghans would request
the same items from multiple sources. The advisor must look at himself
through local eyes and the local culture. If the American officer's "can
do" attitude is too highly developed, he may just seem ill-mannered and
abrasive to the official and his staff, who often operate at a different
tempo than that in U.S. military circles. If he appears to be too young
and lacking in authority, the American may be regarded simply as a
decorative foreign staff aide who tags along to add luster to the
official's entourage.
Age is important in many parts of the traditional Islamic
world. For example, the term "white beard" is commonly used in Afghanistan
as a term of respect, implying that only someone who has grown old has
experience and expertise. Tribal and village elders are the source of
advice and authority, not the younger generation, and young men attending
a major meeting or assembly are expected to sit silently and listen to the
older generation.
When "Tomorrow" Means "Never"
The senior foreign official and the American advisor may
have very different concepts of the time necessary to complete an action.
Some cultures do not place value on undue haste, and the smart advisor
soon learns that "bukra" or "fardo" ("tomorrow" in Arabic and Farsi) or
"inshallah" ("God willing" in Farsi/Dari/Turkish and Arabic) often mean
that action has been relegated to some other time and place, but probably
not any time soon or any place near.
Ignoring the local cultural concepts of timeliness will
simply lead to frustration and ultimate failure for the advisor, and cause
hidden discomfort and annoyance in his local counterpart in response to
his frustration. In the Islamic world, religious holidays and daily prayer
times will take precedence over scheduled meetings, and decisions may be
made in loose gatherings with endless cups of tea rather than at official
conference tables. A meeting may break, even at a critical moment, so that
participants can pray as a group. Much of this world falls more into the
"Haste Makes Waste" category rather than "The Early Bird Catches the
Worm," with many meetings, programs, and social events only drifting
towards a start when the senior official arrives …
An American officer assigned as an advisor normally knows
how long his tour of duty will be. From the day that he arrives
in-country, he hears a clock ticking off the days left in his assignment,
and he may feel a subconscious compulsion to complete a check list of
"things to do" in order to satisfy performance goals. His starting point
for action is the date of his arrival at post. The U.S. government's
fiscal year, his own evaluation report and upcoming meetings, official
visits, American holidays, and the normal needs of his family in the
United States can all be markers that affect his timing. Looking at his
new environment, the advisor may feel that action is vital and should be
immediate.
The foreign official, on the other hand, has a different
view of time and a different perspective. His focus is indefinite, and he
will not be rated on one year's performance. He has been a player in the
long process that brought local conditions to their present state and
assumes that he will be in power for a long time to come, so he generally
will not share the American's sense of urgency. He probably does not share
the Puritan work ethic either, and will see little reason to change his
habits or his work environment in order to fit a foreigner's conception of
what is appropriate. And the official has probably seen a large number of
foreign advisors come and go, their names long since forgotten, and their
presence leaving only minor or no impact on local conditions.
By the same token, the foreign official's tenure is
ultimately uncertain. Because he owes his position to local politics in
what is probably a volatile environment, he can be reassigned, disgraced,
promoted on a whim, or assassinated. ...
Assigning the Right Person or Right Team
Selecting the right individual to become an advisor is not a
simple paperwork assignment process, and involves far more than his having
rank and military knowledge. In the bureaucratic world, however, such
selection criteria may not be addressed or even understood, and advisors
are often chosen for the wrong reasons ...
A young male captain or major may be the best soldier in the
world and a great teacher. A female of any high rank may be a paragon of
military ability and experience. In foreign eyes, however, they face great
initial obstacles, and have a serious disadvantage compared to an older
male officer of colonel to general officer rank.
Many foreigners do not accept contemporary American views
about rank, gender, age, or race. Insisting that they do so will hinder or
doom the advisory mission. It took the United States hundreds of years to
reach today's stage in political and social sophistication, and it is
counterproductive and illogical to insist that foreign cultures and
foreign histories evolve the same way that America has …
Ethnic background, skin color, and religious faith also play
a role, based on local society and tradition. The result may translate
into what Americans consider prejudice and discrimination. A good advisor
will set a personal example of fairness, but cannot impose his standards
on his foreign counterparts.
