Leaders' mortality may sway Iraq's health
by Michael
Rubin
Jane's Islamic Affairs Analyst
April 17, 2009
http://www.meforum.org/2120/leaders-mortality-may-sway-iraqs-health
US President Barack Obama's plan to withdraw troops from
Iraq is predicated on an assumption that Iraq's stability is durable. On
29 January 2009, General Ray Odierno, commander of the Multi-National
Force-Iraq, said: "We are getting close to enduring stability, which
enables us really to reduce [US military forces]." Advocates of military
withdrawal by the United States are optimistic: the 31 January 2009
provincial elections proceeded without much incident.
According to US government figures, violence is down to 2003
levels. Progress, however, has less to do with the governance system, and
more to do with key personalities: President Jalal
Talabani, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, both of whom met
Obama in Baghdad on 7 April, as well as Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani each
conciliate crisis and reconcile disparate interests. Without them,
stability and security in Iraq may not be sustainable.
Pivotal president
Iraq's National Assembly elected Talabani, a septuagenarian
Kurdish political leader, as president on 6 April 2005, nine weeks after
Iraq's first free elections. Talabani is a pivotal official. Fluent in
Arabic, Persian, Kurdish and English, he is equally at ease in Baghdad,
Washington and Tehran. While Iraq's executive on paper is weak and
ceremonial, Talabani has used his relationships cultivated during decades
in opposition to cajole Sunnis and Shia, Kurds and Arabs into compromise –
first on the constitution and then to walk absolutist politicians back
from the brink of civil war.
The Obama administration, like the Bush presidency, sees
Talabani as a primary ally in Iraq. Vice President-elect Joseph Biden
visited Talabani just eight days before inauguration to discuss Obama's
strategy and Obama telephoned Talabani less than two weeks into his
presidency to discuss the way ahead. Talabani is not deemed a figure head
but a partner.
However, basing policy on Talabani is not without risk. On
12 March 2009, Talabani told an Iranian interviewer that he would not seek
re-election when his term ends this year. This is not definitive: Talabani
has been known to change his mind and the White House may enlist Talabani
to mediate even after his return to his hometown of Sulaymaniyah.
Retirement, however, is not the main concern. At 75,
Talabani's health is tenuous. In February 2007, he was flown to Amman for
emergency medical care after falling unconscious. He was later transferred
to Minnesota's Mayo Clinic, which discreetly treats foreign leaders
suffering heart ailments and cancer. Jordanian doctors contradicted Iraqi
officials who said Talabani was suffering from exhaustion. Talabani made
at least three subsequent visits to the Mayo Clinic, the first in May 2007
for 10 days of tests. In June 2008, the clinic confirmed Talabani's
return. His office said he was receiving treatment for a knee problem. Two
months later, Talabani returned and, after he missed several events, his
office acknowledged he had had emergency heart surgery.
Talabani returned to duty, but his age and poor health make
him an unwise pillar upon which to tie Washington's Iraq policy. While
Western officials treat the Iraqi president as a permanent fixture, senior
cadres in his Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) party openly jockey for
position in a post-Talabani Iraq. Talabani's former deputy Noshirwan
Mustafa broke from the PUK in November 2006 and will now head a list to
challenge the PUK at polls on 19 May. On 7 October
2008, a number of other senior PUK officials broke away to
form the Movement for Democratic Change. Still, none of these officials
will be able to replace Talabani on the national stage.
Deputy Prime Minister Barham Salih is popular in Western
capitals, but lacks a powerbase in either the PUK's peshmerga militia or
its intelligence services. Equally as important, he is disliked by
Talabani's wife, Hero Ibrahim Ahmad, whose opposition dashed Barham's
hopes of leading Iraq's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. That slot went
instead to Hoshyar Zebari, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Massoud
Barzani's uncle. However, tribal politics may preclude Zebari's promotion
to the presidency. Not only is he an outcast within the Zebari tribe
(which is centred on Mosul) for backing Barzani but like Barham, his
popularity among Iraqi peers falls short of that afforded him by Western
diplomats. Barzani, increasingly unpopular in Iraqi Kurdistan and long
dismissive of Iraqi unity, would not politically be able to replace
Talabani. Talabani had served in the Iraqi army and after the fall of
Saddam spent as much time in Baghdad as in Kurdistan. Barzani on the other
hand antagonised Arabs with his statements and seldom voiced any
consideration for Iraq's unity. Accordingly, there is no obvious Kurdish
leader able to succeed Talabani on the national stage.
