The Limits of
Terrorism

by Daniel
Pipes
Jerusalem Post
April 22, 2009

http://www.meforum.org/pipes/6295/limits-of-terrorism

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Does terrorism work, meaning, does it
achieve its perpetrators' objectives?

With terror attacks having become a
routine and nearly daily occurrence, especially in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
Pakistan, the conventional wisdom holds that terrorism works very well.
For example, the late Ehud
Sprinzak of the Hebrew University ascribed the prevalence of suicide
terrorism to its "gruesome effectiveness." Robert
Pape of the University of Chicago argues that suicide terrorism is
growing "because terrorists have learned that it pays." Harvard law
professor Alan M.
Dershowitz titled one of his books Why Terrorism Works.

But Max Abrahms, a fellow at Stanford
University, disputes this conclusion, noting that they focus narrowly on
the well-known but rare terrorist victories – while ignoring the much
broader, if more obscure, pattern of terrorism's failures. To remedy this
deficiency, Abrahms took a close look at each of the 28 terrorist groups
so designated by the U.S. Department of State since 2001 and tallied how
many of them achieved its objectives.

His study, "Why
Terrorism Does Not Work," finds that those 28 groups had 42 different
political goals and that they achieved only 3 of those goals, for a measly
7 percent success rate. Those three victories would be: (1) Hezbollah's
success at expelling the multinational peacekeepers from Lebanon in 1984,
(2) Hezbollah's success at driving Israeli forces out of Lebanon in 1985
and 2000, and (3) the Tamil Tiger's partial success at winning control
over areas of Sri Lanka after 1990.

That's it. The other 26 groups, from the
Abu Nidal Organization and Al-Qaeda and Hamas to Aum Shinriko and Kach and
the Shining Path, occasionally achieved limited success but mostly failed
completely. Abrahms draws three policy implications from the data.

Guerrilla groups that mainly attack military targets succeed more
often than terrorist groups that mainly attack civilian targets.
(Terrorists got lucky in the Madrid attack
of 2004.)
Terrorists find it "extremely difficult to transform or annihilate a
country's political system"; those with limited objectives (such as
acquiring territory) do better than those with maximalist objectives
(such as seeking regime change).
Not only is terrorism "an ineffective instrument of coercion, but …
its poor success rate is inherent to the tactic of terrorism itself."
This lack of success should "ultimately dissuade potential jihadists"
from blowing up civilians.

This final implication, of frequent failure leading to
demoralization, suggests an eventual reduction of terrorism in favor of
less violent tactics. Indeed, signs of change are already apparent.

Sayyid Imam
al-Sharif

At the elite level, for example the former jihad theorist,
Sayyid
Imam al-Sharif (a.k.a. Dr. Fadl), now denounces violence: "We are
prohibited from committing aggression," he writes, "even if the enemies of
Islam do that."

On the popular level, the Pew Research Center's 2005 Global
Attitudes Project found that "support for suicide bombings and other
terrorist acts has fallen in most Muslim-majority nations surveyed" and
"so too has confidence in Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden." Likewise, a 2007
Program on International Policy Attitudes study found that "Large
majorities in all countries oppose attacks against civilians for political
purposes and see them as contrary to Islam. … Most respondents … believe
that politically-motivated attacks on civilians, such as bombings or
assassinations, cannot be justified."

On the practical level, terrorist groups are evolving.
Several of them – specifically in Algeria,
Egypt, and Syria
– have dropped violence and now work within the political system. Others
have taken on non-violent functions – Hezbollah delivers medical services
and Hamas won an election. If Ayatollah Khomeini and Osama bin Laden
represent Islamism's first iteration, Hezbollah and Hamas represent a
transitional stage, and Turkey's prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan,
arguably the world's most influential Islamist, shows the benefits of
going legitimate.

But if going the political route works so well, why does
Islamist violence continue and even expand?
Because they are not always practical. Rita Katz of the SITE Intelligence
Group explains: "Engaged in a divine struggle, jihadists measure success
not by tangible victories in this life but by God's eternal benediction
and by rewards received in the hereafter."

In the long term, however, Islamists will likely recognize
the limits of violence and increasingly pursue their repugnant goals
through legitimate ways. Radical Islam's best chance to defeat us lies not
in bombings and beheadings but in classrooms, law courts, computer
games, television studios, and electoral campaigns.

We are on notice.

Related Topics: Radical Islam, Terrorism

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