In traditional Muslim societies, a senior male foreign
government official might find it unacceptable to be advised by a foreign
female advisor. He might tolerate it on the surface, but would be unlikely
in the initial stage to pay serious attention to her advice and might not
be comfortable in her presence. The female advisor would find it difficult
to accompany the official to many events, and being alone with him would
be improper culturally. No matter how moral, professional, and correct she
might be, an American female officer assigned such duties would have to
overcome certain negative assumptions in foreign eyes. The female advisor
may be able to overcome these cultural inhibitions against her success by
force of personality and professional competence, but it will be a
difficult, uphill battle, consuming inordinate time and energy and
possibly detracting from the advisory mission. …
Life Experience
It is difficult to know by what standards a foreign leader
will judge an American. In an introductory conversation with a major and
much feared Pashtun warlord in Afghanistan, an American diplomat began by
listing the war zones and hardship assignments he had had, tying his life
abroad to what hostilities were taking place at the time. But the warlord
was oblivious to other countries' conflicts. Then the diplomat noted that
over the course of his life he had been held by security officials in the
United States and two foreign countries, eventually spending well over a
year in prison abroad.
The warlord's single question was about the incident in
America, and when told it involved a death, said simply, "then I can talk
to you."
Knowing the Local Culture
... Even informal social settings can be a minefield for the
unwary, and what is normal and ordinary in the United States might be
considered rude, embarrassing, and very detrimental to the advisor's
mission. For example, concepts of personal space are different in many
Muslim countries, and the American may find himself far too close
physically to other men to be comfortable, with guests leaning against him
while everyone is eating or simply sitting down to talk. It is not unusual
for Muslim men to walk hand in hand, or to hold hands far longer than a
quick American handshake would allow. In the United States, men and women
will shake hands or possibly even kiss cheeks on first meeting, an act
that would be inconceivable by conservative Islamic norms. For example,
blowing one's nose in public is regarded as repulsive in Iran and
Afghanistan, as much a turn-off as picking one's nose in public would be
in the United States.
Asking personal questions about an official's wife or
daughter (or describing one's own) might be absolutely routine and
acceptable in a Western meeting, but would be considered insulting in a
conservative Muslim setting. And in these settings, the American officer
who tries to show a foreign counterpart personal photos of female
relatives in order to display a common bond of "family" would immediately
lose face in conservative Muslim eyes ...
On a trip in a remote part of Afghanistan's Ghor Province, a
PRT commander and his political advisor stopped at a small roadside
teahouse to talk to the villagers gathered there. The commander, who
really did not want to drink anything, politely turned down the offered
tea. Turning to the local villagers, the teahouse owner said in Dari,
"These foreigners think what we eat and drink is dirty." If the POLAD
[political advisor] had not understood the comment and quietly told the
commander to accept the tea, the atmosphere would have turned very cold
very quickly.
Sometimes hospitality can be carried to extremes. At a
Pashtun banquet in northern Pakistan when an American diplomat was guest
of honor of a large group of clergy at a refugee camp, a whole roast sheep
was carried in on a tray. The bearded host reached his hand under the
sheep's tail and pulled out a large wad of semi-raw fat, holding it up to
the American official's mouth and saying, "Eat. It's the best part."
Swallowing the suet directly from his host's hand with a nod of thanks was
the only way to continue the momentum of the conversation.
Foreign Officials' Sources of Income
Sources of national income at all levels may have little
relationship to what the Budget Office has in its ledgers. Is the salary
structure set by regulation, or is it based on fees for service, on the
order of American waiters and waitresses who receive only a token salary
from the restaurant owner and make their real income in tips from
customers? Is taking a gift or bribe the normal state of affairs? How
large can bribes be and still be acceptable, or is it full no-holds-barred
in the bribery arena? Is there a well-understood and expected "payment for
service" that satisfies both officials and the public—say 10 to 40 percent
over and above the published fee—and on which government bureaucrats rely
to supplement meager official salaries?
Is it really corruption for a low-level worker, policeman,
or soldier to ask for a few dollars as a gift when he would otherwise not
have enough income to feed his family? Do workers in the agency have to
pay off more senior officers in order to get a job? Is acquiring an office
a one-time purchase, or a percentage of the official's salary every month
to those higher up the chain? Does anyone in the hierarchy actually
receive a living wage, or are they all expected to supplement their
incomes by demanding additional money from people who need their service
(e.g., contractors or supplicants) or from people who want to get promoted
or get better assignments within the official's agency?
In much of the developing world, the Western concept of
"conflict of interest" is incomprehensible. Senior officials do not place
their assets into a blind trust when they assume office. Rather, many
assume office in order to get rich, and paying for office can be a normal
procedure at all levels of the bureaucracy, just as enriching their
families and friends through their office can be regarded as normal
behavior.
[1] Accessible as a free
download from the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War
College, at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/Pubs/display.cfm?pubID=869.
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