Prime health
Unlike Talabani, 48-year-old Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki
is in good health. Maliki's May 2006 ascension to the premiership
surprised observers. The White House had hoped Vice-President and former
minister of finance Adil Mahdi, a moderate within the Islamic Supreme
Council of Iraq (ISCI), would win the top slot. Many US
politicians publicly denounced Maliki as too polarising to lead. In August
2007, Maliki became a campaign issue in the US. Hillary Clinton, then
front-runner for the Democratic presidential nomination and now US
secretary of state, declared her "hope that the Iraqi parliament will
replace Prime Minister Maliki with a less divisive and more unifying
figure". Washington's assessment changed as Maliki both showed willingness
to reach across sectarian lines to Sunnis in Anbar province and to take on
the excesses of Shia militias. He then proved his mettle to Washington by
forcing the Status of Forces Agreement through parliament in November
2008.
For the White House, the adversary became an asset. US
officials cheered the success of Maliki's supporters in provincial
elections, especially given the US assumption that the ISCI strays too
close to Iranian interests. However, Maliki's consolidation of control
undercuts the development of potential successors, a dangerous phenomenon
in a country where all officials remain vulnerable to assassination.
Meanwhile, Maliki's Dawa party is characterised by its factionalism,
making the process of succession more intricate.
The ISCI provides no clear alternative. Its leader, Abdul
Aziz Hakim, has terminal cancer, and it is uncertain whether his
37-year-old son Ammar can consolidate control. In such a vacuum, no leader
can rise above the fray without Iranian financial and logistical support.
Western officials are anxious that under such circumstances, Moqtada
al-Sadr emerges as the strongest Shia leader.
Wildcard
The greatest wildcard is 78-year-old Iranian-born Grand
Ayatollah Ali Sistani. He is Iraq's leading religious figure and possesses
significant implicit political clout. Like many traditional Shia clerics,
Sistani sees his role as an indirect guide rather than an active political
leader. While he advocates Shia empowerment, he tempers populist anger,
discourages Iranian-style clerical political control and eschews violence.
When he dies, it is unclear who might fill his role. Najaf is home to
other Grand Ayatollahs – Afghan-born Muhammad Ishaq Fayadh and India-born
Bashir Najafi – but neither has a large enough following to replace
Sistani.
Many senior Shia leaders live in Iran but to prevent even
passive challenge to Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, the most
prominent traditional clerics in Iran – Hossein Ali Montazeri and Hossein
Kazemeyni Boroujerdi – remain under house arrest or in prison. At best,
should Sistani die in the near future, there will be no clear marja
at-taqlid (source of emulation), to represent the Shia voice. In such a
situation, firebrands such as al-Sadr may find little impediment to
religious demagoguery.
Alternatively, 73-year-old Iraqi-born Grand Ayatollah
Muhammad Hussein Fadlallah may return from Lebanon. While scholars debate
whether or not Fadlallah is a patron for Lebanese Hizbullah, they do not
debate either his long association with the group nor his support for
their actions. Should Fadlallah return, no cleric is likely to be able to
challenge him as the pre-eminent Shia religious authority in Iraq. As much
as Sistani has been a voice for calm, his successor could become a force
for discord.
As long as Iraqi security is dominated by personalities
rather than checks and balances, stability in the country will be a
mirage. The situation in Baghdad has improved greatly since 2007, but
while success rests upon the longevity of old men and unwillingness to
acknowledge the prime minister's mortality, any gains could fast
reverse.
Michael
Rubin is editor of the Middle
East Quarterly and a resident scholar at the American Enterprise
Institute.
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