The Troop Drawdown Could Be Costly for Iraq
by Michael Rubin
Wall
Street Journal
June 30, 2009
http://www.meforum.org/2171/iraq-troop-drawdown-costly
Today is a milestone in Iraq. Under
the terms of the Strategic Framework Agreement, U.S. troops will withdraw
from Iraqi cities. In retrospect, however, June 30 will likely mark
another milestone: the end of the surge and the relative peace it brought
to Iraq. In the past week, bombings in Baghdad, Mosul and near Kirkuk have
killed almost 200 people. The worst is yet to come.
While the Strategic Framework
Agreement was negotiated in the twilight of the Bush administration,
President Barack Obama shaped the final deal. He campaigned on a time line
to withdraw combat troops from Iraq, and his words impacted the
negotiation.
Iraq has shown us time and again
that military strength is the key to influence in other matters. Just look
at the behavior of Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, Iraq's most influential
Shiite cleric.
Under Saddam, Mr. Sistani was an
independent religious mind, but he was hardly a bold voice. Like so many
other Iraqis, he stayed alive by remaining silent. Only after Saddam's
fall did he speak up. Though he is today a world-famous figure, the New
York Times made its first mention of the ayatollah on April 4, 2003, five
days before the fall of Baghdad.
Mr. Sistani is as much of a threat
to Iran as he was to Saddam. In November 2003, he contradicted Iranian
Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei when asked what night the holy month of
Ramadan would end, a determination made by sighting the moon. Mr. Sistani
said Tuesday, Mr. Khamenei said Wednesday.
To the West, this might be trivial,
but it sent shock waves through Iran. How could the supreme leader claim
ultimate political and religious authority over not only the Islamic
Republic but all Shiites and be contradicted?
Perhaps this is why Iran bolstered
its support for militias. When I visited Najaf in January 2004, I saw
dark-clad militiamen on the streets outside Mr. Sistani's house. Mr.
Sistani quieted until the following year, when U.S. forces retook the
city.
Militias are not simply reactions to
sectarian violence, nor are they spontaneous creations. They are tools
used by political leaders to impose through force what is not in hearts
and minds.
Because of both ham-fisted postwar
reconstruction and neighboring state interference, militia and insurgent
violence soared from 2004 through 2006. The fight became as much
psychological as military.
Iranian and insurgent media declared
the United States to be a paper tiger lacking staying power. The
Baker-Hamilton Commission report underscored such perceptions. Al-Jazeera
broadcast congressional lamentations of defeat throughout the region.
Iranian intelligence told Iraqi officials that they might like the
Americans better, but Iran would always be their neighbor and they best
make an accommodation. Al Qaeda sounded similar themes in al-Anbar.
Then came President Bush's
announcement that he would augment the U.S. presence. The surge was as
much a psychological strategy as it was a military one. It proved our
adversaries' propaganda wrong. Violence dropped. Iraq received a new
chance to emerge as a stable, secure democracy.
By telegraphing a desire to leave,
Mr. Obama reverses the dynamic. In effect, his strategy is an anti-surge.
Troop numbers are not the issue. It is the projection of weakness. Not
only Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki but Iraqi President Jalal Talabani and
Kurdish leader Massoud Barzani have also reached out to the Islamic
Republic in recent weeks.
In Cairo, Mr. Obama said the U.S.
had no permanent designs on Iraq and declared, "We will support a secure
and united Iraq as a partner, and never as a patron." Indeed. But until
the Iraqi government is strong enough to monopolize independently the use
of force, a vacuum will exist and the most violent factions will fill
it.
Power and prestige matter.
Withdrawal from Iraq's cities is good politics in Washington, but when
premature and done under fire it may very well condemn Iraqis to repeat
their past.
Michael Rubin, a senior editor
of the Middle East
Quarterly, is a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and a
senior lecturer at the Naval Postgraduate
School.
Related Topics: Iraq, US policy Michael
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